

in a dialogue have no meaning for either party. Incomplete Psittacism consists in the inexact interpretation of other persons' language. Such misunderstanding is due to the difference among people as regards age, culture, experience &c. Further, language is never adequate to thought. It is statical, while thought is dynamical. It is discrete, while thought is continuous. Nevertheless the use of language has its advantages. It records our thoughts and so prevents them from total oblivion. Besides, it extends our conceptions. The simplest arithmetical operations surpass our imagination, and we have to call in the aid of symbols. Such *significant* symbols are better than *expressive* ones i.e. those which represent more or less imperfectly the very objects themselves, as in onomatopœic words.

The second part deals with symbolic thought and is more directly interesting to the psychologist. The author maintains that all knowledge is a language and that progress in it is marked by a simplification of its terms. Even sensation is symbolic of its physical and physiological causes. Images are more so, and are better adapted for signs than sensations. For they are under voluntary control. We advance a stage further, when we come to the generic image. Finally, there is the concept. It is here that the author adopts the nominalistic position. The mind has no abstract and general ideas. But it has the equivalent of such ideas in considering particular and concrete ideas as *capable of being replaced* by other similar particular and concrete ideas. A general idea is but a particular idea taken *indifferently* from among other particular ideas of the same kind. The complex operation here involved comprehends a *name*, a *tendency* or *capacity* of calling up like ideas and one or more *particular* ideas. It is the aim of science to make this tendency exact. This symbolism is a necessary part of mental economy. "The march of the mind, like the movement of bodies, is always along the line of least resistance" (p. 195).

W. F. TROTTER.

*Le Bien et le Mal.* Essai sur la Morale considérée comme Sociologie Première. Par E. DE ROBERTY, Professeur à l'Université Nouvelle de Bruxelles. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1896. Pp. xxiv., 237.

Whatever views M. de Roberty does not like he calls obsolete, and so disposes of them. Everything in the nature of Theology or Metaphysics he regards as a mere survival of the unscientific past. This past itself he is willing to patronize. He is forward to point out in its Theology and Metaphysics creditable forecasts of his own more enlightened position. But the Metaphysics and Theology of the present day are for him merely objects of abhorrence and contempt. On the special subjects which his book claims to treat of he does not seem to us to throw much light. He is constantly reiterating that sociality is morality, but he does little to define this view, or to maintain it against obvious objections. Nor does he define Good and Evil; he merely says that they pass into one another, so that what is good at one time is evil at another, as social conditions vary. This is part of his general doctrine of the Identity of Contraries, which seems to be a vague reflexion of Hegelian thought.

*De la Croissance.* Par JULES PAYOT. Paris: Félix Alcan (Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine), 1896. Pp. 248.

An analysis of the psychology and philosophy of belief by the author of *L'Éducation de la Volonté* in the above-named series. After an introductory analysis of 'certainty,' which is found to be a specific form of belief, the subject is disposed of in three books as follows:—On the Object