O'u/ii /.u Qjaca£Urvt OaMA^rz^xic^

Q£oaa~ ^uJLQjuaiL. ^-u ‘cite

-tw S&\rui~ ^VWvAfe^Y ^ATlAjdJ
f\ . BuZLAX^-dli, i Jv^. Cro AVAnJL. > aOu{ Xg JIola-

i, S tW- Z"e- (Z<^CAj.-'\£ji!jU

X < (tcu^J~ JbAACAdtJ-t, ..(uJZt'L

fi> i^1&0 a- %^rXAitIX Jh<X~ AAlmlAvAlnjl-’ AMCdO 6 k/Q ,-mum^
(. < 5 &trwtX- J^JlnAjlM'^ 4 ^Aw
A. A&MJLu^ -~ l^SuaA.

C <^7 3> S-iaj-TjlI-l. AMuJ&Ct-O ClJlvtAvU&^A-

i, £?> >nu^ J^SO <3- Jk&-t&. AsGstl~

A- 'tXu dnflUtJL

3 %y&\p\&£L~ cLmstA— tjZzc&dvA-*

t> (aJOmL tX JL^-teX-tr-

O, l Hi 2. JiEcuJtcJ} ~Q/tivuus^ -faro xiA’t^c^t^Jlvv^ CuZua.

\‘ Bx&’CiA&XL* X- in-* 3 c4pxu^d. Q £LaAalmaJL- oR-<^»— <^u— AAjLtdl)

X . 'sStaJUmAiacQ Jm^ua^A - - -

3 Lclii- .

..fl- kUrf- <Ai.e^ /££* ■Wvufc^tryj , 'd_o. 5W^fc- 5“

-M— £> 2Z’ S'. SlrC^duXXv^'l ■?■’l/vZy'iA**tAsx . -.

(A- UjXa— 'farv ~CcaJ }~i Arv~x &'t Aa-Jai. ovxX, th^ .

6- C«w>i^'i*€'a- .'V'vt«rA^v> .,

<2. i*?73 . .jJLtu*i . JU*- aAcuJx—

I cJLL jj.aiZ^iAGV tJu*^ ^*i

7. - ^\vj?— CdtjUrtMAtju* J^MADstrii-cL^*-' -AAAlcii-^

3 ^Wu^t At^> ,vuUuia$ . ... ._

H U-v'i'VUjdL- u,'vC3k Xv-vvxX- ..

0 Qul, 3 cv 4 e«a*f ^u^iSL

i Av^v^wfot.

7- < 'Yv»JLj?£U| I A-d\%JU\ .'dA-l^A'A-

3* sivw£t(^£!l^ , iMWMit, , SaJOK- Qr*uj 5~CM

Ft CL*As

l - z pst

2 ( <&f coo (2 jtuscvl. dme^ ^ ^ cbz-ji.

Q~ F'^Aji i -^Lc-|u .-dt-cHt-uls'! . . .

I» 2/3 'VlteJZcv) ! c-£ 3

. % N>vv. . CcdUfa-UM*~ , ! 3 »?C tTXt /&Z A/VitjA-irv I

/> / li.x.i'Lj Cl„ ~ ,v_ J

*7 S . /V)AA^AaaAaaav\ Jlr£e*M~ t>-X~tSL £-frl£4.t*U~ ,

nr

BuCt^OiA-C^t-'v u*S

7 .

GsdjUj _t>vj

. .2-. . ZirceJC .i^dAuAttAnA^r

(3 £_

1. LfiJbjL- OrCtAj . ._

2. 5^Xfviu-.„ -$w 2 ii,MjLi, I j&wufrc*j

C. S AvlJL. a£***^ J^<aZZ- -

i . 1 > O 2 c ‘■t&CtArCA h-'AAJU

2- . lQ*iA&i^ Raa/izJJL maaauiAlu -ji<2t2

D ^ <uuj! .

/ - <3 ‘7o .j 2/3 . '*vu.iik-t t~. cLctaA- cnAAiA Coaj .
P~ 2'3^/p ^AAaalAaaZca. Pi/ /i'Ui-sC. /2-V/ cAvr.

^ -, Cir'i— .

j. /t*\ 5^

X. QaxjL vhom .

>3 ^•L-C-t. iAjtHAuJL

^ ~tfdLLC-'jA.%rdf'V£-is~ ,rvij/«.j jLAtAAtJJLs .siA*CtAAs<XUAi.?

h, i'A.— 'f-~

i - l ^<- i-t-t.

A - U^ rL ^ Jj-a.FL.a-^ ci-aAa it'-CtA-td!

3 u ts~ tiLA'A^c-A ti-c-Ai'-

^7* tB/'L. Zc'iAt'jtstX-- Iaa^a-~ f jlsC^iaJIZ

<3oO M

- >.U. ' dhc- er b'i 044. Cu&ti.,.

$ Ciux^

i * *5 ■wu&j'.(L Ctrl *tfw

2. <. AMoihwXoeiP /CIaajlacXLuoLa.

3 CLiZvx*) oiA-j 1 0 0 ~d~ ^cL~jii£ 4 aa>

*4 8rfZ’MO&, 0 0°) o JiatuUdn. Coxlt C&t-JL. A^S. 3 ,j^ASvoJU>d. _ C3 -jbo )

S~ &0.

iS> c*n-zi-

i. BflsjzM Lo i io uniZ dru^ i I'jtih* a*a 4 J-^

A- Q,Hun, JLrc&Sl, ~ ^"sL

3 , l£tA/»X- ^ iA j tt7V»^VK^VVv^ s^tCoLtAAe^

li &%SUuJ SlO AVM*\ >jjU<0 VU^U^jL.. “* / 3 Av-foO-g<-* _^2TL> £•

C. sitnrz^- AXAJdj%t\^ .|ii!U»t. vUrt^ii-- . .

D CJalU,

i. (W. ^ AT£ £ 400 , ju>o

^ ^*<A. Cl/L. . 'd&l~ L J ClfL. J Cj j oL/1*£C\AA^vCA-. 01*0

3 -- OjvJLj^ ’$0j%2l£J{ jk.a-^-o Uu&I'mj.-uA-

M £ds'Ju\sr\AA.-t -Vi. 1 1

3" - u)a£JL .Jjjls <jsc \sJas**ass^c0c£ tn -co\ e*£

~S— <?Kcl& -faeO i-xrinZu/i^. .

.A . Lft^

?3 0lJLs ii.--i.J4 . .

. S.0 *?C >-£ U,n,'i4-1- ^t'vc«- , 0 V /^. ^wuAtvi

P 't£u~ •JvU^ „UsjnJu-0 .

I - £)cv<i. ,’tla^i iZ^Jn^iJL .

at • ^]li^w6a| AyCk^U- 1 , s~‘-£'— J 10 4 0 Co- C<L>y\j-LtJu-4.(X-- &<r.

3 . lit' '-fyv o < '2- i^tJ'vC"nO S-

H j .i.^dLoJL't. .CtUx-^ uuzA .

51 QoM^x- .

P,££•>... .

£ ^4&W 5^

O' . A^jjUifU

. Vi i.

~L%\ - ~^oJ!/ij

B £>'& % (r^ . ..itA i«V, cioui-Hi i-sgij/

/ < -H D . ^AAwru-tdL.

2- 10 7 c. . U~ SSAd^vb-1-f

(- . 3S /v} wVjr.-ct-Cii, G~ yL.t\fix^ cv^t-e^i l_

/. ^-troo -o-,Jl-^

'X . .

0 tylfid- UAA&MvU*- .

. - i • £k't-M^'M4,VU£V L ^-- AUAu4-

2..' -IVf^i-wL-

3 . ‘^I'f^ii.'L.c.^ L ^^ r lrVt S}X(f~c-L-'L. iX?tn£x

j£ . ,<^wt,i, i>v

/■ A"|c) it'J /Wv^&v ^wu»V 3" ^v<-cVej.

^ ^ >^jU*l4§*-. h.sU-£^.

3 QjJ^ILsl, U^L^tZ-^f

*M4T cVM-Fl^ ci^etsw I 2

VQE £W. e^L- -^--U 3 ite,^ >

A £&v\ . />T

6 ^, v 3 , V'^vL 72;/

*• . i?- 75 ’’le... frteX- r<<t^,. S 7-r.tj^ ; /t*| ■^try AJLftXf A

2. . / i^-t'->vtA'W.'i.-i^£&, iASyCf'-fl C*rc-t^

;> , Qm/vU-^U- vi*Sf AM?W^VU1^ JOO^o -.lAJZ'~c+-l^t-~w)

-iA. ..

- -. .V£tA-*JLg^| **4*- .^u^7* . ^Vr ....

B (^'W/rCj/iA. <7w _ l^tSO

.^ ‘ 'hi&-'v-Ls -6- c7z- _c : l-L~ £j^-2— A^JxJXXcvhA-

D • ‘'WlM,' i^t^A-Vvt^-lkT- Cff?A4— .&JLtZUt |

i= -t£wiV*j V“’“'

'sJv-> t2c.o Jas+AaX- oMai cI-u , <V<- .'UM’i~t,<xlZ? v l Xo^alJL jLu-p£i*JL. ^Ou£2- <a- --jjcn*^

■'US'U.'ffiUtuAttl^. CttUAjSjUt-i'l.

3 -80

Q aa£/JL ewi.- O-4-v G/Wua~

^htn^cur^ ' JJUajTtJLa <.-&&&$£>

J- jz aaJU

1 , S Z-ct^Lj t & ffiPG% „ <sJn Ur- Jr u^i^AhJ> * ^jJrudlte*-- JLlc^JL^ jLe&JjJL.

Z * XJ jU^cX— J\UX^J^Al. L+J\Maj fJjJJJG\\/iu- /\AAsV\ ^ AAAnJLlbQxJt-Jk* *

^>, STW£a| yLia'fct^i. jfciA.

H U) *H, /UL&tJs\A/L~ JU~ txfu*uj. &u\ JUj~cJh &—* JuJcJa^,

b LJ-iuJ- x^tru, a>- ? CcJLt* tAjL^ju ? t&JLc. AJ y cJu£H ji£^o ,

^ * 0 tT- -JuX(/C- s^pASvwdL. C^aaJIU •fe^unX^ : -4l.’0A£ - .,

JL >0 cSii/uLf C (J~tbJ \,

j. Csu-u u^t- CcJ^u. cnc\J /Usux+JL Oa*s ? <Ja<y cJlsjjzJLf ^t^uxju C^\ Aaulaa^ f

?J, ^ dbczJL- JVUjdL**€^

3 UJ ^ ^udL OaaJL calu-u AsUsdJlwif /LuU- ?

JrVtcJ^ dti?XAji*jf /Vvt^u-j Jks&AsC’ Ztf- Cc*Jc£a A* ytc^J^. QrU&JL jbuA&*~~

S . AX" JLSAS^Jt ^iA— JhA^$\4/\J-$n^

fcx £: ^Acaa^ /L8v«rut*. tctAj (A-OaaaA^ *fppJ , jffl b€tjusvj Ci/jrlM^

^ * ^Vttr Ar^Jyv-- irv\ $h-A&- £'Cia.*-x- .

M t) JUi, ^ ikiXBw.

i. CLtt- &frtt*vZTi*<| jejuLEL., £>/ ouj cUrtn^U- ' LrxiSX- ji^eHL.

JL<L4i

I

3. >-^vtt>^v^" -i-vx-tT^A-AiL -$trWL cA^ Qih£ Jj&t&u

^ %|d- LlaXaxZ-le-va^cue^ nJCcJilL^ cl. -^luAdi^Lvi ~l

S', (jJ^lUJL. Zlt£<*jz-. , i§ A*aJJUvv\ a*, y /MaMacvi f^A- ^ 330 Leu wi ~ /i?47 Clou

Zj u! {tlUcSL J^UAftez- At- JW- ^leM<Jua^ Juj^h jLuuaacs^ yUCurcO JUffUjlv kL. ? (M>CU., Mae ^L^-SAj)

JA ft^KL

f , W -cCC Ai^j JUytL>LULZx. ?

X ., (?suM<a~. *^j tJU^ cdbh*J~- CCtd^A-. ^i^JL Jk*-4~~ '^AsudbuJ f

3 . dt*4** A'Ur- sfasv 44-iiv AA-l^-tCw^ JloisiL-L Cij-^C~L~ CAr%flJb &AJsVtA&~> J/-Z-* -

*4 . qJJlA — iJUXcJ *

.

( 1 P ^tX- L'axIaJ-c^sA^^ Jb<, J<riAJL^ ,

A/ZL ^X. ^Ct/ Ua*%£-~ <■-- 3^*^

3 . ^v\ ^-dAi^ JUkJ&ajJL* w UMt^JZdsl Ma^SIaahPu^ P

QJrmn**. JLcxX- cvULa. ^ro aovU'U^. r

S', CJJLcJ- do- UrL. do- ^ 1V Ck. J-iA^ J^y "do- ^MJLOyJtMyJ- , l^fS"

U MW 4^u ^ a*. 4 ^ , W ^aJ~,

1- %jIu*C^ CAtu^fiU a™ 4*^ Ha UrAo) Iflut. |£«rwv« usvdz,

- V ( '^Vw- '^JLeo<y~> ‘

i * C-bmA— Ss itwwt } f" £?

^ ^ • c£ ^' jdudUA- j JUMMy CvotsnhMS 3D AMtJJUdv^

3 . CbJbrfscdyytns ,I A-Cyy-ty Ciy*yo*dU<so> .-' D D >Vvi'Ui£t*rV'j

C Ac^y, c*oJm aJuL sc 4 tco J

tXt£T 3 -82.

H.O. 3/0 -ma-v 3 il

JL^.suybJjL ^ C g. (?-

_3i-S'-S&L.- (ItAXJU^fi. dub dtywA' _____-_

-j 9—jJLu. 3(tS$Lt _ dtodUfax vjLfefcfaU. 1Z:__

-L- ^JUJfyUM&E^OAi _ J^jUxnaA >.£* 0 ... _iic 4 ^ 4 -_

---_GX*{_4Q^_JXgi<afei? _ &acamma^ _

-- 3, --^Iba^bia^a^dd^-^Aj^Oa^^_

_ b. _ 'Sduo. ___

Qa3£u^ ...rAjJLJaj ___

. h . ..h.AzAjUM _ Aj&dkejL ^ JjuJL-.ALAul, . _aut.-.JguqA1 ^A^CcUAj-.

C-. Gaju _ i _

I . (hk^. |?U1& S_0_ CL£&m^Jex=^>u ___

-A._ S IL. S *. tl/UiiJUJpi _Jta Ai?_ c£atKujL, __S PV/sAS-.^c£iuirtd^%L

_l i_ 01/uir^.jJLi — ISsueci _

_<£ •_^.a?uL_^A4«£ ! c£- fi>- __

_E>«. _ Quhbm LalJk — ofr-JLt _ AaJkuA&6i/L£f.^u asmAL L%tO,^. _

-L,-S-Cii^LiX .4«i-_ AtAa _ Sji&iriS: _ GAeJ/L _ iALPXCudik^ _ JU^Akl^Ci^ _ chJjuAi* _

./v * S^juir- SL)-d§/u^/uc,JjL*AM’i^ . JLAkAA&jL _ 4/vkl'il AsaA-Of^ _ oAU-y^.

- 3 ._ _U3 A-l&u^L. _ /SI __ QcdcJL^i _ Ad4AA2M*dtA?- _

_ 3L _ Qma2 _ dUfyUA&*AiA-~L\A>tJL. _

___ _ t> _ U!U)uiln.-.Jka$lj*t4. uAsaaA-JLhjL'- _ LJLt*^-£fo _ & * . 3 JULcxdL _

.feaW lamp's -C<~ Avtt< dU&A ou&aJ- _ L.-dhdAi^^.JA.

A. _ G*t'- JUzsJu^. £14- _ LB 1 2., iiStut ^j ^jxuj. _

. . . 1 ^mtUZ^^lA,.M.Q _

_ Zu _Stmoc,_ c£iA^JaJk&£-j^ _ JaaJLuS2£l _

- -__ 3 - UOJu .jbcAA^.- . ISO aa%A13z^\ . v dk^„ jXcul. .A _

-jJLaJz. _ aL, _ mjzJJL _ Utjn/L^^-

.... ^■ r t ,._S~_ mahuJL. _Juwju. j&~. _ s^£o«ia~. JC _ £s4a*AdjUAcJh-. jJU*.. .^jaoii^QjAai

___A&fcfa£L>.—^fe»<W.. 0 /Ljl.^La _ -

_l_LS-2A___

_ 2ts _ Gaa^ _Z ?_&A^<tidMau_. tkntol(JUAtdi _

©

JJH_ cdL jza. _

—L‘ -

3 - _ Q o^leJLurvx . ^-. S'- O-i .0.00. .. ; jUxAimSAJL -_

Gjvtv X_ ps i JUta/iXj,

_L_fefhaSb_ -LA _g£_ il§. _ 'Lko&db&EUaA ___ _

A •_ 1. *? D . A**S _ ^&As^pX3Aa*£>^. _ ^.UA^—.A—AmjS3^xAA^*^-Ck\XxUt— j Ji 2. JWUjt2cv-is\

_ 2 >„_ uXfcAAr .o^ £u^>. JA c . 9 ..o

_JE._ 3 A eui—dn? _ ^ux^uacuJkL. umJL, ______

-fi— _ft« A/uAdL. , —a£— Luuuxoaa. .JLelu*ttaa2 —SLS —CUtdL SU. __- _

_ L _ CLu&2 _ tALdlSluftiMCJU-Aj^ . AJLoaL*- - _Ja3L_^

S-AJlAiAUfrL. . OtfAsiA-.-JCoA^J. J3 .._.MJZ^CAaAI1-. __*£ • L _ CsduUL*^ _

. !•-- Gjau_ cJmx. Uaajl, _ Q^O^r^L^P^S- iiWt , _ ‘aa&mAuiIa-—

. ..Ar.,. _ 4 k- J^i^AjLu—jJ/UiX _ M^Js^AiOSjCi _

-> /tf.. T . i . . _ i . . ".Aft . 'T. a.. I T* . . . . < .1

l AruU. U- -MejMAM- JW4^

VL

. ._ja££— Gajlcuh- aJk^i- jnAv _

-L- %ljiiA^0i4&£~- Ushdk _ MiOA^taMy\ ?~ L Ai&ijEU^ A&loc- _ .

-2jl<- A.-CLc- — JtuSJUxaj -—Gr- tMxtuxii &OZuAr-_ Cix\A bu^x '^O.-^ju^o'^C.iZLitCj

_ icdhtU^ - - CXXaJl*. ^ iJu— Ax^iujjXAA— . ._ -- ...........

. A .. -J CTrsftj.. CjZ<^Lc<*J. _Jkj—__A<CU,v<j- ... C.. /3 ^*-£4... f-^Lc_ X.^Ll.') .. .

. .. .I.. _ £utl-jsUup~. __ -. .- . ..

- - 2 . -“WeuigJb — Ms-*.. tUxAv. *S4~_ SLu JU.-JhjzMi. _ L-—AaXUftU^Zt. C&-3&- ) (/Act AxCVVxzA) .

(3 .. hsM^ruvuj-- s^dlZcruX- AkilLtux—. (Ataax^vUaXxxXL JbuA^d^’y^i- .

.. i • ..(AIL-, .aid!-- JbireUidL, J^uUXL Tc- ^cmk, ffkxl __ _ .

2 ,. (AJL MAa-. t Jj^uA^uXjA-c^. aJ^cuaJ ^ Ji -<<|

. C-____ -_ _. _

-L—— >MAjALi<UiXL S^id&ujArr- c^JL-JLct^. ujzu^ .

-. 2 l.< Q^uJx&iaaA _ yjJaXl--M&UiSiJ J^uAIa-T. _ ___ _ _

(D

3 - 82 .

_ _ I. f).^ ,Jl vjl 1 ~ p* l '- A Usu%, _

_ t L*_ LlIjuAl. _ J-JL _ ^h<iZUau _ZiJaa^SL_ £yy~cL . _Cxry*<yYU*ZL. Jb*{ ^SUJL. Cru CX>i£urr>^, _

. Mr _ &Uj*L..U±C (£sJU _ CoJ^-^Uaje — U*iaZ~ -.-

_Q__ £Kft4r-._ _ QJti&idtu _ i-JLuda _ dtni&bz _ JLjtyjuJL? _ &4*L$/U4JL* jCiM&cJz* _

_^ Sx3£*4l5r_ ^fn^a^c —ojLiv4" ^ sJh&eki _

_JSl._S&W QCU\) -JAa _ i£ etiup _

_ X -«-_ ^j^/vxJUit\/Ut2A3.. ^U^u/Uas^. _ (0.0.^, Ji JituX _ 3/X3& _ Cjpa^JL- _

_<3_ Q&U^kUMiL^ _ J^tdA*bLuJ&! _ JjJP*f4AA&£, _ . HiLldaOMAe^. _

. C . QjLtJL. ^jLu>-$t£4-_ G^tAjiuiU — h . Sa^v- _ Ji^aAJA^^ A53-Q- _

... Jt MsiL. „ _Si 13 & 6 _

.-_.J J _.. J ^eAA^..-.^UA4L. .,_ Amaxsl- . JXtuu*-. .. _>... ... i^uJU-_

JL._ 34mJ^Qa£o^-uL,. _AL- jL. Q-.„ JS*%JL .1L£.._ CtAAtoqu ._ 0 m ^ 4^ _

_ & RrfuT /\^fttJ. J^ujxajal^ _ ULa^fiuu _^pl> .. JUrfixMaZLavO _

_ _ ^AAj Jfr.Zfj, i tvJm- _ i ~^tiuX.-Xn- >j2at^o ._

. 3. JfctO^dk _jAc„ jSjST._ 4t£&_ ___

t*i JtL ZL»- ^JUuua .Ac. 0<334 *£iilld? JL^—JLl. — fi:D l &*z -

.A. CcdU^Sl&U&~ £L (t i S*.— _.. _ SLiULt —*-’T"i „A£$xU&bi£c~ ___

),. jfjutUalL — *fau£U — &4^**^.JXktAJtb$Xck^^ ---

_ _i4.A_ . 'j.JUL.^.. QbuaaX^ _ Mup* .Mtfar. _

j Ur i^3uzJL^ eLcr-

I . (3 jj2u~ £- Js*^ suUxJL^.J^ _ Ocj^_l y J <3 8 i- ...

_A. !21aJmjcJL.^ c^juMvjai -!!—Jkufc. JlsscaiL ..JMaaL<a^ .........

JX

AjSAJUyftjL Jjj€k^u€b U

n^Sr., (2a (J-r fyiP t

__L_ juiAM^. _ LtuidL-Lc--

-4^

/uJbcHa

3_ ^huA^uxisA _ F£_MA. j2uiJL-.JL£^^__

—2«J- Ql^v^cAc - i^JLcu^ ^Ll tiAJL — Mlt-lrr -4^4*. _ifi34'^i*iZs£-. -4**?J-dL - _

_C„_ QqjUaomBoaI — /UJAguidL^-^ji^^ -jCkitjaaL _ G.&G --

_ii— -AtuJL .xLlAGl.^ J&eutt, H^mA- Ltr — ^xr x A u s & G .

. & ■_ tiXiUsfV-A^ - . Mis _ dLLbC.A$7* l _ Jk)4XAAs<kLLr _ L-L^ _ ^pu/iht*.--

_Xi_ . aMGLultj^^J^ —£LJBL

-j2(U«_ Aj^uomju xte-tenij

i AjTSUJlJbui^ (JJmJzs CtAuj^urtU^ .

_ Eli _.^Kfc.. sjd&dAi _ QJZAAX _ ttt^nJh^. ^ lin-. .

_L :U3 Jxe«o._- JMAAu<^^^Q2i4j-- :

. _

- - —.- %L< - §^^AAiM<1TJ — AMUmJL=. Jjj.’CnAaeUadles--

- .. .. J2L, ^UZJL-Tife;: C3^AAA<dt9Ltf^a4^^ _C^fCb^M<!h^C<aA«^.____

. . _ tlz .„y JLtUnJ tyj*- -XXs^pr^.J&uU. fi^\.toxr r Oa^lJL. J'uHA. o- .

.. X L L . Si}- JLco-O _ctcE_t-<^- AtU*&Aj34JzCr- - - - ...

. A 4^" . Gavs^ ^i^ . ,^o-u& UfewO. (xus^i . J^SUx^J _ _ .

.. L ... JLu^> . uxiz&x uAuxtL. ^v-t^ cv\ juas *Jliu um&JL-

.... . a ^pXA*~.s^fA£i2-- jCUa). ->MJ&CIAMScpO •&$*)*' - .. . _ _ __ _

. _ /3 . . _ J3- . . >$ud^UJ> _ 4&pt^O cdlcvUs ^cA^. ^UAjJUm~- _

I ‘ A'vu/s- ua~ 4^c-u-virt-vt£^v?fri^ Jb<n£\. 'tacti.JZt-1,% Gu*Jb JOi/UaajUg.^ aJ&wi/x-.

— - - ... ^j_ QJtfl'iAJLs .AArCiiAXCgZ-' _ '^CEnti-' j5U e^L-oS -&is\ C-G*} ^UdJi/x. dlcUjuJ

c — CaliiiL Oa»4x. £ £ev cm Xu* ayumZ jU'acu^Jt^nJ

.-Js^U/lA- . vILaJU GM** £<J- Jb^L* AjULdkj jb-i^ Otlo t -Mu-i* -^£-HyO ■ .. G~ ok-i*.

LoJlltuX- t*&* f ohe* A-c&vi^4- Lv~ - 2*-1* ~d.'---<~s . t&. vt.-t.-c 1 £ ,— . de&t* ^juXu^ue* &

£aJa2a** M''~- 2lu* t'-t. ! i^-vvZ.|' uri'S^j ^u^usti't^ f ou^-JL cFvxMcf 4 <£ ,.

^tAux- <-iA- iS_ Jt&cJk*- j ‘^tw. J/vecuu^ X^~^c^uC&t*> -a^v-uM =

_<&C--C. OViA| ,^£w <&A*sr-L@Uv <3^'Y . Oj.JkgAJO ~-iA- -s^TUsO ZkJtibi* Jht i&,

(Xajla-* . . Sci-i^w- -^•-w-c . 6— ‘V-*W«, iJatJu SAuxicuak- , XvX.

Jc&<biCL &a*JL Xu*. S' _, MuM .. i Hocwc. Afu!-c <*£(*.. -*4— ..< U<X-X- ,

^ ■cl £. zn^XgteJ'^ ®VUU/\/vu£l'i'd , C-i&iAr -, ^ i8 AXtJ^l> ‘■4,t~

.. o££L ^V- (?SufaucJ**U*~ &tyt^yy\j, a4~, 97V-/3S3 , . ..

(3) R/2. 6%/ A&fcAAzA'le- Ca* the. SviUiudbjrvO CLcb. 19 30

C 3'2.7 "BO Aj^evudSX*- Jhi* ftcVAU/vujXjue* 6v\ S-j&VirtceA-)

^,- (XjUi-dLt^ CiZP U rbuJL> Usttu£c$- CtJ^e- 4*- jamX* ^>V /J-uxe^oO
,_^tdvo£x- J -^irvwi- JUjMujuXXec^O o\i ctXiMj uWpy\ - yvw4j&- u&uAiA^^Cvuc^ .

SZa&v S-CuiaA- Co\AA^^a^fi— *AAeecJxoA) X-LlxtcPi* <unX-\ (Xvi^ -$&aX~- *aaa-c(^\j &cArtiXu*j
G^CCccl&uX' » Su-iXtceatLwx) ^-Jtiueb* *Jkcu>je , &v„ OcruJicS^ ^ A^Ui-<JL Jtuseus- j <*”
CkAfiltuHO CLOOetfewjfcL- > UJ(iM&- JUaa* k *£e«*-$Jrwi‘U^- (p*. Aru^ciectO *$urux*J tec-oi^euZk-

^M/U-UU &V0 A^lUM%£s £Im.JL AuA<liAAfu<Z$ A^tc^chnXt'j-

U)aujtL. ^ l Q&oUajmA~ u^SinXe-, Mr J^c-ut2j &- ^icvb-cULuJu A£e4n~U*f

Jhu^nJ J^i^^XaXeotAj CetuUiJ)— •

^/2 ^AJTX^AA^XffVe -^CrU (kUi«UV CUxxdiuJtA--

^2 -ftovv-LO .~4jLG. v J- ^Ajzec<u-afc<rnJ

( a h(.(yiA-. Ct-f-of /Y-72.. )

o 7 ~ 21~ &Z. ®l4.&Ase, v^oie^Y JeevujL* Mw-euiJl* CuZX-lt** 4 a** ihu* „.w-JLu~tdZi-t^ <f-G. , Sovi&U^

XvSJu Au-^uAuA* to- cdkxiA^ UjrtX &1 difip .JUrtuA - <AUrl- <Ubui*J -ufo tJLtcf CutC, ^tina| i&ru/wO 4wCAxh-^

Jhu* UtMJ-vu*, - *^JUu*s ) (r<*> (JuL* -fytdUL Sefi^vitA- cAtc^ <^r- LuuX) eba- *fr*ob/L-

j JbuA* l9u*\? Xm*~ JttAA/vc4*> to* Xu** ^ C* Q&m*J$ iJuJQ-db

,4ASU> IfyH i J &* f-tZMPl &4 \5 X%U*J Jax* Lla-uJ* <&4tXi£j *

^UAA-OVXycXhj cLwXL- JL/uAuOuAj ^vir(b-UA*-ClAML* JlAHAJ turtiJL, fi/t'V Gjuu*^ £■£$
\J^JIaas~s Jlk^A~ i/->uv»XA< Jiu4jg\A4/\-e> ^v<*iA*e£eu^ j JCkjt&4s cn^X-j bL&CO OuX£&uj •

^VWt^M— ^/U3u^ dUMr- AMArtX- <*iut£cru^ Uf- X<JL> APUL I Aee- AHAtMc**,

JhiAAO tXefye-' - Mr-Uv^tO 4r- Xv-Jyfjj CmuA~ / -^ v iAa» ytecrul 7 hr-

'X/ULtJb iijnsCh l4v<~ , 6«^£. ^VM3VU^-| -ti. JVXJjuleJL Ur ‘Heefi’ Xawi ofi-faste. f A^d,

o'Vyi^/rU'uj ^3 -Iu^aA 6w Cuu^ Jt^JL ^ -^oe^-^udvvtet A. Jb-u*f XrrtAA-. hn>- Js-tt-JL

'-hi* ’ev^AtohuXtA — y«^cu^ *^U-olb\ fi-hrXA^ U-ndh. Uvu -futyhloit#*tA — ‘

C 3 .Qu>U CUh&L; . iAc. US JbetA- Ow. Ptl&fn yn-.-£- Juvut. JttW Avta«^

.,,,<_ . ^-(Ml Ca-L*X. Jy\A.VtJb.O,-J CVZ^U ^lJL- in-%j!ij. . .4-1 . t A\X~

QaA-'&AJL-C^ t -lAuJ^. j CIm-JL* d!'\J,\X* <A^ Ai^r <2 ZD , ^C^V* Jks~y£\s

aguuuh. CSJ~ dUltuMouQ JiCr .V*u&Ul\s tiA-uL CWL &*tvz. 1,1a. j^AMcc, d$a:i / <jtJLjlc&, llgUsajJL.

