exist in favour of what was useful, then, surely, these are the very questions for which a natural science must give the answers. These *are* the questions with which the Natural History of Man and his dwelling-place has been concerned, not wholly without result, from the earliest ages to the present time.

If, however, the real quarrel with the attempt to form a natural science of Morals is that no explanation is given of Moral ultimates, since the ultimate origin of the variations in those elements of human capacity upon which Natural Selection has acted, remains obscure—then Naturalistic Ethics is no worse off than intuitionistic ethics, since the intuitionist explanation is said to amount to the confession that no explanation of Moral ultimates can, in fact, be offered.

I should say that I accept Professor Lloyd Morgan's definition of Instinct:—

"Instinctive activities are those organised trains or sequences of co-ordinated activities, which are performed by the individual in common with all the members of the same more or less restricted group, in adaptation to certain circumstances, oft recurring, or essential to the continuance of the species."—*Animal Life and Intelligence*, 1st edit., p. 423.

REID AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE.

By ARTHUR BOUTWOOD.

WE owe the works upon which Reid's memory depends to the shock given him—no lighter word seems adequate to the fact—by the *Treatise of Human Nature*. Just as Hume awoke Kant out of his dogmatic slumber, and sent him to the study of the causal nexus, and of synthetic judgments, *a priori*, so he tumbled Reid out of the brilliant cloudland of Berkeleyan phantasy in which he had been contentedly dreaming, and sent him, happily for us, not to the criticism of logical judgments, but to the criticism of life. Reid's early allegiance to Berkeley and the debt of awakening which he owed to Hume are both confessed by him in so many words. In the tenth chapter of the second of his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*—the chapter headed, "On the sentiments of Bishop Berkeley"—we find this fragment of autobiography: "If I may presume to speak my own sentiments, I once believed this doctrine of ideas so firmly as to embrace the whole of Berkeley's system in consequence of it; till, finding other consequences to follow from it, which gave

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me more uneasiness than the want of a material world, it came into my mind, more than forty years ago, to put the question: "What evidence have I for this doctrine, that all the objects of my knowledge are ideas in my own mind?" Nor is this all, for, on the 18th of March, 1763, in writing to Hume himself, Reid made a similar declaration. "I shall always avow myself," he said, "your disciple in metaphysics. I have learned more from your writings in this kind, than from all others put together. Your system appears to me not only coherent in all its parts, but likewise justly deduced from principles commonly received among philosophers; principles which I never thought of calling in question until the conclusions you draw from them in the *Treatise of Human Nature* made me suspect them."

There is not the slightest doubt what it was that aroused Reid's opposition, and that converted the early disciple of the Ideal Philosophy—as he afterwards called it—into its most uncompromising critic. It was the scepticism, absolute or nearly so, in which it seemed to issue,—scepticism which appeared to him to cut at the very root not only of philosophy and science, but also of the practical life of man, and of the entire body of religion and morals.

It is true Reid does not charge Hume with holding what Reid conceives to be the full consequences of Ideal principles. He concedes, for instance, that Hume, despite his scepticism, wrote his *Treatise* in the sure and certain hope that it would be read. He finds, indeed, that sceptics in general refrain, even in speculation, from the extreme consequences of their creed—for how otherwise can we explain their confident acceptance of impressions and ideas, when they have rejected everything else?—and he makes frequent controversial reference to their abandonment of their scepticism, as he considers it, when they enter the world of practice, and participate in the intercourse of life. He recognises, in short, that both in theory and in practice sceptics are often less sceptical than their principles seem to warrant, or even to require, but there is not the least doubt that he regarded the scepticism which arose by a perfectly natural genesis out of the Ideal Philosophy as being, both in theory and in practice, little, if anything, short of Nihilism.

Reid's revolt, then, was against scepticism, against Hume's scepticism,—at least as Reid understood it,—against the scepticism which seemed to be the inevitable outcome of the Ideal Philosophy, and which was so nearly absolute that it seemed to vitiate the whole of human thought and effort.

Now, it calls for especial notice that this was not distinctively an intellectual revolt,—it was not the expression of a mere divergence of philosophic opinion,—it was profoundly and specifically a practical

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revolt, a moral and spiritual revolt, directed against what Reid thought to be a false philosophy, it is true, but directed against it in the interests of practical life, and of science and of religion, rather than of abstract thought.

