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James Lindsay M.P.

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Friday, March 23rd, 1860.

Sir SIBBALD SCOTT, BART. in the Chair.

A SCHEME FOR THE RE-ORGANIZATION, RECRUITING,
AND INSTRUCTION OF THE ARMY.

Prepared by an Officer of Rank, and read by Colonel the Hon. JAMES
LINDSAY, M.P.

PUBLIC attention has been for the last six years directed in a favourable manner towards the Army. The brilliant victories in the Crimea, and the calm endurance exhibited throughout that campaign; the splendid triumphs in India, and the dauntless heroism displayed in the suppression of the mutiny and rebellion, have had the effect of raising the character of the Army in the estimation of the country—which, owing to a long peace of 40 years' duration, broken only by occasional campaigns in India and at the Cape, did not receive that appreciation to which it was justly entitled.

For the first time since the Restoration, the Army is looked upon without fear and distrust. Even during the triumphant progress of the Peninsular War, statesmen were found ready to depreciate our Army, and to declaim against any attempt to raise a military spirit in the nation; now, however, the old cry that a standing Army, controlled by the provisions of an annual mutiny act, is dangerous to the liberties of the country, seems entirely exploded; and the necessity of retaining in the realm an adequate force to defend our shores, and an Army, as perfect in all its departments and matériel as can be obtained in peace, is now distinctly recognised.

Though great progress has been recently made towards the attainment of this object, and the position of the soldier has been much improved, yet it is necessary still further to increase the attraction of the profession, and so to organise the force as to make it as disposable and available as the foreign policy of the Government and the vast territorial dependencies of the Crown may require, and as efficient as professional instruction can render it.

For two centuries it has been the constant habit of this country, in its jealousy of a standing Army, to keep forces in time of peace barely sufficient to relieve troops stationed in the colonies. Large forces were raised for special emergencies, and as soon as the object which called them into existence had passed, they were reduced, both for the above reason and for the sake of temporary economy. The ruinous consequence of this policy is now a matter of history. War has always been commenced with an army utterly disproportioned to the object in view—without

reserves, with soldiers suddenly raised, and consequently inferior in discipline; and it has usually required the experience of a few years campaigning before England's Army appears in the field as in the days of Marlborough and Wellington, unrivalled in discipline and unsurpassed in organization. But no sooner has peace been proclaimed than the cry for reduction is raised; and, though it cannot be expected that a war establishment should be maintained in peace, yet reduction has generally been carried to a point so low as to paralyse the power of the nation, and provide troops no more than sufficient for colonial reliefs.

The following passage, from the writings of Dean Tucker, illustrates in forcible language the course of policy which has heretofore prevailed as regards the Army.

“The *Patriot* and furious *Anti-Courtier* loudly exclaims against even a small Parliamentary Army, both on account of its danger and expense. By persevering in these laudable endeavours he prevents such a number of forces being kept up as are necessary for the common safety of the kingdom. The consequence is, when a war breaks out, new levies are half-formed and half-disciplined, and the officers novices in their business. Thus the nation is involved in expenses ten times as great, and made to raise forces twenty times as numerous as were complained of before; till peace is made and schemes of ruinous economy are again called for by a new set of patriots. Thus the patriotic farce goes round, ending in a real tragedy to the nation and mankind.”

It will be within the immediate recollection of every one, that when war broke out in 1854 with Russia, 10,000 men were ordered to Malta, and in order to make up the regiments composing this force, volunteers were called for from regiments remaining at home; shortly after 10,000 additional men were ordered to Turkey, when the regiments that had already parted with their best men were compelled to call for volunteers from the few regiments that were to be left at home, and to fill up their ranks with raw recruits. There was no reserve left. The men sent out to fill up the chasms caused by action and disease, and the regiments subsequently ordered to the Crimea, were, with one or two exceptions, nothing better than recruits, who were, to use the expression of Lord Raglan, “swept away like flies.”