' (jo- otJW Ac-.uj,

- 'd/unva JhosOL- /Ulo-tA^ii. JbxM- -^0 .<ajUL^ ,

<Jfu4-~ ,< a, ,^Lc£tb~Hj> - f Ut*-uX- deiai^SL. ■-■X^ £xeU}<£.t*U asc~x£ ,

dkjUL. uvUjl, /Vc<-vi*<c-vi_ iJU. JruiAz, .CoaJL JUA/afUaZt£u&- u

uL-~x-. Jri'U. 4-v- ix4Ci> .-M4 -

(SjiiiM. .Ju_ ^ju£dc, tZuLs C-c!^'t4^ t£~

ajUijL JL&l^ 2

^ > OlsJ^

O Q-AAi$M*4^ d^\A>CV^S^\P * JtAcC* Jh^~ %u£J2a~ a+x JL'tnAi* , JLl* --^01/X^r

aa^, jla~. ■A’Atj 4 it 'i^X~ L-inJLr -^\jL*C-^UL2-* c’^1

U^s~tL Avu^nx^tA^a- r

>crw w^c_ Ux-^t^A,^A~ ( Xnot, 4*^1/^ <M^,^ S 43 ^ t^vut,

&- c^CtA-ci^X-. 4-drs^uj * SiU-O <s— ^ </ ■'UuJlciS, c^ clstULM, £fC ^U^c-Sajij

Aau^a^jc^M Lv- " Jbi^uaJ^o^o , S <r^t^ CA F OaiU^^ ^<“' €t£Ctw

a CXAA'idbj bfrv4\ IbSL&JtA^ AAA t^4— AAtj jly

JLm^^ (MkJk*~ OIxcjl^ ; i?V\ |£X- ^LeuiSUs**^ -

*StkjU*Jl CCvO Mas Cc^xJi jtaxhj-jL. ^ CU^JL' CUJM&tJ ^O&k .

vVU^At^vi' AZL^'W^j U,4 u^- JLg&jJL* } Ai" ,-MAA+a . ( fictt^e^vU. /ll<Us^

OZO ^q d&- L\^cJ? <Xo (3€u) 01*Ac> "&« , &U. lk^

c4a- cLx~ AA^Mjk^unn ‘ta^Ji, .

^V\ ^JArtAAA<<;ML~ Oi£JLs L&JU jjAjtsJ^ . QJU~eyjeJL £&uAL> CMu\A- £&--t^C<*^ €2.XS-&-A&* .&CU*sisuL ^ ^mGZia^

AMau$uA 4,\ K p!$uAO J/A&tL*' 4 dlut^ C£xZ*%jLjL- AJUaaA— cSMsA^ jicJhC’ A’MUs) XtA vf-'C- ’

otc^^o '-^vO vVVCVt^v uiiA- iPi^ u ^rVc*^!^e> w^d-^V't-^ ULMCaaAL <

QaaAA^ B^yuMAA^ Qa*~ CJLCaAAS*^, J^C«| 'fynJzs i, pAsJ'-j ifhJU _<*-$Q C%**JL oCt-6^>

di^_> c£o- . . .

isu&iA - UjXurvO

Ji4b- I S' i^8 2, j CcJJktJL. £• (iLoA>- ^jUam^sw {. ^Vu^wu^j) J\nnAj*nL» ^ R^P ~^tn)

qaju^, Cnn-isss)

C<~ bOWMvuMjU-- JtuAxx) fttCrt&l. *UadL < 5 J- Aa««aa-u£ 6 ->-’ <«g

XlxA, 8aX</A_ Gi~ (IUa&MA/l- C'/Zp , ty4chuJL- (JPuxdL* s& 6^ 3 4 S <z*AL. F£$\C

iso- — iA(£* t^O ^-jfeivO &lxJ oKxAl, CxxZ*^, y ^Ax*xA* O^^CCxJ&Jfex, L&GjL* xF- c 4s$tt$AluA-

U/lnJu . 5Wt~ L&t^UcktA, wsvCf\ i~BMA ^h»X tAo nJUztX- 4 SCUx, txtA— yH-cW

•WWj , OlC y -jfO^CqcA— (Ax. A/Wt*/vts "jUklvO j (xi'iAJL tej-trxh, 0T-\ <^_ -QJgasO ,

OC AffWi AuAl. aA~ CX^f i£axA~ <$\Jaj-~ (xnjUL AaxA— -iA- <S_ AfVuxmX' ^JlcxxJ -fyexX <Ju^, &SLCO-. j
CXmSL Ju- ^wj , -Jv«~C ^ Jui, filcM, J£jUu~j } (xnjJL Ui^Jr- J^c, Otrux^ieleJL. M^JJ,

iS^feo itf B $~ , axicc-via^ ^ ^^dJUv>M~ C JLAaaI— mJ}a£QAcaAl, ovg^ AssAuALuJ&JLa

svlaaJZJL, m$l , JLn*X- dvo^ieJL £v~ aw>o 'ft?- £" V<?v <?<i ,

-jQaJ ~Jk>- C^umJOxTIxA ^ UrLtosO Cx. 4^JUuO uxtnx&tL JtuL* su&-ei^ ;

"fcwu- f

u^f £aix„

CXxU iX<-. i? BS At^Stv} ; JAXxJ~ CXxA^x At xmx) - 4 UUA^\ (Ax, MxUrt | As^dct'-' Uxid-X 2 - 2 .
/tX&AZOWX. AXAxJUxJaA-' . C ^xduX~ &*Aj dlxlMJL. £j>JL sUxJLov-* ; crv JAAjLuJkJL Tl/3

^tauv\a«a~. O^cvu-*-' ama- c&x- A«i^u<-fvo ^tUAf cn^x Jxx. uA^^tx,

0^ CUP , J!*uA~ ^uJLa£A- ^wii. -Ccua^^JL. <AvxL> T&- citx, ^uoe&&iwi&, ,

^ JlAJL* A-xen^J <Z**J ^Ci^^i^vCdL-Ui^ -^usuA-ci^eJCvT^ j *Ca-- , OxnxieL- Jt5-

AyL ^t£cvu—, AWn-t^A-fcfjvU-t£ ^yUArtAOVi^L. 6 -&s€- XuAv&J— Aax, GxZZf

-Pl&JL. JAAj&Jji^ aJ&L. CrujvO CiA/UUs^&wxM^. ZaL -^-rV A-i- JOjLmL- AjdLu^xtUt^ (Mjl. &c£tjl

<^3\xtAA(Ar<svOuJr-~ ,

^ A- * xJJLcAa- AA- C^/vtrvt^j ^ V% (Ax, Cx?"X/V4^i^Oxv\j C P* P.

0 jxs\> JAx- ^jUJixUxnsis ( Jha/x~ Aim| i&Uaxx^UL. J!mux) <^uv^*^ Eb- /Vs&o\*txTj^ , <t\GAi- lSuxA^
JUxxexo ) Cvtvu 3U- fiSaJz^ -ffeaw, $3 xjL, /yviuPA^^i Chx, mmAmm,<xvx, ■jlajUtJ

^JUux*, , ^cb^j. (JuaXx Jx^oa. Jb-au-0 Qx\ jx^(uroXJMiul~ uxxj cuxj dUtaxloo Ca^xvCiA£^ JLuX-

G^jI^CA, extxJhj xUstA- UjAccO Cxrixt4ccleAxx^i Cv JljUxxZPi'unx. S- •

5 (Xt_ yVU^C- TLvtxX, w* CxnxJZ, } TX- J4xe£u,-£Xx yC-twj (x^t^AcTAX^ x«.ilvi/<j ^ ,s x. tunA )

<2/u AisCLt)l~ (X, -Jk-OxdL. Gao^A- -ioX-aHAf^ xU^Xx CixcJ^ A(iUs\ Jte'CxxxAeA* Aa~ Luzxix Gfafa .

^ L&U— U>Uiu^i^ J>^ $di*Clr%M* 6U~ LsUTn£*> JhjL—*

C$Jb&iAAit™ . &tr ^t4^4rt^CO ,

My /o& A S OfJ jc\f&Cur>7iG M

- 1 .. Jtu&t —uajElv .-Cn^cu«. 4 ajmJL. ..»&<«_ qCum. /H^waMSrM

ti u£ L£A H ThiZKAT - f _

O'" — ~ f

_-

_ 'PJ ^^£•■'-4 _

_6__3l_1_

_CcuL .• <.j S~ "Z*- QcM**dLc-iU. 4 Co^-'-trjp _ 2- _

_ lJ8 l _kti&teuJL .slhadxcrr. _i_

. _V_5“1 C'-l^cO _ <2£^sn-i_C?«*Vl« _ _ _3_

_ , % _

H

2-

H

H

/k

__I_ G^aLu-

GX— h -w|L&s-^._

-Xvu'tAs G-.iL

t Jpv^ j’U-iVvn^L j _ , o O _ G*rusZjL ^L*.. yUvn.W ^ ^ -^U*^

£4Wx_

.vxwU. .^_

GU&E &--

J^L*Jfo)UL. ■£-'•->• lbs - Lz^t-.iy , ^X ~ U. v ui’.-'L (-& &..<-■ JksiA. <Jm^o V f~ ^«r_

. . Gjia/<j _(Tw- ■«*€.. iruXUc’zc-i-d'j _

i-vo-iS* £<v. jus^JL Aa-cLi- Cu+ltri- 'M***~. jbzXt&dU/r*J&3 t $Xc2- Jf£&*^—£sss. _

1/^^uy _, J^twum\aX^ ^u-.u, - ^^u-PcU^cJiii^._ .v«^ii- jJ-rxt^ ^vu _ u^u.t^..a^h£^ .iX-t-_

iTuXhx'Pyyd. A^U-uU _.&£&a*& 0~ *■ °P- -U.p~_ _ ,,£tV G^M sX- < M* J- _

•■^•'U*"^ . ^vu2ci-_i^ _CA?Us±s^t_> -AA&C-*jGCl-iU~- Pc\.^C4jJX( Ituu _ wb-^^i GXA.^- _

Cz-iajiJL Pi- <usu-*L~, _„_

^VUrtX-. LA- o£X {'i-vC- ■*W^Ct^uisLsis+-~ ^X-Vt*-w I_ ii^aP. — *jisH.£tLA /s ^-&{y HciaXaiJI -

«"Vl c^.w <~£ C£vt- r|vtvi-A<, ('-*st*L. titrn£ia£ _ ~$0<A,<. vvhajL- 4 ‘4'^iU-_

_ jma^£S' t-ifyiA . ^Z-X4p.<r- ZGu-tLr T i/ .6-C. Ci.*- _

Aa?u£L iJUv{ yvi’ujLtl PLc, Lpj rvcU*|, _ ■>

&b'<suJL £-C- jil*t,ujLi<d Z‘~ i^tcS.-. <»-is_ _ . A^^/Aiiw^Y

. J^.-CL ; .iC^ d-^PG-ix- at. A.u^i-y aw_ <L^u._ _

- Cf^CuLA. t-£) ■-iyti.LPls 1 oy AyC^yirJsiViiv-iiji ’ , -

J^Wl- jMz-ZLi/iASu hj:v\*£&. ~Po C’-tdx ; ^ ■4~tu 4Ut*n<:i •.■LiU.yi.i-Ui.-y i.iu.~-^'-'i~ s-_

^ juLxty*Vi -f^GL.jLi <X. .iXfU'-V LAyi^ix.v% ti- - (' Taa**J^ f C-lP (yyiAA^L. LAJi’yA-Ce.^- JksJr\£ri~. AWZjr^k —

t C“ly ^U.v>^7 ^jXjuP ^Wi« jU^vc^aC. UtsJkA~ . ClJic^Xc^y. LAJiuX'd. M*L.

i rUU-&~ C- u^uaJL. ‘ sU**&4*d*Jl _£.-n^'-| e^Wi— ^U<L. Cr&txs •£**<£'<- Uv(_ _

< /t^wS-!^<-' ■sLZt'^i <^Jw y ■As4u.*J'\ d.'c\^Li~ U.-?u.2i.£. { _

- . Acti,rci - j _

m-M- J^A^dytA^-cUU'v&y.LUt- /KruEL,,*,, __

. _ X^J^dsJ/ U~ _. ^tyuJ- JnAL'<s XrtJLvzli/iy cT-y\ U-i- £*sC--<A^-U-<r*- 1 ^' c ^«U-u31 1 ^_

St-Ujk-i_ SkAsiJL-cL- M-*—.. Q/t/ltS&ylXi-b-^ t^Sti J£L- - _ jQ^-t^LC'CynZiL- -

UUx>vU.JL uJU m- Cd£yytyiyA-1j~ _ E&JLiy <ri?U<y ./HtZi&sk- --^iC-W-'A— -A*sUik\ i«Sx. <^'UZ.~z£- .,_ l»/*U<.-ij.__>_ -

-vVU^Cfc'14-C^ i^iTiA^'W^j—|U/.A<:~|Lv SiJ-irt.i'i. t

_ ^AyUdL U'bU^L'y. ,dun,t£x.i -£/■■<-. _ A^C'iu.'A & /1/*yU&L~ (a/vl^A. A. .

i^wvu- Clu^ „/!-i,^-<\ t-j, i *A^u-j yl-'H4,ui4.__ AhJ^^Li- . _ '4.— /on^-c.

_ _ i,b&A- &cr>r**-&w*- <*Lc= ^ ‘U^cu'^tL .

__ tiaalA _JL<_. _dfektfenA i- J l tu s uO AS— <*$ *« « .. _

_/L 6mzi^w , u, sidL . iX.. JIuIuacmL^. —QesesSs^Si-^nsdJL _ _

_ ttUksL&e. JUibuJLM toA*i>j dU&jjL CM*r t >1 umAk- -aJUk&e^A* 3^*<dL*dL- —&CT-

__ i^uA (su^dcs^ -LWUjLf$L- /LUgU. VU- _ 4^-ti JUtlAnJL.- Oy&S-flZiSx. ^<4- _ _

_ ffydX'-Z l\r-_ tluu.iZL{ ^tj-vn CL*-<~-is . _ _ _

_ k Jav"i^\ U?4tW. _,._ 'CtA-flA.- C-^>y!yS- -^S*l&%£L, C^tAuLd jLc~ yfyyiy^eLS^i-

- -JU^dL, -JS^v-vO i yiiy^-^Csrl^ duyZ^yhLciJC £yiyyl!>— AvtVl/m- -fbly£uyylAyL.~ |. tT/ -X<li. '*-/£•-*_,—

_ 4/^WlAt 6">jf , -Ay-XyiA" L'-O'U-*^^ -A*r%A — Aiytyt-y -'f\Ayiyts\ A“ __. _

_ -Awr^ri. cT&jyu. A*tL4*ts*i-.Avti?CM^£iZ-rt , _. (X*M$-r _

-- cJUt/W^ iMs- JlstiXSiAJ-' c-^Uj^ . t-A-C-

&t^OU<C£_ - yb'Vxjy'Jy- t —— xJLtldA* — ZfZ’

_ y*J/L- llXA%iA/ir6^l'Yl j iy^y^Ct I ('-■t-*~-c ^CL» - . _

_ _ ^V^'5-' trXSl^Xx _ Ai , -*AlAyC A, ^-'C ViX/'^lA ^ 6 t ~dy£,y£’'-y V 'y<si —

_ U.-* ^?VCv|-Aj(yu _ ^jrVtriA ^ '^AA £ 'S-' fevt^nA. C^frwjy*. r

— . %±*ylLi*-Ji^- JidXkM&Ly- -‘A'Z-UjLdL _ (siy&£$.*<s Ais- JL*. yiy^Z^-'-^At i*| ^Vtd^vt4- £'t&a*uJl CtA—

_1^42-uW.. ,' ~^V -iwt- xU^VS,-W 7 T^,^^r -t^O- <3<^—.

Wt a- _ ______

_ CLyC&<l!±Mifc^ AVA&leJ ~Jyidft4S\JyLl~ JyU~‘ uiryU— <£fa*Jy*Ay&ylA*C<yt*

_ JluyiiidiuJ^^un^k-. 3**0 uaLk* 0 .JlurtJU&L*' . £ti~^./c<y (Audi. .*Xoj£^u> My

_ .jaeSAt&SA’—S^. _<&Au|_ j vMtUtMi«<ij 4«" ^M^ALi. 5> . AWinJUr* C- A**tt/.ec$i(

S^«C<.V5 TtarJ

„A.j /<iii<'. t'-^-eL T V a. ^AaOa^JZ,

» iJu, J^uuC-tuL^ Mj'irTAitjL ^t~C. Z'^iA. 4- <jt>- £c- JkiUso .y</i*<i-*u>tA*~ Jt<!~Gc<jU<r*^ j

J«a*L- CviA^ oj^Us t, d-txlnwj j^Ua tfyt**X. C*4A**ri4i*Zi~- ^ t£ii~ i-UcA~ ujvuM^SL

..-t-C- JiAAJ^~JLu‘*-A 0.4^ t£u. c^AAjOurtrO^*^ ‘jjLbiA-vC- t utsi&Z* Mjrj? t*£z& ,1*.*— 4c"&£ ^~—

<^u/L. C~ <_ '’J-&&Z-VL-U- CAXn^&d. J!-Jt-

^fCuAi-^ iii/u.<.ZZL'i j} r i-v'>'>^\ ^fiAt«jL- Cha^i L'tA*~jHsi~ a
^^ X--J-A- C.L uAAlCt iA — *J*rtSlAA(J S>- C&££t^/ K$'l<£X*LASZi--^ L ^ , t-

v^VVtrU^ < <|tv«^j ^cJLe^jyL. <f— 3 xJx-Sa/x-y ^vxc|L*<v £•<;*-/ 6£**~c. -^-vx/ -£•■*- , 0,A^oa

-t'-^j LulruAtk ..4<_ MxJMAauUau^I) A-x^ -^Ai-t^L ZT~ CtAAAAWxiJl t&U4fyd&L~ • UJIruAttk.

JLi,- ^t;V JliU. "Zt~- &Ol4&*fr$ U- -XA-^-tA. c£l&C-Ct ■Aii&jfc<sS' J-f'Lai , JL-t~<- i^,"Z*i.*-t*->

!sk -Jwvt-»x_ uA<^| >t^yfv«4.'t£ Jt. <-- <<AAi- Zt— v&-C*x-Cf jULd&..-<u*Jl. J^cO -c£xAX-, S^lvifir^l, »

‘-‘^Vt-iX-ci-. GjUI CaJ^Co^u tx-xxiw^W- lA&-**As^\jlc$ir-ts\ Cl- <<M-Cu*jd~ C—

£K. ^'(,'<-*-3_. \J!nA—r ^/<MX<MAr-' ClASLir Lis&iA— A&IA&&4. A. C —J U>vt«Y AjC-t.'t^jLc’iLi .

t VpU*M ^Z?X> &~ yOCi^i-€ Jj-ivu yJu- i- CijwJJL JjsAtA JLuw ■'%*£ , >jLu^ Ct-CxX,

aasvp&MAjl, Co- c j-ol~ tvi «£__ 3-s^x- / <>tJ Jt-C. / ^i-vuL^Z. U.4JL ~&-

Q&jZJL* ._£'is%**tSLs ( - A <.£*>*— 'C'Z'£"&-' , ‘<jh~<?z-4L..

^X^MaLCA— Lis~VXAJtM dLi^Lji^i-. £lA~ <fi.XA>--Vlv«Z-A^ -^-h<^i£t- ,

QaJUAa*^ c^jx. %xrvi«JUsUAs. Q,cJUfariiA*#-* ^'-H &*s<SC4i^,C a i-g 3- (iCtsxsi. J M\l At^irJL,

J^4s<s '^A.'VS'K-^ y c'^*- A**U 3^- AiA-cjsL

C~ ^jf'MTV*-'^-, ,/UvtjJ^-vj ^^aav^JUjLa, ^-U-uiH, vts&sis<Ar C- L%JLa— dj'trO^ CiJ-t-'l. r

_yiXt'vS. .^.tiV uix B -iJi_ oc4xjj- uCc^-u*C, K^i--xvi^t.vCiC7-/-7 < * JUaaiA- U-wiiM><| C- CcJL^

isi/Vvtn*- (JU£*t*o C'-x-L- A„>-<M.'(-2 .i... ( At'.-tC cxs&jks-- Ixa-cJ^ „\njUi&Lt~ JlfUxdL, jZjZci^. £o&XL~ } <JU*~ Aj&£*4-~

iATJrul^- Jit*-. JtfAkJl Jaa^ J^UAAATUiU tvAr ^ ,

^4, t w^. *A-£v<_ .

. / Vct,nx-tva„it. <a-i|cu..
lAtl^uo^S. ^wA- A-JlC, tSjX-

. Aw*'^ J^i
< :./ -■'. Ca- ‘. ■>'-'

JbxuitL

*J/LMJUMepX4'i* J^&A-Cstc. / ..<A»«X« ^ M-TTUti^..

- '• • - ~-y>. 4 .

Aaaa.'a^JAa'-'-

yVf-wt-s-X,' tXc-

x^Litty

. jLi|. ^^C’-tZTvc. C^^iL AWVJiiii- , ,4.ic<-A

<-'t^ >. Cx •.•■cZ't i-* c £-- f -Vt -^. .✓t/fru-v

JJwUA- U»tAjfe<jL' v'vtv- i^v^i^XL- 4^- ^VvviWU J^<^cL .'1'1.4^ ; ('UI tjti

^\nJjLbli~-~ c^^uJu jLu- ^ t<y*u, *cfrUM~£. 4<</u

-r

xi\Aj A*

.TuitS-. „

•^v'i C-a^u Usilx, .M-

^..A-’A .-; ‘-U.U i.^, c4'~<- !.«.<• A.•_

1 0^ .V^vv £j|Lc (A*J*4£jU> < UJ A^ih. JLuj^' tX^U ( /5 iATVld'^L '& Jt ~>

&^trV%(L. —* -^i'v Lu&*£jpf^\ ; U-n-^-v dL**» *-^ -#t4<£ .

JLfc> tVVfrW^i* ^lut. ^ ^ptrC&, ■'V’WX^tfc- .JUiG-CAA&ttrt&i clj <«4-r &/i_ cdi-x.*^-

Li Q* kAAA^'-g^j^i ££W*_- i’ J C'W^4. *-i».<L* '^'i^Vi^'L^.. t^t'O Uo-C- ^{JUL~ •Jck^Xf-JU^ &LAa*JL ‘-*^r*-*-*-es£ j M^w&C> iJ!^>

CJ(AjL £’<r&jJt £c«U.4£.t~ Cvx*£&. U^-viX. ^V* U^"/> £t*s^ i tX* ■4iAJC^ &cUlU^ <Wf -t£s ii^u. *<.*^f>L» L&%a-*v\ - i ~^-

^LuJ --tv-x ic X/xf' C^W j '-|vic<yt- £- A-ciiwO A^ct*L-t/£C

*-(j*V * .- -.-

_ 0-£6-U b-tst /i~ <g ViUjv\ _

_sA&^--CfcS*C^«8-!H^ yH*c*t«ZuAJ C-^.

_-4utaoe«!|--Si if/U*</ir i^triW -4ii<mi*- < Ar ^ M wli xferm*r < j^a_«<£*t«c««a—

U ^Lo.vt'lsi-jfC. UyXTuU^~ L'-As CUU- u£, --tjvx^- -IssUriL. <Us'MSt,l*~t.-i\J , OV c

_ jJ^JjAufatU^, Jldm^s^oaq -_ tytn/JL^osu-JkLst

0^rlA4^i^. CiAy^/i^L^. i$%JL. -fyuO ^Ia./£a tc*.-**■*> ^sj'V-JL dS&JX'^ /hc£fy$Jhj^ CcaJL—

_ t'-h'irw^ Uj- 44tu j is\j •A.'i’ w\J~r *»icJ-zj O^U'^y V U* * u~ AjUc%-^ . J< £_ *£*-**'- ■&*.*. tA^t^sj

j ndLs- wca- CtJ/U.^ ^Cl^u

CL 3 ^ 'Couj^qVL^C cn^JL jL’

* /v r /n ^

^ . £&o J' 2 **' Uy^Uu^c \cr

_dk^-L. -. .. ^.JLCi 't&yO. - 'JLa- „£/t^ - ;

fc^/Ci-l^ t,/ *■' L. .■4^ , ^^'V4iW‘Z I ‘ C&

-^M^v^Ud £p~ U-C*u&-*^ JU~

P-itdLezw Jh*■*A-' JU.

- (Jl'l't^X' . . J

JL

Uy-Vv'i JU.'C<-c^ -

i!a_ ^uciivi. j c^t£- k>- '-^-l- Jlt<.iA&\, ^ i£-*sUj A yJUiJa-c^p 7 &aa£cL J^<-*cit.<^£-* ***««-«^

>/l/Vw-U^ .. -JaM— -J-CXt i- ''’C-L~: ,AUi^-^e£Z^- , A/Ll-C A-

Msv^vJjAa* ^*y— -^yUrV^cAji^ ciAsiAJtX-‘£UA*&xL* -AU^ &AA~ \AaA- /iyft.-> ..-. c. -^!^c.f, r /.CC-*L C'

•■ ’- C '-•' L -- — 7 ' U-vVU'-.,.' c£6Ms1*4‘~l^ t y i-7X^ t

Ja- 1-^- dU — ■ms^i'JL'iL i^iAXZ, i^C-J CA* ji-^C- J ii'C<>^i ,

-jyU'yi-.s.yu.-.'iA <_ 6<-£^ cL&,'L*'t‘A/- /f Z^ ~tu-. J.'ts.a <n^ S-*jZ-~JL sCaJU- C-ilA- (

.... -AA'-~’ .-^ 7.’i .'..j J— C." '-t-vf''. ■ .ZZAAy^r^Atj^AiA ^...^ '^^C^.' 1 . H ‘ ■■'•'<_£——.. ..

I/H-Itt i~,/ -tvt.U -C-i- tCUi^Z,iJ tir- JLa- <St-*C. tt> ^X.~J-JL C^t-UL. -C«.ttASU.^ ,y.i ^., ^t. -<-i.

Ct- C£i.t<-C L-t^A- ^ i/ A-iA- O-.'tS-JL J-’-t'iA '.. O-. - ..^ -t" J<A. •

O^iA. JvUAVu v!aA~ lAdiA^yO y (..£ ,-uJ~< & ^ <. ii „ ^ , iS. -<.AHr^U4L -Avr- ycc-*'^ A-J

_- jUnJIfUt^ jxtajfa. -d bi *.- .. tl&y iaadi&lsJtfi- .£aau4£E&tr~dtjU«i<j<M^ —

(/t^--V‘'W.,'"v *■ cv. jy/L'l’ t-*zj yjtsdUiUr yVl>u.^iA- ^*A- JlMASa. c/ 6c-y,y.ylt-^y<-~ _

_ J\jAAA*lJfA:kAAi- j fcV'K^. -isU*~-'d(.'^'t^ _ ytifXfi/^iAtCyA-A^A^-^- - - AAtJ&dtr*JL‘%%*riUAA?-~ ... . Cu\jt£ A^Ar -. y£'?--‘J%'i.yisC f 3-A< ^iAcd\ £2 &is\a _ ___

-f ^Ay-a-^xA- <:— cq-^jsJL Jl^-<J,._J-<a._- . ^2t*i-LtcU<-At- .-Csc-t.<!.■-*-L^.-, , . .. . _

dy fivtit ^ -i
^ -

^ uLo ^cjtrtyL^'vj O^cJc — _ <>^J -2^- ^Ur.ZA^iy-dL TX dLs— _.

c^i-<L~ y.Ast£j~- Jio^ OAC'LiS'sUyCt^ _ t . _

:_'3S?-U- CcJtZA S isL4,i a_ i 3-1

-_ A/lManC. LmS'U

- ±^£i*c&!-* — dtiui/Lr_„_jl&dGuZti&l^. 3 \ J^A^ksJ^r Q<nA/lx*ejLc*L*~jS\^rrr — ffe&k<A? — d/l&4/Cc~jGQ&s--

-Ifcfj—-£*CiA _ dk^U/^vJL s^g^^«a-fc^yi _ tSvLv ^JUdA&^ULi^„

- jJo&Lzl^ — OdA*dU — AjaiJL l_4'1 —iAu sU^dj^cJk-- j^ndtiUti-^ cinlti^ Ua.\'^UL, — Q_^__ —

- £&umjI _ ,-Jvfj h^m^. Jka^aU>=— iXc,- jJunttU _ itUytA**^- . ^Id&sfry. JtW. h&JL-fyjp*.-&t*. _

-4/gvt4i€t| _ UuL* ^ttb-A-— y J U^M^ _ JLjl. Jk,traMly--- ■djjxy-i-^'i-^ ^_

_- GsusoajJL ^ ,?v fit. sM^<^-‘^kii^.J^U4lL r . ..___.... _ _ __ ___

Ji _ cli.uu 4 - -

_^a^vwy^vvtc.^ jupvts-'.t*-- l ., yvvulLtz*i>~

U^A*i|vivfc-> 6ui,v»*-. A^Jp^yCa^J- . jU-t,-*-* ^lv^J.-<~ >■>— __

Out***— . _ _ _ _ _ __ ___

?Li _ Oi-JM, M** .ttw- J*UM*«S , - Gk. «*/<**( ttA^eu*A «fefev4*^ygiiiA._flguf«£ JlhUM^ Cttwlz _ <Jj.rtiMjMfA ^an » «/& <A * UfttL _

_X&r JL£a*±'s ^ ‘■Ut- rtA.k- L&, v M &6£'H«£%v . tJui-Ki .r*iv _4*.~&i4c£Of Sr^d^ JU/Ca^imiM.^

iMIrti-tdL d*-e— Ai>vJA^ (fo-ij- 4*&wt* U-syd- . - . . _

\«_ U<Mjbu j tjua-*-«£. ti'VvaiL &AMnM/L> .^TnUjL. (lAiU*vL- i-^vtruS«^4c , W-; ^'<^<>t4-5;2<-vf .

*/v. ^tycMiyJL- . ^CCAtLuX- (Kpvuut- ?-CU4-U^ Mrf*c**&£*^ ,

£"\ ^YuyuJj^O JLmxJb- cltlii^J-tJ- M '.| A^i^cJc,-^.

^OiC- _ CXtinaJ^_&~,_ 1 Jo^aa^--aa.\auaL. _, .iX*s-iJ~. ^ArJUt^jUkcBCLiZZ jJh^_£i4Ari&^ut __

C-tT.-wM.t si-tt*-*-_, J*-.>- sAo /t-vc^-t^, <i/i- y>A^-- ^L^-v-^ _iit^-_

iV^Jjvu i. . J-'tx. > c ll2 O/Jis^p'U-iik _-xAiiZUa*t,_4Wj_ -iUds.&t^-p... C^-v^/t^-c'O A— _

<U^>ul^wdCt;<_- C^£d«ri*ws*^ OfAAjAjJL*., _ -_^A£AAii£&- __^____

iAt> AVvuidl-V (it*.*/*-. ^.Jifli-U CiLrujL-eh^v-fjc, sJiJUaJ _

. tv- stys*aaaJL.&&-jJLiu-X^ , •J Cc***4- At444q ■‘Uc.^»- _

_CA4A- •&*i=-£Aii- dbtuiej-, __/(? -ffl<8-/ g »_ /Ul&aadAiStj.. .■A4au:-<Z< J <fe«a^ _

_ ^ f j^v . J i aJ£ *, i aa~j <l^.JiiiA2L^Jk4*un&&ia-JLjdaM-d^ a&U? _

. .i^UaM^cU^ ~4&nAt**^ . Jht~L, _ Jijceh £« t ,~7 a£~„2±T7^,J7

. Ql;"■&'}$ . L?> i«-.i^ -f^u,***** ; rt'---^iL,4iiL^ ,JS. ^-.JLj^.-MidtsUL*... _

_LjjCa;jic^ . At- -RsPu(jMM _ CsMreizS..

-* -i

- <>u.c.C^ '<■■-■- ■ s-'-O--.<►*-c_*• iAX-_cw-tri.i.o.^1.. . j as--d.