Reid frequently refers to the contradiction between the conclusions of the Ideal Philosophy, and the postulates and doctrines of natural science, but although deeply and practically interested in physics and chemistry,—as witness his letters to Lord Kames,—and in all those parts of physiology which bear upon psychology,—as witness the whole content of his Inquiry,—it is doubtful whether the scepticism issuing from the Theory of Ideas would have succeeded in calling him into the arena of controversial philosophy, if its destructive energies had been confined to the domain of science. As a disciple of Berkeley, Reid had already accepted the idealistic construction of Nature, and if Hume had done nothing more than reiterate and reinforce this particular form of idealistic doubt, Reid might possibly not have been seriously disturbed. This much, at least, is certain,—if Reid had been moved primarily by a care for the certainty of physical science, his famous treatises would have possessed a character quite different from that which they actually have. Reid did not question Berkeley's destructive analysis of common beliefs concerning the material world,—at least, not so long as he had the Bishop's theological reconstruction to fall back upon,—but as soon as Hume revealed the consequences of a wider and more thorough application of the same principles of analysis, then Reid drew back. It was the extension of scepticism to religion and morals—to the very domains from which Berkeley had hoped effectually and permanently to exclude it—that led to Reid's revolt. The interests he had most nearly at heart were religious and moral interests, and it was his deep and urgent concern for these that shaped his investigations, and inspired his argument, and gave the characteristic note to his work. Perhaps in this connection it is not unworthy of notice that for many years—the very years during which the main features of his philosophy were shaping themselves in his mind—Reid was actively engaged in the pastoral work of the Presbyterian ministry.

Now, as Reid found the root of the scepticism he opposed in the distinctive doctrine of the Theory of Ideas,—in the doctrine that we do not really "perceive things that are external, but only certain images and pictures of them imprinted on the mind which are called *impressions and ideas*,"—as he found the root of the scepticism he was combatting in this theory of mediate knowledge, it was only natural that as the basis of his own system of practical faith he should advance the opposite doctrine, that we *do* really perceive

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things that are external. In other words, because he regarded the doctrine of Mediate Perception as a necessary part of or consequence from the Ideal Theory, it was perfectly natural that he, on his side, should emphasise as fundamental, the contrasted doctrine of Immediate Perception. Just as, to Reid's mind, the doctrine of Mediate Perception was responsible for Ideal Scepticism, so his counter-doctrine of Immediate Perception was the condition preliminary to his practical answer to that scepticism, for it secured to him a real world of men and things independent of his feelings or knowledge, a world in which science and human society, and moral and æsthetic judgments of objective validity were alike possible, in which God and the soul could be apprehended as living realities, and in which human destiny could be worked out, and the dignity of a full manhood (which is the image of God) could be achieved. It was in defence of this fundamental doctrine that Reïd made his famous appeal to Common Sense.

Now, what is Common Sense?—or, rather, what did Reid mean by it? This leads us direct to the heart of our subject,—What was the Common Sense to which Reid appealed as final and authoritative?

One possible answer may be disposed of at once. By Common Sense, Reid did not mean the opinion of the crowd,—of the man in the street.

It is true he is constantly appealing to the common sense and common practice of mankind against what he calls "the strange and paradoxical opinions" of both idealists and sceptics. It is to this, also, that he appeals as the ultimate and supreme witness in behalf of those cardinal verities of thought and practice in defence of which he is engaged, and it is upon this that he falls back when abstract or scientific demonstration seems to fail. Sometimes, too, in the very earnestness of his revolt against traditional metaphysic, he appeals to the plain man against the philosopher, to the rude man against the cultivated, in terms which almost suggest that for him Wisdom dwelt only with the illiterate.

Such a degradation of philosophy would, however, have been quite alien to the spirit of Reid's broad, sane Humanism, and whatever meaning a little ingenious ill-will might be able to extract from isolated passages, the general tenour of Reid's works suggests quite a different view.

His frequent insistence upon the mistakes of the uncriticised reason, even if it stood alone, which it does not, should of itself be decisive against so mean a view of Reid's teaching. In more than one connection the crudities of the vulgar are seen to be as little to his liking as, in others, are the absurdities, as he reckons them, of

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the metaphysicians, and while the metaphysician is to be recalled from misleading abstractions to a healthy trust in life and nature by the example of the unsophisticated natural man, the said natural man is not unfrequently called upon to submit his beliefs and prepossessions to the correction of science and of a sound understanding. Even when Reid makes one of his most plebeian appeals—that to the day-labourer on behalf of the real existence, independently of consciousness, of "the quality or virtue in bodies which we call their smell,"—it is, in so many words, a *sensible* day-labourer that he calls to witness. Perhaps, too, we may observe in passing, a writer who seriously held the supremacy of the natural man would not appeal, as Reid did, for the decisive and critical judgment on his work to "the candid and discerning Few," who are alone capable of attending to the operations of their own minds, who are, therefore, the only competent judges in such matters, and to whose authority, if they approve, the Many will at last yield, as, Reid adds with charitable optimism, they always do.