Such have been the results during a long course of years of the want of preparation for emergencies which characterised the policy that has been pursued with regard to the army, and it behoves us in the present disturbed state of Europe, and the uncertain position of our relations with foreign powers, to consider if some improvement could be introduced into our military system. It is therefore proposed to show,—

- 1st. That the nation can be attacked, and that the Channel can be bridged.
- 2nd. That the organization of the Army is defective, both in numerical amount and distribution.
- 3rd. That great improvements can be carried out in the distribution, recruiting, and instruction of the Army.

The Possibility of Invasion.

The formidable forces permanently at the disposal of the Emperor of the French, Cherbourg and its capacity for mischief, and the successful issue of the Emperor's rapid aggressive operations in Italy, having pro-

duced a salutary alarm and distrust, and confirmed the opinion of able officers, that the command of the Channel may be obtained by our warlike neighbours, and that it is possible, with a free sea, for 200,000 organised disciplined troops to effect a hostile landing on the assailable shores of England, the real and positive danger which may still continue to embarrass and beset us will be precisely comprehended by an attentive consideration of the note which General Buonaparte transmitted to the Directory, dated Paris, 13 April, 1798, "relating to the system of war that ought to be pursued against England."

Napoleon's Plan for Invasion in 1798.

From the following extract from this remarkable document, we may imagine the advice offered to the Directory has not altogether escaped the notice of Louis Napoleon.

"Dans notre position, nous devons faire à l'Angleterre une guerre sûre, et nous le pouvons.

Que nous soyons en paix ou en guerre, il nous faut 40 ou 50 millions pour réorganiser notre marine.

Notre armée de terre n'en sera ni plus ni moins forte ; au lieu que la guerre oblige l'Angleterre à faire des préparatifs immenses qui ruinent ses finances, détruisent l'esprit de commerce, et changent absolument la constitution et les mœurs de ce peuple.

Nous devons employer tout l'été à armer notre escadre de Brest, à faire exercer nos matelots dans la rade, à achever les vaisseaux qui sont en construction à Rochefort, à Lorient, et à Brest.

Si l'on met quelque activité dans ces travaux, nous pouvons espérer d'avoir au mois de Septembre trente-cinq vaisseaux à Brest, y compris les quatre ou cinq nouveaux que l'on peut construire à Lorient et à Rochefort.

Nous aurons vers la fin du mois, dans les différens ports de la Manche, pres de 200 chaloupes canonnières. Il faut les placer à Cherbourg, au Havre, à Boulogne, à Dunkerque et à Ostende, et employer tout l'été à emmariner nos soldats.

En continuant à donner à la commission des côtes de la Manche 3 millions par mois, nous pouvons faire construire 200 autres chaloupes d'une dimensions plus forte, et propres à transporter des chevaux.

Nous aurions donc, au mois de Septembre, 400 chaloupes canonnières à Boulogne, et 35 vaisseaux de guerre à Brest. Les Hollandais peuvent également avoir dans cet intervalle 12 vaisseaux de guerre au Texel.

* * * * *

Il serait possible alors de transporter 40 mille hommes sur le point de l'Angleterre que l'on voudrait, évitant même un combat naval si l'ennemi était plus fort, tandis que 40 mille hommes menaceraient de partir sur les 400 chaloupes canonnières et autant des bateaux pêcheurs de Boulogne, et que l'escadre Hollandaise, avec 10 mille hommes de transport, menacerait de se porter en Ecosse.

L'invasion en Angleterre, exécutée de cette manière, et dans le mois de Novembre et de Décembre, serait presque certaine.

L'Angleterre s'épuiserait par un effort immense et qui ne la garantirait pas de notre invasion."

Means of Resistance and Composition of our Forces.