ALyf-i— _ 7 t/LU-^u -Juu.as<- s^j 4u— X(X&rj-5 ZJ- <X'~e~a-_ _ _

Wvy >-*• _ (-Kv- Ly‘ Y;^ ' r I'-- .Y.V. ( JaM.^ I&la— i- J < A-A '- -_y ^ fj ' : -' T '-'

..,- 7i,<. ^cMX Ct^c <y>ycvU ^ Li^-Ois -%vx> Jtu.a- ui.-r.i- J w— j. -^.-t-oA^i—

ti- 'L <■ | i- A -^-5- _ J„ A A-' ^V> it- LL’-CjJ^ , &V-U.U t.1---* U".C*€(,J~ „ _

_; .1-4 ..-ct-_ (£c7ltdii^-ca£^ JUtC^H-- -}pA/ KAA^lt&tU r e&JU Ci^ntA-dL* ijj.«ji~{jL^ ) J^uM ulfix^

-"'W- <X?£l'UJr- -xXc-— Urt-C-±i#jLt-m _ $£c4Ui~ yi t^~ _JLw«, tu_zcu£-_

- O^-us-C^Ta j 5>- ‘^K 4 x-< a ej <.£^, fcc-jvuks-dt*--^ j u-v U.- xzj- <u >_

_^-WciXC - i-—)- -^J*t\A2yK?%^\ — g^l -^ idAd&0-*= ‘-M&&Q- -^ <■'-'**. io<jL ■-At-.—_

dW/ii-iii, ^ ^Jjp&c^Loc. _ _ _ __ „ _ __

- S{i^i.:.Ua-‘A Y.V&'i.yM-'A-yfl'VY aw --£. -y^viYvC 'U-AA,‘a\ . ( Js, •£**•<-' -4. y £.'C' £c-Ct.yy_. .££*'•' -'tiK. y-yk',, j-

_UJt3Al; <i V- _A*igj£t Hi, c- ^ Usmjc^ % cltiiUA,VUi-^. OaJ.^^ £. <ru JLnAtqtlJ ‘-jJ. U.^H. _

-... Lf^Z'X-.'X-<!k~r —j-^’.1^. i *i----C:.. vis-*-* ./-.* X<u-4^<t,<ir^e4j ^ _.____

_ -x^LSL dLc^( <*C-iU t,a^£t£&$J~ iTisesL- } Ci -g>- ^stu 7

_ &• if|j iI6 ^ £.0 0 _ ^tA^^jjuriUA- Cc^c^J^ A^_ u-w^iXt

, j ^<^v_ ^2 6 ,C'tV iM-^. &cJZf td.^d^JL. -^yUe^i^ Us-t-* ^0 £<sc£i j_ . _

____'2cA.-V^-^y^^^r--..v ^ w'VWi’l^ _ £jto~ —

t A.vu:i^ viv,^.^, ^A, 5 i^C7t:L St^Ci.1 ^ $L2zK.

ia>K</«TUi«X_ „-*W-V-<_ S'- 2aX, ^ri. -crt^c-l 'V<-V1 <Z&U^ _

tn^-vi' V ” f t / 'A^,;. ^-.Hc/K^-W, „iV COU-t<~ } JLl**}-^ e~i- JU*.- X £\,, Ujtt.'l*.*-"> ,

JL&uia^ *-5 / -' AivuHU*-^ , a. ,?-^<_ UrujU-* JUs^JZ^ ji$Jj.<-$ ct/^j 1,000

AW-iAv . '-'A'i,v^Avy(.L' , Aaa*cAjaas-£\ H. frV ^ ^/ ^ ^ 1 _A>- Ac IaLa^XU^ SLr '-'^'-ts£ r tA-£ci£c-iAi t ^' Wl ^

jOvv . Iwv trio-yi- -ft _ ■A’iA.'JZ.jj- (^L-Z-'Lici- . y ^'A\Ak.^^ ~K'U.C~‘{~L^ _

_ Ck-tt-JL. *AtUd' 0-A-i-iA -lAu 'Uy^SirJA- u,-*j- OaaL JASMn*a£tZf^ Ajjt±4J,r lAyj. i$wrt!L G*~Jl t7~J**o _

x-fiAii-, _ _____

R0 AND CO

PRO

Robert Baffin

It is quite in order to consider a
number of possible solutions for our
civil defense and to weigh them
carefully, taking into full considera¬
tion all their advantages and
disadvantages, then to focus on one
solution and implement it.

This was in fact done under the
(Nixon Administration, and the
selection was Crisis Relocation
Planning (CRP). At that time
American leadership, acting on the
advice and analyses of many
experts, made that choice for the
American people.

as to a choice of say (1) a right end
run, (2) a left end run, (3) over left
tackle, (4) pass, etc. There are pre¬
sumably good arguments for all of
these. But once the decision is made
to say go around right end and the
play is put in motion those who
advocated the pass must support
the play being executed without re¬
servation or the result will be certain
disaster.

No team effort could survive any
maverick attitudes.

In the same way, those who have
been advocating in-place shelter

Germany, obeyed orders only if they
were told WHY the orders should be
obeyed. So, with apologies for
repetition, the following advantages
are among those for which CRP was
selected by the Nixon Administra¬
tion and for which it is now being
continued by the Reagan Adminis¬
tration:

1. The Soviet plan to prepare for
an exchange is to evacuate Soviet
cities. Should this begin we would
know about it quickly. That is
certain.

... WE RISK “LOSING THE WHOLE BALL GAME.”

When the Reagan Administration
assumed its duties in early 1981
CRP was already several years old
and much work had been done on it.
A further evaluation was made in
early 1981, and CRPwasfoundto be
based on sound policy. So step was
not broken in the CRP effort. CRP
remained on course, and is still on
course today.

It is a tribute to the Reagan
Administration that it saw fit not to
undo all the work that had gone into
CRP. CRP is in fact a non-partisan,
military, strategic decision, and with
that decision made and in force it
behooves even former opponents of
it to support it. Otherwise, as has
been pointed out, we risk “losing the
whole ball game.”

One might liken the CRP decision
to a crucial football play that has the
potential of winning or losing the
game. In visualizing such a situation
before the game — or even at the last
minute — suggestions are in order

14 Journal of Civil Defense: February 1982

(which had some good points to be
sure) need to realize that our gov¬
ernment has made the strategic
decision to go with CRP and that in
fact the CRP “play" is in motion.

To insist now that another course
of action be taken is in fact like in¬
sisting on a pass play in the above
football example when the running
play has been decided upon, called,
and put in motion.

In both cases a dissenting opinion
is too late to be of any help — ex¬
cept to the opponents.

In the spirit of Baron Friedrich
von Steuben, the Prussian general
who came to the United States
during the Revolutionary War to
help George Washington, perhaps
we should add one more item. Von
Steuben complained that American
soldiers, unlike those back in

2. Americans, with better
transportation and better exit
facilities can evacuate much
faster than the Soviets.

3. A blast-shelter system was
judged to be far beyond our
means at the time of the original
decision. With budgets now being
drastically cut it is certainly much
farther beyond our means today.
CRP is a small fraction of the cost
of a blast shelter project.

4. CRP is an established strategy.
Its implementation is well
underway. Logic dictates that we
pursue it instead of changing in
midstream to another concept
that has been turned down as not
being practical.

There are of couse other
arguments for CRP, but the above is
a capsule version of the main issues
involved.

We need now to close ranks. We
need in the interests of national
defense to get on with the CRP job.

CON

Kevin Kilpatrick

In the event of threatening inter-
x national developments plans are to
remove the President from the White
House and Washington in a matter
of minutes.

Good! It is vital that every possible
precaution be taken for the safety of
the President. Similar immediate
action extends, as it ought to, to
Other elements of leadership.

Not good, however, is the contrast
between the rush to protect
leadership within a half hour or less
and the bland assurance that four to
seven days is a time-frame suitable
for John and Jane Doe.

How come? There is this to say:
The four to seven day attack delay
theory (where citizens are con¬
cerned) is based on the assumption
that the Soviets will evacuate cities.

Evidence was presented 3'A years
ago, however, that the Soviets at
that time — 1978 — had enough
urban shelter to give them the
option of evacuating or staying put.

This, with the heavy Soviet accent
on strategic surprise and a history of
being willing to sacrifice people,
appears to wipe out the four-day
signal upon which CRP is based and
must depend.

If the shelter-evacuation option
existed in 1978, then with the
continued and accelerated Soviet
urban shelter development since
that time it must certainly be even
more valid in 1982.

An with further acceleration of
urban shelter construction what will
be the picture in 1985? In 1990? and
in 1995? (The unfinished CRP will
be even more incongruous at that
time.)

Indeed, it appears that plans to
evacuate Soviet cities will simply be
shelved-except forpropoganda use.
Or has this already happened?

At best CRP is tremendously
complicated and vulnerable to
multiple applications of Murphy’s
Law. Too, there are many problems
such as evacuation of hospitals,
homes for aged and ill, the
handicapped, jails and prisons.

Complications only begin here.
In a megalopolis CRP is its own
contradiction. One Soviet-engin¬
eered false alarm would doom it for
keeps.

With in-place shelter, however,
such disadvantages are minimized
or disappear. Government studies
prove the point. Statistics show

effective CRP (an unlikely occur¬
ence) the attack fatality rate would
be cut in half with the use of blast
shelters.

Staying close to home among
familiar surroundings, near friends
and neighbors, with access to
emergency supplies, etc. is in
numerous ways preferable to being
at the mercy of the elements in re¬
mote locations (think of our 40-
below weather this winter!).

Not that serious problems can be
eliminated. A nuclear attack, even
with sophisticated preparations, is a
superdesperate life-and-death
affair. Problems need to be
analyzed, brought into perspective
and provided with practical
solutions in spite of difficulties.

Impossible? The Swiss have
already done it. The Soviets have
done it. The Swedes, the Finns and
the Chinese have done it. The
British are making passes at it. They,

the Americans and other NATO
countries can also do it, should do it,
must do it.

Cost is cited as the defeating
factor in the blast shelter program.
The quoted $100 billion price tag
looms as a threat to sacrosanct wel¬
fare programs. But the time has
come for survival to outweigh
welfare.

And $100 billion is not necessarily
the figure to be dealt with. For
instance, by using a shelter type
tested for blast by the Donn Corpor¬
ation the cost can be brought to
under $20 billion. With the Reagan

policy of phasing out the federal
nursemaid role shelter cost could be
shared as they are elsewhere.
Spread over a 5-year period the cost
breaks down to $4 billion a year
total, with a federal share that can be
substantially less than $2 billion a
year — even less than $1 billion a
year. Inducements such as tax
breaks would provide workable in¬
centives.

Is cutting anticipated fatalities in
half worth the trouble?

To this add the new possibility of
space and terminal active defenses
— with further substantial cuts in
fatality estimates — and the survival
picture is brightened even more.

Such a program presents an
aggressor with targets so poor and
an attack so risky that it discourages
a nuclear adventure to begin with.

All this makes CRP obsolete.

And — if pursued — the shelter
program creates a new and practical
road to peace. □

Journal of Civil Delense: February 1982 1 i

AT BEST CRP IS . . . VULNERABLE TO MULTIPLE
APPLICATIONS OF MURPHY’S LAW

that compared even to a fully

iS Ljs Li-UitUs* ?uL ^ukLaLftNis* Wati! L&‘l*.

s b

y i

Crisis Relocation Planning . . .

BY BRUCE D. CLAYTON, Ph.D.

and San Francisco—and the areas in which
they would take shelter. The numbers indicate
preliminary allocation of risk area population to
host areas, in thousands of people.

Y ou probably already know
about Crisis Relocation Planning
(CRP). You’ve head that CRP
is that idiotic “Civil Defense” plan
designed to evacuate Los Angeles in
the eight dayS between launch of
Soviet missiles and arrival of the war¬
heads. Worst of all, this is the plan to
stuff your retreat cabin with dozens of
useless city folk who will prey on your
food supplies.

That was my opinion, too, before I
took a careful look at the real CRP
effort. In fact. I’m ashamed to admit
that a year or so ago I published a
scathing critique of the program based
on “common knowledge” of its defici¬
encies. Common knowledge turned
out to be a poor source of information,
much of which originated with people
whose loyalty to this nation is in doubt.

I was wrong about CRP—partly,
that is—and I apologize to CRP
planners. It’s time survivalists took
another look at this controversial
topic. CRP has some beneficial
aspects, even to survivalists, and
though it also has glaring flaws, they
are not the ones trumpeted endlessly
through the liberal news media.

CRP (Crisis Relocation Planning) is
based on Public Law 96-342, Septem¬

ber, 1980, in which Congress created
Title V of the Federal Civil Defense
Act, and required the Civil Defense
organization of each state and county
to create:

. . a civil defense program provid¬
ing for the relocation of the population
of risk areas, including the larger cities,
during a period of strategic warning
resulting from an international
crisis. .

Right away we can see the basis of
two common misunderstandings
about CRP. The first is that Congress
required civil defense departments to
write relocation plans for all major
cities in the nation, without regard for
the feasibility of such plans on a case-
by-case basis. Civil defense planners
are not stupid. They can see that
relocation would be a more workable
option in some places than in others.
But the federal law says the plans must
be written, good or bad. workable or
not, for every major city. If you think it
is idiotic to try to evacuate San Fran¬
cisco, don’t blame the planners.
Blame Congress for a poor law. This is
the fundamental flaw of the CRP
program.

The second misunderstanding
relates to the phrase “strategic warn¬
ing.” Strategic warning refers to inter¬
national developments which seem to
threaten war, such as a sudden large-
scale evacuation of Soviet cities. One
school of thought holds that we can
evacuate our cities faster than they can
because we have more automobiles,
and, therefore, a Soviet evacuation
followed by our CRP would result in a
stalemate. From this point of view, our
CRP program, by its existence, makes
itself unnecessary. Proponents of this
argument aren’t very concerned about
the practical aspects of evacuations,
because they are certain that once the
plans exist they will never be used.

As an aside, I should say that 1 don’t
buy that argument because 1 think the
Soviets can evacuate most of their
cities overnight by ordering everyone
to walk out of town. Our nuclear war¬

heads are very small, and it isn’t hard
to hike a few miles to get beyond their
reach. Leave it to American strategists
to assume that the fastest way to move
a population a few miles is to put them
in cars.

People who criticize CRP on the
basis that there wouldn’t be enough
time to evacuate everyone from the
cities overlook (or conceal) two impor¬
tant points. Congress specified that
CRP should be designed for a period
of strategic warning, not tactical warn¬
ing. CRP was never intended as a
quick-reaction program, and it’s not
honest to criticize it on that basis.

The second, point is that most
people can be evacuated from most
U.S. cities in just a day or two. The
claim that CRP would require several
days focusses too narrowly on a few
worst-case cities—Los Angeles, San
Francisco, and New York. This really
means that these cities require a differ¬
ent kind of Civil Defense program.
Congress did not provide and has
never provided, any money to create
such a program. Again, don’t blame
the planners. Instead, give your
elected representatives a piece of your
mind.

What are the potential benefits of
CRP to survivalists? First, the plans
have forced local officials to think
about nuclear war. something they
generally hate to do. The furor over
CRP, led by the anti-nuke activists,
has created a rapid increase in nuclear
survival expertise among civil defense
professionals, who are normally pre¬
occupied with flood fighting. They
have become much better educated
about nuclear war in order to resist
anti-nuke attacks on their jobs. This
makes it much easier for survivalists
and CD professionals to relate to each
other. This can be a very good thing.

Another good thing is CRP’s impact
on the national fallout shelter pro¬
gram. Before state officials can
actually plan to move refugees to a
particular host area, they must be able
to show that the area has a sufficient
number of fallout shelters to receive
the newcomers. The host areas are
being re-surveyed for fallout shelters at
the federal government’s expense. If
the community knows that there are
usable public shelters, there is less risk
that the local survivalists will be
attacked during a war scare.

The best thing about CRP, how-

b SURVIVAL GUtDE/OCTOBER ^83

ever, is that it is our only hope of cop¬
ing with spontaneous refugees. 1
believe the President never will dare to
officially invoke CRP, especially
because the plans are not supposed to
be ready until 1990 (after the “window
of vulnerability" has closed!). Even so,
the plans could still be useful. We
know from actual experience that 40
percent of the American public sud¬
denly heads for the hills during a
nuclear scare, as Floridians did during
the Cuban missile crisis. CRP planners
are required to work out the logistics of
sheltering, feeding, medicating and
policing the relocated population.
Those same plans could be used to
help manage the spontaneous refu¬
gees and keep them out of trouble
with the locals. As a “local,” that
sounds good to me.

CRP should be allowed to proceed,
not because it will work as intended,
but because it doesn’t cost much and
good things are coming out of it. In
California there are only a handful of
planners involved in CRP. Our best
move at present is to leave the
planners alone, get out of their way.,
and let them get back to their work. I
know these men personally, and I can
testify that they are intelligent, dedi¬
cated, and fundamentally honest.
Their efforts to write the plans will
eventually prove whether or not CRP
can really work. But first we must let
them write the plans, and for that the
planners would appreciate a little
peace and quiet.

So am I for it or against it? Let’s say
that I believe Congress has not defined
CRP as a workable program. On the
other hand, there are beneficial
aspects to the planning process itself,
and this process should be allowed to
go ahead. The final decision of
whether or not the plans are workable
will have to be delayed until 1990
when we actually see the plans. ®

Copyright 1983 by Brace D Clayton
P O Sox 1411. Mariposa. CA 95338

Dr. Bruce D. Clayton received his Ph.D in
plant ecology from the University of Montana j
in 1978. after earning his bachelor's degree in j
zoology and botany from the University of j
California at Los Angeles in 1972 He is a pro- j
minent survivalist. author of Life After Dooms- j
day.co-author of Survival Books and Urban j
Alert, publisher of The Survivalist Directory; j
and founder of the Survivalist Co-Op He is j
Civil Defense Coordinator for Mariposa County. ]
California, a radiological defense instructor, j
and editor of Info-Ray. the California Radio- j
logical Defense Officer's Association newslet¬
ter In October. 1982, Dr. Clayton received the .
Eugene IViqner Award from the US Cwil I
Defense Council for his work in educating the- |
American public about civil preparedness :— [j
The Editors. '•

REVIEWS

THE COUNTERFEIT ARK: CRISIS
RELOCATION FOR NUCLEAR
WAR. Edited by Jennifer Leaning
and Langley Keyes. Cambridge,
Mass: Ballinger Publishing Com¬
pany (A Physicians for Social
Responsibility Book). Cloth, S29.95;
Paper, S11.95. 300 pages. Publica¬
tion date: January 20, 1984.

— Reviewed by Richard Sincere

While there is still some contro¬
versy in the civil defense community
about the efficacy of crisis reloca¬
tion planning, none of us reject CRP
outright. We point out its flaws,
argue for more CRP funding, and
offer alternatives. Physicians for
Social Responsibility, on the other
hand, in its never-ending battle to
maintain America's vulnerability to
enemy attack, has made CRP s flaws
a platform for attacking the concept
of civil defense.

In Counterfeit Ark, edited by Jen¬
nifer Leaning and Langley Keyes,
the vast gulf separating PSR and
groups like TACDA becomes more
apparent than ever. For example,
in Jerome Weisner s foreword, he
says CRP (and by implication, all
forms of civil defense) "is morally
wrong; it is strategically wrong; and
it is operationally wrong." Contrast
this with TACDA's testimony before
Congress last April: "Civil defense
against nuclear attack is a moral
imperative, a political obligation.
and a strategic necessity.”

Some of the specific criticisms
levelled against CRP by the various
authors in this book deserve further
examination. There are, indeed,
valid points made which draw atten¬
tion to some faulty assumptions
made by FEMA planners and others.
However, these criticisms should be
taken into account not in the way
Leaning and Keyes would like — that
is, to give up the idea of crisis
relocation entirely — but rather as a
starting point for solving the very
real problems which we must recog¬
nize can exist.

The basic deficiency in this book
is that it examines civil defense in a
political and social vacuum. Incred¬
ibly, it discusses civil defense and
nuclear war without acknowledging
our chief adversary, the Soviet
Union. The authors make their argu¬
ments as though the threat which we
face comes either from nuclear wea-

18 Journal ot Civil Defense February 1984

pons alone or perhaps from the Oval
Office — but never the Kremlin. It is
amazing to read 300 pages of text
about nuclear war and to find no
recognition that Soviet military doc¬
trine stresses not only that thermo¬
nuclear world war can be fought and
survived, but that it can be won.
(Several writers do imply, however,
that this is the belief of the Reagan
administration; but this flies directly
in the face of the facts and renders
questionable any legitimate critical
faculties on the part of Leaning,
Keyes, let at.)

Strangely enough, the contribu¬
tors to this volume suffer from the
same deficiencies they attribute to
crisis relocation planners. A com¬
mon theme in the book is that the
scholars and writers and engineers
who have investigated the feasibility
of crisis relocation are "too analyti¬
cal": they break things down too
much and simplify in order to get
predetermined results; they neglect
the “big picture." Yet in attacking
these studies, the authors — particu¬
larly Donald Schon — commit the
same sins: they analyze, nitpick,
point out particularflaws, and gener¬
ally come out sounding like the man
at the scene of a car wreck. When
the driver comes out unhurt and
weeps for joy at his good fortune,
the bystander says, “Yes, but it didn’t
cure your rheumatism, did it?”
Under the pretense of scientific
objectivity, Physicians for Social
Responsibility masks its own biases.

Some particulars worth noting:
Ex-admiral Noel Gayler, in the only
mention of Soviet civil defense,
makes no substantive argument
against it but uses an argument from
ridicule. Unfortunately for us and
for Gayler, laughing at it will not
make it go away. He further makes
the ludicrous assertion that should
we evacuate our cities, the Soviets
will retarget” evacuated popula¬
tions — an idea inconsistent with
Soviet military doctrine.

Philip Herr refers to the spontan¬
eous evacuation of Three Mile
Island, but fails to make the obvious
conclusion that crisis relocation
planning therefore becomes all the
more necessary to prevent such
chaotic events in a future crisis. He
also assumes the only clue Ameri¬
cans will have that a crisis is immi¬
nent are statements from the White

CUP

House — as if American citizens
would be oblivious to news reports
on TV about Soviet troops marching
into West Berlin, etc.

Herr further makes the assertion,
often heard from PSR. that civil de¬
fense “could reduce the political
urgency of achieving real means of
avoiding rather than ameliorating
the consequences of nuclear con¬
flict” and that if we had effective and
credible civil defense, our leaders'
“reluctance to risk nuclear escala¬
tion might be reduced." Once again,
as always, these statements are
made without proof. Nowhere has
Herr (or Caldicott. Geiger, or Lean¬
ing) drawn analogies from history,
evidence from military strategy, or
examples from current conflicts that
protecting innocent civilians makes
war more likely. They must be re¬
minded that there is no contradic¬
tion between a commitment to civil
defense and a commitment to
conflict resolution. Defense, deter¬
rence, disarmament, and diplomacy
are all tools in the same arsenal to
preserve international peace and
stability while enhancing lioerty and
justice in this land and abroad.

On the level of absurdity, in a
touching essay or the potential
harms to children during evacuation
or during war, Irwin Redlener argues
that gangs of children "might band
together and" contribute to "massive
social disintegration." Again this
ridiculous argument deserves atten¬
tion only to the degree it (and the
rest of Redleners mi nutiae) spurs us
to make more thorough and effective
civil defense plans.

The Counterfeit Ark is a shallow
book that raises many questions but
offers no answers or suggestions; in
this it is more destructive than con¬
structive, and may indeed lead us
closer to nuclear war than any of us
— TACDA or PSR — wish. In the
words of another contributor to the
volume, linguist John Haj Ross: "I
could go on, but I think that if my
point has not been made already,
further analyses of [this book] or of
similar ones, will be superfluous.”
(See ad, page 3.)

Disasters

The Weekend

Nuclear Exodus

After the accident at the Three Mile Is¬
land nuclear generating plant last
spring, according to reports now com¬
ing in from telephone surveys of resi¬
dents. as many as 60 percent of the
people within a five-mile radius left.
The orderly exodus included many
more people than the pregnant women
and preschool children whose evacua¬
tion was ordered officially—yet it
might not have been as large if the ac¬
cident had not happened just beforl a
weekend, when people could easily
leave their jobs and keep their chil¬
dren out of school.

A number of researchers realized
the significance of the accident almost
instantly, and started collecting infor¬
mation during the first weekend of
trouble. Ray Goldstein, a sociologist
studying how the accident affected
young mothers, took out a personal
loan to cover the expenses of doing
surveys that he realized would take
months to be funded officially. The
first telephone survey results came
from Cynthia Bullock Flynn, a soci¬
ologist with a private research firm
working for the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission: at a recent special ses¬
sion on the growing field of “Three
Mile Island Studies," sponsored by
the Pennsylvania Sociological Associ¬
ation. reports came from Martin H.
Smith, a sociologist who was 19 miles
from the plant at Franklin and Mar¬
shall College when he did his poll,
and from Donald B. Kraybill and two
colleagues at Elizabethtown College. 7
miles away.

Departures peaked on Friday, two
days after the first news of trouble. In
part, anxiety built up on that day with
news of escaping radioactivity and a
possible hydrogen bubble, but many
people postponed their decision until
the week’s obligations were over.

Other people reluctant to move, the
■ new studies found, were most likely to
be elderly, to have comparatively low
levels of education, and to have rela¬
tively few misgivings about the infor¬
mation they were getting from the Met¬
ropolitan Edison Company, operator
of the plant. Some people decided not
to leave after all. once they had made
such preparations as filling the gas
tank of their car or taking their chil¬
dren out of school: the preparations
apparently were enough to calm them
down.

CR.?

Conflicting reports of how serious
the initial damage was played a role in
keeping resident^ from leaving all at
once, and roads were not jammed. The
evacuation bore few earmarks of the.
terror-stricken stampedes that journal¬
ists and some scholars have reported,
incorrectly, ever since a 19-10 study of
reactions to Orson Welles's radio dra¬
ma “War of the Worlds.”

The study had reported news ac¬
counts that ‘.’women and children ran
screaming from their homes . . . high¬
ways were jammed with fleeing mo¬
torists throughout the Northeast." In
fact, recalculations of the data showed
that only about 16 percent of listeners
believed the “war" was real: many
people checked it out simply by tun¬
ing to another station. According to
Russell Dynes, a sociologist and ex¬
pert on evacuations who headed a
panel on the topic for the Kemeny
commission investigating Three Mile
Island, over 40 evacuations take place
each year in the U.S. because oi natu¬
ral disasters or man-made ones like
leaking industrial chemicals Al¬
though some involve up to 500.000
people (when a hurricane hits the Gulf
coast), most go smoothly.

Still, people were upset. Other stud¬
ies have found that the average level of
emotional “demoralization" peaked at
a point as high as that shown by pa¬
tients under care for chronic emotion¬
al problems. Even hospital workers
joined the exodus: approximately 15
percent of the workers at the Hershey
Medical Center, six miles from the re¬
actor. stayed away from Friday until
the following Wednesday because of
the accident. Goldstein found.

As in most evacuations, people did
not rush to emergency centers. 90 per¬
cent stayed with relatives or friends
(evacuees sampled by one of the stud¬
ies went an average of 100 miles). Peo¬
ple came back after an average stay of
five days, chiefly, they said, because
they heard official reports that the
worst was over, but also because they
were drawn by their job responsibil¬
ities. Their short stays. Dvnes says,
parallel the behavior of women and
children who were ordered out of Lon¬
don during the World War II blitz:
most staved for such a #hort time that
at one point, evacuees were returning
to London faster than new ones could
be shipped out.

Dynes says the Three Mile Island re¬
sults show that people probably can be
smoothly evacuated from the most
likely kinds of nuclear-generator acci¬
dents: those that provide some warn¬
ing before a problem gets severe and
involve fairly brief releases of short¬
lived radioactivity. The studies pro¬
vide few hints, however, for planners
now pondering what would happen if
an accident worse than the one at
Three Mile Island occurred in one of
the several dozen nuclear plants near
densely populated areas, accidents
that would require a sudden, whole¬
sale evacuation. Nor do they shed light
on what might occur if releases of
long-lasting radiation forced evacuees
to stay away from their homes for
months. —Christopher T. Cory

Goldstein is at the U.S. Health Care
Financing Administration. Oak Mead-
lows Building 1F3, 6340 Security
Blvd.. Baltimore. Md. 21207. Flynn is
at Social Impact Research. Inc;.. Areis
Building. Suite 427. 2366 Eastlake
Avenue East. Seattle. Wash. 98101:
Smith is now at the C. W Post Center
of Long Island University. C.reenvale.
N.Y. 11548: Kraybill is at Elizabeth¬
town College. Elizabethtown. Penn.
17022: Dynes is executive director,
American Sociological Association.

1722 N Street. N.W.. Washington.b.C.
20036.

3

To Flee or Not to Flee

WITH APOLOGIES to Shakespeare, the title I have
used for this chapter directly poses the key question of
all survival planning. To flee or not to flee? Run or stay?
Retreat or dig in? To continue to paraphrase Hamlet, is
it better to sit still and take it or to get out of the way?
Well, it depends.

This chapter is intended to help guide you in select¬
ing among several difficult alternatives in your personal
survival planning. In the case of a nuclear war (or some
other massive disaster you may have in mind) will you be
better off staying at home or would it be better if you ■
evacuate to another area? If you decide to stay, what will
you need to do in order to secure your position at home?
If your decision is to evacuate, where will you go? How
will you get there? Should you drive, hike, sail, or fly?
Would it be better to evacuate now, immediately, or
wait until the last minute? How will you know when the
last minute is at hand?

These are some of the difficult questions every
group of retreat planners faces at first. The answers
depend mainly on your personal situation. Where you
live, how many people are in your group, and how much
money you can spend will all affect the decisions. The
only area which is completely up to you is how much
effort and inconvenience you are willing to tolerate in
the name of security. You could move to Bora-Bora and
be completely safe from nuclear attack, but in exchange
for that security you would have to give up frequent trips
to the movies, the grocery store, and your doctor. Where
do you draw the line? That's up to you.

Predicting Nuclear Danger Areas and Fallout Patterns

In Appendix A you will find a map and a list
describing over 1,500 nuclear attack high-risk areas
defined by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (and
which I have updated). These include 1,054 missile silos
which are listed as aggregated “complexes.” Areas sub¬
ject to extremely high fallout are also indicated.

You should check to see if your home or potential
retreat location appears on this list. You may be sur¬
prised to discover that many nuclear targets are located
in remote corners of National Forests, etc. It would be
better to be surprised now while looking over the list,
rather than later ...

The target list is divided into primary, secondary,
and tertiary targets. Primary targets are mainly Stra¬
tegic Air Command missile and/or bomber bases and
support facilities. These targets will be hit within min¬
utes of the outbreak of the war. Secondary targets are
industrial or governmental targets and may be hit imme¬
diately or may be designated for attention by Soviet
bombers several hours after the first strike. Tertiary
targets are centers of civilian population. These targets
probably won’t be hit in the first strike.

As I mentioned in chapter 2, predicting where the
fallout from a particular target will go is a shaky busi¬
ness at best. It is impossible to know what direction the
wind will be blowing in the 40,000- to 50,000-foot layer
at the moment of detonation, and for this reason, most
people simply give up on the whole idea. This is a
mistake. Although you can't accurately predict where
the fallout will go, you can do a pretty accurate job of
figuring out where it won’t go. Since retreaters are usu¬
ally more interested in locating safe areas than danger
areas, the mapping of fallout-free locations fits in very
well with their needs.

First let’s establish some fundamentals. The basic
idea here is to plot on a map all the areas near your home
(or your proposed retreat) which probably will not
receive any local fallout from targets nearby or in sur¬
rounding states. By “probably will not receive any local
fallout” I mean those areas where the probability of any
particular spot receiving fallout is less than 2 percent. If

area, you couid expect to receive tahout once in. fifty
nuclear wars. Good enough?