Particularly interesting in this connection, are Reid's observations on natural causation,—on the nature of physical causes. He discusses the matter at some length with Dr. James Gregory. His fundamental doctrine is briefly but sufficiently set out in a letter dated the 30th July, 1789, which comments upon the Introduction to Dr. Gregory's *Philosophical and Literary Essays*. "Power and activity," he there says, "are first conceived from being conscious of them in ourselves. Conceiving of other beings from what we know of ourselves, we first ascribe to them such powers as we are conscious of in ourselves." The same subject is also dealt with in his *Essays on the Active Powers*. In the first of those Essays—that "Of Active Power in General"—he summarises the matter as follows:—

". . . . It is a general prejudice of our early years and of rude nations when we perceive anything to be changed, and do not perceive any other thing which we can believe to be the cause of that change, to impute it to the thing itself, and conceive it to be active and animated, so far as to have the power of producing that change in itself. Hence to a child, or to a savage, all nature seems to be animated; the sea, the earth, the air, the sun, moon, and stars, rivers, fountains, and groves, are conceived to be active and animated beings. As this is a sentiment natural to man in his rude state, it has, on that account, even in polished nations, the verisimilitude that is required in poetical fiction and fable, and makes personification one of the most agreeable figures in poetry and eloquence.

"The origin of this prejudice probably is, that we judge of other things by ourselves, and therefore are disposed to ascribe to them that life and activity which we know to be in ourselves.

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"A little girl ascribes to her doll the passions and sentiments she feels in herself. Even brutes seem to have something of this nature. A young cat, when she sees any brisk motion in a feather or a straw, is prompted by natural instinct to hunt it as she would hunt a mouse.

"Whatever be the origin of this prejudice in mankind, it has a powerful influence upon language, and leads men, in the structure of language, to ascribe action to many things that are merely passive, because when such forms of speech were invented those things were really believed to be active."

Reid's own opinion, as he avows it to Dr. Gregory, is that nothing can be an efficient cause but an *intelligent* being, but this philosophical conception he is careful to distinguish from that which does duty in the physical sciences. "I think," he writes to Dr. Gregory, on the 23rd of September, 1785, "I think we agree in this, that a cause, in the proper and strict sense (which, I think, we may call the metaphysical sense,) signifies a being or mind that has the power and will to produce the effect. But there is another meaning of the word cause, which is so well authorised by custom that we cannot always avoid using it, and I think we may call it the physical sense; as when we say that heat is the cause that turns water into vapour, and cold that cause that freezes it into ice. A cause, in this sense, means only something which, by the laws of nature, the effect always follows."

"We perceive," he says in another place, "no proper causality or efficiency in any natural cause, but only a connection established by the course of nature between it and what is called its effect."

Now, here we have a case in which Reid unmistakably regarded as erroneous or, at least, as seriously misleading, a natural and universal belief of such strength that it has given permanent form to the languages of men and continues to control their thought even after they have seen the error of it. Whatever, therefore, Reid may have meant by Common Sense, it is clear from this that he did not mean the opinions or prejudices of rude folk, of the vulgar, nor the uncriticised deliverances of the unenlightened understanding. What, then, did he mean? Now, I do not think it possible on a first view of Reid's works to gather from them any account of Common Sense that is quite definite and satisfactory. He often defines it, and still more often illustrates it,—illustrates it by alternative phrases and expressions,—but his definitions and illustrations vary according to the exigency of the moment, and, at first sight, it is not easy to reconcile them, or, at least, not easy to unite them in one general view which shall embrace and express the truth of each.

One of Reid's commonest appeals—one by which he more

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frequently almost than by any other illustrated his doctrine of Common Sense,—is that to general testimony or consent. This seems, at bottom, to be an appeal to the constitution of human nature. He turned to universal practice and belief and experience as revealing the fundamental principles involved in human nature and in human life. In fact, the appeal to the constitution of human nature is even more prominent in his works than that to general testimony. In many cases it appears as a direct appeal to the trustworthiness of human faculties. Our faculties, he says again and again, often in so many words, we have no alternative but to trust, for we could only criticise them, if God were to give us a new set for the purpose, and, even then, the testimony of these additional powers would have to be accepted upon trust,—upon the strength of its own intrinsic evidence.

Look for a moment at Reid's position. He found himself face to face with a scepticism which, as he honestly believed, contradicted, or analysed into insignificance, some of the most widely-spread beliefs of mankind,—beliefs which in some cases, at least, (and those the most important) seemed to spring direct from the normal exercise of the ordinary and essential faculties of humanity. It was, therefore, perfectly natural that he should, in the first place, point out that human faculties are, as he says, the natural and indispensable light of both the just and the unjust,—not only of the plain man in his plainness, but also of the sceptic in his doubt,—and that he should appeal to the native and general convictions of mankind in favour of the trustworthiness of them, and should claim on the strength of their testimony, to reinstate beliefs which Scepticism, on the strength of its analysis, has claimed to reject.

