that no single activity is the source of the idealising movement in religion; and it is also true that it is hard to frame any adequate definition of so complex a fact as religion. He suggests we might speak of it "as man's whole bearing towards what seems to him the Best and Greatest". This is like the well-known definition of poetry as "criticism of life," true so far as it goes, but not enough to include all that is characteristic. Some might define the moral consciousness in the same terms. Any useful definition of religion must contain a reference to the sense of need, of incompleteness and dependence, on the human side, and the attribute of power on the divine side. In the concluding chapter where he discusses Standards of Religion, Prof. Stratton reaches the boundary of the psychological field, and comes in sight of the problem of truth or validity. And if he does not seek to deal with the problem deliberately and in detail, he at least says enough to show us the direction in which his thoughts are moving. To our mind he wisely refuses to accept the theory that there is a single test of truth. He distinguishes four kinds of truth, viz., pragmatic or utilitarian truths, truths of intellectual consistency as in mathematics, value-truths, and truths of fact or represented reality. Religion is concerned with them all, and not least with truth of fact, for it "feels itself concerned with a larger world, not existent merely in idea, but potent and actual". So the religious consciousness supplements the given world by an ampler one, and that in a way that corresponds to the scientific postulate that the world implies a rational unity of things, and to the demands of the æsthetic and the moral consciousness that it should be seen as æsthetically satisfying and morally harmonious. Religion has an equal right with art and science to express its peculiar need, and an impartial world-view will take that need into account. In religion as elsewhere the discovery of natural causes does not decide the question of validity. And though it is no part of the psychologist's task to pronounce on the matter of ultimate truth, Prof. Stratton at least makes it clear he does not sympathise with those who deny the reality of the religious ideal. "The dim and broken image of perfection may well be formed in sympathy with a Perfection that is most real . . . The truth may well be, that those definite causes which work lawfully, as science would describe, in our mental life and in external nature and by intercourse with other men, are themselves sanctioned by the Best, as the means by which its own outline shall gradually appear in the clouded minds of men" (p. 367).

The book seems to us a very candid and suggestive one, and its perusal should be stimulating and profitable to all who are interested in the subject.

G. GALLOWAY.

Psychotherapy. By HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, M.D., Ph.D., Litt.D., LL.D., Professor of Psychology in Harvard University. London and Leipzig: T. Fisher Unwin. Pp. x, 401.

This is one of the most fascinating of the many books that have come from the pen of Prof. Münsterberg. In his preface he takes care to tell us that the book is one of a series in which he adapts the results of psychological reflection to the non-technical of various types of experience. The lawyer does not want the same class of facts as the doctor, and the layman has his own preferences. Hence the volumes on *Psychology and Crime*, *Psychology and the Teacher*, and *Psychology and Life*. The present is another on the same plane of non-technicality. In a relative sense, all the books are "popular," but this does not mean that

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they are either platitudinous or inexact. On the contrary, they are carefully adapted to the needs of readers educated in other fields, but not necessarily acquainted with the technical methods of recent experimental psychology. The preface has many details that are personally interesting, as, for instance, Prof. Münsterberg's justification of his entering on medical questions: "I have been through five years of regular medical studies, three years in Leipzig and two years in Heidelberg; I have an M.D. degree from the University of Heidelberg. In my first year as docent in a German University twenty years ago, I gave throughout the winter semester before several hundred students a course in hypnotism and its medical application. It was probably the first University course on hypnotism given anywhere" (p. ix). To any one that reads this volume the information is hardly necessary, for the precision of the clinical details given in the practical part tells its own tale of familiarity with the methods of the consulting-room. But the information is none the less welcome in that it may persuade the medical men of this country to accept the strong pleading here adduced for the incorporation of hypnotism among the medical studies at the Schools. Whatever be the reasons, the fact remains that in this country the scientific use of pyschotherapy is in its infancy, and the medical schools have neither the men nor the wish to teach it. All the more do we welcome this English book by a German-American of such extended experience and such eminent skill not in science alone, but in the greater field of philosophic thought. Let me say, too, that the English is, for its purpose, English of the first quality. Indeed, the style is so crisp and precise that it makes difficult things almost too easy, and may land the reader in assent before he has time to dispute. The redeeming point is that the book will certainly be read a second and a third time, and then reflection may do its work.