R£0

39

TO FLEE OR NOT TO FLEE

The next question is, what do we mean by “fallout?”
For the special purposes of this discussion. 1 have arbi¬
trarily defined fallout as sufficient local fallout to pro¬
duce 150 rem of radiation exposure in the first two
weeks following the attack. If you get less fallout than
that, you will be in little danger, because even the most
modest protection will cut your exposure down to neg¬
ligible levels; even without protection, the consequences
of such radiation would not be too serious. If your area
receives more than 150 rem in the first two weeks, you
will have a radiation problem, and some more sophisti¬
cated measures will be needed to insure your survival.
Therefore we will be mapping areas that have less than
a 2 percent chance of receiving more than 150 rem in
the first tw'o weeks.

The next question has to do with the targets that
will produce fallout. The actual selection is up to you,
although Appendix A will help guide your decision.
Real-life predictions should involve consideration of
local fallout coming only from missile silos and certain
key military targets u'ith hardened facilities. These
include bases located near Omaha, Nebraska; Riverside,
California; Washington, DC; Colorado Springs, Colo¬
rado; and possibly the submarine bases at Bremerton,
Washington, and Charleston, South Carolina. It is a
virtual certainty that the other primary targets (mainly
SAC bomber bases) will be hit with air bursts and will
produce no fallout.

If you are the kind of person who believes that the
Soviets will try' to generate as much fallout as possible
and will hit as many military bases and cities as possible,
you are welcome to go to the extra w'ork of taking all
targets into consideration, but I suggest that you not
bother. Under those circumstances there aren’t any
totally “safe” areas worth mentioning. If you are more
interested in real-world predictions, however, you can
rapidly eliminate your local danger areas and concen¬
trate on safer locations.

Who knows where the wind blows? Several years
ago the DCPA compiled "effective wind direction” data
for the fallout-carrying layers of the atmosphere over
forty representative cities throughout the United States.
It found that fallout would almost always be blown to
the east of any target. When the high-altitude winds
were moving very slowly, the wind direction was usually
between north-northeast and south-southeast. At nor¬
mal speeds—around 50 or 60 miles per hour—the wind
direction was usually between northeast and southeast.
At higher speeds, the range of variation was even less,
roughly between east-northeast and east-southeast.

The DCPA people were kind enough to supply me
with the raw data from this studv in “windrose” format,
which gives the exact percentage of time in which the
iailout would be biowm a particular direction at a partic¬
ular speed from any of the forty cities. I used these data

to define the directions from each city which could be
expected to receive fallout more than 2 percent of the
time. Most cities had three such fallout sectors, corre¬
sponding to 20, 40 and 60 mile per hour wind speeds. In
addition, several cities had a fourth danger sector pro¬
duced by rare winds over 80 miles per hour. These
sectors are listed in Appendix B.

Once you know in what direction the fallout may be
biown, now do you know how far it may go? This was a
difficult question for me to investigate because the
sources disagree, sometimes by very wide margins. The
“problem” lies in the fact that the Atomic Energy Com¬
mission did not want to kill thousands of people with
their tests and therefore avoided creating too much
fallout in their Nevada explosions. The Pacific tests did
generate plenty of fallout, but almost all of it fell into the
sea before anybody could measure it accurately. This
leaves us with theoretical models which differ from one
another almost as much as they differ from real life.

Eventually I selected two sources of information
about the downwind extent of the 150 rem exposure
area at two weeks. The first, of course, was Glasstone’s
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. 1 The second was the
DCPA publication User's Manual, Meteorological
Data for Radiological Defense . 2 As you will see in com¬
paring the two sources (in table 6), the DCPA figures
indicate downwind travel of fallout about one and one-
half times as great as the Glasstone figures. Both pre¬
sume 50 percent fission surface bursts. Which set of
figures you decide to use is largely a matter of opinion. If
you assume that Glasstone is right, then the DCPA
figures represent a substantial margin of safety. If the
DCPA figures are right for 50 percent fission, then the
Glasstone figures are very close to correct for 30 percent
fission, which is a real-world estimate of the actual
fission content of the bombs.

I prefer to use the DCPA figures for 1-megaton
fallout and Glasst,one’s figures for the 10-megaton fall¬
out. On one hand. I know that I’m not overestimating
the smaller fallout clanger areas, which is the safe thing
to do. On the other hand, using Glasstone’s figures for
the 10-megaton patterns assures me that I am not under¬
estimating them by real-world standards, noram I over¬
looking potential retreat areas by exaggerating the
fallout danger radius. This is a real problem in terms of
the Minuieman silo fallout; if you use the DCPA fig¬
ures, the danger radii are so large that nothing east of the
Rocky Mountains; could be thought of as a safe area.
That makes retreat planning difficult, to say the least.

Mappin® Fallout-safe Areas

I lie following pa-Agraphs describe the method of
mapping fallout safe areas within the United States.
Get a folding United States highway map, such as

LIFE AFTER DOOMSDAY

40

TABLE 6

150 Rem Radiation Exposure Distances

MILES OF TRAVEL

WIND SPEED I MEGATON 10 MEGATON

mph

Ghsstone

DCPA

Ghsstone

DCPA

20

ns

140*

290*

335

40

165

265*

430*

650

60

210

310*

510*

830

80

250

340*

590*

1.000

•These estimates are preferred. (Distances indicate areas from the target at fourteen days.)

the one produced by the American Automobile Associa¬
tion. It is important that the map be relatively large and
that it include the whole country, exclusive of Alaska
and Hawaii. (Residents of these states can make do with
a state map.)

Refer to Appendix A. Mark a circle on the map that
encloses the entire area within 1,000 miles of your loca¬
tion (or the proposed location of your retreat). Plot the
locations of all missile fields within this circle. (The
missile fields are located exactly in Appendix A; gener¬
ally, these may be found in the following states: Mon¬
tana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Ne¬
braska, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, and
Arizona—see also figure 7.)

Draw another circle on your map, this time enclos¬
ing everything within 350 miles of your home or retreat
site. Within this circle, plot the location of all primary,
secondary, and tertiary targets. Use a “I” - to designate
primary targets, a “2” for secondary targets, and a “3”
for tertiary targets.

Now consult the list of forty cities in Appendix B,
and check off the names of the cities on the list which fail
within your two mapped circles. Mark their locations on
your map.

Next, carefully plot the fallout danger patterns for
each of the cities which you checked in the last step. Y ou
will draw these patterns on a separate sheet of paper, cut
them out, and use them as tracing templates in plotting
the danger regions on your map.

Figures 5A-5F show you how to construct the fall¬
out danger zone for Albuquerque, New Mexico, follow¬
ing a 1-megaton surface burst in that city. The same
procedure can be used with any of the remaining thirty-
nine cities listed in Appendix B.

Figure 5A: The easiest way to plot fallout patterns
is to use “polar coordinate” graph paper. You can use
blank paper, a protractor; ruler, and compass if you like,
but the graph paper helps. The very center of the con¬
centric circles on the graph paper will be the location of
the target—Albuquerque in this case. Write in the direc¬
tions of north, east and south. (In most cases you won’t

need to put in west, because the fallout won’t go that
way.) Now label the radial lines with their “degree”
designations. The line running due north from the target
is 0 degrees. The line running east is 90 degrees. Due
south is 180 degrees. The number of degrees increases as
you travel clockwise around the circle.

Now, how far will the fallout travel downwind? For
this example I have used the DCPA estimate for a
l-megaton surface burst: according to table 6, the fall¬
out will travel 140 miles at 20 miles per hour wind speed,
265 miles at 40 miles per hour, or 310 miles at 60 miles
per hour. Check the legend of your map to see what the
scale is. It may say “One inch equals approximately 100
miles”; this means that the 140-mile distance will be a
radius of 140/100 = 1.4 inches. A distance of 265 miles
reduced by the same method is 2.65 inches, and 310
miles becomes 3.10 inches. If the scale on your map is
not 100 miles to the inch, the method still works. Divide
the distance concerned by the map’s scale to get the
inches of distance on the map. Then draw in three arcs
representing 140, 265, and 310 miles on your graph
paper. You are now ready to start plotting the danger
areas.

Figure 5B: Referring to Appendix B, you see that
the 20 mile per hour danger zone for Albuquerque
extends from 25 degrees to 175 degrees clockwise. Draw
two vectors from the target out to the 140-mile line. This
wedge-shaped area is where the fallout from Albu¬
querque will most probably be deposited when the high-
aititude wind speed is 20 miles per hour.

Figure 5C: From the table in Appendix B, you see
that the fallout danger area for Albuquerque ranges
from 45 degrees to 145 degrees clockwise when the wind
speed is 40 miles per hour. Draw in these vectors and
extend them to the 265-mile line. This is the area where
the fallout will most likely be deposited when the high-
altitude winds are blowing at 40 miles per hour.

Figure 5D: At 60 miles per hour, the winds deposit
the fallout within an area from 55 degrees to 105 degrees
clockwise, extending to a range of 310 miles. (Notice in
Appendix B that there is no danger area listed for Albu-

TO FLEE OR NOT TO FLEE

querque in the 80 mile per hour wind category. In some
cases you would have to draw a fourth danger area for
the 80 mile per hour winds.)

Figure 5E: In this figure all three danger areas have
been plotted together. The 20, 40, and 60 mile per hour
danger areas are superimposed in the diagram. The next
step is to draw a smooth outline around the ragged and
angular pattern of wedges you have constructed. This
step will reflect the fact that the winds blow at all the
speeds between 20, 40, and 60 miles per hour, too. This
outer dashed line represents the total danger area for
fallout from a 1-megaton surface burst occurring at
Albuquerque.

Figure 5F: Here the outline of the total danger area
has been plotted along with an idealized fallout pattern.
Notice that the area covered by the fallout pattern is
much less than the total area within the danger zone.
The danger zone simply represents the extent of places
where the fallout could come dowa. As figure 6 indi¬
cates, the predicted danger zone for the Nevada test site
far exceeded the actual location of fallout.

Reconsider figure 5E for a minute. You may have
wondered what the numbers were all about. It is not easy
to predict the relative risk of living at different locations
within the total danger area, but by checking to see how
the 20, 40, and 60 mile per hour danger areas overlap,
you can get at least a rough estimate of the hazardous
locations. The numbers refer to how many of the three
individual danger areas overlap each section of the dia¬
gram. The wedge-shaped area directly to the east of the
target is overlain by all three patterns and has the best
chance of receiving fallout. Areas overlapped by only
two patterns are not quite as dangerous, and those
within only one pattern are safer still. Areas marked “+”
are probably within only one pattern. Areas marked
zero are judged safe. This method of sub-dividing the
danger zone is not statistically sound, but for crude
approximation it can be very useful. Note that this
method also applies to situations where overlapping
fallout from more than one target is a possibility.

There are a couple of important exceptions to be
aware of in plotting fallout danger areas by this method.
The first is that some cities in the southeastern part of the
country have a second danger area listed for wind speeds
in the 20 mile per hour category'. Sometimes in the
spring and summer, the wind blows slowly to the west in
these locations. This produces fallout danger maps with
a short, stubby “tail” sticking out to the west. The pat¬
tern shown for Charleston, South Carolina in figure 7 is
one such example.

Another exception has to do with 10-megaton fall¬
out patterns. At extreme ranges (such as those 600 to

area are very unreliable. The fallout cloud will almost
certainly change direction and speed somewhat before

traveling that far. The danger area calculated for 10-
megaton fallout using this method is only useful for
general planning. Don’t make the mistake of feeling safe
just because you are-1,001 miles from the target. You
can’t cut it that fine.

I have adopted the expedient of usinga 10-megaton
pattern as a mode! for the fallout that will be generated
by the destruction of missile silos. There will actually be
much more fallout generated by these explosions than a
10-megaton figure would indicate, but the explosions
will be spread over such a wide area that you need only
worry' about 10-megaton’s worth passing over you at
any particular point downwind. To figure the danger
areas for a missile field, just plot a 10-megaton pattern
from the edge of the missile field that is closest to you. If
the line misses you, you are probably safe.

Now that you have drawn the danger pattern tem¬
plates you will need for your area, carefully cut them
out. You can use these cut-out shapes to plot the danger
area boundaries for any target on your map. To draw the
danger boundary for a particular target, select the tem¬
plate from the nearest city to the target, place the
“target” spot on the template over the target location on
the map, line up the east-w'est line on the template with
the east-west line on the map, and carefully trace a line
around the edge of the template. Your map now shows
where the fallout from that particular target is likely to
land. Draw the fallout danger areas for all the missile
fields on your map and also for any primary or secon¬
dary targets that you suspect will be hit at ground level.
(Most of them won’t be.) When you are done you will
have mapped the dangerous and safe areas near you,
and you can proceed to your selection of a retreat site, a
new neighborhood, or escape route.

What does this method of mapping fallout tell us
about the situation in the United States following a
hypothetical attack? Figure 7 is a map of the probable
fallout areas in the United States following a real-world
attack on military and industrial targets (see also figure
2). As you can see, most of the country is in little danger
from fallout. And as noted, even within the plotted
danger areas only a small proportion of the area will
actually receive fallout. Even so, anyone who lives in the
Central Time Zone should give serious consideration to
digging a deep fallout shelter. The Dakotas, Nebraska,
Kansas, Iowa, and Missouri are clearly in more danger
than the rest of the nation.

Notice in figure 7 that the areas outside the fallout
danger regions are “safe” only in the sense that they will
receive no fallout. There are two or three hundred fairly
important targets in the rest of the country which would
not generate fallout but which would not be safe to be
near.

Figure 8 is a map constructed for the pessimists

among us. This map shows “safe” refuge areas under

43

TO FLEE OR NOT TO FLEE

FIGURE 7: Fallout Danger Areas in the United States. As calculated
by the method described in the text, areas enclosed by broken lines will
receive most of the fallout generated in a realistic attack by the Soviet
two “doomsday” assumptions, namely that all primary
targets will be hit at ground level, or, alternately, that
every target in the country will be hit at ground level.

If all the primary targets are hit with fallout¬
generating ground bursts, there will still be a selection of
potential refuges where the probability of receiving fall¬
out from any particular target is under 2 percent. I refer
to these areas as “Type A” refuges. One of the largest of
these refuges is in western Canada (area 1). If you like
foreign travel, you might dodge to the north. Within the
United States, the Pacific coast from San Francisco to
the Canadian border will be fairly fallout-free, including
a sizable chunk of east-central Oregon (area 2). Near
Los Angeles, the safest fallout refuges are the Channel
Islands (area 3), forty or more miles off the coast. People
who routinely sail to the islands on weekends might
decide to take an extended vacation if things start to
look bad.

There are Type A refuges in Nevada, Utah, and
Arizona (area 4), Colorado and New Mexico (area 5),
the Big Bend area of Texas (area 6), and the southern tip

of Texas from roughly San Antonio south to the Mexi¬
can border (area 7). Much of Mexico itself (area 8), of

course, will be fallout-free.

Union. Targets which generate fallout are missile silo Fields and a few
special military bases. (Compare to figure 2.)

The refuges numbered 9. 10, and 11 are “Type B”
refuges. These aren’t really good refuges, but consider¬
ing the circumstances, they are the best the central part
of the country has to offer. Assuming that they receive
no missile field fallout, the probability of getting fallout
from other primary’ targets is under 2 percent for these
areas. That’s the best I can do for the Midwest.

On the east coast there are four refuges. The
northernmost is in upstate New York (area 12) and
extends across the Canadian border into Ontario. This
is the only portion of civilized Canada east of Alberta
which is unlikely to receive fallout from United States
targets (under the assumption that all primary targets
will be hit at ground level, of course).

Area 13 is in southern Virginia and North Carolina.
This is roughly where our national leaders have their
special fallout shelters, complete with offices, dormito¬
ries, cafeterias, tennis courts, and the communications
equipment necessary to run a country (and a war) from
deep underground.

Area 14 extends along the Gulf Coast from New

Orleans across the Florida peninsula to Jacksonville.
The last Type A refuge (area 15) lies between Fort Myers

45

TO FLEE OR NOT TO FLEE

and Fort Lauderdale, just north of the Florida
Everglades.

The Type A and Type B areas assume that all
primary targets will be hit at ground level. What if all
domestic targets are hit at ground level?

In that case, the probability of getting fallout in the
Type A and B areas rises to the point that they cannot be
considered refuges any longer. In the case of an all-out,
genocidal attack on our country (which is extremely
hard for me to envision) only the “Type C” areas will still
have less than a 2 percent chance of getting dangerous
levels of fallout. There are only three such refuges. The
first is in western Canada (area 1), the second is around
the Oregon-California border (area 2), and the third is
Mexico south of Monterrey (area 3). All of these areas,
of course, are also Type A refuges.

As this book was going to press. Congress allocated
funds for the development of the controversial MX
missile. This is to be a system of 200 land-based missiles
mounted on mobile platforms. The idea is that each

missile can be moved constantly from one random posi¬
tion so another within a ten-mile long trench, making
So . ic targeting problems hopelessly complex. In my
on.oioii this project is sheer folly. 1 strongly suspect that
the. 5o\ lets will respond by developing the capability to
pui.cnze the entire length of each trench. Only their
technologic il limitations and the SALT treaties would
hamper them in this goal. Since the MX system is the
“ars 5 cr“ to the Soviets' rapidly developing ability to hit
eve ry Mmuteman missile silo, it doesn’t seem likely that
missiie technology will hinder them much in coping with
the MX system. I may be old-fashioned, but I don’t
think the treaties will hinder them much either.

At present, the MX trenches are to be built on
government lands in the states of Nevada, Arizona,
Utah, and New Mexico. If these trenches are ever at¬
tacked, they will generate twice the overall amount of
fallout we would expect to see from existing silos
(because it will require several warheads to destroy each
trench). The impact on survivalists in the southern

LIFE AFTER DOOMSDAY

46

Rocky Mountain and south-central states will be severe.
If the MX missile reaches the deployment stage, it will
mean that there will be no fallout-safe refuges in the
southern half of the country from the California border
to the Mississippi River.

Still, I want to be sure that you have not lost your
perspective while looking at these maps. These refuges
are not the only safe places to be when the fallout starts.
Even under the worst assumptions most of the land area
of the country will escape lethal fallout exposure. How¬
ever, it is only in these refuge locations that you can be
confident that you personally will be missed. Outside of
the refuges you might be missed by the fallout, or you
might not. But don’t forget that if the fallout does
happen to descend in your area there are still many steps
you can take to protect yourself.

Personal Decisionmaking

The series of decisions you will need to make before
starting your disaster planning are presented in the form
of a dichotomous key—the “Key to Survival.” This is a
sequence of questions in which the answer you choose to

The Key to Survival

1. Is your primary concern a nuclear war?

Yes—2. No—23.

2. Consult Appendix A to locate the nuclear targets in
your state and adjacent states. Do you live within ten
miles of a primary target (twenty miles if the target is
listed with an asterisk)? Yes — 3. No — 14.

3. Are you willing to permanently move to a safer
area? Yes — 4. No —7.

4. Would you rather move to a local area that is just
out of range of the primary weapon effects, or would
you rather make a major move to a really safe part of
the country? Major move — 5. Local move — 6.

5. Most retreaters seem to consider the Klamath
region of northern California and southern Oregon as

. about the safest place to go to avoid direct weapons
effects, fallout, and starving refugees. Actually, many
other parts of the country are “safe” too, if you
assume no fallout except from the missile fields. Even
if the Soviets hit all primary targets using surface
bursts, there are still many parts of the nation which
have less than a 2 percent chance of receiving fallout.
At this point you should select a possible area to move
to and start over again at 2, answering each succeed¬
ing question as if you live in your prospective refuge
location. This will help you determine if you have
selected wisely.

a particular question tells you which question to ask
next. Eventually, the questions lead you to a suggested
type of disaster planning which fits your particular
situation.

Using the key is simple: look at question 1, “Is your
primary concern a nuclear war?” If it is, you proceed to
question 2. If not, you skip straight to question 23. Keep
following the instructions given in each entry and the
key will lead you to the information appropriate to your
needs.

6. You will have to analyze your situation carefully to
select a local neighborhood where your risk from
direct weapons effects and fallout will be minimal. As
a first approximation you should consider moving to
a location northwest of the target. If the target is a
single military base, such as a SAC bomber base, a
distance of 25 miles should be sufficient to preserve
you from very much direct damage. For a Minuteman
missile complex, however, I would suggest a 100-mile
minimum to the west, and 500 miles to the north,
south, or east. The fallout generated by 400 or more
megatons detonating at ground level is extensive.
Select your new location and then return to 2. Start
again and answer each question as if you lived at your
selected location.

7. You live within ten (or twenty) miles of a primary
target but don’t want to permanently move some¬
where else. In the case of a nuclear attack, would you
prefer to dig in at home or evacuate on warning?
Dig in — 8. Evacuate — 9.

8. You will need to study chapter 2 and chapter 4 very
carefully to select an appropriate fallout / blast shelter
for your location. Be sure to allow for the fact that
your house may collapse and burn, which means that

it would be better to locate the shelter outside. If.vour
problem in finding an appropriate shelter is too diffi¬
cult, I suggest that you reconsider and decide to evac¬
uate. The whole point of retreating is to avoid sitting

47

TO FLEE OR NOT TO FLEE

on the bullseye when the missiles start to fly.

Still going to dig in — 46. Evacuate — 9.

9. You live within ten (or twenty) miles of a primary
target and you intend to evacuate in the event of a
nuclear attack. The next question is obviously . . .
where? This in turn depends on when you will evacu¬
ate. Before the attack — 10. After — 13.

10. Are you willing to evacuate at the first sign of
danger or will you wait until the last minute? First
warning — 11. Last minute — 12.

11. In general, you can expect to be forewarned to the
extent of knowing a day or two ahead of the time of an
attack (remember the days of tension during the
Cuban missile crisis). If you are willing to head for the
hills as soon as things start to look hot, you can plan
on driving to a refuge which is as much as ten to twelve
hours away. The same time limit applies to flying, but
of course the distance which can be covered is much
greater. Go to 5.

12. If you would rather stick it out until the last possible
moment, it might be possible to hop into your car and
leave town in the last five minutes between the Civil
Defense alert and the explosion, but I don’t recom¬
mend it. Your last-minute warning could come either
from hearing your favorite AM/FM radio station
suddenly cut off the air, or from the wailing beep of an
emergency weather radio (which also reports atomic
attack). Weather stations are illustrated in figure 9.
Don’t count on local sirens. Most of them don’t work
anymore, and we have all learned over the years to
tune out the few sirens that do work. If you prefer not
to leave until the last minute, your refuge had better
be within one hour’s driving time of your home or
office. That will give you just enough' time to enter a
prepared shelter before any fallout arrives. Don’t plan
to fly out at the last minute; it would be suicidal. Go
to 6.

13. If you wait until after the attack to evacuate, you
will need a blast and fallout shelter appropriate to
your location (see chapter 4). local stockpiles of sup¬
plies sufficient until it is safe to evacuate (see chapter
5). a guaranteed route away from the city (or target),
and someplace to go. Don’t count on flying out after
the attack because all light aircraft in your area will
probably have been smashed by the blast wave. Driv¬
ing out could be a problem too, due to damage to
automobiles and obstruction of streets. I would
recommend evacuating ahead of time if possible, but
as a back-up you should plan a route to your refuge
that allows you to make use of backpacking, motor¬
cycles. or river rafting. As strange as these suggestions
sound, they are ways of leaving a shattered city which
do not require broad, clear streets. Having a friend

from out of town® meet you with a car at a pre¬
arranged point would be best. Go to 5 and6, then go
back to 2 and begin again.

14. Do you live within ten miles of any secondary target
(twenty miles if the target is listed with an asterisk)?
Yes — 15. No—16.

15. Secondary’ targets are likely to be hit because of
their industrial importance. Sometimes this “impor¬
tance” is based on a local accident of geography which
concentrates railroad and highway routes along a
valley, pass, or shoreline and has little to do with
industrial output as we normally think of it. In most
cases, however, we can reasonably expect that the
Soviets will concentrate their missile strike on the
primary targets and people living near secondary
targets will have a few hours of warning before the
bombers arrive. This greatly improves chances of a
successful last-minute evacuation, provided you have
prepared ahead of time and can load a car quickly
enough to beat the rush. (The last thing you want is to
be caught in a traffic jam while the Backfire bombers
are closing in.) Using motorcycles to leave the city
alleviates this problem, provided you have stocked a
refuge out in the woods prior to the attack and do not
have to carry all your supplies with you. The location
of your refuge relative to the secondary target should
insure that you will be out of range of thermal and
blast effects; there is probably little danger of local
fallout. Go to 18.

16. Do you live within ten miles of a tertiary target
(twenty miles if the target is listed with an asterisk)?
Yes—17. No—18.

17. It would be best to make plans to evacuate to a safe
refuge, but there is the distinct possibility that tertiary
targets will not be attacked. This puts a different
complexion on your preparations. It would be a good
idea to get out of town for a few days when things get
bad, but you w ill probably be returning. An elaborate
refuge off in the hills is not necessarily required. In
most cases a fallout-free spot to pitch a tent for a week
or two ought to do nicely. Notice that if you are in an
area subject to fallout from a primary target you can’t
get away with just a tent and a flat space to put it on.
In that case, you might be better off to build a fallout
shelter at home and trust to luck that your city won’t
be attacked. Retreaters who don’t believe in trusting
to luck can still arrange for a permanent refuge in the
hills. Go to 18.

18. Do you live within fifty miles of any Minuteman or
Titan missile complex (see Appendix A)?

Yes—19. No—20.

19. Your location has a chance of receiving over 10,000

R of fallout radiation, which is more than a typical

LIFE AFTER DOOMSDAY

home fallout shelter with a protection factor (PF) of
40 can protect you against (see chapter 4 for a more
detailed explanation of the derivation of PFs). A per¬
manent underground fallout shelter with a PF be¬
tween 100 and 1,000 would be a sound investment.
You should also make preparations to evacuate after
two or three weeks, unless you have the provisions
and the patience to stay underground for ninety days.
Actually, if you live this close to a missile Field your
best survival option is to move somewhere else imme¬
diately. Moving — 5. Staying — 46.

20. At this point, you should turn back to the previous
section of the chapter and map the probable fallout
areas around your location. If you live to the north,
south, or east of a missile field, take your predictions
with a grain of salt and err on the side of safety. Once
you have constructed your fallout map, answer this
question: Do you live (or is your retreat) in an area
with less than a 2 percent chance of receiving local
fallout? Yes—21. No—22.

21. You have no problems. I suggest that you take steps
to provide some radiation protection anyway, just in
case, but you really don’t need any. Your location is
suitable for a permanent retreat, at least as far as
nuclear weapons effects are concerned. Go to 46.

22. There is at least a 2 percent chance of getting some
fallout at your location. Your options are to provide
yourself with some kind of fallout shelter, trust to luck
that you won’t get any fallout, or relocate to a safer
area. Relocate—5 and 6. Shelter or trust to
luck — 46.

23. You are not primarily worried about a nuclear at¬
tack. This implies that you are more worried about
something else. Natural disaster—24. Man-made
disaster — 36. Religious or supernatural disaster —
45.

24. Natural disasters may be earthquakes— 25, tsu¬
namis— 26, tornadoes—27, hurricanes— 28, floods—
29, droughts— 30, crop failures— 31, wildfires—22,
volcanoes— 33, epidemics— 34 and blizzards— 35.

25. The cardinal rule for surviving an earthquake is to
stand in a doorway away from windows, shelves, or
other items that could topple over or shatter and
shower you with glass fragments. Usually you will
have only a few seconds in which to reach such a
location, so you should pick it out in advance. Statis¬
tically, the earthquake will probably catch you either
at home in bed or at work. An earthquake can range
from a minor inconvenience to a major disaster. To
prepare for the worst, stockpile food and supplies for
at least a month of self-sufficiency (see chapter 5).
Figure 10 shows a map of earthquake danger areas in
case you are not sure how much danger you are in.
Notice that there are only three really safe areas... all
of them in prime hurricane country. Go to 46.

26. The one obvious thing to keep in mind about tsu¬
namis is that you have to be near the ocean shore in
order to be threatened. If you live more than 200 feet
above sea level, you should be quite safe, unless you
are adjacent to a bay with a long, narrow V-shape.
Such bays can magnify the wave. In most areas sub¬
ject to tsunamis (such as Hawaii), the government has
well-maintained alert systems which predict the waves
and warn residents hours in advance. You should take
precautions for a rapid evacuation as described for
“wildfire” in 32. You will be in danger of being taken
by surprise only if you live at the water’s edge near an
active submarine fault (see the shoreline areas in fig¬
ure 10). If you live on an earthquake coast, don’t buy a
beach house. Go to 46.

27. Figure 11 shows the country’s worst tornado danger
areas. In the most dangerous area (centra! Okla¬
homa), the number of tornadoes can reach three to
four per year in each fifty-mile square area. If you live
in a tornado danger area, you should build a storm
cellar in your backyard or construct a reinforced shel¬
ter in the northeast corner of your basement. Torna¬
does usually travel from the southwest toward the
northeast, making the northeast part of a building
marginally safer than other locations. Some of the
fallout shelters described in chapter 4 will also double
as tornado shelters, so why not build one shelter for
both purposes? An emergency weather radio with an
automatic alarm would be a good investment, too. If
your house is damaged and your community widely
disrupted by one or more tornadoes, you will need to
provide temporary shelter (tents, etc.) as well as most
of your own food, water, clothing, and other supplies
for a day or two at least and for possibly as much as a
month. Read the rest of this book with these needs in
mind. Go to 46.

28. Hurricanes represent the natural disaster most sim¬
ilar to a nuclear attack. Surviving a hurricane means
either that you must seek specially constructed shelter
or that you must flee. The effects occur over thou¬
sands of square miles and tax the preparedness of
entire states. It isn’t safe to go outside or to travel; the
aftermath can take weeks to come under control.
Fortunately, relatively few of us live in the most dan¬
gerous hurricane areas (see figure 12). Mv advice to a
retreater who fears hurricanes is to prepare i’ood,
clothing, gasoline, and makeshift shelter supplies in
boxes or duffle bags that can be loaded very quickly
into a car (see 22). If a Civil Defense mass evacuation
is under way, authorities will tell you where they think
nearby safe areas will be, but I would be more inclined
to take a weekend trip entirely out of the danger
region. (Drive up to the Lake of the Ozarks—and
admire the Minuteman missile silos!) For your own
sake, do not even contemplate stayingmear the shore.

49

TO FLEE OR NOT TO FLEE

FIGURE 9: Emergency Weather Radio Stations. Black dots represent
operating stations, while circles represent stations planned but not yet
constructed. The section of the country with the greatest density of

Whole towns have disappeared during hurricanes
along with the hardy souls who tried to weather it out.
Go to 46.

29. Floods can happen almost anywhere except on
mountain peaks. Natural floods result from too much
rain (or melting snow) all at once, and no one can be
entirely safe from them. A measure of safety can be
obtained, however, by deciding not to live within 100
vertical feet of the nearest major river, or within the
boundaries of local “100-year” floods. Your county
Civil Defense office can supply you with the informa¬
tion appropriate to your location. If you live within an
area subject to very wide-scale flooding, you might
invest in survival equipment and supplies appropriate
to a floating retreat. (This subject is discussed in more
detail in chapter 4.) Go to 46.

30. Droughts do not normally threaten direct survival,
but they can be very bad for crops and livestock.
Stockpiling water isn’t the answer unless you have the
ability to do it on a grand scale. A solution more to the
point would be to drill a deep well on your property or
to invest in equipment for purifying brackish or pol¬
luted water into drinking, water (see chapter 5). The
main danger produced by drought is crop failure— 31,
or possibly widespread wildfire— 32.

first strike nuclear targets has been conspicuously neglected in terms of
emergency warning stations. (Compare to figure 7.)