This is his position,—the doctrines alleged are true, because they rest upon the direct testimony of our faculties, and that they do so rest is made apparent by the appeal to universal testimony.

Free trust in the essential powers of manhood, both in speculation and in practice,—this is what Reid is here contending for, and, if not in itself, then, at least, in its postulates and suggestions, it seems to take us nearer to the real heart of his thought and feeling than any of those other and more familiar principles which, in different parts of his treatises, appear for immediate and, perhaps, limited purposes as authoritative and ultimate. Some of these essential powers are necessary even to the most sceptical Scepticism, —necessary as furnishing its basis, still more obviously necessary as furnishing its instruments,—and yet more of them are acknowledged and used, even by the most nihilistic of thinkers, when they leave the fine-drawn analyses of their closets, and take part in the common practical life of the world. Now, all our faculties—as faculties—are

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intrinsically equivalent. Since, therefore, it is impossible to discriminate between them in point of trustworthiness, it is the plain duty of a sound understanding to place an equal confidence in each,—to assign to each a share of essentially equal intrinsic value in giving form and order to the content of experience, in determining the direction and character of practice, and in guiding the interpretative exercise of the speculative understanding.

It is this conviction of the trustworthiness of our faculties that is the support of Reid's distinctive doctrine of Immediate Perception. It is true that his vindication of that doctrine frequently, more frequently than not, takes the form of appeals to Common Sense, to general testimony and practice, and to the sober practical judgment of mankind, but this summoning of universal testimony would have been useless unless each individual witness could affirm a personal certitude.

All this, the connection between Reid's appeals to Common Sense, and to human nature, and between these and the doctrine of Immediate Perception, is well illustrated by his theory of natural judgments, or judgments of nature.

Now, by judgment, in this connection, Reid does not mean discursive judgment,—about that he is quite clear,—and he uses the adjective "natural" to indicate that judgments of this category are made for us and not by us,—*for* us by nature, by the constitution of our own nature, and not *by* us, by means of the discursive reason. He confesses, indeed, that, perhaps in strictness, they ought not to be called judgments at all. They are antecedent to judgment as we ordinarily regard it, for which they furnish the material, and it is only by a sort of analogy that the name is applied to them. If we have regard chiefly to the content of these judgments, we may say that they constitute that body of primary and fundamental truth which is given directly by experience,—that body of elementary and ultimate truth which is prior to all our reasoning, and which furnishes the material for the exercise of our reasoning, but which cannot be, in any real sense, the result of it. Now, this content of primary and essential truth comes to us as the immediate deliverance of our faculties, as the direct result, as it were, of the contact in experience between those faculties and the world of reality around them, and if we accept it, it can only be because we trust the faculties through which we receive it.

Among the foremost of the truths thus delivered by Nature to our keeping is, Reid urged, the reality and immediateness of our knowledge of extra-mental existence. This is to him pre-eminently a judgment of Nature, a truth which we receive and do not make, and although he often seeks to confirm men in their apprehension of

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it, he never seeks to demonstrate it, for it is, in the strictest sense, *supra logicam*. It rests upon a native and spontaneous conviction of the human spirit,—upon a natural judgment, as he would say,—and most frequently he limits himself to quickening and confirming this conviction by calling into evidence the world-wide beliefs and practices of mankind, which he holds all rest upon it. When he attempts anything more, it takes the form of a direct appeal to the trustworthiness of our faculties, to the natural and spontaneous confidence of the human spirit in its own experience.

It was the confidence Reid thus reposéd in the witness of human faculties that led to his celebrated advocacy of the inductive method in psychology and physiology. That method had just received brilliant and startling application at the hands of Newton. It is true that Newton's discoveries had not yet been popularised, had not yet found their way into the text-books, so that men had to go direct to the discoverer's own works for an effective acquaintance with his method and its results, but they went, or, at least, "the candid and discerning Few" went, Reid among them, and they found, or they thought that they found, a new key to the interpretation of the Universe, and one which would open many a door that had baffled older instruments of investigation. To their new enthusiasm, Bacon and Newton were the founders of a new science of nature and of life, —the heralds, or rather the beginners of a new epoch, not only in the history of human thought, but in human history itself. To Reid Newton's *regulæ philosophandi* were maxims of Common Sense, practised every day in common life, and seemed so essential to a sound philosophy as to justify the declaration that "he who philosophises by other rules, either concerning the material system or concerning the mind, mistakes his aim." It seemed to him that it needed nothing but the thorough application to psychology and the allied sciences of the same method that Newton followed,— the method, that is, of induction from carefully observed particulars,—to render the emancipation of the human mind complete, and effectively to inaugurate the third great era in the history of mankind.

