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## GENERAL STANDPOINTS: MIND AND BODY

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During the past year behaviorism has continued to be a prominent subject of discussion. Watson (17) has attempted to formulate the scope of behavior psychology in an article whose material is to be used in the introductory chapter of his forthcoming book, *Human Psychology*. He describes the procedure of common sense, the procedure of science in interpreting behavior, and the divisions of behavior psychology and its relation to other sciences. In two articles Weiss (19, 20) points out the relations respectively between structural and behavior psychology and between functional and behavior psychology. First, without attempting to ascertain whether or not behaviorism is psychology, he endeavors to show that "the problems of the structural psychologist may be studied from the behavioristic point of view in accordance with the methods employed in the natural sciences and with a greater degree of simplicity than is possible from the structuralistic point of view." Since science recognizes only conscious states that express themselves in behavior of some form, this behavior alone calls for analysis. Again, since introspection is behavior (speech) and since introspection usually reveals only reactions to obscure stimuli, it is better to direct our study at once to behavior and especially to the major reactions, for these are the important objects to be investigated. Finally, behaviorism can analyze as far as structuralism, can present its phenomena as a causal series, and, if it succeeds in solving its problems, can solve all the problems of the structuralist also. Second, "the functionalists have never shown how mental activity may control action." On the contrary, the evidence shows that "conscious processes" follow and do not cause the conditions that modify behavior. Moreover, here as in structural psychology, verbal reactions have little if any influence upon the socially significant reactions.

In contrast with the foregoing Yerkes (21) finds Watson's dogmatic assertion of the adequacy of behaviorism and his refusal to admit the possible value of other presuppositions and methods "an 'illiberal attachment' to an assemblage of ideas which is in itself valuable, but which certainly does not monopolize the profitable possibilities of psychology or physiology."

Related to Watson's behaviorism is his hope (16) that "the men behind the psychoanalytic movement will come to realize that they have not built up a complete psychology differing *toto caelo* from anything which has existed before. When clearer discussion is possible we venture to predict that the one thing which will stand out as distinctly Freudian will be their utilization of the principle of *Uebertragung*." That is to say, by the method of conditioned reflexes emotional reactions can be bonded with new situations and these emotional reactions furnish the 'drive' absent in ordinary behavior. To an earlier and similar criticism of the Freudian psychology made by Watson, Jelliffe (11) replies that the behaviorist misunderstands the terminology of the Freudian and the place it occupies in practical psychology. The Freudian is not using the effete terms of psychology, rather he has taken many of those which had grown meaningless and sterile and has put new meaning and life into them. At this point two criticisms of Holt's book, *The Freudian Wish*, may conveniently be referred to. Neither author finds Holt a genuine Freudian. According to Watson (18) he is a behaviorist, but not a thoroughly consistent one. According to Calkins (3) he makes the self psychologically fundamental without having intended to do so.

Finally, three other articles should be mentioned here because of their explicit or implicit criticism of extreme behaviorism. Pillsbury (12) in discussing the new developments in psychology during the past twenty-five years refers to three types of psychological explanation at present apparent, at one extreme animism and at the other behaviorism and between these extremes the explanation of mental states in terms of other mental states. This last is adopted by the majority of psychologists. His own view is that "the choice of one rather than another of these general principles of explanation seems so little related either to the known facts or to the earlier experience of the psychologist that it can hardly be regarded as other than arbitrary." Against the attack of behaviorism upon introspection as a method of psychological research Washburn (15) raises three points. First, it is not because introspection has produced no results of scientific value that it is attacked by the behaviorist but because

he is not interested in states of consciousness and therefore thinks an account of them worthless. Second, introspection has been of extreme importance as a supplement to objective methods, for example, in the study of the learning process and even in abnormal psychology. Third, where, as in the study of the higher thought processes, no objective methods are available, the unsatisfactory condition of affairs is our own fault. "Why should we not recognize that conflicting descriptions of the same experience, on the part of trained introspectors, are each of equal value and authority, and simply mean that the experience in question really differs in different minds?" Carr (5) proposes the view that "the mental functions with which psychology concerns itself are in reality psychophysical, and at times neural, activities and that psychology shall study and attempt to comprehend these functions in their entirety." This view offers a way to mediate between the extremes of subjectivism and behaviorism; it changes our attitude toward the purposes and methods of comparative psychology; and it removes the serious difficulties of subjectivism.