31. There is only one answer to a serious crop failure.
As has been the case for a hundred thousand years,
those of us who have stored a little extra food will be
much better off than those who have not. A crop
failure by itself will probably not produce serious
problems in the United States, but even so, there
could be nutritional and economic advantages to hav¬
ing a basement full of food after a really bad agricul¬
tural year. Go to 46.

32. I have listed wildfire as a natural disaster, but as an
ecologist I personally regard runaway wildfires as
man-made disasters. Forests used to burn naturally
and surprisingly often, but the evidence suggests that
most of these natural fires were not very dangerous.
After half a century of fire suppression, however, our
forests are so full of fuel that they burn violently and
uncontrollably whenever they get a chance. (We have
Smokey the Bear to thank for that.) If you live in a
forested area or in dense chaparral you should take
steps to be ready for an emergency evacuation. First,
be sure that you have at least two escape routes. Then
pack a few boxes or duffle bags with food and cloth¬
ing, and place a list of items to take with you along
with an empty duffle bag in some central part of the
house. Without such precautions you might make an
irrational selection or waste valuable get-away time

LIFE AFTER DOOMSDAY

50

carrying one item at a time out to the car. One more
thing: put an extra set of car keys with the evacuation
checklist. You may seriously regret it if you don’t. To
protect the house itself, clear away all native vegeta¬
tion within 50 feet (100 feet downhill), and substitute
succulent plants like iceplant or cactus. Landscape
with paved patios, gravel walks, and well-watered
lawns. Put a rock or tile roof on the house, or at least
have the shingles treated with a flame retardant. Go
to 46.

33. Volcanoes are not a threat to you unless you happen
to be living next door to one. Even then, you probably
have little to worry about, since almost all of the
thousands of volcanoes in the United States are
extinct. The exceptions are in the states bordering the
Pacific Ocean, where there are several definitely active
volcanoes: Mt. Baker, Mt. Rainier, and Mt. St. Hel¬
ens in Washington; Mt. Hood in Oregon; and Mt.
Shasta, Lassen Peak, and Cinder Cone (near Lassen)
in California. In addition, there are many others
along the Cascades which are dormant. Mt. St. Hel¬
ens, northeast of Portland, erupted violently and
repeatedly throughout the 1800s, producing gigantic
flows of mud and ash. Since the last eruption, three

hydroelectric dams have been built on the slopes of*
the mountain. Civil Defense planners are worried that
a future eruption mav produce a mud flow over¬
whelming the uppermost dam, causing a chain reac¬
tion of dam failures that would flood the Portland
area. The state of Hawaii is entirely composed of
volcanoes, four of which are active: Haleakah on
Maui; and Mauna Loa, Hualalai, and Kilauea on
Hawaii. Alaska contains about forty active volca¬
noes, mainly concentrated in a single belt stretching
southwest from Anchorage to the outermost of the
Aleutian Islands. The one outstanding lesson of vol¬
cano safety is that no one has ever died in a volcanic
eruption who had the sense to leave early. If you wait
too long you could be caught in a trap like the one that
engulfed Pompeii: volcanic ash that’s too thick to
breathe and too thin to walk on. Go to 46.

34. Epidemics concern me as a population ecologist
because they are a primary natural remedy to over¬
population and because it has been so long since the
human race was subjected to a serious disease out¬
break. If a disease should invade your community,
there are several steps you might take to avoid con¬
tracting it. Running away isn’t one of them. Unfortu-

FIGURE 10: Earthquake Danger Areas. Zone i areas may expea

minor structural damage. Zone 2 areas risk moderate damage, and
Zone 3 areas have the potential for major structural damage. Areas

(After Protected Educational Facilities in Found Space. Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency, TR-80, May 1973—D14.9:78.)

TO FLEE OR NOT TO FLEE

FIGURE 11: Tornado Danger Areas. Contours represent the average
number of tornadoes each year per fifty-square-miie area, (After the
New York Times 5 April 1974.)

nately, getting out in public (as you must do to flee) is
about the best way to catch the disease. Also, people
in surrounding communities may not take kindly to
your intended migration. People have occasionally
even been shot for trying to escape from quarantined
areas. A better plan is to withdraw into your home
and avoid coming into contact with anyone. If you
avoid other people and practice rigorous sanitary
precautions at home, you will have helped yourself
about as much as you can. Of course, such a with¬
drawal will require an in-house source of food, water,
and perhaps medicines. Chapters 5 and 6 will guide
you in the selection of these items. Go to 46.

35. Severe winter storms usually don’t mean more than
three weeks of isolation, but those three weeks could
involve hardship if you are not prepared to supply
your own heat and food in the meantime. If a blizzard
is your main worry, see chapters 4 and 5. 3 Go to 46.

36. Man-made disasters are all around us, more or less
waiting for an opportunity to happen. Dam failure—
37, city fire— 38, nuclear reactor accident— 39, train
accident (chemical spill)— 40, terrorists— 41, repres-

37. How do you know if you are in danger from a faulty

dam? Obviously, appearances aren’t worth anything.
I would suggest that you have a close look at some
detailed topographic maps of your area to see just
where the dams and reservoirs are actually located. Be
sure to check any ponds or lakes in the hiils upstream
of your position to see what keeps them from sud¬
denly draining. When you have a good idea of the
distribution of such potential threats, go to visit your
local Civil Defense director. My experience has been
that local CD people are very helpful and can usually
point out exactly where the flood waters from a rup¬
tured dam are expected to go. They may also be able
to advise you about large dams far upstream which
might cause problems. In any case, your options are
to move permanently to high ground or to relocate to
a mote! on high ground during especially heavy rain
storms. Dams are particularly vulnerable to failure
when they are overfull or when they are filling for the
first time. Go to 46.

38. Most of our cities are far less inflammable than they
used to be. and except in periods of poor labor rela¬
tions. our fire-fighting capability is very advanced.

enclosed concrete stairwell which you can locate in
the dark that leads to an exterior ground-level exit.

LIFE AFTER DOOMSDAY

You should also look into the possibility of having a
rope ladder. Otherwise, if fire is your worry, you
should take steps as outlined in 32,

39. The best rule to follow for avoiding nuclear reactor
accidents is, don’t live near one (see figure 13). You
can bet that if the reactor melts down and starts to
release radioactive materials into the air, you will be
one of the last to know. The history of reactor acci¬
dents clearly shows that the authorities don’t like to
say anything until it is impossible to keep silent any
longer. It may only be in the future that the real
circumstances of the Three Mile Island incident will
be fully known; critics are already alarmed at the
apparent lack of communication between controlling
agencies. I suggest that you buy a radiation detection
instrument and a gas mask or other respiration filter
as insurance. That way you can avoid inhaling dan¬
gerous particles while you find out for yourself how
radioactive your neighborhood has become. As for
the area which could be contaminated by a really bad
accident, the rules for nuclear weapons fallout do not
apply. The best I can offer is the observation that the
Russian nuclear accident in the Urals apparently
required the evacuation of an area at least twenty-five
miles square. Go to 46.

40. Chemical spills from derailed trains are not usually
much of a hazard except within half a mile or so of the
wreck. If several train cars derail near your home I
suggest that you pack up quickly and go visit
Grandma until the trouble is cleared up (even if the
local authorities don’t ask you to evacuate). About
one train car in twenty-five carries explosive or toxic
chemicals, and many times the Civil Defense people
don’t know what is in the cars. If the wreck is two or
three miles away you might get out your trusty gas
mask and keep it handy for a while, and you should
certainly carry it with you in the car if you have to
drive past the wreckage. Individual gas masks are
inexpensive and inconspicuous (stuff them in a paper
bag) and are good insurance for people who live near
railroads. Go to 46.

41. The experts disagree strongly about what to do if
you are in a group that is taken hostage by terrorists.
On the one hand, some advise gradually getting to
know the terrorists, under the assumption that if the
terrorists begin to see you as a person instead of a
“thing,” they will have a harder time shooting you. On
the other hand, the people who are usually shot first
are the ones who stand out in the crowd. I would be
inclined to offer one additional piece of advice. If it

FIGURE 12: Hurricane Danger Areas. Contours represent the rela- each area, (After Protected Educational Facilities in Found Space ,

tive number of destructive tropica! storms which have passed over Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, TR-80, May 1973—D14.9:78.)

53

TO FLEE OR NOT TO FLEE

looks like you are going to be killed anyway do
something. A person with a machine gun is not
invulnerable—only overconfident. As for terrorist
attacks directed at a more general target, such as
sabotage of the city power network, there is really
nothing you can do except be ready to evacuate or
become temporarily self-sufficient. Go to 46.

42. I had not seriously considered the possibility that a
totalitarian government could arise in the United
States until one day 1 met a retreater who keeps his
passport in his pocket and refuses to travel more than
200 miles away from the Canadian border. 1 thought
he was a little paranoid, but as the saying goes, “That
doesn’t mean they’re not out to get you.” After read¬
ing Executive Order 11490 I’m not quite as compla¬
cent about this subject. 4 In my opinion, flight from a
repressive government is the wisest course. The Jew's
who left Europe just before World War II made the
right choice. Six million of their slower brethren paid
the price of tardiness. Incidentally, when you hear the
conservatives opposing gun control on the grounds
that it leads to tyranny—they’re right. Totalitarian
regimes do have a historical tendency to disarm the
civilian population prior to throwing their w-eight
around. Frequently they use very humanitarian argu¬
ments, too. If you are the sanguine type who would
rather fight, there are many left-wing, right-w ing, and
military manuals available which will tell you exactly
how to go about it. Some of these are mentioned in
chapter 7. Go to 46.

43. I put in a paragraph about personal attack because
in some parts of the country' the possibility of being
assaulted ranks very high on the list of things people
worry about. Obviously, one tries to avoid dark
alleys, rowdy bars, slum neighborhoods, and walking
alone at night. As for personal defense, there are
really only two ways to go. You can spend several
years learning to be a deadly martial artist or you can
spend several w eeks learning to be a deadly pistolero.
Karate gives one the advantage of being “armed” ail
the time without being in violation of the law. If that
doesn’t appeal to you, there is the pistol. Don’t bother
with knives, tear gas, hatpins, and other assorted
weapons. If you are going to defy the law by carrying a
concealed weapon, you might as w ell carry a gun. See
comments on pistols in chapter 7 for a discussion of
selection and use. Go to 46.

44. The survivalists who are preparing for economic
collapse tend to follow one or more of three courses
They buy United States common circulation silver
coins and hoard them. Your local coin shop can heln
you find these. The main idea is th^t c- en sf tN. J hm
suddenly becomes worthless, the s.hcr in the corns
will still have value. At present, the coins are worth

five times their face value, and they should continue to
increase in value as the dollar becomes weaker. The
second approach is to invest in “trade goods” to use
when bartering becomes necessary. I have usually
heard this idea explained in terms of stockpiled
ammunition (especially .22 caliber cartridges), in a
survival situation, ammunition has an intrinsic value
which might make it a substitute for money. The third
approach involves buying retreat property which can
be farmed. The idea is to retreat to the hills and
become entirely self-sufficient until the trouble is
over. People concerned about economic collapse usu¬
ally subscribe to one or more of the survivalist news¬
letters devoted to this subject. Consult chapter 5 for
discussion of these newsletters and other survival
resources. One particularly good treatment of the
subject is Howard Ruffs How to Prosper During the
Coming Bad Years. 5 Ruff does a very good job of
describing the economic dangers ahead and pre¬
scribes personal financial strategies to cope with
them. Go to 46.

45. Build an ark. Not only is there historical precedent
but you won’t be alone. There are actually people who
have built floating emergency houses to be ready for
the next “deluge.” Otherwise see Jim McKeever’s
Christians Will Go through the Tribulation ... And
How to Prepare for It. 6 Go to 46.

46. At this point, your options are either to proceed
directly to the rest of this chapter or to return to some
point in the key and try a different set of possibilities
to see where they lead you.

Additional Considerations

When retreaters plan the location of their refuges,
they normally take into consideration factors other than
direct and indirect nuciear weapons effects. Very' fre¬
quently, the location of large population centers is takqn
into consideration, as well as the availability of good
w ater and suitable land for farming or gardening. Which
contributing factors are really important in selecting the
retreat site?

The first thing many retreaters point out is that the
refuge must be in a place that can be defended or it isn’t
any good, five thought a lot about this characteristically
immediate response and i am inclined to put it down to
the fact that most, retreaters tend to be extremely
securiu-conscious. The thought of hordes of desperate
refugees or Rancho Villa-style banditos laying siege to

refuge is not biologically capable of supporting the

LIFE AFTER DOOMSDAY

54

FIGURE 13: Nuclear Facilities in the United States. Black dots indi- Black squares plot various kinds of uranium processing plants and
cate existing nuclear power plants; circles represent proposed plants. facilities; white squares indicate proposed facilities.

retreaters, the retreaters themselves will soon have to
become bandits in order to stay alive. The first priority,
then, is arable land and dependable water. Once you
have located a suitable area with these qualities, you can
go on to the problem of defense; first make sure that you
have a piece of territory that is worth defending.

What about those ravening hordes? Suppose there
is a nuclear attack that leaves all those city-bred people
without food and water? Won’t they come to the country
looking for something to eat? Well, maybe so—but
maybe not. One point which is frequently overlooked by
retreat planners is the damage to the routes of communi¬
cation which a nuclear attack will cause. In most states,
the main highways run right through the high-priority
targets.

If you compare California’s nuclear target sites (as
illustrated in Appendix A), with the maps in figure 14, it
becomes clear that virtually all the north-south arteries
in this state would be severed by an atomic attack. Any
attack severe enough to drive unprepared refugees from
their homes will also interfere seriously with their mobil¬
ity. There will be virtually no gasoline for them.

nate route, and plenty of gas.) It will be reasonaoie to

expect a few refugees following an attack, but not as
many as you might be inclined to believe.

There is one situation in which there could be a
large number of refugees in your neighborhood, how¬
ever. If things start to look bad, the President might
order the cities to be evacuated as a precautionary move.
Millions of people would head for the designated “host
communities” as the Civil Defense authorities try to
execute their crisis-relocation plans. In that case, as a
retreater in a secure area, you might suddenly have a
score of refugees billetted with you by the local Civil
Defense command or the National Guard. You will not
be able to legally refuse. This would be a situation where
the war has not begun and might never start. Civiliza¬
tion with all its laws and restrictions still stands. You will
have to take in the refugees assigned to you. What will
you do then?

A third topic concerns the possibility of retreating
by boat. Persons who live in seacoast cities may discover
that their escape routes are severely limited by surround¬
ing targets and the coast. This situation applies particu¬
larly to potential retreaters living in the Boston-Wash-
ington megalopolis, Miami, Houston, the suburbs of
Los Angeles and San Francisco, and cities on the shores
of the Great Lakes. If you can sail out to sea as little as 20
miles off the California coast, you will be quite safe from
blast and fallout. On the east coast, a distance of 200 to
300 miles would be better. Retreating out to sea is an

TO FLEE OR NOT TO FLEE

FIGURE 14: Major Highways in California. (A) Prior to a nuclear populated areas will tend to isolate retreaters and refugees in local

attack; (B) after an attack on five primary targets; (C) after an attack areas,

on all targets in the state. Extreme fragmentation of highways around

unusual suggestion, but in many places it could be the
best chance you have. Chapter 4 discusses how to use a
small sailboat as a fallout shelter, in case you don’t make
it far enough out to sea in time.

Commentary

What to do, where to go, and how to get there are
the three primary questions retreaters face in beginning
to plan their refuges. The right decisions are crucial to
success at this initial stage. To make the right decisions,
retreaters need information on the nuclear targets and
fallout distributions near their locations, as well as.
information on the agricultural ability of various poten¬

tial refuges to support them in the long run. Potential
interferences from refugees should be considered, but as
a secondary factor.

Now that you have made your first decisions about
how to organize your survival effort, the remaining
chapters will help you begin.

Notes

1. Samuel Glasstone, ed., The Effects of S'uclear Weapons, 3rd ed., a report of the United States
Department of Defense and the United States Department of Energy, 1977 (D1 2:N 88/2),

2. User’s Manual, Meteorological Data for Radiological Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness
Agency, July 1970 (FG E 5.6/!).

3. See also Evan Powell, “For Winter Survival Build a Warm Room,” Popular Science
November 1977, p. 110.

4. For a brief summary of the provisions of this order, see chapter 1.

5. Howard Ruff, How to Prosper During the Coming Bad Years (Sew York: Times Books, 1979).

6. Jim McKeever, Christians Will Go through the Tribulation . , . And How To Prepare for It.

(PO Box 4130, Medford, Oregon 97501).

LIFE AFTER DOOMSDAY

56

APPENDIX A

Nuclear Target Areas within the United States

cef

The following information was compiled from various publi¬
cations of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA),
the Strategic Air Command, the United States Senate, and the
Library of Congress. All of the data were in the open literature;
there are no government secrets revealed here. The primary
source was High Risk Areas for Civil Preparedness Nuclear
Defense Planning Purposes (DCPA, TR-82. April 1975). All
high priority targets were double-checked against Analysis of
Effects of Limited Nuclear Warfare (United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, September 1975).

Figure 35 shows the extent of areas of direct weapon
effects in which an unprotected human would be in danger of
injury. However, 300 tertiary targets not shown on this map
are discussed in the text. Do not overlook these targets in your
survival planning. In the list that follows, the radius of danger
is assumed to be ten miles unless the target is marked with an
asterisk (*). In that case, the danger radius is twenty miles.
Note that some danger areas cross state boundaries.

Primary targets are military bases, missile silos, and com¬
mand posts which the Soviets may attack without warning in
an effort to disarm us. These areas will certainly be hit in any
nuclear exchange. Persons living near these targets will receive
virtually no warning before the incoming warheads explode.

Secondary targets are military installations and cities
which have high military value but which do not house stra¬
tegic weapons. These areas might not be attacked in a first
strike, but would be reserved for subsequent bomber or missile
attacks with the object of reducing our ability to fight a pro¬
longed conventional war.

Tertiary targets are non-military cities whose residents
can be held hostage for purposes of nuclear blackmail. The
object here would be to destroy cities one by one in every state
until Congress was clamoring for peace at any price. If this
course of action sounds unthinkable, remember that it is
exactly what we did to the Japanese at the end of World
War II.

The High Risk Areas manual designates 175 counties
which could receive extremely high levels of fallout radiation. I
have chosen not to reproduce this list here because, in mv
opinion, the information is very poor. The DCPA researchers
made assumptions and used statistical techniques which have
very little to do with reality; problems were compounded by
inappropriate graphics and slopping printing practices. The
results are misleading and potentially dangerous from the
standpoint of survival planning. The fallout prediction
method described in chapter 3 is much more reliable.

I C 1BD

145

APPENDICES

Note that the ^ir Force bases designated as stratotanker
bases or heavy bomber bases involve an additional fan-shaped
high-risk area extending about 50 miles north of each base.
Medium bomber bases have an additional high-risk area
extending 100 miles north of each base. Danger in these areas
is caused by the possibility that the Soviets will attempt to
knock down our bombers and tankers shortly after they are
launched. The danger areas represent a five-minute flying time
radius from each base, within which nuclear air bursts might
be expected during the first few minutes of the attack.

This list covers 1,108 primary targets (54 bases and 1,054
silos), 142 secondary targets (bases and industrial areas), and
300 tertiary targets (cities). That’s 1,550 in total.

ALABAMA

Primary: None. Secondary: Anniston, Selma, Huntsville,*
Montgomery. Tertiary: Muscle Shoals, Gadsden, Childers-
burg,* Tuscaloosa, Phenix City (Columbus, Georgia),
Mobile.

ALASKA

Primary: None. Secondary: Adak Island, Anchorage,
Fairbanks. Shermya Island (space radar). Clear (BMEWS
radar). Tertiary: None.

ARIZONA

Primary: Davis-Monthan Air Force Base complex at Tucson
(Titan missiles; including the entire area within a line
connecting Nogales, Cochise, Mammoth, Eloy, south to the
Mexican border). Secondary: Gilbert, Perryville, Yuma.
Tertiary: Phoenix.

ARKANSAS

Primary: Little Rock Air Force Base complex (Titan missiles,
including the entire area within a line connecting Shirley,
Newport, Des Arc, Little Rock, Russellville, Nogo, and
Shirley again). Blytheville Air Force Base (heavy bombers).
Secondary: Pine Bluff, West Memphis (Memphis, Tennessee).
Tertiary: Fort Smith, Texarkana, Little Rock.

CALIFORNIA

Primary: Travis Air Force Base at Fairfield (stiratotankers),
Castle Air Force Base at Merced (heavy bombers), Mather Air
Force Base at Sacramento (heavy bombers), Beale Air Force
Base at Marysville (heavy bombers and PAVE PAWS radar),
March Air Force Base at San Bernardino (heavy bombers).
Secondary: San Francisco area (including everything within a
line connecting Pt. Reyes Station, St. Helena, Antioch, Palo
Alto, Redwood City, and—up the coast—Pt. Reyes Station
again), San Jose, El Centro, China Lake, Edwards Air Force
Base (space camera), Lemoore, Portola, Los Angeles area
(including everything within a line connecting Malibu,
Camarillo, Lake Arrowhead, Perris, Laguna, and—up the
coast—Malibu again), Oro Grande, Oceanside, San Diego,*
Lathrope, Santa Barbara, Oxnard. Ventura, Thousand Oaks,
Mt. Laguna (474N radar). Mill Valley (474N radar),
Vandenberg Air Force Base (satellites). Tertiary: Milford,
McClellan Air Force Base, Sacramento,* Santa Rosa,
Modesto. Stockton, Salinas, Monterey, Fresno, Ridgecrest,
Bakersfield, Mojave, Lancaster, Wrightwood, Barstow,

Yermo, Victorville, Banning, Warner Springs, Gilroy.

COLORADO

Primary: Warren Air Force base complex (Minuteman
missiles; including everything w ithin a line connecting Grover,
Briggsdale, Fort Morgan, Sedgwick, and—along the state
line—Grover again). Colorado Springs (North American Air
Defense Command Headquarters).* Secondary: Denver,
Pueblo. Tertiary: Greeley, Boulder, Aurora, Cheraw,
Pueblo-Boone area, Broomfield, Rocky Flats (target is ten
miles west of Sedalia).

CONNECTICUT

Primary. None. Secondarv. 'Sew London (submarine factory).
Tertiary: Hartford,* Bristol,* New Haven,* Stamford,
Norwalk, Bridgeport, Danbury.

DELAWARE

Primary: None. Secondary: Dover. Tertiary: W'ilmington,
Odessa, New Castle.

FLORIDA

Primary: Homestead Air Force Base, McDill Air Force Base
at Tampa (474N radar). McCoy Air Force Base at Orlando.
Secondary: Panama, Cocoa Beach. Jacksonville. Pensacola,
Key West, Elgin Air Force Base at Ft. Walton Beach (FPS-85
radar, space radar). Tertiary: Port St. Joe. Tallahassee,
Gainesville, Daytona Beach, Cape Canaveral, Titusville,
Tampa,* Sarasota. Ft. Myers, Palm Beach, Miami, Boca
Raton, Fort Lauderdale.*

GEORGIA

Primary: Warner-Robins Air Force Base at Macon (heavy
bombers). Secondary: Atlanta,* Albany, Brunswick. Valdosta
(target is ten miles northeast of Valdosta). Tertiary: Augusta,
Columbus, Savannah,* Stockbridge, Marietta.

HAWAII

Primary: None. Secondary: Honolulu area (includes all of
Oahu'except the Waimea-Kahuku area and Makapuu Point).
Tertiary: None.

IDAHO

Primary: Mountain Home Air Force Base. Secondary: None.
Tertiary: Boise.

ILLINOIS

Primary: None. Secondary: Chicago,* Rantoul, East St.
Louis.* Tertiary: Freeport, Rockford, Zion, Decatur, Moline
(Davenport, Iowa), Peoria, Bloomington-Normal, Cham¬
paign, Springfield, East Dubuque (Dubuque, Iowa), Alton,
Joliet,* Aurora, Elgin, Des Plaines.

INDIANA

Primary: Grissom Air Force Base (stratotankers, located
about ten miles southwest of Peru). Secondary: Jeffersonville
(Louisville, Kentucky), Crane. Tertiary: Gary,* South Bend,
Elkhart, Fort Wayne, Lafayette, Muncie, Anderson,
Indianapolis,* Terre Haute, Evansville,* New Albany.*

LIFE AFTER DOOMSDAY

146

IOWA

Primary: None. Secondary: Burlington, Sioux City. Tertiary:
Waterloo, Dubuque, Cedar Rapids, Des Moines, Davenport.
Council Bluffs (Omaha, Nebraska).

KANSAS

Primary: McConnel Air Force Base complex at Wichita
(stratotankers. Titan missiles; including the entire area within
a line connecting Eureka, Arlington, Attica. Caldwell,
Arkansas City, and Eureka again). Schilling Air Force Base at
Salina, Forbes Air Force Base at Topeka. Secondary: Olathe.
Tertiary: Elwood (St. Joseph, Missouri), Leavenworth,
Manhattan, Topeka, Kansas City,* De Soto.

KENTUCKY

Primary: None. Secondary: Louisville,* Lexington (and
another target ten miles east of Lexington), Richmond.
Tertiary: Covington (Cincinnati, Ohio), Henderson (Evans¬
ville, Indiana), Owensboro, Paducah.

LOUISIANA

Primary: Barksdale Air Force Base at Shreveport (heavy
bombers). Secondary: New Orleans,* Alexandria (and
another target ten miles northeast of Alexandria). Tertiary:
Baton Rouge,* Sterlington, Monroe, Lake Charles, Lafayette,
New Iberia.

MAINE

Primary: Loring Air Force Base at Limestone (heavy
bombers), Kittery (Pease Air Force Base at Portsmouth, New
Hampshire). Secondary: Brunswick, Franklin (target is about
five miles northwest of Franklin), Charleston (474N radar).
Tertiary: Bangor, Auburn, Portland.

MARYLAND

Primary: Mt. Weather complex (Presidential survival
command post located fifty miles northwest of Washington,
DC on the Appalachian Trail), Washington, DC. Secondary:
Patuxent, Fort Ritchie,* Baltimore-Washington area (includ¬
ing everything within a line connecting Gaithersburg, Reisters-
town, Bel Air, Aberdeen, Rock Hall, Annapolis, La Plata,
Riverside and the Virginia state line). Tertiary: Lexington
Park.

MASSACHUSETTS

Primary: Westover Air Force Base, near Holyoke. Secondary:
Otis Air Force Base (PAVE PAWS radar), Boston.* Tertiary:
Springfield,* Worcester,* Fitchberg, Lowell,* Pawtucket
(Providence, Rhode Island),* New Bedford, Nantucket.

MICHIGAN

Primary: Kincheloe Air Force Base at Kinross (heavy
bombers), Wurtsmith Air Force Base at Oscoda (heavy
bombers), K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base at Gwinn (heavy
bombers). Secondary: Mount Clemens. Tertiary: Detroit area
(including everything from a line connecting Pontiac, Ann
Arbor, and Monroe, east to the state line), Escanaba, Sault St.
Marie, Alpena, Midland, Saginaw, Bay City, Muskegan,
Flint, Grand Rapids, Port Huron, St. Claire, Lansing, Benton
Harbor, Kalamazoo, Battle Creek, Jackson.

MINNESOTA

Primary: None. Secondary: Minneapolis-St. Pay f* Duluth.
Tertiary: Rochester, Anoka, Forest Lake. Jy

MISSISSIPPI ;,

Primary: Columbus Air Force Base. Secondary: Bilc i.
Gulfport, Meridian. Tertiary: Jackson. Pascagoula. Meridian
Station.

MISSOURI

Primary: Whiteman Air Force Base complex (Minuteman
missiles; including everything within a line connecting
Freeman, Richmond, Arrow Rock. California, Gravois Mills,
Osceola, Stockton, Sheldon, Rich Hill—west to the state
line—and Freeman again). Secondary: St. Louis.* Tertiary:
St. Joseph, Kansas City,* Columbia, Springfield.

MONTANA

Primary: Malmstrom Air Force Base complex (Minuteman
missiles; including everything within a line connecting Devon,
Highwood, a point ten miles north of Winifred. Winnett,
Melville, Neihart, Wolf Creek, Augusta. Ethridge, and Devon
again), Glascow Air Force Base. Secondary: None. Tertiary:
Missoula, Helena, Butte. Billings.

NEBRASKA

Pr/marv.-Warren Air Force Base complex (Minuteman mis¬
siles; including the entire area southwest of a line connecting
Henry, Oshkosh, and Chappell, to the state line). Omaha
(Strategic Air Command Headquarters).* Secondary: None.
Tertiary: Lincoln, Dakota City (Sioux City, Iowa).

NEVADA

Primary: None. Secondary: Hawthorne. Tertiary: Reno, Fal¬
lon, Las Vegas.

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Primary: Pease Air Force Base at Portsmouth (medium
bombers). Secondary: Portsmouth harbor (submarine base).
Tertiary: Manchester, Nashua (and all area within twenty
miles of Lowell, Massachusetts).

NEW JERSEY

Primary: McGuire Air Force Base at Wrightstown. Secon¬
dary: Rockaway area (everything east of a line from Franklin
to Somerville, to the state line), Trenton,* McKee City. Phila¬
delphia area (includes everything within ten miles of the Dela¬
ware River from Pennsville to Cherry Hill, and within fifteen
miles of the river from Cherry Hill to Trenton). Tertiary:
Millville, Lakehurst, Scotch Plains,* Colt’s Neck, Long
Branch, Middletown.

NEW MEXICO

Primary: Roswell Air Force Base. Secondary: Albuquerque,
Cannon Air Force Base at Clovis (and the area east to the state
line), Gallup. Tertiary: Alamagoirdo, Las Cruces.

NEW YORK

Primary: Plattsburgh Air Force Base (medium bombers),
Griffiss Air Force Base at Utica-Rome (heavy bombers).

147

APPENDICES

Secondary: New York City area (includes everything south of
Stony Point and west of Stony Brook to the state line), Water-
vlict, Buffalo, Syracuse.* Tertiary: Massena, Niagara Falls,
Rochester (includes the area south to Henrietta), Albany,
Troy, Schenectady, Binghamton. Brookhaven (within ten
miles of Brookhaven National Laboratory).

... NORTH CAROLINA

Primary: Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base at Goldsboro
(heavy bombers). Secondary: Cherry Point. Fayetteville (Fort
Bragg), Southport, Jacksonville-Midway Park area. Ft.
Fisher (474N radar). Tertiary: Winston-Salem, Greensboro,*
Graham, Durham, Morrisville. Raleigh, Asheville (south to
Hendersonville), Charlotte, Wilmington, Carolina Beach.

NORTH DAKOTA

Primary: Grand Forks Air Force Base complex (Minutemart
missiles, including the entire area within a line connecting
Wahalla, Grand Forks, Tower City, Valley City, Devil’s Lake,
Sarles, and the Canadian border), also Minot Air Force Base
complex (Minuteman missiles: including the en tire area within
a line connecting Westhope. Eckman. Minot, a point fifteen
miles south of Towner, Harvey, Mercer, a point ten miles
north of Beulah, Tioga, Portal, and the Canadian border. The
danger zone extends about ten miles into Canada between
Sarles and Wahalla, and between Portal and Westhope).
Secondary: None. Tertiary: Grand Forks, Fargo.