It was this application that Reid himself essayed to make, or rather towards which he took the first steps. It seemed to him an essential part of the work of philosophy to tabulate and systematise the principles upon which the human mind proceeds, not only in what Reid called its natural judgments, but in its natural and practical activity generally. The result of his labours in this direction is given in the fifth and sixth chapters of the sixth of his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers*. I do not propose to detain you by quotation, for we are not called upon here and now to estimate

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the philosophic or scientific value of Reid's enumeration. We are only concerned with it in so far as it throws light upon his central doctrine of Common Sense. The point of connection seems to be this:—these alleged principles are intended by Reid to express the general modes in which our faculties work, and it is because they are held to do this, and not primarily because they are gathered by induction, that Reid seeks to make them fundamental in philosophy. What Reid seems to be really relying upon is the testimony of our faculties. To know what that testimony is, he falls back upon observation, and then, by means of induction, he presents the results of his observation as a more or less systematised body of principles, which are truly indicative of the working and testimony of our faculties, because formed and elaborated by a true method,—the method of observation followed by induction,—but which can be regarded as authoritative and ultimate, as supreme in guiding the critical estimate of thought and practice, only because they are so indicative, and not in virtue of the method by which they are gathered. Here, then, as elsewhere, it is in the faculties themselves that Reid's actual trust is placed.

We are now, perhaps, in a position to see more clearly the meaning of Reid's many references to the plain man. In these also he seems to be virtually falling back upon the testimony of human nature, upon the witness of human faculties.

It is not to the plain man as contrasted with the educated, but to the plain man as contrasted with the artificial,—to the plain man not as uninformed or untutored, but as natural and normal, that Reid's appeal is really made.

To the Aberdeen professor, scepticism, such as he opposed, was a morbid and not a natural product of the human mind. It was pre-eminently the token of a certain artificiality of thought, and of a greater or less departure from sound judgment and healthy feeling, just as the Ideal Philosophy out of which it sprang was, for him, fundamentally artificial and out of touch with the broad certainties of healthy practical life. As the parent, so the child. It was precisely to those same certainties that Scepticism was not true, and it was against the artificial thought that did not regard them, and the equally artificial temperament that did not respond to them, that Reid appealed to the testimony of the plain man, in whom the true witness of human nature had not been distorted, nor the normal deliverances of the human faculties weakened or obscured.

An appeal to the testimony of human faculties and to the constitution of human nature might, however, only succeed in showing that we are *compelled* to think and believe certain things without giving us any assurance that our thought and belief are true. Now,

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curiously enough, that feature of our natural judgments and of the deliverances of our faculties in general, upon which Reid most frequently seizes as characteristic, is this very necessity. We are compelled, doomed, as he says in one place with most sinister suggestion, to believe this or that, and even if we try to rid ourselves of that belief, or to act independently of it, we cannot. So frequent is this mode of expression with Reid and so important the part it plays in his arguments and expositions, that it is quite comprehensible that commentators have found in it the indication of an essential affinity between Reid and Kant, and quite comprehensible, too, that in the later history of the Scottish School this emphasis on necessity has developed into a doctrine of relativity perilously near to Nescience.

Yes, all this is quite comprehensible, but only, as it seems to me, by a fundamental misconception of Reid's position.

The main purpose of Reid's work was to counteract the destructive tendencies of the then dominant Ideal Philosophy. Now, this purpose would have been ill-achieved if Reid had rested content with merely subjective necessity and certitude. The Ideal Theory had, as Reid conceived it, issued in a scepticism or nihilism which was inconsistent with the reality of the external world of men and things,—of physical nature and of human society alike. In words and in principle it was, of course, equally inconsistent with belief in the spiritual nature of man,—with belief, that is, in the soul as a real entity; but possibly, even in the scepticism of the most sceptical, this latter natural belief still lingered, not only as shaping their practical view of things,—their practical view, I say, not their speculative,—but, also, as tacitly and unconfessedly furnishing a theatre upon which impressions and ideas could appear and move, and a centre of reference which, in some measure, unified them and which rendered even the sceptical account of their order and association possible. Reid himself, although at one time a follower of Berkeley, had never accepted the more extreme consequences of the Theory of Ideas, and when his eyes were opened to them by the *Treatise of Human Nature* he instinctively rebelled and reconsidered his entire position. At the bidding of Berkeley he had been content to abandon belief in the extra-mental material world, but when Hume sought to exact a further renunciation, and called upon him to abjure belief in the real existence of God and the soul, then he refused. That he himself was a living soul, and that there was a living God above him, Reid, so far as we know, never doubted, and it was with the reality which the soul thus seemed to possess as an extra-mental personal subject,—a reality which, he held, the Sceptics themselves could only deny by doing violence to their own natural convictions,—it was with this that he contrasted the unreality that fell over the theatre of the soul's

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life when it was resolved into impressions and ideas. The logical result of Nihilism may have been a dream without a dreamer, but to Reid its practical result was this,—a real soul amidst unreal surroundings.