The above may assist us, during this temporary lull, which is dependant on the management of Louis Napoleon, and before a peace establishment suited to the times may be determined on, in calculating the means and power of the nation to resist attack, in examining closely the composition of our forces, improving our military constitution, and in judging how far the defensive measures proposed are adequate to the supposed crisis. Commissions on our national defences have been appointed, forts and towers have been armed, positions for reserved arsenals have been selected,

every creek and accessible inlet has been repeatedly surveyed. The principal fortresses and dockyards are being extensively enlarged and improved. The Volunteer Rifle Movement has been enthusiastically and opportunely encouraged. The divisions, and brigades, and regiments are models of discipline, and are in themselves as perfect as they can be made by vigilant instruction, elementary drill, rifle practice, and incessant tactical display; but the battalions destined to bear the brunt, and to be first and foremost in the fight, and to give example and confidence when arranged and united to Militia, Yeomanry, and organised Rifle Volunteers; the troops by which the whole defensive machinery is to be brought into use and worked, are so deplorably below the mark in respect to numbers, that it is inconceivable in this age of reform, that the distribution and formative regimental organisation of the Infantry of the Line should not yet have been constituted on solid principles, applicable to every description of service, and embracing the ultimate purposes of depôts unembarrassed by provisional battalions, and the waste of force resulting from their restrictive duties.

The organic reforms to which we advert, and which we think necessary, could not fail to aid in planting firmly a precautionary system of defence, advancing the interior and exterior political interests of this country, and in sustaining without difficulty the required reliefs of corps in India.

Recruiting.

Voluntary enlistment, a mode of recruiting peculiarly suited to the British Army, and the only one adapted to our institutions, should be rendered so attractive, that it might be composed of the best of the working classes, and raised in character and usefulness far above any other European force.

Effect of the Military Constitution.

A military constitution found to be so ruinously defective, that it will not admit of extensive or important offensive operations being carried on, or the interests of colonies protected, without exposing the parent state to insult or invasion, must increase the public expenditure desired to be avoided by temporary arrangements necessarily sanctioned in such a case. The organisation of our Army constantly produces such results.

A Kaffir war draws a force from our shores not disposable, Russian menaces denude our colonies, and, the Crimean services terminated, a formidable mutiny requires that the Militia should suddenly be called out to replace the troops on passage to India. A more uneconomical system could not have been devised, or one more injuriously affecting the discipline of regiments, than that which it appears from the annual estimates will continue to be followed.

Impracticable as it would be to guard against such shocks as these, or to be prepared at all times for the calamitous consequences inseparable from the control and management of vast territorial acquisitions, yet the permanent forces of the empire might be augmented and distributed so judiciously, and adapted to a defensive position, quasi belligerent, that the endless excessive outlay created by transitions from inconsiderate and

absurd reductions to extraordinary exertion and exhausting efforts, and occasioned by raising new regiments and concentrating scattered troops for immediate action and unexpected warfare, might never be demanded.

Effect of the Depôt Battalion System. Proposed Organic Change.

The active battalions of the regular Army at home may be estimated at present at 29,800 rank and file; viz. 5,800 Foot Guards, 24,000 or 30 battalions of Infantry of the Line. To this slender statement may be added 24 depôt provisional battalions, amounting perhaps occasionally to 23,000 rank and file. These, however, from their construction and abrupt fluctuations in numbers and restrictive local duties can scarcely be called moveable for field service. They are in every respect inferior to service companies of regiments, and have not the advantages derived from *esprit de corps*. They are liable to an oppressive accumulation of the youngest of young officers, beyond the influential control of their own commanding officers, which must be unfavourable to strict discipline; they absorb nearly half the force of the Infantry of the Line stationed at home, in carrying on a preparatory and limited course of drill for recruits, to fit them for embarkation, which could be accomplished, and many other important objects secured, by adopting *permanently* the organic formation of regiments with two battalions, each applicable to unlimited service, *one* to be in its turn, as a general regulation, retained at home with the functions of a recruiting depôt, while the other is serving abroad, and both at the disposal of the War Department on urgent occasions.

It cannot be denied, however, that as a mere depôt for drilling and distributing recruits, and for the reception of soldiers whose cases will not admit of service abroad, the establishment of Provisional Depôt Battalions works smoothly, and the process of regulating reinforcements and drafts for embarkation and conveyance to colonial territories is carried on with wonderful continuity and exactitude. But although such depôts might be necessary for a large continental Army raised by conscription, the continuance of the existing depôt system would interfere with the efficiency of the Volunteer Regular Army.