The book contains three parts: Part I. on the psychological basis of psychotherapy, Part II. on the practical work of psychotherapy, Part III. on the place of psychotherapy. Part I. has chapters on the aim of psychology, mind and brain, psychology and medicine, suggestion and hypnotism, and the psychology of the sub-conscious. The relation of these to the practice of psychotherapy is not direct, but the scientific "orientation" they furnish is very necessary. "Psychotherapy is the practice of treating the sick by influencing the mental life" (p. 1). Its "chaotic character . . . results from the fact that in our period one great wave of civilisation is sinking and a new wave rising . . . the history of civilisation has shown at all times a wave-like alternation between realism and idealism, that is, between an interest in that which is and an interest in that which ought to be . . . the world dimly feels again that technical civilisation alone cannot make life more worth living. The aim of the last generation was to explain the world; the aim of the next generation will be to interpret the world; the one was seeking laws, the other will seek ideals" (p. 3). Here we are at once introduced to the dichotomy made so familiar to us in the *Eternal Values*—the dichotomy of cause and purpose, science and value. Whatever may be our view of this philosophic position, it affords an excellent standpoint for the critical and expository chapters of Part I. "The man whose inner life I want to share I treat as a subject, the man whose inner life I want to describe and explain, I treat as an object" (p. 13). "The causal view only is the view of Psychology; the purposive view lies outside of psychology" (p. 14). "Causal truth can be only the second word; the first word remains to purposive truth. From this point of view we may understand why there is no conflict between the most consistent causal explanation of mental life on the one side, and an idealistic view of life

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on the other side; yes, we can see that the fullest emphasis on a scientific psychology—which is necessarily realistic and, to a certain degree, materialistic—is fully embedded in an idealistic philosophy of life, and that without conflict" (p. 17). To establish the causal view of mental facts, we need to postulate psycho-physical parallelism. "Every psychical fact is to be thought of as an accompaniment of a physical process, and the necessary connexions of these physical processes determine, then, the connexions of the mental facts. Indeed, this has become the method of modern psychology" (p. 33). Otherwise, "it becomes entirely impossible to conceive necessary connexions in the sense of physical necessity in the world of consciousness" (p. 32). "Mental life is produced anew in every moment" (p. 32). This extreme statement needs discussing, but it is discussed in such a way that the positions can be fairly countered by any one concerned to counter them. Parallelism is "simply a postulate" (p. 40). This makes it possible to reduce the elements of mental processes to sensations, which are capable of objective description and, therefore, of scientific handling. "In short, the psychological association of ideas, which we should simply have to accept as inexplicable fact, is thus transformed into a connexion which we understand as necessary; and the fact is really explained" (p. 43). Into the theory of "explanation" here implied it is not necessary to enter and the fact that we are asked to accept the "postulate" somewhat disarms any criticism in this context. More important is the view of attention, which is fundamental to the work of psychotherapy. "Yet even the highest development of the association theories did not seem to do justice to the whole richness of the inner life. . . . If there is anything essential for inner life, it is the attention which gives emphasis to certain states and neglects others. . . . This new development has come with the growing insight that the brain's mental functions are related not only to the sensory impressions, but at the same time to the motor expressions. . . . If a neutral fair account of the brain actions is attempted, there can hardly be a doubt that this whole sensorial view of the brain is only half of the story and that the motor half has exactly the same right to consideration . . . must understand that there cannot be any sensory process which does not go over into motor response" (p. 49). This view, though not so simply and directly put, was made familiar in Croom Robertson's original summary of Münsterberg's early positions many years ago. It looks curiously like a restatement of Bain's position, though the physiology is different from Bain's conjecture about the "out-going current". "Full vividness belongs only to those sensations for which the channels of motor discharge are open, while those are inhibited for which the channels of discharge are closed; and any channel of discharge is closed if action is proceeding in the opposite channel" (p. 49). Here then we have the elements for a theory of attention and its mechanism. The theory is applied with happy effect to "suggestion". "A suggestion is, we might say at first, an idea which has a power in our mind to suppress the opposite idea. . . . Our life would be crowded with inner conflicts if education had not secured for us from the start preponderance for the suggestions of our educators" (p. 86). But how shall an "idea" suppress an opposite "idea"? "From a logical standpoint, ideas may contradict each other, but that refers to their meaning. As mere bits of psychological experience, I may have any ideas together in my consciousness . . . as mere mental stuff, the one idea does not interfere with the other. On the other hand, this is evident: I cannot will to turn to the right and to the left at the same time" (p. 89). "There is no action which has not its definite opposite. The carrying out of any impulse involves the suppression of the contrary impulse"