It was precisely to restore the reality which the sceptical analysis had thus seemed to dissipate that Reid took up his pen. His object was to vindicate the reality of the soul's surroundings so that they should be seen to be real in the same sense, with the same extra-mental reality, as the soul itself. Now, this object he could never have hoped to attain by merely pointing to a subjective necessity imposed upon us by the constitution of our nature and the natural working of our faculties. Such a refutation of Hume would have been in reality nothing but a systematic vindication of him, and would still have left the living thinking man—real with a reality of which neither impressions, nor ideas, nor any of the forms of thought or operations of the mind, nor any of the natural furniture of the mind, merely as such, could give adequate account,—it would still have left this real man surrounded by a world of his own making,—rather, perhaps, of his own phantasy,—of which the only thing that could be said would be this, that if real at all it was not real in the sense in which he himself was, that, as contrasted with himself and his own reality, it was the unreal.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find that numerous and important as Reid's references to necessity of thought and belief undoubtedly are, this subjective necessity is not the only result of his appeal to the constitution of human nature and the witness of human faculties. On the contrary, there is at least one other result of quite a different significance which although certainly less conspicuous is, equally certainly, not less important, and I would submit to you that it is to this less prominent feature in Reid's argument, and not to his more frequent insistence upon necessity, that we have to look for the most direct and fruitful suggestion as to his real meaning.

This other and more significant result can, perhaps, be best set forth by saying that for Reid the testimony of our faculties gives us not only certitude, but illuminative or objective certitude. We cannot think or believe otherwise than our faculties permit, that is obvious, but these faculties of ours are the instruments of truth, and the witness of our faculties, whether it concerns the soul or its surroundings, is intrinsically and essentially a witness to extra-mental reality, so that through that witness we come to know reality that is independent of our act of knowing, and independent of the mind or faculty that knows. Our faculties are in no fundamental sense *constitutive* of reality, they are *declaratory* of it, and the reality

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which they declare concerning the world of men and things is reality of the same extra-mental kind as that which we attribute to the soul, and which, indeed, we only attribute to the soul in virtue of their testimony.

This illuminative certitude is, as one might naturally expect, most insisted upon by Reid in those sections and chapters of his treatises that deal with Immediate Perception and the other natural judgments suggested by the senses. These, however, are not the only means by which we reach objective certainties, by which, as it were, we pass out of ourselves and illuminate the reality beyond consciousness. Our æsthetic faculties are the instruments of a similar achievement. Listen, for example, to the following passage from the chapter on "Grandeur" in the last of his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers*:—

". . . if we hearken to the dictates of common sense we must be convinced that there is real excellence in some things, whatever our feelings or our constitution be.

"It depends no doubt upon our constitution whether we do or do not perceive excellence where it really is, but the object has its excellence from its own constitution and not from ours.

"The common judgment of mankind in this matter sufficiently appears in the language of all nations, which uniformly ascribes excellence, grandeur, and beauty to the object and not to the mind that perceives it. And I believe in this, as in most other things, we shall find the common judgment of mankind and true philosophy not to be at variance."

After this glimpse of Reid's æsthetic, it is not surprising to find that both his teleology and his ethics introduce us to realities of the extra-mental order. Belief in design is, with him, no mere regulative principle, it is the gift of a genuine insight. It is quite similar in ethics. "Conscience," he says, "is the candle of the Lord set up within us to guide our steps." In a certain sense, therefore, it must throw a trustworthy light upon the order of the external world, sufficient, at least, to justify the effort after goodness, and to warrant the hope for moral achievement. It is primarily concerned, of course, with our personal acts and motives, but that, to Reid's thought, it also stands in some direct veridical relation to the extra-mental world of practice seems undeniable. Some such conviction as this seems to lie behind the whole of Reid's account of the moral faculty and moral judgments, although we can rarely find quite unequivocal evidence of its presence.

The point we have now reached is this,—that Reid's appeal to Common Sense was, really, an appeal to the illuminative certitude of the testimony of our faculties, or, in other words, was an appeal to the trustworthiness of our faculties in revealing extra-mental reality.

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As these faculties of ours are our only means of knowledge, we are, of course, shut up to their deliverances. Hence, those deliverances come to us, in a certain sense, with the weight of necessity,—we cannot shake ourselves free from them if we would,—the evidence with which they come is, as Reid said, irresistible. We are, therefore, bound to act upon them, and to accept them, but, be it noted, their necessity does not constitute their truth, and Reid's trust was placed, not in their necessity, but in their evident veracity,—in the manifest reality they set forth.