The establishment of every regiment at home should be raised as soon as possible to 1,400 rank and file; and, on reaching that strength, divided into two battalions, and the system of two battalions gradually carried into effect as a permanent organization.

It has been computed, accurately we believe, that we are losing men at the rate of 11,000 a year by desertion—a loss to the country of at least 300,000*l.* per annum.

The whole bounty money given to recruits is a waste of nearly 200,000*l.* per annum, and the whole process of the system disgraceful. Under such circumstances it would be inexcusable in any war department tolerating a mode of raising recruits for our Army, without making every effort to obtain the abolition of a system, believed to be based on falsehood, and directly tending to immorality.

It has been proposed, we observe, in an augmentative memorandum originating in the War Department, to increase the soldier's pay, and to

place it to his credit when he receives his discharge, and to shorten his term of service; and that to meet the expenses of this increase of pay the public should be released from the following charges:

1. Reduction of the pension list altogether, except in a case of a wound.
2. The abolition of bounty.
3. The diminution of desertion, by which we are losing 11,000 men a year.

By these reforms and others, the public would gain, it is supposed, about 1,500,000*l.*; the increase proposed in the project to which we advert is one shilling per day, which, at the end of a certain term of service, would amount to a large sum, which sum the discharged soldier would be entitled to have paid to him unconditionally.

The whole proposed innovation is excellent in principle, but would not, we think, obtain the approbation required to carry it through as a financial measure. We entertain no doubt that a modified scheme might be most satisfactorily introduced, and completed with the same object, viz.:

Voluntary enlistment for ten years to be continued under a stipulated condition that every soldier, after serving with good conduct for that period, should be entitled to an annuity or pension, calculated on one shilling per diem, and also a gratuity, with the option of continuing his service for seven years more, and all bounties and other pensions to be discontinued.

We may quote some of the leading objections to the present recruiting system as specified in the memorandum to which we refer.

That we do not get men enough; we do not get men of the right sort; and those whom we do get, are not got in a satisfactory manner; they are generally speaking inveigled into enlisting; that it is possible not only to raise a sufficient number by voluntary recruitment, but to make the service so attractive that it will secure the best of the working classes.

It is certain that there are more valid objections to either increased bounty or increased pay than the public expense it would occasion. High bounty leads to desertion, and both one and the other lead to drunkenness and riotous living.

With the inducements proposed to be held out, and the opportunity of enabling a young man at an early age to work out his independence, it is supposed that the recruiting serjeant would soon lose his avocation, and that the difficulty would not be to entice, but to choose among candidates.

Necessary Strength of the Military Force (Infantry) for all Purposes.

At the outbreak in India, the whole of the European troops in the three Presidencies did not exceed 45,500, viz: 24,336 in Bengal; 10,720 in Madras; 10,430 in Bombay.

Whatever may be the force now required for India under present circumstances, we could not calculate on less than 55,000 Infantry of the Queen's Army, exclusive of European corps considered necessary to act with them, under the immediate command of the Governor-General, being retained in the Presidencies for the military occupation of the country, nor less than 24,000 men being required for garrisons abroad and the colonies; 73,000 Infantry of the Line should constitute the regular force, with 5,600 foot guards to be maintained for the defence of the United Kingdom and Ireland, and for reliefs in India. If these forces were organized and

distributed with ability and economy, it would place at the disposal of the Queen's Government about 145 battalions of the Line, exclusive of troops serving in India, for colonial and home service, at the expense of about 2,500,000*l.* from which would be deducted the charges to be paid by the East Indian Exchequer at about 20,000*l.* for the maintenance of two companies of each battalion of the fifty-five at home.

The results of this construction of the regiments of the Line would prove.

1st. That battalions in serving in the East Indies and distant colonies might be relieved every ten years punctually, and every six years in colonies nearer home.

2nd. That Volunteer Rifle Corps could be united and efficiently attached to 15 or 26 divisions, composed of soldiers of the regular Army.