OHIO

Primary: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton
(heavy bombers), Rickenbacker Air Force Base near Colum¬
bus (stratotankers); Rickenbacker is also called "Lockbourne
Air Force Base” on some maps). Secondary: Cleveland,
Youngstown-Warren area. Tertiary: Toledo (east-northeast
from Delta to Lake Erie), Cleveland (everything within twenty
miles of Lake Erie from Vermillion to Geneva), Windham,
Mansfield. Lima, Steubenville, Bellaire (Wheeling. West Vir¬
ginia). Middletown, Miamisberg, Dayton, Vandalia, Spring-
field, Canton, Akron,* Columbia.*

OKLAHOMA

Primary: Altus Air Force Base (stratotankers), Clinton-
Sherman Air Force Base near Clinton. Secondary: Oklahoma
City, Enid (Vance Air Force Base). Tertiary: Tulsa,* El Reno,
Oklahoma City, Lawton, McAlester (target is ten miles south¬
east of McAlester).

OREGON

Primary: None. Secondary: Portland,* Mt. Hebo (474N
radar). Tertiary: Canby, Salem, Eugene, Klamath Falls,
Madras.

PENNSYLVANIA

Primary: None. Secondary: Pittsburgh,* Harrisburg, Scran¬
ton,* Willow Grove.* Philadelphia.* Tertiary: Natrona
Heights,* York,* Waynesboro,* Chester. Erie, Beaver, John¬
stown, Altoona, Harrisburg, Mechanicsburg, Lancaster,
Reading, Allentown, Bethlehem.

RHODE ISLAND

Primary: None. Secondary: Newport, Quonset Point. Ter¬
tiary: Providence,* Westerly.

SOUTH CAROLINA

Primary: Charleston complex (submarine base; including
everything east of Summerville between Goose Creek and
Folly Beach). Secondary: Parris island Marine Base at Beau¬
fort, Myrtle Beach, Sumter. Tertiary: Greenville, Greer,
Columbia (and a second target ten miles southwest of Colum¬
bia), Aiken (target is five miles northeast of Aiken), Hardee-
ville (everything within twenty miles of Savannah, Georgia),
North Augusta.

SOUTH DAKOTA

Primary: Ellsworth Air Force Basecomplex(Minuteman mis¬
siles, heavy bombers: including the entire area within a line
connecting Albion. Montana; a point ten miles north of Faith;
Midland; a point ten miles south of Velvidere; Scenic; Sturgis;
Spearfish; and—along the state line—and Albion again).
Secondary: None. Tertiary: Sioux Falls, Rapid City.

TENNESSEE

Primary: None. Secondary: Memphis.* Tertiary: Nashville,
Chattanooga. Signal Mountain, Knoxville, Alcoa. Bristol.*

TEXAS

Primary: Amarillo Air Force Base, Dvess Air Force Base at
Abilene (heavy bombers), Bergstrom Air Force Base at Aus¬
tin. Sheppard Air Force Base at Wichita Falls. Carswell Air
Force Base at Fort Worth (heavy bombers). Secondary: Bee-
ville, San Antonio. Texarkana, El Paso, Houston,* Sherman-
Dennison, Big Spring, Kingsville, Lubbock, Corpus Christi,*
San Angelo. Del Rio. Laredo. Tertiary: Dallas.* Tyler. Long¬
view. Caddo Lake. Abilene. Odessa-.: Midland, Waco, Killeen,
Bryan, Alice, McAllen. Harlington, Brownsville,* Freeport,
Lake Jackson. Galveston,* Beaumont.*

UTAH

Primary: Hill Air Force Base at Ogden. Secondary: Tooele,
Dugway (chemical warfare testing center). Tertiary:Sah Lake
City,* Orem-Provo.

VERMONT

Primary: None. Secondary: None. Tertiary: Burlington.

VIRGINIA

Primary: None. Secondary: Washington, DCcomplex,* Rich¬
mond,* Norfolk-Portsmouth,* Newport News-Hampton,*
Radford, Dulles Airport, Mt. Vernon. Tertiary: (Bristol, Ten¬
nessee),* Roanoke, Lynchberg, Hopewell, Petersburg, Black-
stone, Yorktown, Chincoteague, Quantico, Manassas.

WASHINGTON

Primary: Fairchild Air Force Base at Spokane (heavy
bombers). Bremerton (submarine base). Secondary .Oak Har¬
bor, Tacoma.* Walla-Walla, Seattle,* Everett, Richland (the
Hanford nuclear processing facilities northwest of Richland).
Tertiary: Copalis Beach, Vancouver, (Portland, Oregon),
Spokane.

LIFE AFTER DOOMSDAY

WEST VIRGINA

Primary: None. Secondary: None. Tertiary: Wheeling area
(everything north of Moundsvilie), Huntington, Charleston,
Cedar Grove.

WISCONSIN

Primary: None. Secondary: Madison. Tertiary: Superior
(Duluth, Minnesota), Eau Claire, Green Bay, Appleton,*Osh¬
kosh, Onalaska, (Dubuque, Iowa), Mequon, Milwaukee,*
Waukesha, Racine, Kenosha.

WYOMING

Primary: Warren Air Force Base complex (Minuteman mis¬
siles; including the entire area within a line connecting Chey¬
enne, Federal, a point ten miles northwest of Wheatland,
Guernsey, and—along the state line—Cheyenne again).
Secondary: None. Tertiary: Casper.

149

APPENDICES

OW

V

3

0

' WJTPtA*^- -dw*CL*A- -^£T^ JO— b*4JU- ,

fo\A*£rdL»yiJL t^l < 3 ^c-cO £0 $~}f( C JCp)

e^VlJi- c£ LA/ti-O

l - (!<ru-<v^c^U-*-c^^ ! >w^» Lo-

^ * ^dcjf Jbul**Jt±+s\ AM^cK^ ^ ~U*a^ 4sL~JL JU*&cJUJ£<As\ Ur-

^ CAXo^Xx CdukA, -&£- j2e&i~ jUd*v\ djUL c\<JL- .

Cc^X. -^<-<rxv$vvv*j ~c£ i(f£

CL qpnrtSL, ^irLA^i.&ZZf U^vt\ CO . ...

^<A ^ 2. ^>VU M<i<- C>U4>Wi_ y UstAX* ^o~VwC> -JtwHtL /VVlAA«iu4. C- t/i C- 4o^4(v\ A^-A^-tnsU

CtnAjZtA* JLjJ(^x*t- XC^s^+J-' u/UX Mu^x-s JLccJfa** cUix^fJn.- Z~ X4*^CdUA*&t~ AagZIcuclI .

-*•"*- , >vx Ga*-** 4~ f Ju^j U/l£JL dlu— AjLd^cX f dt^X. JLttuJ U^dtp tk*X

*■■*■$$%&?.■£** r»-«r.'»^r/ C>- * _

S „A-jLL / - 5 , i *? 2 9 s» ^lvu-C*A /- 0 <£cmC <«^c-

$[rwJUAsO <x^tSu tniiAO JL^o\X> £U*. ^JLci^UA^fpuJ $L »

i&AW (TVn . , .

J / ^ H c i - 4 b” yVoL-^v^t^ - 4 + 4 rl~ &*e£*s-U**<*i*^ %ch^lcC. -$&z*A~~

C*Xt\*s\j<dL • ^<4^w^>sj PHC (Xu*~u>fvCA~- , ‘3'W- *£jU~c+SL^ cn,

^^u 4 |vti/- I ^irvtSl. ^ Xfi\J&JLt\s . Gxo^vic- Ce~ -^ 4 &y c^ * wL * y

CLVi^JC / C ( *Cp- / 3 ~£xA*<A 4 Xc 4 $L* « 4 ^ -OC - f C^kAvw^^L -tf**C*--£. ,

i^lG Z. CaMs- tk^y. /\rAAi%JjLr Qa* 4 *a~ > yc^ Jr 4u<4u A^^^A-

d(?^vv*4^ a^v<i Jhe*~4%Ct£ C*^J CmjisA— d&C<^£/d~ hrbfi*. 4/&*Cd£!Zcd%sX- •

. . $ 'twi^wj dv*cL, °tnJLL, 44 &cu~JL’ . f. VO 9 e ^ <il»i. l*A-4u*« /S >«•-

4/*~x, d mtr.ooo Cn*X tftg S"?0(£)Co) XasZ^<*-*-*\6«JL .

£ D CtTT^cTjL^ -A^o-O A^i*Od&<r<~JZ«jL~ trv i UjtJIL CZ***L *XA*ta*dbt~

Ul 4 ^ 1 ^ 4 ^"

*6

(S) Qu&u U ^Cvu^ck^o- ^ 4 /|uw^ .. . JCO ./ 2 .“Sv 5

fictile /So ^dtXi cc^ u-TVi^t ofaMU«~rts*c£ £&,F .

AvwW * /U^t^ yutc<^ve^j ^C^v^vv*^-*j -vA- ^tuL t^Wu*^ ^

Sx^-^v^-rv^, <-*^\J~t Jb*4» u<-. Q.*" O- XirocJL, (£[rvt^vv4A44^vt*2 oM«. -farO JLrdCeJi •

^XtActc^, <*JVt£ ‘- 06 ,XL 0 V\ yl^dLcJ^ ^&*jU£ot-%- &- Xl c£)UaA*«^

Ct7Vv\^rvxA4^vi^ W- ^^6x<-v*^ yVrU^u^ o£<rv>~t^ -4s+-~*- ■^ r laja«&

w^wdvC- «

^VW<XC J *A%^T- ^ 0 J - 6 *J- i 7 V*A^ ‘ e ^cX.

. ^Vw- jtuA. Gj£$-*t\ Cc^Ci^cP CO ~jbufd£X. .

Jx. Jl&dJbtfaJL Jd^^uMssyb. XnJCcJt 4sLK^~j£*A<~ 0<U\ ^U^vd^A-. , >iAtx*^JL 0aj^~ xAc-u^JL

iAJls&y --CwtX-^ -^cn-> £hdUUA-r ^ >C&*VW 4 . i-o^Ac^-cxt^ XtuAfo w/^e,^

$4- COA 4\4uW^ -|tO-£d<A. ■ AVI Cd<juo— . Sp£*~L i?0 .A/V\^MlJ^\ UdfiJt -***

CAn^AryUX^dlZU^ ■ ‘^Vwxt- ^wJL Ur~ cAt-JO ^JtrV £isi*~czH

OX^u^Xi^ dt*jlx~ yt 4 A istyfX ^fiwtSL- -^UO^L r^t^rvx ^ ^XeX^-tJL

A

t'

IN DEFENSE OF CRISIS RELOCATION

— Walmer E. Strope

Crisis relocation has been getting a bum rap recently from some people who should know better. It is bad enough
when the international anti-nuclear movement cries that there is no possibility of evacuating our cities or an otherwise
sensible United States Senator insists that the Russians would start World War III if they noticed any unusual traffic over
Washington’s 14th Street bridge. Things are getting out of hand when civil defense advocates join the disinformation
campaign by denigrating crisis, relocation in favor of their own preference — usually blast shelters. I'm a longtime
advocate of blast shelters myself but I also know all too well the program limitations as they apply today. Others would do
well to get back in touch with reality . . .

The brief defense of crisis relocation is that it is the only civil defense measure that could alter in a major way the current
vulnerability of the American people to nuclear attack in the near term; say, the next two to ten years. It is true that a
nationwide shelter system — blast shelters in the cities and fallout shelter elsewhere — could save as many lives as a
well-executed crisis relocation and sheltering operation, perhaps more. And, high quality shelters close by where people
are could save great numbers of lives under a wider range of scenarios including that of a surprise attack. Such a civil
defense program — a nationwide shelter system — was proposed to President Eisenhower in 1956 by the Federal Civil
Defense Administration. It was estimated to cost $50 billion then and would cost at least three times that much now.
Of course, it was planned to be accomplished over a ten-year period . . .

The concensus of military strategists is that the late 1980s will foe themostperilouswithrespect to deterring nuclear war—
the "window ol vulnerability" that has been spoken of. Preparations forcrisis relocation and construction of fallout shelter
in the hinterlands could be in place in as little as two year's time and would provide high population survival under
most plausible scenarios. It is, in fact, the only basis for improving the survival of our population under nuclear attack
during this decade ...

The second ooint to be made is that the Russian people are going to do it, too. Remember, the Politburo had to back
down in the Cuban crisis and decided that we would never put them in that position again. Along with their military
buildup, they put renewed emphasis on civil defense. The Soviets had been incorporating blast shelters into new
construction s nce World War II, but, as we have already noted, a nationwide shelter system is a longterm project and
they weren't all that far along. Our Pentagon planners didn't give much credence to crisis relocation until they discovered
about 1968 that the Soviets had spent the previous five years making it the center piece of their civil defense effort.
The Soviets continue to incorporate shelter in new construction but right now and for many years to come their planned
response in a future deep crisis includes the evacuation of their cities. Without a mature and well-planned program of
preparedness lor crisis relocation, what options would an American President have, once the Soviet Union began to
evacuate its cities? . . .

A few final remarks may be in order. The Administration’s proposed civil defense program based on crisis relocation
is not easy to defend. Priced at about $4 billion, it has been stretched out to seven years of accomplishment at the urging
of the Office of Management and Budget. Thus, the main argument for the program, namely, that it offers the only
hope of reducing the vulnerability of the population in the short term, is largely vitiated by the slow pace of the proposed
deployment. That program could be accomplished in a period of three years or less if the Administration undertook it
seriously. Such a schedule would support arguments that could make more sense to the Congress, wnich has turned
down the stretched-out program the past two years, although not on the basis that it is too little too late.

It also can be argued that the Reagan program would have a more solid basis if it included a long term commitment
to the incorporation of shelter into new construction as a routine matter. Then, crisis relocation could be presented as
the interim capability until a nationwide shelter system could reach fruition. Shelter and evacuation are the central
countermeasures for protection of life and property. But it is misleading and counterproductive to argue for one over
the other. The two options are not alternatives. The American people deserve both. And they need crisis relocation
right now.

JOURNAL OF CIVIL DEFENSE

rs

William K. Chipman is the Director of the Population Protection Division of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency.. B. Wayne Blanchard is a
Systems Development Specialist for Civil Defense Programs in the
Emergency Planning Branch of the Population Protection Division. Both
have been awarded doctoral degrees (SJD and PhD respectively), following
completion of dissertations on civil defense.

MOBILIZATION AND CIVIL DEFENSE

or

SUPPOSE THEY CALLED A MOBILIZATION AND NOBODY CAME*

WILLIAM K. CHIPMAN and B. WAYNE BLANCHARD

For the last several years the United
States Government has been increasingly
interested in the problem of mobilizing the
economy in time of international crisis or
war. Today mobilization planning proceeds
upon the recognition that (1) conventional
hostilities may not necessarily escalate to
nuclear warfare; (2) if a conventional war
did escalate to nuclear exchanges, this
might not happen for a considerable time,
possibly a number of months; and (3) even
if nuclear exchanges did occur, they might
be limited to less than an all-out attack
upon the U.S. and its centers of industrial
production. In all three scenarios mobiliza¬
tion activities would be most important — if
not crucial — to successful conclusion of
the war.

What would happen, however, if the
need existed to mobilize the economy, but
the people were not around to accelerate

istence of adequate civil defense to protect
the population will contribute to maintain¬
ing social cohesion, and provide a basis for
accelerated production under conditions of
either protracted international crisis or ac¬
tual combat, up to the most acute level of
crisis. In other words, civil defense
capabilities could have a positive effect
upon the mobilization potential of the U.S.
during a crisis by reinforcing perceptions
that efforts were being made to protect the
population, thus inhibiting social
disintegration as well as the urge to
evacuate prematurely. Widespread spon¬
taneous evacuation would obviously impact
adversely upon mobilization.

At an acute level of crisis, civil defense
•plans could be activated calling for reloca¬
tion of the population from potential risk or
target areas — to the extent that such
crisis relocation plans actually existed. Or,

DEFINITION ...

MOBILIZATION OF THE ECONOMY:

THE ORDERLY TRANSFORMATION OF INDUSTRY FROM ITS NORMAL
PEACETIME ACTIVITY TO THE PRODUCTION OF ESSENTIAL MILITARY AND
CIVILIAN GOODS AND SERVICES NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OBJECTIVES. IT INCLUDES THE MOBILIZATION OF MATERIALS,
LABOR, CAPITAL, PRODUCTIVE FACILITIES AND CONTRIBUTORY ITEMS
AND SERVICES.

—Editor’s comment.

production? What if large numbers of
urban workers took to the hills in a major
crisis because adequate civil defense did
not exist? It is quite conceivable that a
future mobilization might be greatly
degraded because large numbers of people
decided they had no choice but to take
measures to protect themselves and their
families, just as the U.S. Government has
taken measures to protect its key leader¬
ship

The relation between mobilization and
civil defense should be obvious. The ex-
10 Journal of Civil Defense: August 1981

if the U.S. were attacked with only short
warning, plans would be activated for pro¬
tecting the surviving population from
radioactive fallout in-place and for con¬
ducting lifesaving CD emergency opera¬
tions, to improve survival and thus the
basis for eventual reconstitution and
recovery.

Factors Affecting Population Response
It may we!! be true that population
response during a period of developing
tension could be influenced, to a degree,

by national leaders even without adequate
civil defense. But in a crisis involving
potential or actual U.S.-Soviet hostilities,
widespread public anxiety will result, par¬
ticularly af mors intense levels of crisis in¬
volving the potential or actual use of
theater nucleaV weapons. The problem for
national leaders would then be to reinforce
the tendency to close ranks in time of
stress, and to minimize disruptive or cen¬
trifugal tendencies. At the more acute
levels of crisis, in which nuclear attack
was seen as a real possibility, this is likely
to require more than exhortation from
national leaders, to alleviate citizen anxie¬
ty-

IN A CRISIS INVOLVING ...
HOSTILITIES, WIDESPREAD
PUBLIC ANXIETY WILL RESULT.

During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,
there were some calls for protest marches
and demonstrations to oppose the U.S.
blockade, as well as other incipient at-~
tempts to influence U.S. government deci¬
sion making, by minimizing the nature of
the perceived threat and by seeking to
soften the U.S. response. A severe crisis
in the 1980’s — involving protracted alert
and/or combat — might well lead to much
more pronounced disunifying activities
than were attempted in 1962, conceivably
including large-scale and concerted at¬
tempts to influence decision making by na¬
tional leaders.

Professor Michael Howard of All Souls
College, Oxford, has pointed out the fun¬
damental importance of social factors in
times ot acute crisis:

... the question insistently obtrudes
itself: in the terrible eventuality of
deterrence failing and hostilities
breaking out between States armed

with nuclear weapons, how will the
peoples concerned react, and how
will their reaction affect the will and
capacity of their governments to
make decisions?

★ ★★

It is not easy to visualize a greater
test of social coehesion. [than the
strain engendered by the possibility
that a conventional war might "go
nuclear" at any moment] especially
if no serious measures had been
taken for the protection of the civil
population. (Foreign Affairs. Sum¬
mer 1979 issue, pp. 982 and 985.
Emphasis added.)

This suggests that one factor likely to
be significant in population response to
governmental attempts to maintain or ac¬
celerate production is the perceived ade¬
quacy of civil defense, should a period of
protracted alert or combat escalate to at¬
tacks on CONUS. Current U.S. civil
defense capabilities are minimal. However,
steps to improve CD capabilities and to pro¬
vide information to the public on nuclear at¬
tack effects and methods of protection
could help ameliorate public concern —
thus contributing to social cohesion and ac¬

celerated production during a mobilization
period.

Spontaneous Evacuation

History suggests that possibly large-
scale spontaneous evacuation is a real
possibility. For example, between
September 1st and 3rd, 1939 (when the
British declared war on Germany) the
British Government "crisis relocated" ap¬
proximately 1.5 million women and
children out of London and a few other
large cities. Unbeknownst to the British
Government at the time, however, was the
fact that, an additional 2 million left on their
own.

SPONTANEOUS EVACUATION

IS A REAL POSSIBILITY

In East Prussia in 1944-1945. nearly
everyone left before the advancing Soviet
forces arrived — during one of the hardest
winters Europe had seen in many years.
Not only were there no plans or ar¬
rangements for transportation, food and
shelter, but the people had been ordered to
stay put. They left, however, despite such
severe conditions that some estimate that a
quarter to a third of the evacuees suc¬
cumbed to cold, hunger, and exposure.

It has been reported that during the
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis many tounsts
returned home from Florida, and that con¬
siderable numbers of city residents "took
vacations” during the height of the crisis.

Finally, it is of note that during the
Three Mile Island incident, roughly 40 per¬
cent of the population within 15 miles of
the plant (145,000 out of 370.000 popula¬
tion) spontaneously evacuated.

It is clear that social factors in a situa¬
tion of crisis or combat could have great,
even profound, impact upon U.S. will and.
therefore, ability to mobilize. United States
civil defense capabilities, in turn, could
have a substantial effect on the will and
morale of the people.

Efforts are being made to improve our
civil defense capabilities, but there is a
long way yet to go. If the U.S. Government
is to plan on mobilization as a response
that could be critically needed in a future
severe crisis or war, due regard should
also be given to narrowing the gap between
where we are now in our civil defense
preparations and where we ought to be.Z

*The views expressed herein are soiey those of the
authors and do no! necessarily represent the views ot
the Federal Emergency Management Agency or the
U S Government

cap

o

c

A

V 3 S iL

0 'fiw S> crmcAZ. AL. I 7 vi/wU&cni t S-O - P 9e AA* . -&♦/<<«« « vCC ‘~/~ & %.

ALvclax Cccm) JLArXc^A-vAm t jL-fc */^T ~7 £ (Lem*. C**i~Cx>

u!<-t^ e£v*-'-ij cX. AmM, cm CctXa.. JUnmx. Am-f^ *-«~v Xxrtt-CAmUi-,

OZAAAJrimxCOcm , iZ-ccisi, Cn-iX l/ j Axtmc/l *1 e JkjZ*.<sA*cZi, C. &&-•*. aa-Av- datxvJL O-tjxAx- _)

^ JUitLX- SxTU-uJ- AcAMAcActryy ejpr (rv\. oubxX- , -WC^tVMtUvl SU*C~JU+**VL. ^m->
iill/XcC. MmC (iwi trxtU^ JbfrCjL /tt- -€<rWj . U 5 JlA^e«^dc<rui ‘caaaSLa

.^^-VMJVvv^J JrxxXx- Uj4~JLLt S-0 -ftmrAm-JZcry I ti c r»v4l****JX, M. UJvdLlX- AcCaMa yiiUiiM-l-
«-t caa*JUx/ Aoaaj ^-ccC-. _JU-«-&x'£v~ ~aC:~- d<n<si- , '—Jvv XmL JCt<^ -Ic-ctx^

^iArntruc- Ccrxxx- <-Cems\ vtX- ~-^w«oc. .

C AL CASXXJl d*A- Av~Cc~ i *l*t 0 X- duAfynju* i*A- CZt»\ XjtA-v A/Xxcddx<J Ct/*o .
^-*AA- AXC~ /VvnXXVvix- ^AxCkmv Kxl>*j -&tAX- fT, £ 7 . Au*. AX- S*A— jLucX- So

^ir * ^4ri~ ./Wtox/u^ tocvutx-oamA- JL*Jtxox» ^vcx-clt&x cumo Uxw-t- Xs<xm<x. <-£c- . S cvxedZ

Jbxht-Cx. JU~

- | (W^L Aosmm JUuS£ xxr~

Sww.

^1

twoU. cUjLc-tZ,

Cewv cSjxUv^ ioc e£j -Kum Koxt-^ eo^Ji JLt^cf a£i c£*x . a£*L, JltiJ— i loo a-JsU. .<- •:• '-•••.; ~

4*CU^ zixcZxA- * OiZiX-c 0£tm JCcX- ^ ^ ,vl -

^U<i~ CJCu*. A^^trJ^C y 4^0 XrxX&a ffUJU* <ASt£{ U**~ ' t/n ^JuJIC. ,

iy^ CaJam^O cioJZmft^ ' (Mcx, AxbwjU- cm Aoi^x, zf-tC,

CS \AMAxci~ Alciix^iJU* Jj<&L o*wv( •^*'*1* Ltx^f^tz , Xxvcd- ^x-

CX A^jSZcv i t/Odxb £>& C- dcjfcc^cxi*^ Xf~Cc— • d>-LX~ ‘Vie. Cuctt. ~AZcr£ °*C

ijrfxdx-} . ^biA^ctxu i&Cwd , ^J&~- JzXxoA- Jiwk (Urv-fas-t-Zj* QtruX. Jko-trX -&*x

<jbx4rLi*~\ GO - &*Jye*~ Qfisix^. t tScUlfi , JXCcJL- wu\*jL<JL S Xvv ^

4> t/uv /UUUZZ, csxL j a~~JL , UtrvtXjL. .

-tev^. Zo- -&vM*sXi/x~ y tAJrvutJL ^coax, tv- CUu^- ^LtvfyU- Q- , (

Z^vtv^ 7 - tH ctcup— C .A-uML) Ujtvd 6 a*sO <Urn^t-^ 7 ^ 0 - Js~ xv+c*~ , Stv XtxvttxA— c

^ Crv^kvw^ OcmZx, Ocx^ocxvuaaAa~ ^ (2frtvC _^tvc m*Xi^ ~£v- dj_ Jiiujl£xe£— • LU cmjLJi. £ux.

ZccmjJi Owt ^C^-UcOccJ) , ^ .^vt 4 ^/wYl_ 5 C> ~^<AxvJZXiS) € S CUfL- <Vw 4

'•tj^JuL- ^£vw«itJL> jLx-fvOu. Lit- cLtr Li-cu-tj ^ oix-t£^ 6JL. LllXwLv^ -faurto Ax^JL.

°r u -

>-^V fci- ~^Xv£AjC- ix-l££ C-t.^ 2v- A*fiXA^l/XVVC^it~- illMsts fl-CXC\slAft$ f dn*X- -ZAXtJUC*C-

vAh^vO -\A_Aj&X- U' cJLQs t fasycXCA— C&Jb^elsVLAVCCC*. ~XC*m liu-

%£x*xyX- , 3-*_ C- ^ ^cuUc-cU. pjju^

JL-xa^l. aU^. cnxc- trx, Ucnj- ivtnjvi^ ^ dU»^ o^Jctv -^4^0 JL^s&Xlfvs

CU-aL •X^xa-^xCcU- CAm Jrc^juL a. pJOdtlL,, C c Wc ^ ^ JA-C-JL <XAXv- t ^. L / ^iLe£.

^AA^J-Ji-. 2-HJU. U-cmkA, IZuxZa , a^ljJxaaa

Ar-vJ- £^v| C<£uxiL, S , ^l&mA. S £)^_ Qnmmaux. .

c^. ‘t> c-^-uJ^. vCmA- CaAAjcZ- CUSux, . Sa-^ c/i ^UXu- A. f - M . ., /

,^7vw6- xfjlAZi- £tm xxcm SS- o-^cr-. A^CccOO^ ^cJA

ck&Lmx , lew- ^ 4' Um t > c ^*- , c r*c. ^,w»w^x

L^-cxZ^-u^. JaaAjlx, UZC.~ lo^c ^utcXv, 6 t^

^ C<l3Zua*, oCCumxm- <aj-$LajL~. dm & (j XaaxaacajA

m, ^ ^<XC

7/S dl^+uu. MActmL. So

y

_ SLC/Z O _> _. (±L_2 ^ H-J^-JBdL^Q^

__ Lcy^xi _ ^£aa^JL —

_ QjU\j _SfflUflaA*_ Mauji-r . Uxtth^—

-

_

_ 3m _ tM3*£d~-JyAAActejJU-

_ dt£uJLjiM.t- _

MA*JULrt4A!T^- _

_Qe ^ a4»-. JU^-JUshMi _ ^cmu cJUd* —

r~ ~ *®

_tj__Juniata_". - T!~ .

_ d.AMiL^d-^ <3*- _ df^MULbid^. JudUL. xiu^JLu- -CD -^AbudUtu. ^AUxdk^tdjUt'A^U. Jtet&JU MM&AX*&&kh‘ T

jj>

If _ 1L^^44MxJU^J^SllL^^

_ OokjAi. _4 Ju£L. ^ _^O^Lr_ t^t-UH. ££> .., UJvCtv

uxuu- _ £jCuJL -~§t-^—-u^&£U4- -um PC _i 'Aa, _ CJL-

..jJyu_

_ Ca\Ajl/V\ AAjtl,^ _ £^S\ r{AJAsvUllvd—) Ajy- ki^L^ _ LmxS-1. JLULAAJTAjM>TD _ A£XXEoJj£t*iil _

_ J^At4AM^oaMeJcL^.. .. .tJkkC^jQ- -j_fiJit_

...__ Ac,..^ _ (JL

_Virui\ —kfeu <d£&dL^ GaJ^- CiA,- -JDuALJl,

Cui^vL- JLa^Jkh&Ut _ &^d _. jJ^uoM-...Cssmx . u^ullJL^ ~$xLaj- . dLuc^uu^ _

_ UMX _ Uu- .Cuzn&dLj- .

~11 ) 000 JLI>A-< i dud— \MZMjUjL' JLiM*- /\AAM~dLc.- MisiDt— JfjjXM-%’ -d3*££i.tZcz yl4MC~l£duA<L?~-^ , -

- - - -SoXa.- & „ t y p&ZAM&A- — Ck^Mzy^jJL-6^ -

_ ftaaA-_a£<l <£_ Z2' (L , QJa&*L? dSsLvzt-JL utCCcMeiA _ Te~ CmmlJLmJ- Jma^ulAul^g-u^ ^§D: _

_ (X&xd .1—-

_-i

■j _ IsL — divuJLiiJbijL ; Ecc . _/i,£<au!vi=—

___ kJtauJU. (XuJU*cti» .*__

_

^AjjjZrJt CUaJL >

__ QfyfueJtA. _^ada«^._tA«ha&_ EJEAlA^ _ .Qt&xdi&^-Xdf&u. ^hju^u^tA^. .AMliJUtXhEL,

- rd&ysxi^lcn - ?haXrzs — Edjt&Ja£2. -^UL. <£_. -Jtvt-ci __>ArM ^3hJ^Z^._ JUJP?0„-&f^*jUL~. _,_ i^c~. dturj. _

_-^5d-Cris^j_^tl=_i^gfefei^feL__ \Jb^L _^L4^4^eU-_^ ^,AdU>Juo^.,<i^. ..<£_ JLL^-AAuUilLu-^

J5z _ jktaMA, _ Uj£^'.^*^:kiA Ht£t _ 3.^oon _

— JsjAtLt -— di&A* tdd^&s£djoJ> ASo^ULl^t^^ '3&— ,4<S'S=<JL_ ^&k£!UAJ~t

_ -4Adri~ _<3^, Cnkj^i __

_ CL%mSL ..Jk* _ CcMjtd*J~. . rcL _ Ci-> Cgwp, i A4** J L. JL*-r. ue ^[ ^tEM-r. _

.rtv&L. dL. _

.£u . _.4i^_.&:_ U~, . /iJLiiIZ^ .,-. . £o’ z^S^Uuc~a-

— _£-tt CdXkLGaj^U — jJnJU*v\,. i*u&i£\ /XSasALllA &££■ 6*C4*a*4si- .c/o_» ‘^6. 5.

— i %iGAit_^ — feEfrdAljUAt(L^. — s^sJx^yvidiA^ <A&L- __ -*a^p ,_ S&^u<JL _h?a-- o^Ml^v^a- A>c.-4f4i^

CXk~- J}aaJ- .^^^cdiAcilZer^O— Mi-O-O . ^ _ _ .. _.