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(p. 89). And physiology supports this view. "To attend means, therefore, to bring about a motor setting by which the object of attention finds open channels for discharge in action" (p. 99). Suggestion "shares with attention the power to re-enforce and to inhibit . . . it is meaningless to speak of suggesting an idea; we suggest either an action or, if no action is concerned, we suggest belief in an idea" (p. 100). "Yet what else is a belief than a preparation for action?" (p. 101). "To prepare ourselves for one line of action means to close beforehand the channels of discharge for the opposite" (p. 102). "Every suggestion is thus ultimately a suggestion of activity" (p. 104). Here are the elements for the complete correlation of attention, belief and suggestion, and the correlation is enforced with much wealth of simple illustration and argument. "Auto-suggestion" is not left without explanation on the same lines. "To be suggestible means thus to be provided with a psycho-physical apparatus in which new propositions for actions close easily the channels for antagonistic activity" (p. 106).

Hypnotism is then analysed in the same way. It is less akin to sleep than to attention (p. 113). "The fundamental principle of the hypnotic state lies in its selective character" (p. 115). Like attention it suppresses all irrelevant ideas. Superficially like sleep, it is fundamentally different; for sleep is characterised by a lessening of cerebral function, while the hypnotic state is characterised by the contrary, but with selection of idea. In fact, "we have there symptoms which rather characterise the state of over-attention than the state of sleep" (p. 115). The position is thus summed up: "Thus the increased suggestibility of the hypnotic state will result not from a partial sleeplike decrease of functioning, but the decrease of function is a motor inhibition which results from over-attention" (p. 116).

There are many pointed propositions in the argument, but it is enough to indicate the essentials. The chapter on the "subconscious" has also much that tempts one to argument. "The story of the subconscious mind can be told in three words: there is none" (p. 125). But, when we read to the end, we find that the difference between Prof. Münsterberg and Dr. Morton Prince, not to speak of Janet and Freud, is rather one of interpretation than of facts. It is important to discuss the subconscious in such a book if only to make the reader aware of the confusions that arise from a loose use of the word. But Münsterberg (p. 156) says: "in the light of such interpretation, it has been correctly proposed to speak of co-conscious processes, rather than subconscious". The facts usually subsumed under the term "subconscious" he prefers to explain by "physiological dispositions". This group of expressions is more fully discussed in a symposium on "Subconscious Phenomena" by Münsterberg, Prince, Janet, Ribot and others (Rebman).

Of the chapter on "Psychology and Medicine" it is necessary simply to say that is a clearly worded plea for the need of a thoroughly grounded "applied psychology," if psychotherapy is not to do more harm than good.

In Parts II. and III., these general principles are applied over the whole field of psychotherapy. Their value is abundantly shown in the many concrete cases described. The ethical as well as the scientific aspects are fully developed. The work of Freud and his school is cordially recognised. It would be difficult to exaggerate the value of the many wise directions the book contains. Of all the books I have scanned since I first read Braid and Heidenhain, I have seen none that offers to the educated physician or psychologist a better perspective of the whole field of psychotherapy in the sense of "applied psychology".

W. L. M.

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