3rd. That a sufficient force would always be ready to embark on any emergency for foreign service without being compelled to continue that practice, destructive to regimental discipline, of collecting volunteers from battalions that remain on home service.

With the improved means of transport to India, it would be very desirable that every battalion in India should be relieved when it should be found unfit for active service by sickness or loss in battle; and that every corps should be relieved after nine years' service in India. This system would prove less expensive than reinforcing corps continually with drafts of recruits.

With reference to the Army estimates, it should be borne in mind that in the charges brought forward this year are included alterations and improvements which should have been authorised many years ago. These have been occasioned by improvident reductions, neglect in fortifying dockyards and arsenals, building barracks, repairing and ventilating them since the value of a soldier's health has been understood, and for pensions to invalids discharged in garrisons of an army too limited for their work, and for new armies and armaments.

The commissariat and military train and medical departments have been resuscitated, and greatly improved barracks have been built.

Recapitulation of Advantages in Proposed Scheme.

"We get," says Mr. Sidney Herbert, "our men with *difficuly*, by every kind of cajoling and inducements we can devise, and in our necessity descend to those means which men do not have recourse to till they think all others are exhausted."

Could we imagine this detestable scheme of recruiting the ranks of the Army totally abolished, that young men of the labouring classes of 18 years were able to work out their independence in ten years, and that organic changes in the method of raising recruits had been effected;—

Could we imagine that all battalions at home were carefully distributed and fully occupied on garrison duty, or in the temporary barracks or encampments, or permanent barracks of instruction; and that in the drill season, *for four months*, but never more than *five*, were formed into corps d'armée, and assembled in encampments, as an established regulation; and tactically, strategically, and scientifically instructed and moved; could we imagine that when that tactical and strategical course had terminated,

and tents struck, the encampment would break up annually in October, and that their battalions would be marched to good permanent or temporary well-ventilated barracks, with drill grounds and ranges for rifle practice, and artillery practice if possible, where they would remain under the immediate command and careful instruction of their own commanding officers, and were inspected, but not too often, by their district brigadiers, or by colonels on the staff, and the recruits with this system carefully trained by elementary tactics for advanced service with their corps; and that every company were instructed in artillery practice, and as staff corps or sappers and miners are taught;—

Could we imagine that all officers appointed to their first commissions, after their examination, were, by this revised system proposed, ordered and compelled to join their *battalions at home* (which should be designated reserved battalions to distinguish them from battalions abroad), and required to go through a course of instruction, before they could succeed to a lieutenantcy, which would qualify them for their duties as regimental officers, and to hold staff situations, in fact to complete their military education under able professors; and that mathematical masters and professors of fortification and drawing masters were attached to each corps at home, or to each district, and that young officers were kept steadily at work under them, and with practical instruction also, turned out and reported tolerable engineers and artillerists after being closely and constantly employed for a year or eighteen months, and that able and accomplished staff college officers, and officers of artillery and engineers who could not find active employment were offered the appointments of instructors;—

Could we imagine that young officers thus educated, and indeed all regimental officers, were to pass an examination for a degree at Sandhurst, and that their examinations were recorded if successful, and noted for promotion by staff employment, and that by this system the military authorities and active general officers employed could have the widest field possible from which officers could be selected for the staff, instead of receiving them from any special staff corps, composed probably of accomplished officers and first-rate disciplinarians, but without military qualification requisite to entitle them to join the staff of an army at the commencement of the operations of an active campaign;—

We would exclaim enthusiastically, could we imagine these essential reforms and revisions effected, that the realization of such benefit to the army would confer lasting honour on the country, and raise the profession and character of a British soldier so highly, that no sum in the annual estimates would be considered extravagant to perfect the beneficial arrangements recommended for adoption.

Primary Examination.

While we endeavour to bring under patient discussion the important questions to which these observations refer, the subject of primary examination for commissions established on the principles recommended by the Duke of Wellington, and of military education and professional training, to which Mr. Sidney Herbert directed the attention of Government in his speech of 5th of June, 1857, since published with an

appendix, are of such intense interest, that we cannot refrain from offering our opinion that no opportunity should be lost in giving them most attentive consideration.

