

giving a careful reproduction of all the published and some unpublished economic works of Petty, he has provided in his introduction a biography, bibliography, and general estimate, with ample references to authorities and sources. He had already (in the *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* for March 1896, xi. 105 *seq.*) decided against Petty's authorship of the 'Observations upon the Bills of Mortality,' but he has included the 'Observations' in the present collection, thereby making his book more valuable to all but the mere biographer.

Dr. Hull is certainly no blind admirer of the eccentric genius whose works he edits. If there is one thing associated with Petty in the popular mind more closely than another, it is the phrase 'political arithmetic,' the title of his best known tract, written about 1676 (vol. i. 235), and being an attempt to estimate the population and wealth of Britain, Holland, and France. Lest any should think that political arithmetic means what we now call statistics, Dr. Hull reminds us that

statistics demands enumeration. The validity of its inferences depends upon the theory of probabilities as expressed in the law of large numbers. Therefore it adds; it does not multiply. Political arithmetic, as exemplified by Petty, multiplies freely, and the value of its results varies according to the nature of the terms multiplied. For example, in the absence of a census Petty had to calculate the population of London, of England, and of Ireland. His calculations for London are based upon the number of burials and upon the number of houses, facts which at least bear some relation to the number of people. The burials he multiplies by thirty, an arbitrary figure for which he pleads Graunt's authority; the houses he now multiplies by six, and now by eight, as suits his purpose. The sources of probable error are obvious. The population of England he further estimates at eleven times that of London, because London pays one-eleventh of the assessment. The chance of error is thus raised to the second degree. Nevertheless the calculation is not altogether unreasonable, and Petty asserts that the results 'do pretty well agree' with the accounts of the hearth money, the poll money, and the bishops' numbering of the communicants, figures which he neglects to give,

and which, the editor adds, when we get them do not always bear out the assertion (vol. i. p. lxxvii). Besides this 'Discourse on Political Arithmetic' Petty wrote no less than eight 'Essays' on political arithmetic of similar purport. These, with the 'Political Anatomy of Ireland' and other Irish papers, the 'Treatise of Taxes,' '*Verbum Sapienti*,' and the racy dialogues '*Quantulumcumque* concerning Money' (1682) and of 'Diamonds' (1674), are all to be found in Dr. Hull's collection. Dr. Hull's 'Life of Petty' owes, of course, a great deal to Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice's recent publication,¹ but every other source has been turned to account. The annotations to the economic writings are just what is wanted. A facsimile of Petty's handwriting forms a frontispiece to each of the two volumes. It is a book of which both the American editor and the English publishers may be justly proud. J. BONAR.

Great Britain and Hanover; being the Ford Lectures delivered in the University of Oxford, 1899, by ADOLPHUS WILLIAM WARD, Litt. D. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1899.)

It is not too much to say that the real significance of the personal union between Great Britain and Hanover has never before been accurately

¹ *Life of Petty from Private Documents*. London, 1895.

estimated by any English historian. Beyond receiving a general and often an erroneous impression that English interests were in some ways sacrificed to those of Hanover during the reigns of George I and George II, students of English history have ignored the important light thrown upon the motives and policy of English statesmen during the first half of the eighteenth century by the union of England and Hanover. There is no doubt that during the first two Hanoverian reigns English political history was considerably affected by the dynastic traditions, ideas, and tendencies of George I and George II. Loyal adhesion to the house of Austria and an anxious jealousy of the advance of Brandenburg had long before the close of the reign of Queen Anne become the dominant note of the foreign policy of the electors of Hanover. The aggressions of Louis XIV had roused and strengthened their patriotic resolution to support the emperor, a resolution which in no way interfered with a determination to establish and improve the position of the electorate in the empire. After the accession of George I Bernstorff continued to represent the Hanoverian aversion to Brandenburg, while Carteret, who enjoyed the confidence both of George I and George II, adhered steadily to a close alliance with the court of Vienna. In the very interesting lecture on the 'Foreign Policy of George I' Dr. Ward removes many misconceptions and solves many difficulties. The famous triple alliance of 1717 'was due neither to British nor to Hanoverian statesmen, but to the regent Orleans himself.' This treaty, as is well known, was a blow to Townshend, who had not taken a hand in the French negotiations, and for a few years it established the ascendancy of Hanoverian influence in the English court. The quadruple alliance was, however, a more direct reflexion of the views of George I. Bernstorff and Bothmer, the Hanoverian ministers, were ready to promise almost anything in order to strengthen the emperor's position and to secure his alliance, while Stanhope, who was working ostensibly with them, was not always in agreement with views which represented Hanoverian traditions and Hanoverian interests. Nevertheless the quadruple alliance was, on the whole, a considerable triumph for English statesmanship, though the cession of Sicily to the emperor, in direct violation of the treaty of Utrecht, was a discreditable business, and justified Alberoni's active hostility to the English and Austrians in every part of Europe. How nearly successful his plans were in the north is admirably told by Dr. Ward, who is the first English historian to give us an accurate account of the quarrel between George I and Peter the Great over Mecklenburg. It was on this question that British and Hanoverian interests became curiously intermingled, and at times openly clashed. If England had no concern with the fortunes of Mecklenburg, at any rate the future of the Baltic trade, and the balance of power in the Baltic itself, was of vast importance to her. If it had not been for the death of Charles XII, it is hard to see how Alberoni could have failed to unite Sweden and Russia in alliance against England.