_..C^So^ucfi. <&-. OifViA^tlXuj . Jk&L. ux*nsdl<$L-.. -^ui, _cUdLc£. Lc-(JlE'T' / Ce^*^yUu^ jL/yuut^

— ..Aik-ta'Lrt-.IL jSw - . iiAuvJ A^*MkAC*^ T . IMfoUd^-. 6 tsJL-. dh>. -^dC DW. (

_ ....Jkuu .. A&e£Eu^-~-$M£4^.-.~£&M£^ JmU. ju*. cJU&t&i

_ iJ. Ur— ^du^JL> ^^obMj^vu.u-tJU. -J*tj?m^JLjL^ JkAddXdtg/L... _£L -dhjn*A^t*JL4~. J ^ X ^ L ~ c ***-*-^—* _

-j£ktcfe4f_. Q^felciLedU, -JuA<dZ- _ A^uMujx, ■. S&*s*><dL

^VVWvA4-, . .. _ _.. ...

... _ _ _ Q-Ms ~OfyUs+*zL. . i£^Ld- t OAJL <Mjl. JiEUUX. dX^ed^c- CJH- iJJTT^tci^ <^xUh&tA. Ci~_ _

-i^u -jlUidU/taadL. ,.-^»L. dh^Jb&ud&tJ. J2a4*L~L!lt+&> SOQ ^ .

.^US^.jsI<-6c»i2s^m^4<!£2Lzm_.^ 7 . c- __

_1^._ JLsAsL .LeJki ur , _

(D

ao/zo

<-l- ‘S’-SZ.

Z? CLoL~ 3 . Cy, t^cA- ^ciak. 4~ Pe- ActA/iCfAtArc — c*g l$ul. \* slc&ocZ&mjZ l^sa—

crulu_j 7Z~ JUs&^uijU^ , S^vcvul. trviX- eg iJu_ S' i-VkM^Akj Oo^cl. JfusX— i^miAlJL JLa~
■ZMjlJL* JLu^ T~ v' / 'X.&XLcvuf-- - *ZsCt*uJk^ -&oPu .ZLZi*ci*jmJ . ‘••‘^tr!A_ y&p£~* _^i~. ^

JL*-~ JnJL. jLOrflX-* l_W -1‘iA^t/iMO. v<^T^-. wtWO JZi-SU. J OO-twL. Z^L AUa-JL UjdllAi*. (~0~

^lT _) 4<J Czdk4s*up4Tisi&- eg <Sx«C/U«jeL_ . Lo^dbi. £ lZ-P -fcr\J

H < S' QaJZia- oku e&ct*A&. e>£_ a2zM~ , I> <a^, aJJL cn*t<} -S~c?, ppp)

d»-<- sJk-tJL* » .. .

^aXRA' Jh<f\jL*. XMs aJZ{j<4«A~. <£- - i^tixxctx, f JIhs*A- *<Ll*s c£u*_ X>Crt^-<^_

yCAA^X^^jL- U^^tTVO tLc~ G^iX^vJ 6 Vv^U^i£e- C^U^-ojL~ , /^ o

CouAtt? JL&* JU?fZ<u~fM-tdL . tv-... ^C^uJ Ciaulaai. , enJ -&&— lZj^, .

0 vX'-^L-' -AdC. {Xd-u~dL> P- JjWtr^ •r^VTnA^. } ~ •Jtt-i-dLzlu^ ( &Vt*:£dL,

Ji4unM£&- . UJ cidtJL- dluUs*-. tv-r Jjeseur*-- <JL*l. jaaa d*-*- ac^j, . .

(XvtXyu-AfyLr ) t oo \ O CO , JltXfcCElnsO C-g ^^OASUtlstJL, , V^£ev<*a- £«- JUj€*<aajcJCl* A*fe <U?UaaA^

O- S^AAJLAn^tjdJL. , CL ■XmAk* Gc^IsWiMavIJ^ t <Si~ .2 C-L*^b ,_ lUvl, SbiAjAA-fo-t&jL-

C& cSUa£4£vxa- JLcu^l*. _Actvo tA*c io- <Vwtcc4^ ,- UJaSA,

ty- at*- uAxcX- Ccm—> LaSiXO-, MuJ^uhAAtl-^ cridldL&ttdl ^t~w=£ Jt^vdfavuu*^ .• §#4nA*Jl.

iJnA- £-£> A*a\-\J^C/U | CL JUhaCJL /1^aAi£Aaa4Zas£ , C l-/&-dL i2U» C£) ^O-C^iAUi--.

4*<UJLjuU, rts-q } Jfaid'uJL CZasu f)&JUtJL' GaC\A* tCtAoi-iMA^. j &HA-JL (JLuL~

A&&L- GyndL i^ccwu,. CcJv IcJj&i^P Scufu dUnJL- &Aitz„ JL<JL. <fyr*zl, MkaA- Ja^aa^JL

JtAU- C?- aaaa- Jk&wv f JUlIUa. JUetAAj ApunAAtj ,

GmAvdL Jli-oviAuA^ /tu LoiASiAt i AmaJLs ca»>- <«X- ^ / <3~ po cl. c£«sw^^

Jls-*wiAfvUstAX-~ . Jiecux- riovdjZj, aJLu^ C&uMJZ LoZjl. ZSDO. %ct-a^45^.

•J*7\a\Aa^A- aa^> Ci-'-C-t" CLAdiZtAL- A^yO.d- -^j-ZAaa} '-^tn* «^C- JlZ@\£^ a

y^A^rw-c*i_ PX /C\Atv4aJL Ua-4uu— UAaCL, ~Co~ JaawaajuL- ~Z<S\> ?*f Aisv-g-HAAL. , -Se3-«4L

=yVM^^t_ Kwvi Cfcen/iX -fv>--eew J^JictA*/iA Cv~ AyArUAjL- (^ 00 Aaaa Aj^. ‘^ueA^u t ^

I 2~00 Jaaj C— A/ZuaX&Bh^a^ drift awLa) ddrJdf\A^ .

CdyOuJU dUfL, ^eritcdL ‘£t^<&dUt-t£tsiZ&. ~^£aUaA^- U- Ccfi/dcAtu^ A\MfCuJL A^aaj-CCA-. > ^Co-uA-

e£^ iA/XM^IAaa) bjTdO tln>i/iZdL dw-is-t' (A ip^c^O OaJLc&uaal- C&sirdL^. r^ro tiy- ^tU, endC r

GdAty- ~Cif- QotaZlZvujl* - <dU£iAj4AAA*^ awoaSL. ^5)

{fhJAA&dtAj jtsCuJL. OaiAcJL cJj^aA. ■$£AwdL~<JLtZ{ eg cs^£ "cAatul. ;

PLC^t,—- Aa^ AlaX- 'c/ e^ovL ~‘A'UaaS 1 -dl~ (-v~ ^s^jiAA CuAugU^JUt^ . <$" CtA^SZ.

aJJL. Acpt~ A~ 4/%%ccdjvcpO < 9dAA. AZcynytdUjL I, (£> < ^wuA~ f Zc^> c*g£ccA~J@

uJUrtr- ZffUtZm uA £CL- < dlvyUA- J ^LfiAA^tflAML- •-M*C&JL JU- AxSAjL AaA. JZAAAru^tO

tL ^,v« CLAu.-TA*aJL, ,

&

^ JuJtpLi-. cU- , JsuX- ^wwCtt A£££&. if^ dUi^fyoUt^ A^udUZi^. »

'^CVCx^fjL Jkc. Ji-l\iCuzjL /GtGojIZ^j ■'-/{IV■ i-liA-. fy.Ju£&t>o£3eri«3 eg ... l JvUlU/jlM4£eU4j^

CiMsjL JL^. Ci-\A/L&iZu£^~iJ i Us$\jt*jJln^ aJL. Jb-~ Ju-u$L ^ dLs~, c£a^ t-buuj .o£ccti~ dLowvd -<a-JZ— i$<£xAj
C'lovv J^MkszJL- Jb-$Vv%jk* M^xJcACL, t -. JLi HwdUJL (*- AvinJut*M-> -i^toO ci/OTpM^cL^cj ,

3,o/20 Jugg (Upvu&u*3jJl vM- &WUO , LaJsvuA— ^~t S c£*ViX- (JhtiJk <Ax- GpflAAMAMM«Z\.

J^jiCsuJi-* £Xvt ..(,-£ Qflro-jL • 5^-- ^0 Ci^vL -uO u.'iu.-iU-' iJk^/d ^j,_,- .. .iJLa. . ^m/a/uJ^~~ iMGU*—

. Q&wiua£l id^JL'- diHk 3 <.

...^ml- . >*6^ iwl tJZZclo .

20/ZO

CD *=i IajssiaAmj dklJU- £JvDvo|u'i- iUX~ jftor- dctUrZ. ZlMjjAJU (h&qo vO U«U*2L 4-

>|i4vU AU(a5 MmXIzsu -tw.. £uA*tfyu. %H>- cJUiiA-. (UZvCudct*-. VJuX do- StM-tX-L- -^vjvtACXAjL J^JUlcA^.
cJ^Iamvo*- .OUtO tfeuM-. 4 ... . ...... .

(§3 £Xvuer4ie<-> /U^&vU. ? (£tnA^ &ovn^ 'cvell'j-tA- jtAA&AJ&hdl AAv <Uvlasu,-z-L JLma. Ct>?

K cxaI*JL EU avU- ^Ww^iiu,.

&f-> CLP ^w^uWj aZa- MfJCivdA , (Sir tXc.

C^f&cjr-' XjOO^ Juu >6 CU -flrCa^ttHrlrtrO CxXiriSXA^ riAV ^-MeXcJU- J &**■ tfc. Xurjrr- -dr- -tA—

X^uA- 0>r\ C-(l? ,

’•j iiLtW- JL'WClAi A 3 - rl-X- sU/" AAA-c-cdo CtiA- Cp ‘-^-JZZ*wU 4 A— <-LrCrOt._ OutcTs-^ CtArX dlt- <Y\AD

dXcfcu'Aju j C\-jl. du- do-ck- ^uvStr- JkufjL -Juw , a^JjL *- , wth^ .rz-iX- j^u^AIciaj < < ^Xuy Xmjl-
CjCA. JUJMjL W AAa~ StjUirAA/vou^ -fetv <J<X- X‘iCCUAcJLr U 0 U*rX-<L!MAAAvujL

-miaaJu^ do- Wf-)D AczJjaUx,, X-l. djteAotri. ^ i^i~ du&Xt ^MuJccA,

. .Uj 4 uX~ ~Xt-^ r <Ma-JL ^d&virV’ML& iirCA- dUsTnJ— i^. XoXXL. Xjl, duxidiA- ,

xX&erdUtdi. JHA-dsO /t- 4 - ^Vw-/~r ■---'' LZCuAlArW Xt 4 A*Z- JL^rtdEcdLr XXO ,

5 WiU, £tead~ du^l CtrUL. UdJuLi^ Orl-tArd- JL(>U4%ts AriAArlnrduiA, C~fe dtiroJL a*o <X*-

QXa£t. i, fro ,dtJ—. Xi&d~ PA4.04SL. ., Aum- *t*v .£&*. btXcri- . ’.wA- (Z&U-gJhf 2*A&#mX3!dM^ LAjdtl Mz.

■JtfcL-Hf suAr-. JLc XhAazA. JU*f ^ 4 JU*Ja- ; ay AzJUlltdA- ) X&

-^rC^ArJb&tL. OsuiJL UJ&jUJL, dArtclo JUfPLr iAhX C&U^viccX Ur-idx (LcXZLmmzJC A*MArU&X r

<S^ A^ddAur^ . ctLiiJX'd,^, X/tAJ t^S- Xo^-jX O-rbLti^, t Clsi.XL d (£- UsCOAcX - f . lAm.

JXieuldi Jb-C. <K_ 3<'"i>nXZ.£ yVtMArvXiAj id . JU^JL- MrO du~r CUXZtrx-, duu^ ■aZ- Xj-

nrd- ^(UruA’X-X^ (JkoX- X(, ^o^KAi^et^d-- u*Jl£, ^uX JLz, UAr^AnXscJL <

(2) -sA^v JLuJiAO CfiMX- ; MjaM- JLl, JbJZtx. 4JAJP '.~£, : &CMdu^cdc,P

fcl- £&3| ylVl/L-iX- ,S 4Wij4. .dJ^UZAMr- Jri^uudiAAvi-id- ; ; OWL

JlvA-^^ud- -feznj> ciuu o^JaXIcX- f LX ■jUaXIjm^ ? MiA-(Xri/i^ Q \-c-~u-tA, Gsul, AAteJjuctA*^ j

XlcJL~ *AaaJ&Aa/P CLr Z^-'L^vi^o ^ .. iAjrSi^o^ (XX.^c'— . yHvtcii. d-i-* A- ~< d .

CiArvJLr ‘ CciA^fUAAjL Ju^Xurir^ (t^^cw j AvudjLlAA^ & 0 A, O^JL-XtO ^JLciArlArvtX^ ,

© ! duMtji\ /LhruXgj 11 i 00O -jJo-i- G-^uaa*^ f . >Uu?- CL/zi4_ AMroXbu Aat<~

■Ld^VuJ^ArrMr W-l— Li.- Z^O- CA^lAUArpn ZjlXEl!- AMr(n£jhu«JL- * C)~4cru0 <£-&lAc | Usi££, Jd~

C&$Ai- c ty-icn-O Ac- Xu

AttrljQ ctzriXuX-UrtZirg^ rtd-

(fD Q&wiwUr&o j ^ CuaajUtcc^ majl* QtaArtZLr } dkt. c^jCriMAAAJUiX^ tleu4A. lv- JP^ai- .

(2D tiu,. . . DaaH<^ C- (let* AA&tujc&tntQ JurznA cdfjU^ ? JLux^ £- £**&*%- _

L&-*- '-|u»b-|2£jL* Uj&o* CwA<w dyx> AA**) AM^cJd^ici AmZc- -faAAjia&xtJb .„ S f" ~^aJ) i St*C* Jht&ud-

-M-tniw*H| fotvuL- c~- efj IliirtJhsfrdh^ -fiavzJL Ou^jL. bJtu,o CAjtCoeX G&aAWW&O ^UVzJUl. t

(2) a^<Uw -^iddic&trvi *fc.r\j dm- jufUtL. y CxxuAAuActtJL, Us%uAjl~ Jh^. _JL.v&feo a/*A- T^v-

*■&-*— SWAs<A/id-**&r -Aw*- driA* C**^ Ac-v*. U?t,<'V\$L* ''-iSt-A— \Aj&-*AAL* yLo*-| i Jhjt— v*^

C&AAA- **'^\C<jtAA/d0LAb\ a 'l??4&1AAA - ^feutAgL* C&'VcL^- ,$tTtotk> ■■SUAAAfCutJl .14*CuaZL. JUmS^-i

@> Vi ikuU- ,/Vl/UEl'Vwj UudlSL A&^*nX> Ay^ CV\ dK<IvC- &OVU^t*^£^J / (UXvd- (UfUyt^A*

dicj~ Jlsmlu^. |wvvi a. < £2 a. £>- fiJLaiX, oaaJL JUtcJL a^uoeda, /UaJUaji*^ mdcu*~ t .

i&UA- tXA/UAAA^-y (Avu^ i-trtr iwv*- fidktijM/L. , vj C&trtJLX-~ r

(Q) JW- yA. JL^juZlJI dkai~ JM-&3&- Jtviu^ua-L^ ixndX JLl. MunX~ bcutL ^tru

Jnn$\ jLA*JUoi-&*u$ 6 -iaJL JL'LvbussJS'^ - OJ-el<A~ b- JUa. ^aJUwLA <^<juo- c^uAa. Ji^u>*L<rdL

0*L JUaaax^A' j JbicauAd- .aaa&^uu. ccv^di JUx^Jl J Ju^uA- Kjo-svvL aa*c£jl- ^n^yu^L,,

exAyt'L JtX,, Glo AMaajuJ-- maAjGaa/l. j^Za<X~ atu!L J^aaJUJL iawiXm. <n.

iXy- < '£*®A-<yL. llAA^xnAAA^jAU £t*JL- -A-v J-ClAjyL- Q^ZcHx- yA^-JL JHaaX\ lotJJL JLa ZAbtAsA-trVtMJL. r

Qk^ (3 UL*—. ^^ajaaJL> JjuMr$o<> ff\s\ (Jaao (lZl(XiM4&t. LsaajOaJL CaaA€ c£a£cuaa-~ aaux^ ^u^l,

i CGA<L&*j A_ U^tcUUh^ C^AA/lLtri^ ,

J'V ,K ROO,; wn l ^ c church in our
I town is may!*- 40 feet alxwe
JL the ground, give or take a
bit,* ami what’s worrying us is how
anyone is going to hoist 120 cubic
yards of dirt up there. Our quan¬
dary comes of having Ironed up
on Washington’s Crisis Relocation
Plan, one asjKct of which calls for
putting at least a foot of earth on
the roofs of rural buildings that
are designated for use as fallout
shelters. Naturally, the boys in
Washington have a term for this

•R>r lilt- ciki' of accuracy wc wire toiii# lo
lake measurements, but thr ruminate sale was in
progress ami wc couldn't get near the place.

procedure—“crisis upgrading,”
they call it. Rut a man we know
calls it “damned foolishness —even
if a buihling’d stand all that weight.
And even if you could pile all that
dirt on a pitched roof, what’s going
to keep it there?"

The church is not the only build¬
ing to catch our eye; we’ve f>een
taking a mental inventory of all the
facilities in town because we’ve just
learned that the citizens of Monroe,
Conn., will be moving here in case a
nuclear attack is threatened, and
we want to be ready for them.
There were, at last count, 14,010
souls in Monroe, anil civil-defense

It’s a wonderful Washington idea
called (>risis Relocation, to be used
in the event of nuclear attack.
You just relocate the crisis

AnJJncivil

Defense

Condnisrd Jrom Country Journal
Richard M. Kktchum

officials in Connecticut anticipate
that 12,600 of them will head for
one of the three “host towns" in
Vermont to which they have Ixren
assigned. There they will stay until
someone sounds the all-clear.

Before getting into this any
deeper, we'd like to urge that the
folks in Monroe avoid taking Route
1-91 if possible, since a lot of .their
neighbors from Connecticut will l>e
coming that way. In fact, (154,000
(Connecticut residents are scheduled
to head for the Green Mountain
State, according to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), which is charged with
moving 150 million Americans
from cities and other high risk lo¬
cations to the countryside. Assum¬
ing that all those people have access
to automobiles, and assuming an
average of three people to a vehicle,
we will have 218,000 cars heading

north from Connecticut. I -91 will
accommcxlate p>ix> cars per hour
(assuming no breakdowns, acci¬
dents, panic or other problems), so
it will take nearly 75 hours—.1 little-
better than three days—tor those
cars to cross the Vermont state line
bum|>er to bumper.

Once the Monrovians arrive in
Manchester Center—and we
should warn those who insist on
taking 1-91 that the going will be a
lot slower after they get off the
interstate and onto Route 11 —they
should ask directions to their host
town. Under no circumstances
should they linger in Manchester
Center, because the residents of
Ridgefield, Conn., will be arriving
there at the same time, and even on
a normal day there is usually a
traffic jam at the intersection of
Routes 11,30 and 7 . (This is bound
to be even worse after the new
Grand Union opens.)

It’s safe to say that no one here
has decided exactly where the Mon¬
rovians will be housed. We’re
guessing that about 3000 of them
will stay with us (that’s almost
twice our population), while the
remainder go to the two other
towns assigned them. Meanwhile,
we will have to find 40 square feet
of living space for each of our guests
in what FEMA calls a “congregate-

care facility.” No one here has ever
seen a congrcgatc-carc facility, but
if you were to take the school, the
church, the post office, the library,
the three inns, the sportsmen’s dub
and the alternative school, you’d
have a fair amount of space. If you
add the grocery and general store
(though they are so jammed with
merchandise it’s hard to see how
they’d accommodate guests;, you
could probably manage.

Perhaps this is the place to point
out that FEMA’s plans “do not call
for placing evacuees in private
homes,” but even so, a few Monroe
visitors might be in luck. We see
that the Department of Housing
and Urban Development has pub¬
lished guidelines for requisitioning

homes "whose owners have disap¬
peared” following a nuclear attack,
and has suggestions on such thorny
problems as determining what is a
fair rent, which applicants have
priority, what the grounds are for
evicting tenants, and when to re¬
turn the property to lawful owners
who unexpectedly reappear. And if
an attack actually occurs, prevent¬
ing the Monrovians from returning
to Connecticut, they will find that
the post office has available postage r
free, emergency-change-of-address
cards so they can notify surviv¬
ing relatives and friends of their
whereabouts.

If, by some error or miscalcula¬
tion, the nuclear strike does not
follow FEMAs assumptions and

Vermont, instead of Connecticut, is
bombed, the visitors from Monroe
will have a lot of pick-and-shovcl
work to do, along with the rest of
us, converting their congrcgate-
carc facilities into fallout shelters by
hauling earth up onto the roof.
(Regrettably, nothing in the litera¬
ture tells how you collect dirt if the
ground is frozen solid.)

As we sec it, the trouble with
making plans for what the citizenry
will do in the event of nuclear war
is that before long you begin to
accept the possibility of nuclear
war, when in all truth the only way
to plan for a nuclear war is to plan
never to have one. •••••

PAW»
ISfitiUsL '

Every evacuation
list has a price

'7'm probably the only public
official in the country who's getting
hate mail from his 88-year-old
mother."

— Robert L. Kingsbury

HH called up Bob Kingsbury
yesterday because 1 figured
Kyi maybe we could cut a deal.

CM Kingsbury, of course, is
director of the county’s
Department of Military and
Veteran Affairs. And last week be
made a splash when he revealed
bis plan for a systematic
evacuation of Los Angeles in the
event of nuclear war.

Kingsbury said that we should
have a priority list of evacuees.
First out by his reckoning would be
those deemed essential for the
rebuilding of society, those who
are “young and physically fit,
skilled specialists of all sciences,
trades and occupations, and a well-
balanced labor force." Last out
would be “the elderly” — that’s
when he ticked off his mother —
“the infirm, the unskilled, the
unessential and those whose
presence in the relocation area
would only serve to place a burden
on the survivors.”

So I called up Kingsbury to get a
fix on where I stood. Frankly, I
don't want a ringside seat at the
apocalypse when, suitably
forewarned, I could be snuggling
against another top-priority
evacuee in a fallout shelter in
Dagget.

“Yeah, listen, 1 was just
wondering when, according to
your calculations, I get out,” I told
Kingsbury.

“I really couldn’t say,” he said.

"I'm 31 and 1 write a newspaper
column," I said.

“Well, maybe you have great
ability at building something; that
would count very heavily," he said

“Nope, can’t hang a picture,” I
said.

"Let’s take me then, I probably
wouldn't get out too quickly,” he
said.

VOh, you're being too tough on
yourself,” I said.

“Not particularly,” he said. "I’m
age 58, and 1 don't know anything
about producing food, shelter or
clothing. If I get out down the line,
that'd he fine. But I’m hardly
essential. And I'm not going to
worry about it.”

Las HtU.e.L£S,

1 explained to Kingsbury that I
was beginning to understand the
intricacies of his plot, but that
there were a variety of definitions
of essential.

“In other words," I said, “when
do the Dodgers get out?"

“That’s a loaded one,” he said.
“I’m a great baseball fan. And from
a recreational standpoint, it would
be swell to have them. Maybe they
have other skills I’m not aware of.”

“Don’t get carried away," I said.
“These days they're having enough
trouble just catching, throw ing,
hitting and pitching.”

“I have a brother in Illinois who
likes to call me when the Dodgers
are doing badly.” he said. “They are
beginning to embarrass me.”

In the event of nuclear war, that
does not bode well for the Dodgers.
Because while he sounds like a
lovely man, Kingsbury is not the
type who embarrasses easily.

In the past week, he said, he has
received many critical telephone
calls and letters, but they haven’t
bothered him a bit.

“There’s been a lot of flak," he
said. “I’ve been called everything
from a Nazi to a paperhead.’’

“A what?” I said.

“A paperhead," he said. “I'm not
quite sure what it is. But I felt my
bead after I hung up and I was
assured nothing had changed since
I last looked in the mirror."

Perhaps one of the reasons he*is
so certain that his proposal is
sensible is that Kingsbury, a
veteran of 23 years in the Army, is
also a veteran of msclear warfare.

In 1945, he was a member of one of
the first patrols that went into .
Hiroshima after the bomb was
dropped. And in 1957, he was one
of the soldiers who participated in
a nuclear test at Desert Rock, Nev.
Wearing a gas mask, he sprawled
flat in a foxhole 2,000 feet from
ground zero.

“Jeez, any aftereffects?” 1 said.

“I’ve been tested for radiation,
and it’s not too had,” he said. "I just
glow in the dark a little
bit.... Seriously, though. I’ve seen
the devastation of a nuclear attack
and I’ve seen that there were

l4erLAU3 GlKAnuuetL S’-t c i-6X

survivors. It wasn’t the hydrogen
bomb, but there will be survivors
of that, too, which is why we have
to plan for the eventuality.”

It was right then, I guess, that the
lightbulb went off. In the bribery
business — capitalism’s finest hour
— this could be the big enchilada.
Some guys bribe building
inspectors. Some guys bribe traffic
cops. I wanted to be the first guy to
fix the nuclear war evacuation list.

“What’ll it cost me to get a top-
priority rating?" I asked.

"Call me back on my private
line,” Kingsbury said. ■

SoumERbT A/sus S-1ki-&X.

Evacuation of L.A. not practical

LOS ANGELES (UPI) - Plans to
evacuate the 11 million people who live in
and around Los Angeles in the event of
nuclear war are simply not practical, a local
emergency panel has decided.

The Emergency Preparedness Commis-
sion for the Counties and Cities of Los
Angeles said in a letter to county super¬
visors that it doubted that the Crisis Reloca¬
tion Plan proposed by federal civil defense
officials would work in the nation’s third
largest city.

“There arc 11 million people within 60
miles of downtown Los Angeles in a unique
geographical setting which does not lend
itself to a plan that would require
evacuating most of... them in a relatively

brief period of time, ” the letter said.

The 60-mile radius includes 82
incorporated cities in Los Angeles County
and the most heavily populated section of
Orange County.

The letter released Monday mentioned
problems of limited transportation routes,
lack of resources and hosting facilities in its
conclusion that the evacuation concept
would be impractical.

The commission urged President Reagan
and Gov. Edmund Brown Jr. to reassess
crisis relocation in the Los Angeles area and
provide greater chances of survival and
recovery than what i3 offered by current
planning.

“This may Include antimissile defense

and protective (blast) shelter programs,”
the commission said.

A federal study published in 1977 conclud¬
ed that 85 percent of California’s population
is “vulnerable... to nuclear weapons effects
in the event of attack” but said a relocation
program could work “with proper
planning.”

Earlier this month a retired Army major
who heads the County Department of
Military and Veterans Affairs told
supervisors that any evacuation should deal
first with those who have the most “value to
society,” which he suggested were the
young and healthy and those with useful
skills.

County disowns nuke evacuation plan

j Los Angeles County supervisors yesterday went
put of their way to make sure no one mistook for
bounty policy a nuclear war evacuation plan drawn up
by one of their department heads which divided
people into “essential” and “unessential” groups,
f Supervisor Ed Edelman said he was concerned
about the news media attention paid to a report by
Maj. Robert Kingsbury, director of the county Military
and Veterans Affairs Department, which indicated
that crisis relocation should concentrate first on those
who would be most needed after nuclear war.

The supervisors did not criticize Kingsbury for
what they said were “well-intentioned” statements, but
stressed it was impossible to decide who would
determine those who should survive.

LA«£ 5-11-62.

o on,

Cd?

: AxW/i'Av;

3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846

DISASTER CONTROL RECOVERY TEAM

Mail Coda 7-25
March 16, 1982

Dr, Loren Fields, Chief
Nuclear Civil Protection Division
California Office of Emergency Services
PO Box 9577

Sacramento, California, 95823

Dear Dr. Fields:

Vie are presently covering civil defense in the classes I conduct, and
a number of questions have come up in regard to the effects of fall¬
out on the food supply. I've attached a list of questions for your
comment.

Can you refer us to any other sources of information on this subject?
Any literature you might have on the subject would be appreciated.

Yours truly,

Clarence C. Baal Jr.
Instructor

p.s.: You are probably already aware of the fact that the jurisdic¬
tions in the LA Basin have decided against a mini-evacuation
plan. Have opted for a regional plan instead, but same won’t
be completed by the mid 1980*s. Have told the people I teach
to start making their own plans.

ry

30G/U.1 JELL. O0WG14S J feL_

1 LXy

§ Lahu Gj&Uao

^ QoaMj iQetoO s ~$'

U)OaJ C '\o.jJjUl-0 Qtv^L QsU’&v&tvO -) Qji&isO

*5 eot-> I , Gajo ' (StMJU^ovUi^ (?£vt enJL

& £»0 16 OqJLi..J iurCb- jyty~> £>•** AbciJky COtAtK- . C AyC\-<*jL ^ ,

(Paa&i^ <2 '0 tyo ^ -j^rUA^fcd! A&UJtlltj ja*v Cia<-<s-— Jk^vt- ~tt£ati~ QyfrJZtgtL, AvJ-\

(%AX&A^ i OOiA — -^tr\J MVd&tyj ?C c-$-c? AAAxcOytyyyL

fylCC ^Jady^t, to- ^V<WC ^T^tA^CCd Ac*$~f~ulA- AMj -JU^eX* ) (TO A/JytltXsZiexy-o , (llMJlMJl.

.A-CJd4JyMtix^ O^j C(2iP, C2&VUm^.4- S6^ C'R P, -{jouXji- A-Adf^y 10)000,060 J6 vcl<m**ZLL<^ e lA. £,

yv\Atti<f^-tti5^vj (Xmuxa^ , tevn*4. yii*ovcA>^ &- fA*x ^w-oj JU>aX~ ^g-o .?v

-'Vu^j ^ OdM^otm^x, sua& Cmc6A-~ j ^Ux^o H

GMi^OaUyffid/L. QyOUidU^ j -^UyFj £t~- 6

t C^tyOZAytoeW AAL£*^> *Jky(Ay j &ytyd*L <Jdydy /^ O' Jlitt*c£ty^ > iky^-LAy*A~y

*A/\AAywdMy<J (XttcrCycUdyJL J^MJ i*^ytdyU*y j <^-3— ^AdytnyO JjtAA- J (^O-^jCy /i &*yyt£*y /S ^Itnt-

JlleJO- Oyt^CAdyCU^ clUXtMy f Wlit JUjUFtyi*. ^n-i y^jvt&cn*Jiy*vj —

2.”^ GM&*£w*MJL- i U^&AyVUdVj

Q^-Cgts S 4 / (jUXoa^aaasmJ-- 3 (loJ-^nAAM(UxiydaM^yii^ CtfudUffisM'. .