If the test for admission to the Army were so modified and regulated that candidates would never be hurried from a public school, half educated, to be forced through the process of cramming, but limited to examination prescribed as indispensable and preparatory, to enable them to commence an educational course strictly professional and mathematical the moment they joined their respective reserve battalions at home, their appointments to their first commissions would be free from the difficulties and objections which many officers have noticed who have devoted their time to this question. The second examination at present directed by the Regulations comprehends merely a summary of routine regimental duties, which, in every regiment well composed and commanded, was always insisted on.

But it may be inferred, from the remarks of Mr. Sidney Herbert, that he attributes our reverses in war to a military system unaided by a sound practical education for officers, to executive tactical errors, rather than to ill-considered plans and strategical combinations. Whatever reliance may be placed in these assertions, we are much indebted to him for his continual exertions on behalf of the soldier, and for stimulating the Government to raise the character of the British Army. Every officer will be interested in the great work of introducing a beneficial and extensive system of instruction, and ardently desire that it should be carried further even in detail and method than he has suggested; so that all intelligent officers desirous of improving themselves should have every encouragement and the best opportunity of qualifying themselves to hold staff appointments; and that none should be exempted or excluded from the course proposed to be established.

The grand objects to attain are to get rid of *for ever* the dissolute and idle habits and want of occupation and full employment at depôts, and to change altogether the constitution in regard to "tactique elementaire et grand tactique." Compare the routine depôt system with the activity which would prevail if this new school instruction once opened, where would be studied under able professors, energetically supported by commanding officers—*practical* mechanics, military drawing, sketching, surveying on the ground, sappers and miners, gunnery, throwing up forts, works, pontooning, military topography, reports on roads, and on ground for military positions. Reconnaissances, including an inquiry and report of the resources of the country. Contemplate the beneficial change in prospect which would form a perfect soldier. Habitually accustomed to every kind of military labour, obedient, disciplined, and convert him into a useful civilian after he had reached the independence at an early age to which he would be entitled by the new system of recruiting.

In continental armies, the previous education of officers adopted at military institutions has seldom been found to qualify them properly for the staff.

The military constitution which is advocated in this paper would more contribute to develop the pretensions and qualifications of officers for high and confidential employment than any other system.

We find that the situation of Brigade Major is always filled by able and active officers, in every respect fit for the duties they have to discharge, because they are selected generally by commanding officers, under whose vigilant inspection they have risen to a certain rank, and established a character in their regiments. It was asserted by a general of great reputation that *fighting, and a good deal of it*, could only make good officers. This, to some extent, may be received as an axiom; we must, however, consult *Guibert*, who persuades us that great generals are rarely to be made or found, and to conclude that none of the capacity described by him can start up in one campaign.

“C'est une encyclopédie, elle seule, que la science militaire. C'est le plus intéressante des sciences, soit qu'on la considère relativement à la variété de ses détails, ou à l'importance de son objet, ou la gloire et aux grands intérêts qui y tiennent. Puisse cette vérité, sentie par les hommes qui sont destinés à commander les armées, leur faire appercevoir l'immensité de leurs obligations! Car ce n'est encore rien, que l'acquisition des connaissances qui composent la science militaire; il faut, pour être un général du premier ordre, savoir employer ces connaissances; il faut avoir le génie que rien ne peut acquérir, le coup-d'œil que l'habitude perfectionne et ne peut donner; il faut réunir un assemblage plus qu'humain de qualités physiques et morales. Aussi doit-on rester confondu d'étonnement et de respect, à la vue de petit nombre de généraux que le postérité honore du nom de grand. Il semble que la nature ne les produise çà et là, au milieu des siècles, que pour servir d'époques à la grandeur de l'esprit humain.”

Hygiène.

With respect to the Hygiene Statistics of Mr. Sidney Herbert they may be correct, but few officers will concur with him when comparing mortality connected with different avocations, that either food, bad cookery, clothing, or ill-ventilated barracks are the *chief* causes of the excessive mortality of the soldiers of the Guards and Line.