The first treaty of Vienna, which startled Europe by an alliance between Austria and Spain, who threatened to seize Gibraltar, to restore the Jacobites, and to destroy England's trade, was followed by a series of rapid changes bewildering even to the clearest mind. While the treaty of Seville in 1729 separated Austria and Spain, and restored, so to

speak, the *status quo ante*, and while the second treaty of Vienna in 1781 brought the emperor and Spain to a harmonious understanding respecting the possession of Parma and Piacenza by Don Carlos, Europe found itself in 1788 suddenly involved in the Polish succession war, in which France, Sardinia, and Spain attempted to hurl the Austrians from Italy. It was well for England that during this unquiet period a man of Walpole's sagacity was at the helm. On questions of foreign policy he had clear views which differed from those hitherto in favour with the Hanoverians. He recognised that an alliance with Prussia would be most advantageous for our commercial interests and for strengthening our position in the north; he was opposed to entering into any intimate relations with Austria. In 1780 he had indeed recognised the pragmatic sanction, and so induced the emperor to agree to the second treaty of Vienna; but he firmly refused to allow England to be dragged into the Polish succession war. In the Austrian succession war, however, George II, supported by public opinion, was enabled to give Maria Theresa valuable assistance. But the colonial wars with France and Spain prevented England from devoting all its energies to the continental struggle, and from the outset Walpole and later Carteret were at one in advising the Austrian court to agree with Prussia. In spite of royal ill-will towards Frederick William and Frederick the Great it was becoming recognised in England that a political understanding between Great Britain and Prussia was advisable. Walpole's deep distrust of the house of Austria had been forced to yield before the wave of enthusiasm on behalf of the empress queen, and Carteret became the ready exponent of a policy in consonance with the royal no less than the popular sentiments.

Of Carteret's designs Dr. Ward has much to say of interest, and his lecture on 'Hanover, Austria, and Prussia' is, one might almost say, epoch-making. He shows how, after the conclusion of the Austrian succession war, Walpole's dislike of the Austrian connexion was justified, and traces the steps leading towards the convention of Westminster and the first treaty of Versailles. In his preface he acknowledges his debt to 'Louis XV et le Renversement des Alliances,' by M. Richard Waddington, who has further added to our knowledge of the period by the publication of 'La Guerre de Sept Ans,' *Les Débuts*. Dr. Ward's account of the failure of the Austrian negotiations in 1755, and of the consequent recognition by the English cabinet of the necessity for the Prussian alliance, will prove an invaluable guide to all those who have hitherto found the diplomatic tangle hard to unravel. In this and in other cases where complications appear wellnigh incapable of being unravelled, he gives us a line to follow which always brings us through our difficulties. For example, in speaking of the objects of English diplomacy in 1755, he has no hesitation in asserting that

the security of the electorate was the ultimate purpose which British and Hanoverian statesmanship alike had in view, and for which, in default of an Austrian alliance, an understanding with Prussia now seemed indispensable.

The second treaty of Westminster, as it was called, was the natural outcome of inevitable tendencies recognised by Walpole, but checked in their development by the personal feelings of George I and George II. For the first time the British nation and the Prussian king were

placed side by side, and though George might enter into the compact with reluctance and misgivings, the conclusion of the treaty of Versailles between France and Austria soon led him to realise the wisdom of the Anglo-Prussian treaty. Nevertheless it is not improbable that Louis XV might never have been induced to take the final step had not Frederick's defection roused the French court and French public opinion.

In his concluding pages Dr. Ward gives us some valuable references to the part played by Hanover in the history of Great Britain during the latter part of the last and the early portion of the present century. At the time of the establishment of the Fürstenbund Hanoverian diplomacy co-operated with Prussian, British interests in this case forcing upon Hanover a policy opposed to its traditional sympathy with the house of Austria. From this time, however, the Hanoverian duchy experienced misfortunes, from which the predominant partner in the personal union was unable to save her. Prussia followed its alliance with Austria at Reichenbach in 1790 by the treaty of Bâle with France, and undertook, if necessary, to force Hanover to adopt a neutral attitude. In 1801 the first Prussian occupation took place, and in 1808, on the outbreak of war between England and France, 'the doom of Hanover was sealed.' The Suhlingen capitulation was followed by a period of deep humiliation. The country was occupied by the French, the Hanoverian army was disbanded, the British government was unable to send any help. But under such circumstances the unsoundness of the basis of the personal union became apparent, and after 1815 the two countries 'drifted apart in their political sentiments and aspirations.' The dissolution of the union at the accession of Queen Victoria closed an interesting period in the annals of Great Britain, during which German and English soldiers often fought side by side. ARTHUR HASSALL.

The Daughter of Peter the Great: a History of Russian Diplomacy and of the Russian Court under the Empress Elizabeth Petrovna, 1741-1762.
By R. NISBET BAIN. (London: Archibald Constable & Co. 1899.)

THE author of this seductive volume unites to the advantages of a ready pen and a vigorous manner the still greater advantage of having been able to use freely a considerable number of authorities who are dumb to the large majority of English historical students. But, in all conscience, he exults a little too much in his facilities, and seems to exaggerate the results of his employment of them. He 'will venture to affirm' that not one in a hundred of the students aforesaid has ever heard of Alexius Bestuzhev, and insinuates that not many 'of us know the name of the Russian field marshal who annihilated' the Prussian army at Kunersdorf. Is the personality of the persistent grand chancellor really so unfamiliar to our examination rooms, where, in accordance with Mr. Bain's own subsequent narrative, the chief credit of the rout of Kunersdorf is usually assigned to the *Austrian* commander? The diplomatic history of the empress Elizabeth's reign, which, with an account of her court, forms the subject proper of this volume, is described there as 'a nut hard to crack,' but containing 'a kernel worth the trouble.' Here and there the author has undoubtedly turned to good account information derived from the special sources enumerated in his bibliography (which admits of being