Just, however, as when it came to a matter of practice, he dealt with his principle of universal testimony,—applying to it material correction and limitation,—so he also dealt with the further principle we have just reached. Our faculties are trustworthy, but sometimes they fail us. They are our sole and sufficient guides to truth, but sometimes they mislead us. Their information is normally correct, but sometimes they misinform us.

"God Almighty," he wrote to Lord Kames, "has given us various powers of understanding and of will. They are all equally his workmanship. Our understandings may deviate from truth, as our wills may deviate from virtue."

Not only may our bodily senses fail us, as in the case of the colour blind, and as when one who has the jaundice sees a body yellow which is really white, but even our reason itself, as he told Dr. Gregory, is so imperfect that we are not exempt from the possibility of swallowing contradictions.

Now, how did Reid meet this new difficulty? In the Essay entitled "On the Fallacy of the Senses," he turns to the explanations and corrections of natural science. In his earlier Essay on "Seeing," he appealed to general testimony:—". . . . all men believe that, as a multiplying glass does not really produce ten guineas out of one, nor a microscope turn a guinea into a ten-pound piece, so neither does a coloured glass change the real colour of the object seen through it, when it changes the appearance of that colour."

In other cases, however, his treatment of the difficulty is more suggestive. He turned, not to science, and not to universal witness,—to what all men believe,—but to the sane man, the man of sound understanding. Whatever mistakes of belief or practice our faculties may lead us into, he never wavered for a moment in his confidence in their general trustworthiness. In our present state our minds, as well as our bodies, are liable to strange disorders, and, "as we do not judge of the natural constitution of the body from the disorders and diseases to which it is subject from accidents, so neither ought we to judge of the natural powers of the mind from its

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disorders, but from its sound state . . . . General rules that regard those whose intellects are sound are not overthrown by instances of men whose intellects are hurt by any constitutional or accidental disorder."

The normal office of our faculties is to lead us aright, and to tell us the truth, and, just as Reid appealed to the plain man against the artificialities of the sceptic and the metaphysician, so he also appealed to the sane man,—the man of sound heart and clear judgment,—to the normal man, to the man who, in all essentials, is what a man ought to be. "General rules that regard those whose intellects are sound are not overthrown by instances of men whose intellects are hurt by any constitutional or accidental disorder," and, certainly, the testimony of those whose minds are thus sound is not to be overthrown by the evidence of those with a smaller achievement of manhood,—with a poorer experience, or less-developed powers. Just as the practical judgment of the sound mind is decisive against Scepticism, so it is decisive in the cases we are now considering. The appeal is from Philip drunk to Philip sober, and although Philip drunk cannot be expected to recognise the superior authority of his sober judgment, yet it is with his sober judgment that the superior authority does rest, and it is his sober judgment, and that alone, that can guide conduct to a safe and successful issue. In the last resort the decision must lie with the maturer judgment,—with the judgment that expresses the fuller, richer, more developed manhood.

Now, the manhood to which Reid thus appealed is emphatically a progressive one. In the life of the individual the different faculties appear and attain maturity at different times. Each individual faculty has, moreover, its own particular history and development. There are, it is true, certain gifts of nature which are with us from the first,—which constitute part of the original and essential furnishing of our minds, and upon which we cannot improve, but, speaking of the individual life as a whole, we may say that it is a progressive life. Nor is this the privilege of the few; rather does Reid represent it as the prerogative of the many,—a prerogative of which, it is true, they may make but very imperfect use, but which is, none the less, theirs, and which never remains quite unused in any case.

Human nature does not spring into being in a mature and perfect state. At first its faculties are immature and correspondingly imperfect, and it is only by exercise that they can be developed. Even the things of the material world around us are at first apprehended by us but very imperfectly, just, indeed, as they are at first by those who have been born blind, but who receive the gift of vision in adult life. By the discipline of science, however, and by the informal training of everyday life, these faculties of ours become more

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proficient and more exact, their deliverances become fuller and more accurate; the obscurity and vagueness that marked their early testimony gradually disappears, and in the place of the dim perceptions of infancy we have the perfect vision of a Newton.

The same process of growth and development can be traced, also, in our powers of reasoning, in our conceptions and judgments, in our appreciation of beauty, and in the life of conscience, and it is very significant that Reid always suggests that it is in the last stage of this history that there is the fullest and most accurate apprehension of truth and of reality. The history of the development of human faculty is not a mere chronicle of inconsequential change,—it is a record of the progressive achievement of truth, of growth into truth as one may perhaps say. Hence it is that the mature, sane judgment of the man in fullest and closest contact with life and reality can always correct the less authoritative judgment of the immature and untutored, and it is to this full judgment, to the last and most complete results of a progressive experience which is a continual growth into truth, that Reid, in the last resort, appeals, and it is in this that he places his ultimate trust.