A young lad of the Guards probably is on guard twice a-week, and on sentry two hours at a time, four times in the twenty-four hours; and after being exposed to the weather and the currents of the avenues of St. James's returns to a hot guard-room, throwing himself with his damp clothes on a guard-room bed. It is this kind of work, and the want of continuous uninterrupted sleep, the temptations of a capital, habitual inebriety, in fact, the life of a soldier, night duty, and inadequate garrisons, that destroy our soldiers and increase the Pension List.

Barracks are too crowded, and seldom sufficiently ventilated; but the rooms and cottages of our labouring classes are poisonous, in consequence of defective ventilation and cleanliness, in comparison with Barrack accommodation.

The wear and tear of the constitution of the Metropolitan Police do not support the conclusions arrived at in the statistics to which we allude. The stout well-fed Policeman takes his eight hours walk, has ten hours off duty, and a comfortable home ready for his reception when relieved. Positive and accurate information relative to the averages of mortality, and causes of discharges in regiments of the Line, must be difficult to procure. Rapid embarkation, unhealthy stations, and the consequent ill-health, and discharges from the effects of a disease *unnoticed* in the controversial and statistical details lately produced, defy all calculations of the

Actuary, and the great increase also in the list of discharged, narrow-breasted, ill-formed young soldiers incautiously enlisted from the Militia.

Militia.

The Enrolled English Militia may be stated at 60,000, but not more than 20,000 of this number can be calculated on as an effective force when called out. Unsound and defective as the Militia system is, it might become less objectionable by discontinuing to enlist for the Line when a corps is embodied and called out for permanent duty, and when a regiment has attained a fair state of discipline. If called out for drill, or for inspection, the men might be allowed to volunteer, at any time, with the sanction of their Colonel, while regiments remained disembodied.

Expense.

It might not be thought possible to commence, at this time, with reference to the Navy and Army estimates of this year, the projected reconstruction of regiments of the Line, and the organic change in recruiting which is to attract to the Army the best description of recruits. We have no doubt, however, that these beneficial and necessary measures might be carried into effect *immediately*, without an outlay beyond that included in the estimate of this year; and that, brought forward with the support and concurrence of the Secretary of State for the War Department, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Queen's Army, the Service would derive from them more advantage than from any of the boons which have recently been conferred by their intervention and exertions.

Evening Meeting.

January 30th, 1860.

W. STIRLING LACON, Esq., in the Chair.

NAMES of MEMBERS who have joined the INSTITUTION since 1st January, 1860.

LIFE.

Somerset, His Grace the Duke of, First Lord of the Admiralty
Layard, C. E., Lieut. 15th Regt.

ANNUAL.

Davies, John, Captain R.N.	Bannister, G. W., Major 2nd Bom. Light Cavalry
Lee, Mainwaring C. W., Lieut. Coldm. Gds.	Longmore, Thos., Dep. Insp. Gen. of Hosps.
Buckland, F. T., Asst. Surg. 2nd Life Guards, M.A.	Smith, H. Fowler, M.D., Staff Surgeon
Mayne, Richard C., Lieut. R.N.	Lemon, Thos., Col. C.B. Roy. Marine Lt. Inf.
Howison, Young Howison, Surg. M.D., Royal Hospital, Chelsea	Sladen, Joseph, Lieut. Royal Artillery
Leahy, Arthur, Bt. Major R.E.	Chamberlain, W. G., Capt. Royal Navy
Doull, Alexander, Lieut. R.A.	Windus, A. J., Lieut. H. M. Indian Navy
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Porter, Whitworth, Major R.E.	Minchen, F. G., Lt.-Col. H.M. Indian Army
Duff, James, Bt. Major late 23rd R. W. Fus.	Dundas, Thos., Capt. 12th Regt.
Hay, Graham, Capt. 62nd Regiment	Rough, Wm. H., Capt. H. A. Company
Wyatt, John, Asst. Surg. Coldstrm. Guards	Gould, T. T., Lieut. 13th Light Infantry
	Jones, Geo. Captain, late Mon. Mil.

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