At the December 1916 meeting of the American Philosophical Association the nature of the mental as contrasted with the physical was an assigned subject for papers and discussion. Fite (9) puts the question, Where in the world is consciousness? He replies, Where in the world is it not? It is not in the mind but in the world and everywhere in the world. It is the "familiarity" and "intelligibility" of things as opposed to their "strangeness" and "opacity." "In the familiarity and intelligibility of things we find our consciousness and ourselves; in their strangeness and opacity, the limitations of our consciousness and of ourselves." Again, "in the familiarity and intelligibility of things I find myself; but I am myself no less substantive an entity, and no less of an immediate and original fact or phenomenon, than the things with which I am familiar." Bode (1) maintains that the problem of consciousness must be attacked through a consideration of the facts of behavior. But not all behavior is conscious behavior, and therefore in differentiating conscious from other behavior we find the nature of the mental or psychical. "All consciousness is behavior directed or controlled by the environment with reference to a future result or a future adaptation." It is not specific response as such (Holt) but is an organized system of discharge. And this organization is not an inborn mechanism as is reflex action, but is experimental, flexible, and selective, and must be provided for continuously. Cohen (8) finds in a neutral monism

(or it may be equally well called a neutral pluralism) the basis for distinguishing the mental and the physical. "Every system, physical or mental, is but a class or selection of neutral entities, and therefore can be defined only by the character of the fundamental principles or postulates of the system." The physical is the class of entities to which physical laws are applicable and the mental the class of entities to which in turn psychological laws are applicable. And the two classes are not mutually exclusive. Pratt (13) defends a dualistic view. "Consciousness and the world of physical objects in space are essentially different from each other in kind." The psychical though spatial is not in space and exists only as functions of organisms. Some of the principal reasons for this dualism are: the subjectivity of emotions, meanings, images, and so forth; the privacy of the mental content; the innumerable different images derivable from one physical object by different observers and by the same observer at different times; and the physical and physiological facts of perception. Hoernlé (10) maintains, on the one hand, "if we want definitions of the mental and the physical as distinguishable entities in our universe, we should go to the sciences which need and offer such definitions, and not to philosophy"; and, he maintains, on the other hand, philosophy should point out that the objects of science are ideal constructions, abstractions, or selections. The mental and the physical do not exhaust between them the whole universe. Finally, if we "restore both terms to their context in concrete experience, we perceive that their relation is not one of mutual exclusion, but rather that mind is a distinctive form of activity exhibited by bodies of a certain structure." Urban (14) deals with a related problem, the knowledge of other minds. To know one's own mind is to know one's purposes, intentions, and meanings; and to know another's mind is to share his meanings, intentions, and values.

The general standpoints presupposed in self-psychology have been further discussed by Calkins (2, 4). First, self-psychology is to be distinguished from vitalism. The two doctrines oppose in common a mechanistic conception of psychology, but there the agreement ends. "For the heart of vitalism is its metaphysical conception of a soul which guides the organism in its growth and functioning, whereas self-psychology deals with the experienced self to which it attributes neither freedom, nor a peculiar potency, nor guiding force." Second, why do not all psychologists acknowledge the existence of the self? There is an historical reason. The self has been confused with the soul, and modern thought has wrongly discarded

the former with the latter. The self should be reinstated; for the valid objections that hold against the soul do not hold against the self. But the soul must go as a concept in psychology.

Two further general standpoints of psychology have been discussed. Chase (6) defends the doctrine of inheritance of modifications of behavior. "Glandular responses such as those given in strongly emotional situations become easily comprehensible if they are viewed as conditioned reflexes which, once set up in ancestral organisms, were transmitted." This view is supported by the experiments of Kammerer and the 'hormone theory' of Cunningham. Moreover, it accounts for the fact that many sorts of ancestral experience are not inherited. The same author (7) argues that students of social problems should base their theories upon the laws of human behavior rather than upon the laws of biology and economics.

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## CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

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The contributions, by professional psychologists in which the term consciousness and its derivatives are placed at the center of gravity are becoming fewer in number, and the references are of a supplementary character in which either a structural or analytic attitude is taken for granted. Those who regard consciousness from the functional standpoint, while maintaining the interaction between mental activity and bodily processes, do not emphasize this relationship, preferring rather to leave the mind-body problem subsidiary to the actual analysis and investigation of human conduct.

Titchener (10) gives an excellent genetic analysis of the Wundtian concepts of consciousness and attention and also answers the objections raised by Britz (1) against the concept that sensory clearness is the elementary phenomenon in what is ordinarily called attention. A clear and concise exposition of the nature of cognitive and attributive clearness is incorporated in the discussion and gives the article its prime merit. Carr (2) suggests that more emphasis be given to the psychophysical and neural conditions in mental process. In teaching psychology much unnecessary confusion results because the exclusively subjective descriptions of traditional psychology are given independently of the neural basis. A complete description of mental phenomena should include both the psychical and physical aspects as a unified system. By a revision of the definitions in psychology so they will conform to the actual methods which already prevail we can do much toward the elimination of the sharp distinctions which confuse rather than enlighten students.

The need for definitely formulating the relation between the con-