Nor is this all. There are passages which suggest that the living achievement of truth thus characteristic of the history of the individual, is equally characteristic of the history of the race. I must ask you to note, too, how fully Reid recognised the part played by the social environment in the development of our reasoning and of our moral faculties. "I am very apt to think," he says in his *Essay on Systems of Morals*, "that, if a man could be reared from infancy, without any society of his fellow creatures, he would hardly ever show any sign, either of moral judgment or of the power of reasoning."

If, now, we attempt to combine all these views of development and of progress into one,—never forgetting while we do so that the progress with which we are concerned is essentially a progress into truth,—we shall find, I think, that the final synthesis of Reid's teaching gives us a Humanism of the broadest, fullest, freest sort. It carries us past all secondary and temporary standards, past all intermediate courts of appeal, to life itself, to that living experience which satisfies, justifies, and, in a measure, explains itself.

Stated in bare outline, the conception we have now reached seems to be this:—The human spirit is surrounded by realities of three orders,—by God, in whom it lives and moves and has its being, by the world of nature, and by human society. In the midst of these surroundings it cannot, even if it would, live an isolated life,—this, its nature, and the very conditions of its existence, as the informing soul of a physical body, alike forbid. It is thus, from the first, in

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some kind of active relationship with them, and in the experience into which it is thus born, it knows them. Its life, moreover, is a progressive life,—not only does its contact with its surroundings become wider and more varied, but, through the developing and maturing of its own powers, the experience which thus becomes wider becomes also richer. On the one hand we have a physical nature which is daily becoming better and better known, and which reflects itself more and ever more perfectly in this constantly improving mirror of a developing humanity. On the other, we have a human society which is slowly achieving maturity, and which, by the varied incidents and phases of its historical development, is ever making new claims upon the potential manhood of the individuals constituting it. Just as the individual achieves self-realisation—works out, that is, the manhood that is in him—through the changes and discipline of individual life, so, speaking from a point of wider outlook, we may say that humanity achieves self-realisation through the changes and discipline of its historical life. Every time of progressive change, whether for individuals or for nations, is a time of moral synthesis. New conceptions of truth, of goodness and of beauty arise, and, either apart from these, or as their causes or concomitants, changed historical or physical conditions commandingly call to new ways of life, and open up new avenues for individual and social achievement. Thus, the possibility of a fuller and richer life is brought into view, but the life thus seen as possible, can never become actual in individuals without a corresponding development of the individuals themselves. The new conceptions must be taken up and assimilated, the opportunity of new achievement must be met by a corresponding development of character and activity, and the new must be united with the old in the living synthesis of personal life. As the spirit of man is one, so must his life be,—if, that is, it is to attain its highest achievement, or, even, to escape frustration,—and it is precisely because this moral synthesis is not achieved that many a fair morning of promise brings on an evening of cloud and disappointment, and it is precisely because the synthesis is at best incomplete, and because it is rarely accomplished without the loss of some of the positive achievements of the past, that human progress follows the spiral path it does.

Now, it is to this human spirit, thus growing, on the one hand, into clearer and even clearer vision, and into fuller and even fuller apprehension of truth, of goodness, and of beauty, while on the other it is progressively achieving the realisation of the manhood that is in it,—it is to this progressive and progressing spirit and to its confidence in its own achievements, whether of knowledge or of manhood, that the ultimate appeal of Humanism is made, and it is to this same

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spirit that Reid's doctrine of Common Sense, as we in these modern days may hold it, also leads us.

Just, however, because Reid's Humanism is complete,—taking account of every part of human nature, of the whole experience of the whole man,—just because of this, its final utterance carries us over into theology and into the life of religion. On the one hand we are told, with evident scriptural reference, that the end of human life and the sum of human duty is to grow into the image of God, to achieve the fulness of that Divine likeness after the pattern of which Reid believed that man had been created; on the other, that whatever of truth or beauty is known imperfectly or partially to us is known perfectly and fully to God, so that as He is, in a sense, the pattern of our manhood, so He is, also, the exemplar of our knowledge.

To pursue the line of thought thus opened up would take us far beyond the necessary limits of this paper, but one can hardly help thinking that in Reid's own mind these conceptions may have been connected with his belief in the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, —with the Christian doctrine concerning that unique Incarnation by which the Eternal Thought concerning man was made perfectly manifest,—and also with that magnificent Pauline teleology which looks for the fruition of life in those eternal days of changeless light when, in the perfected vision of Him who is the Truth, we shall know even as we are known, and when, "in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God," we shall all come "unto the perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ."

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