$iyii%y Uu- GtfXylyJUJdyOTAA. , H~ J&Cdy^ j0l-O\AAy%s*Jl j 3 ^CcMjL. ytytyJZLdyi^J} CdgZtyUVO J A ^yvUAd^

JiUnjffulA* Jjfklyfayiyty J ( <X- COu^MEL, AJLeJOL, . O-^ A(AuSUdyUdyl. ,

@CX4^6y 3 I ( Cdi1y<iyC&\y\AydAAy3y iS ^t*i*^i**i*J ^^ylAT&V&££OsAy-' <Xt£&iCdyyO

C CAJU^ycJtdwt -^j <UatCc\AA- yy*A~ Art&ywJhtyQ , ^LlddycCoo A-

jlW^ilC" \yinJl2y ~$UyyCA-y r ^(M^UAy- -^yly<sttyc£iytVi G,~ (V*ika» (lOdyJiLVAUd^ O^U^iZioO ■

d'slytyitfl ^yp~ &t)(s / 00 ^C C£\1&ssGls , gML ^

x^ir Otfc oXa> r SCcjCo dfoOu ju^ ^S^>z^v cAa^ c^mj? r

C?<5^> v/ QMAc^XAAA- tirfX- V y QtUL&4?ldL. §$$3f&v
Qo^u S ^UM'cAamM^- 5 1 $AL&A~* -

(? -$trJ Lu&a/ O^U^i^i&vo j ~(p£jb>wtd. A R~C~ )

(tyfA*sXZe)AA-

StcX-a ZL Qju$&uMaMM~

jLh^^JLcJl IA nrJ^ut- t OfarLfooZ*^ Atcu^ -fiulti. JudU AfrlOte&~ A&jdiXL>< ^kf&tJr-
G a,S-C' t ^c0 . jbtAAAX-. GAA^dA^udZL^

,€Ua4$~„ Mk&AI^aJ&sI \JajU^ C-CUax, ^ oaM^X^L^ JUa^cxmaXI^c^ &- C&Liu. Aassj C^ujuA**.*

. . GlAamj-*- ) cc^crxjU AAvcta£JL £u* £>- j ££

AaJLusca* tiAA^L^JCyxr^o- , txruJUiJt eu^JL. MtiaUau^ ^$tns ^uSte*x* AmjzJL - £ P $0

'iyU^JL '$CV AMZUAtX*Uj £&-&!&<* <L$TxirtjL x- Q&JlltA. 6f^ j

^LdSJuJL, OsodU XtcdjL* iffuvu&kr *$vO ^ £!iwXL Xa^cuaaaJL

GJlGAtLmjtAJ^ . /'^ QiJtX/9^4^ Qaj^ dllw^hA^

Jt&U \AaaXL~ f dkj~- Jk&ji-. O-'i-A-c^ '-4-x^- ^t-<-^ 4-<rt-c^i, <x. JLa-*a-

&<*€LiAjrisis LaAaA^s ~Qr JL&.aA~> CWxcl.t^Si^ &CrtAA*Zub£*. .. 6U .Auju ~*&4%A-U*££r t

LvtruJUl iA>-C* ^JhjfzXJijL Xa^ ox*-r^\ > ^inMrJixJl JhxfrUd- -67> v-vv'uik^-

H/ilirfX- , dhxaJL' Uxu%%. .Mj&AL&I— &is- dbx* J\AJl{ 4~ Cv &t*U— cw

. iA'Cw\%. _^tTV * .. £0 JulA**- AAjucAo Jh*^ ^Ux> #V’ j -&L4JbXtxQ XAJ^Ct^J w£-C**

'^WVWM^ to- ,.. .

fylfrUr. JIaXlXj- ^ £>~i ~(jW ^§Kn^\ j QaXIaa^c,, &*** (h^AA^uZK.<c£ot<*?~ 9

(X^J^ &6us\ xXt’^v-' <Un<^ZuA.~ C St^dt^ 7 -/ fiXx^MurCdL. -(pr^ xaaa^ta^ J

AvbUUiAr j24/\JjksZL*Jl UjitxJLlaa^ CuXZibL&i.... SZ> y\yx^Acx. o^dL» -^A^LxdUbh/t^ ux^3^Xs\ 7S~ yvyuAft. .

^ > b A&aa*^, £zmJL Sn^i\ Cei^sO oik^KiX- &Uns± AaaM\ ^■xj^J>cJ^iaj,

cjfusi. SliXUAjtsE/L~ X4V- - AsCiATH^t**^ _ “( C'- ^ ”/ <■. SCfcJtt/^ &JL&AiJ~

x$UU^ Cs^Ma*A 4JSW~\ I A*Cdu<A/l*r ~P\&£$IC’ AAXBX/MmXQs-JI c?l-1U- .,.

-IvoaX- ^L>C^2__». « ( -S^-vx. ^ S

£c<-v> 4vmA- iAew ©o^rvi . f -O^U ,.uoX4 ?4^<rc^{L.. -€n^e&. i_A^- o^vw ^Xi^rv^' ^tha

&A4-A/2-. *v :!^/Vt^VVV^ "■ ^ A>Gl4a-^%AA*^ £►- 2.“/.

-^CutjL* j JL^X^jCJbudl | -&VVj^— Og. f'ilp / / (? a^t*. ‘iA

■SKtjx. JLtrtlu^j friltrcXXXists j_ ^£>V Szrt^-Ai-vn (XJU^cxmX- AiA *i & $ev ^W4«^ , Qa-yc^ *?C

JAAe^p .-'leiAMX'* at^L. Co-ua-U^ d«*v X~e**A-cliz*~ -?S7f 006 (n^n^-f . 0¥oZ t eco

ttun * ^vi^t£e>1 ^fc4_ MT^uL- S 5 ^ JLm. JxtA-J JUjwjL, <UtAc*i*gCj

CfciL . Q.8c*r>

CD

^gJAjUa+At OA~~ U*J& w4vc*oi- QJtts& 0 &&*A- 0-4- AvuJ 4^rlA^C £rg ■<*-

«- S Ca^v ^ JJL4qv~ i^Ctt^A^ iV^Ui^L. A<TV*aX, djj S tX^v S\ ^U-4^- <2tTX-J3t^ ^A-U^r^-* ^ ^VV^£/U^ i

&4^6^CJ /l4<£ci>c^- >VU^via^Ka3 Jv-<^- dLk> Ahf^^AjitAX^4^^ ~

•^Lo / D 3 t £oA, tA^JLcJ) C-C^t/t>fo<-

(Si^A^3L<^ CA^trv^vto* --^ny a. lv 6*VtA C^ruX«^* x?tv\ *0*55* &- f 0 Q s 2q

i!kj~ c *'Trt&, ^ftcc* , JLtdXu* oiAtMs ■*&-&* 'Ca^muz4jlJL -

P<2^t. / 2 ; CUicu^M' ttW- 3 ^ Q<JLoc£iXiDd

CicXUrL, dbuXi^ jVaaJJou^ tUvJ~ -fycJiX ck. A^a^aToXoCuaV , ^ AM***-

X«H/ O^T^Z^VJ J *£^_ cLtr- CAArt&t&VS .AMaJLUSu^ , Cbl^tAAOAAAAuJL xt^U| X<-

/udLopJl ^po ilu- juk&M* <Jru/ , JbuJL AjjU&uiJb t Co- JLul, yuJLc-caZut!

isuXfc. JImhOt Multi M~> •

Qo^r /->' ,

(?<sUL&&<, \^ftyA*foriAA*&tCc*Q

(7<^ ^ i

CUJ&tJuM^ £T t

^MAfltCwUAA-i- &-^0-6ZccT*t- C JUjis JL&lZh* AMaJIa-caP^

6h^ ^

WAyfavb 0 ' ^ j

^avucvDo. CtsvxMdMT&CUA, OaaJL CesuMst&u c £eo t)

(?^o

OJAiuAjmsUa^ ^ j

QuiiAAcZicrvi OeutAftAMt®-. C &cts <£u*Uj£ <?J

^Cctue-lnJ 2> (XjJuLcX-i <2^iX Qo$X. - GAjjicli? C^J>Aa*(siLi&,

SCciZeA— <n&o && Vo /il&tii, ^c^a£g£a?v) ^u iw>A, cou-a^. , iuLiciC^

ttr yyuA-citeyo aAAtub. ; Caaa/uJU<3 (Utw\i<aaXDvo& 1 j , dUe^vwxJL o\>

•Du\&tr*jbccQ , ^&CAsXD^VU AUiXo &A&6-iMaaP -£~H aXi^* j ( OjAArt^eUCA-’ LUtJ*<£<IAA~

Oa. ffXiMAA. t fiici4A43&^m4^ JsX&uirtb^ctJ} in) A^Xrtr[ci^e~, u*Ajlt*-eJL -iCCuJhU. aah^

-^jaLLohM- lAj- ^CeTCoU. ul'AAM To- CLu- &£uuc3a/J- Aaaaa^Aaj .
try AUA^ui-tCU&O-li r'

GUilcfutiUcL- f Q)^d**ttr^DP ^a^JUaaJU Qtnv*X(AMMcMl/UA-

Q cutp* / 0. <^voaa* ^wwJal t EUvy- -^MAArzLt- > ~forO -/t<rvw A&uH dc.

*^&*lltruA~ -fl'UA-’ Ga*&~ . ^ 6 l . ^XaIuaM. j AtMJUcdcU*^ dlUAryJbAAAOAAAi^^ ,

^ QjuU f

Q

? %^o W«t6

COuML*/- i -f Q^Ja. tJLcV\ (M^A. ^IXuJaaJL,

SlJt&L, c$£AruhJl JUsJ2~ 7 j A" 6- * £efl- ytu^ *£*

KZ°i - 6 3 S&AA*^j£~ . ^irJ . . ..

CfucJa. ^rdidUjti^ ,.>fciCpt4- ^trj . AajUaA^ ./I^UaaAA^.. ^gu ... A AA^ur- t

^Hv&^C L$ajl* AAAjLLuXgj) '§&o cttn*A-~ EcjEaA- (Tl/

<5L£cc-^W^- AfriXtll, ) JIjjaaX. ^Ai^A^J- «^U| '-fax* £' /c *

GLAASvUAf* Ol* ) ^bdAns&iAA^^ $ •^xa&JUmW^-

SL MjcixA. Cajf-iU^Cj /UftodfaLj 0<Xi4AA**j Jh&d^icujid -

&r~ ^Aa^uX vUmJvJ A*dC*~ >^^sri^L* j ^Jj^uJL* Avt4nrC*sru*~i- ^ ^\sLer\xJ^

'U-kA. ?0% /U^A . £L^uXv». ... . .

S (aJUa*. JLjL^juX™ /Urwui— M^viMfrAAsni/L* , JL^^~ ezi&u^U. <fyAs<* , Styj^dL-

7^%.. ^ ^AA/YIaI<£^ jAS&s£4AsgClt^- UaAJL* C j^pA^- . -jUduAt T 3 £ *>£? UsdLS Ah&is** &Msis% f

JJ^cpx^Jl Jh^nst^A-'i enj ^%*A^-i£-'~- , Sucdh iAsdill Jbt4A&*? (Jajl* JUjUs /m t'<>T^-U^/c^.-- {Ui.-~.X-* ^

^ £iAA&iX\ . ^Uav*^ ... /UCAMrfiJ-^... U&fflpd t<J^hd! AJU ,,C. Us^_ aAz£&^ ,

C uj Jk/*x~ jtJhdl&b^ ? j UjJM 'CcdjL^. Jikjdltid. t &A*-*$L* y4<rXTA-J # *^4^^XrO.

IX- y&A^Zc<j' ^

AX&-te- Lor ^AAfb-^&CO -^tfd *&0&^KA&Xc4rd) iV .

/U4><£a. ^tA> /^4A^' >t-<r^-s£ {U^v 1 ^ dj^TlAtiQ^. .-/tVS*^; At)* ^t/Y .

@A*b£l*AA. w/iA &&«X\, AL&ctc’C** r ^ $£4>urJZ~ AAF&-JL, aaa

"%r. %AJUMXj> 6 >v j CJUaMa/^ /

,£:: t(^L ^ Q>- JU<€iXi*-crin ~^£i^£ . .

vA^(Ei-c^£» 2 o- AA>'ttZt4^ AA*Xd JAszL<AC t^J^r>\ /ls&w£izd~ . | AwA&iaJ 6d(n^.t^

Atn*x*-' J^MAArTZ^ A&<lA~f?s2s td- JUmdl~ Cl&€;a4Si~~ r . ^ J^ud>

(As&^d/ (uruA*X~ jla^Jl-^ -dk 6ww.^ . UJutfX c^u^Lr

UlAJfr&A-dXdp-y/} AAjiAsSrtsd><AA-* ^ ^U^<X4^7tXvU ALe&Asi-dL ^ Co- yiH<lVM/<?U 4^- f^04iAv(-

d^AJuJL. ^ r. CdtA<y A*A4f\AstGn^ ' ^2a<4^A. (Ajiti A-O &&t%A+<$L lAJXs&x

MccU, (XsX- Juu^t, VuaA^ j ^ -fyictl*- mss, Zi«. £- tax ^

* Uj* uiA U*$$4A> AasJjtXasaJI MsJEv- AaSA tvu*#*-* f (U-JLl ^ -A*^-C. a^c*_--

^XIlJI . juX* -tAjp Jlsr&dL sterjl^ ....

Cal grft *1

0

(?*4«L UjvUb Ju^ _Aa^X*a<> -^ArtrlrcArM^ JU^ ^. (atC^^O tifJJJlyi^L kJ*

CUL Oju^ji' f Cilcrvi^ unMU Up^ i/u.uX^ , Jb^M .aa~^- J^t-i*- <ro y^AjJUbcS ,„ < £cJZZ u^tll Jui^ C&Jjk^K

£&U .-VLU^ciUxL ,

■ Xu */H*r uJkufau ZjUI Jm* ^|^XuX cU~ AUUumL A&Iww£* , ^d-C^L- Q~ A<J~

JU'UjUs ^cX~ -^Apr\r\ ^X^TViaC- Ca- jJL*.. JIaAi^TcJ .

^CUiA^yti^. £L^ Jlufy ia 4* ^ucnA/iA? } 4?>uO S<^e, . £ ibxAb- JhfejL. 3 SAlPH

(JJliJL JLa^ ) <? CLtyA- 2 / j 2-2 , 2 . S /i$\*rvol_ >VK^>^u^^A ^ CU*d. C&IaasXi^ £M£#<4zj@2jA\A'

CLsaA/Ua^ 3 Gxcl^Z ( aiv -i 6u*JL

ZjUL 4*0 ^0^4. &- UUaJ- JU^^pUlA- ~$<A> U&OaL Xa> -(j-<*AL 5 C&Cufiij* ! Xvvcfc*^

.AtkXwi ^ X-C GtrVv|v4X^f .At*?- -Avc*v& 7 dc^gi. * SfcgjuX. Z AJAU^ gA~ j&mM~. £ u&dA. -

Ia)a$JL AamJL A- dLJ- ^ sO^£u<^Ua> JhU $>„ (fad%e&~ Mr- Ju- oMmSJ Ms* iJwU~ £U Ass^u* , UJJu^J HusU- Sc^z**- f

XlA/j U- AArvZfcxsj XgJj Jutfe*

S j&wXo ht*r-JU*Si~- cJUrC~ A<X- <aoo yuiX fav <££*dbu^ &utJL ^

l\jnr\&U AA, AaM&£uJZ<S)a^ Jk&rL Cfut-U- JbLr&-V<* t &U*^iL /LM=^ -^U*4a-„ (AAtVUrC^I ^ /ituiZrLr ^VWU^f«^

*-"W-t£^ /iM/tX^J^ {jJjUb Jj*~ diAvLr CVj iio> - {ttC<^vZpV^ 4 ^lJL- C&tA-r <As tAAv^C- <-X-^t^C* r

C±4f\ArisM^ ^AjA^A^AtU- <s^. Aur' tA&*<£*rp- r Aaaau^ U&eM dm*

i^rJjL AMAritA^ .

Xi, GaAc^viaM^ <^t4AtA^A~ JZtM^A^ Qltv&P Mb '<- jtM*A/b<JL ^stJ ,

^ A^uvoai^sS^ovvA. W-rtltfi '^•C' M*a*C4AjIAA**jaJL 2o- <• £X- £47W*€g^^&M-~*.

^■GydLs , ClAJ^r *i 0 ° JZ -> ^LU<fVvr XrVV ^ .^l^nrzru

-Ari/'t*^ CUUA 4 - j, -j^o '^ATVU CIAaJ / 0 O X^A&^AjL~ - fco*c%\J A&A*JhJZ[ £o- tdrCm*-*

Xoaa) ^A^A^totryy . tOXxuo ^ £?WWV tfA/ uA&P UriiA AMVist^ £^

AtA^ijLj ^5- CcAA<^ 4- jtuv-> - (?-dju U^ijJl Jj^,

^u4a Ao CKt^O C^J 4^4^ ^H/ &$JLcx*$ Jbu£ CAsiz&\ ,

^ ^irv«L vUuC^i-i^i 4^UVWu^j r JUjaatJzJ? Z 3_ MAuJtb* -§aaj aMc^ -

<JMaaa~ ^ fl£G$Z&riSL. 4 Aa> AXt^uAjlaA*^ " Clc^sA^AX^h ^cvi ) ^ A^kd^irU j x^LlAZe^ j s(tAA4&cZs£j

A&ArCt£M~ ( f £ ~*6

G XjpUA- C^ ^iruwvx. ^MiiAAZudijP < S' t€U*AL&J? ifin/yJL cdUreujz^^JL* C&*■*.) JLtEldL f '*/ Jin. ^JUa.
6 Vjg^^v iW<( "? ^vCL ^VwXl. C ijurtrj} Ju/l. JltAL. Jukv^ ^ duZ&iA e

1/ © " £/Cf JLaX- cJJUx&AtZiA’

cC&lJ cuaJl.

'J*A4XUceA&%^ ^clifvu^ £*rfj$ AAa\. Jbt> A^*£&$1<$ Oa~ QyL4A*£> £0 r L%U#ju tu^wRi c£
MAl&MA?bL. UsuJ$ JL^S AJ&I&AjJL CTLcit^J ^ AvwJ Ju^jLaaao? &CUaJ~ „ cf6c<d2*. CUm£l^I^£cLL.

UA^ Aj^jLXiAJt^ wCVtrd" &. ^*“.6^-4— .

&A*CCl** CtSliA*- ^A-tuot* • <U AaaJa, y

OvV^Sl* JJAMaasU**- isidlltjL a*~s . ..f$Lo~ Zo- 0"H«U > ^-cJaaJL £UX*gu J dmrt^ Jk*^U

ZCtA^ct^ &\Aa i Jh*%A/Jbs} j jJEcA . ^ . / -*2 iJv&Ui^ , g ^ ^

6ofy '^prJ JUj-c^ W JLbt<riLri. JK^Cx^ Ms^caAjju^^

^^Ga*OaJI tj tA-- C^' X 4JL JLt*, Ui^AA^fAn^^ ^IV y^XtJL- Jk&iA-. ^ J>£j?^£. s^fr£cszA^*

C\nl2? fc A6<^^ .-d^ /U^A* ..* ........ .

CaAMM<^, S' I%A4X--C0uJL Q*Ct£v*--

'A^ilA^£c<~ ^AAAJtJX^ -^£x-C- JUrUAC&Q^. ^ UAJt> iAJ^LeJ^ JL Z“ aC-O

^AfawA/jl ^vvN w£^ttx«x-c6<4-,

6 &)yudouJl a*«Ji Q/<te£ci)

&AAmaa* 4L~ ^S^lc ~ &&a*A- JLa^ &UA*dwu^*<P 0% A^&tdtJL e

LirdM Jks&ArK* M&AAA^Ur&- vfavxt cLat,X.» (Ji^dr- (UUa -£* 4 ~* ^AAAAT\,-t-JL > &uuJl & 4 X*JU> && 4 SI
Aaak &p?4r- I fyuc&c&£ .MALdlk. otn£j2 aa^caaAaX^ ^brtJr* C(AA-ti^ f *ZsiaJ!L aaaaJUocJ^ J^aahaaxJL

JL^%4*X~ ^-*. 6U3rvtw J2- >4ysi4^P ^

ama^ o-f' duu^ju^ J^4^Xcd^ mimSmm uo louou\i iaa^iS ..

{?2^c. jywL'AZiATU, 1. iW 4c40 ^ >At^

t4«v^cW^ ^ JfjtrU JUy^JU. flJhjJljUs A^utu*~+ t fyjAsJUk*^

uAM* [^JrJAy &jt*iru 4 ^ $un w >1U^A ^ ^ etZC&&t i j LAJ&sJle^,

- r t&A*' $myL*s ( <4s4is\ Le%*Zt*u,UL, Ma*&M> $&'t&nU. Jl£^JC j- . SZ&a>L <n*o
3 ^V<- ^ -Uvviil. ^ (iAXlA<A$

^<a^u. ^ " AS - ..i^xiiiuJL jJkjJEt^

Cat, Q jUm , Gc^jl *j

MZrf, $ (Uc*n*-crwtacr Cu^JL G^svUIa^&l-

Ccuv Jif}pjul~ ijjir>i*AWA*iA*l~ %- CmaJLg«JL [loviaJU JL^j&^JLJlZajA, /X*. i|w> sfo
(mX/^t-XiM, Oi, <¥u£ajL. c^aajOtJ^M-- . flw jjj£.uA- /iM^L. a^s Jljv^&si- } Jhzcunf JU-Oa^a^

JUasiasiauX jJLwA^ f jA^CAl4XtL$ aJjAArXcU^vxx j J^xtAeiAxi-ru/l^ -&OfrCuXUtmJ ^ ^OaIcAU^

Ur _AvuxLl* JUrfrAXA^i&ArvO crijc&saJl f &**0 £^mA- Aa&U) Oaa^, Area^Atu X-

CJLevu Ur ^i^rcL. GMtijth- . Qitcuu*^ JkruAjA- tf*«t Oov^JyultArytM <3 unii i£i&L>dt(n*'V 0 '

G^>ZtrJU/t, Aaaa i*| dbxJL j Q-0 JhXnvL- iAJVxXdfa&viJ&t'i^ r QUm&xq-vv cSuaIx. Atvu^j MuA~ (UfVu£- j A\ua^

(— fyK- £*-0 Aij^e* 6&— (X- flft-tA • a«*vc- ***. dx&iA- &ux&—

SUsamXL& j OV Xk-

Qa^JaAU ^V~ S CaXZ, Gaic^wuio dv)AACfilA*Ctj (2iAdUiA^lA_, UtVUxwPij^rtaetiJr- Q-&£u*J>

fy^vcvMnA£uX urvujLt&> fiXasiA, t&* jlmaJaXAZa £&\aIaaAsl, X-c^vvl, at&da/vcA*^ to. „ t^lv

UbdULtLxn -1 &~>JL t±cvU*<*&u 1 LOW^AL ^tavteiAA <ji. jUmtu44i«| U D^AixG)

MfXur\ -ftvO knSXJi ‘fprvtl*- AtAAstutA* , Q^WU^ C (2. UruuSiA. JUc* S**^r*UrxjX*s>^\ (hfAr

a-rJi, CiriXv^G%L*rxtA> iou &U-2UA, *$ ea ^ aU#^2,y C&oxxr^j JXrt*t<£s\- t£~iAU

JlLtrtXx &n*L • !AJ&u£dL du, ^cdotaJL ^ca^ooX GtrdXX^Ci. m*. -JUnt,- u/nO

^SAAAf^ *

J-^&ucJL, 0£t4,(AAxstvu.*J~ c*rdtB (^mgaaca* G 2 , 6LtJL a^O-ta A/vzhcJL t*stl£ Aa- c^ur&-\ 2 ZI*Aa~j

JVUMssa^ CAAtictfc jbttAsifr/Z, AiCtwstd!. , Q3uJJ.epojxx) eu*d~ 1 bunt, 4 aaa*Ml,Uv- iArmJU UsUj

\Ja 4_, C4fWM4&Ct£& U/fox%j£t' ^-^u- AAcAX* * 'S '$Anks dsV-C&JL, ^\afc(AAJLaaaAmA~ OjXC£ jQs<, 0t\ bxAdUA*,

U/Jl h\ CLcuaaaA. JtO IhyAjrnaJX^J? CU, dLx. &udi JLa, &Ua*as .

S)-UsC R. JrTrt\ MjIvlstAAAA' G*aAL -AvU~ C^v^-a| CUfUt lAx. oXTu^SX UrJl£

JAAjLAa/ZaX itZprirtlA- AaslaX #4, Mat . yJiAcXutitx, tJunM, ALAjU/JZ&Aj?

l/innix - <&i- OJA. 64*0l, MttAuJI i^uaJK. &**JL JlurCti, ujtAi Am^ OaAA£(uuAI U&(Ji/L. ,

oftt-dL GCLrrtfl- 0>A~ Ci£xa^4t^ 0. ■^VTAAAaA- -fyrU j^— ykWU&L- 6. *$+%) /H ada^z, l

U)2lSb iA/mti &>m.JL> C dhs*ilvxjA~cfl S&AASUA*, Qu*ctci*A?)

cAovi- JLcJr. /U^leuLt^&r

G&trU/x* ^MnXAA, .^ 1 in} Ctocm^A, Aw , lL\, •^tyiX*. (yuA*k- -^4 /uatA.

SJkjJZtA, &Zrvh$JU**tj CAj-tiJl ■&-<, uruJU ^rzrtH- djVvxvx A^c~i, Maaa<J*&zUsi__ eu^JL *Ar£& JUt~-
iAa/utAL, &iaJ (XaajAjUax, iAaa-ccXz, dfoAj jd&aaA- aXaAc, &cJlcz*&i* *

©

JUA-Ofi to- 8ccXbiOO aw, C iU^.

C ^X $^JU. ^X^Ur tofa rfc ^jutu^JL <hJ*o.

*? QvlguaXjUL-

. ^ Wu - < * UU usuJlt-JlX' xfUaxJ; & z^ cuZ^> £nj u^ou^Ji <UM^,

■ M^cua^ -a^a^Zou^ a+JL .

^Uxu^U^ MM ^U-44 mJ> 6- ^nrzSL ~Q- uA«W£-_WiwA < rviM*'; .lAiii Jj&JU'd- JhviA.

&XCX., OU J^, C^Lor^ , WUiWw. ^ Ju*i- ^£^4,, ^

M^t- <5 -..Al. ^yuz.^..Awtvfiu^ ,*^_cow^»t.G:

S^-v, ^ £«*- rfjrf- c. ju, .dtoJUjujL.-. £&*. ^4«SZLw..

QtfirtAA*. AAAtdcc^CdX AXi/v\XX€*i&v?%3_ yi/u,£&i'X—

:dlx4> OA^.(A.^.CiJbjru^ Qtecu&g ...

O/o The Cocapl^T i of Crisis Te loca no^ Vcakjaj/^

tO'Zo-l ^ .-o , Cz>o ^ &.0-. Ma**. tru£^ ‘/s~ dUJU^ svujuJl . So-tJL.

i If 5" _t/u C\. A-G&&, CefiA^i/£ih3>o <&£&-' i 6U*-tlL -iM^c tx- , < n*J GjwJZvvcus^

tru^cvi^| Q<s04aaEJL *— i 0 ^Casia-€v — £?Oudb ^MXoczdt £L*sdL ’£*c^

-T^L*rECo^A~ 'fyH A'CzA-* .

FRESN'O (API — A
threatened nuclear attack
could find metropolitan
Californians evacuated to
rural areas without food,
wafer or fallout shelters
to protect them, a state
official says.

Several million people
would find themselves
relocated to the open
fields of the southern San
Joaquin Valley and the
deserts of Imperial and
eastern Riverside coun¬
ties. said Donald Pinegar
of the state Office of
Emergency Services.

Not only will author¬
ities be faced with the
problem of relocating the
city dwellers, but they
will be forced to organize
construction of thousands
of temporary fallout shel¬
ters, Pinegar said.

The shelters would be
created from existing
buildings by heaping
earth over them, Pinegar
said in an interview.

He admitted that no
plans have been made to
provide shovels or power
equipment for construc¬
tion. But he cautioned
against a pessimistic atti¬
tude about one’s chances
of survival.

"Most people have a
misconception on the
scope of a widespread nu¬
clear war,” he said. “They
have an ‘On the Beach,!

everyone-is-going-to-die i
attitude, but that’s not*
really possible from a
statistical point of view.”

State officials are
working on plans for
Merced and Riverside
counties that will serve as
models for other parts of
the state.

Parts of those two
counties are considered
high-risk areas-because of
the nearness of Strategic
Air Command bases and
the lumbering B-52s that
would carry a nuclear at¬
tack into the heartland of
an agressor, he said.

Other high risk targets
include Mather Field in
Sacramento, Beale Air
Force Base near Marys¬
ville, and Travis Air
Force Base near Fairfield,
Pinegar said.

Targets of lower prior-
ity include military
complexes in the San
Francisco Bay Area,, Long
Beach and San Diego.

The plan for Merced
Countv calls for evacuat¬
ing 61.000 people from
around Castle Air Force
Base to an area near Los
Banos. In addition, 67,-
000 people from San Jose
would join them if offi¬
cials determined that a
nuclear attack was likely
within a few days.

In Riverside County,
about 1.2 million persons
from Orange and Los An¬
geles counties would
make their temporary
homes in the Coachella
Valley near Palm.
Springs. They would join
those evacuated from
around Riverside’s March.
Air Force Base.

Loren Fields, chief of
the state Nuclear Protec- !
tion Division, says the
plan will work if enough i
time is allowed, butj
admits a sneak attacki.
could slay millions.

He estimated it would
take up to eight days to
evacuate Los Angeles,
while it might take three,
days to evacuate San
Diego.

“It’s important that the
average citizen think
about the critical things
he would need to take
with him,” Fields said.
"People should think
about stockpiling food
that doesn’t require
extensive preparation
and water.”

"Our plans do encom¬
pass redirection of food
and fuel, but it takes time
to turn the system
„ around, and for the first
three or four days people
might have to make do
with what they have with
them,” he said.

S Port H— Sun., Oct 7Z, 1977

5os Queries;

Msvf Erdand Maps Huclear Evacuation to 3 States

CONCORD, Nil. (A’)—New England Civil
Dofmise officials are developing elaborate plans
to transform New Hampshire, Vermont, and
Maine into a sanctuary lor other residents of
their area if the nation is ever threatened by
nuclear attack,

“We erpoct to hove something on paper that
should work, in nhout loo 3 rare.’’ said David
ILtjdcn. who h coordmuhng the plan m New
H-.mp: hire. “Thou we would make various re¬
finements.”

Under wl\R is termed the Crisis Relocation
l ! !en, tmoi k- who lire m mmc populated “risk
area; '', m h as louthcrn \h ,v Haumsbirt', Mas-
saehu Us ami Cornice I icw. would be t\ acuated
to lew P'-'iiu' u<'d •) os' mva

The pi, .11 ' de uyed to irn'o Uisperie people
from “iwk an i-> near lag nliei and mihlaiy
bases thal offiemU imln\o wwki be used as
pawns m nuelmir 1 lam. m a!,. tempts

“Thv pkui wouei mn,” -woik with normal
roopctuiion, hat d V.orb W.w Hi were im¬
minent, and the I’reMdcnt say-, ’Thi; m what
you have to do to Slav alive,’ we think the peo¬
ple would ir pond. A lima ler seems to make
people more cooperate re,” Havden said.

He said New Hampshire officials hope to sign

a federally funded planning contract.

“After the contract is signed, we will go into
the cities and towns, high-risk areas first, and
talk with officials about cooperating,” Hayden
said.

“if a town says ‘get lost/ I will quietly get
lost, but 1 'li li.-ii them if the tune comes, the
people will come here, whether they plan or
not,” he said.

Private houses would not be used to shelter
refugees, but an engineering study, compiled by
computer, lists churches, banks, schools, county
homes for the elderly and other buildings as
possible shelters.

‘J he New Hampshire slatehouse, for example,
would become the temporary home for about.
7,500 people; a undv Home m Claremont
would house 1 , 200 ; a wastewater treatment
plant in Concord 563; a seminary budding in
Enfield .1,700, and Darthmouth College in Han¬
over about 69,000.

Hayden said some states already have car
stickers designating where evacuees would go.

New York state is “pretty much taking care
of itself,” Hayden said. That means Connecticut
and Rhode island residents cannot flee west,
but must head north, most of them into New

Hampshire.

“Maine is good for a tremendous amount of
people, but the problem is transportation. There
would be a tremendous bottleneck at the south¬
western corner of the state,” he said.

The evacuation ratio calls for five “immi¬
grants” lor every “native.” That would jam the
streets of Concord, Nil, with about. 175,000
people instead of the usual 35,000, Conway,
N.IL, would be transformed from a quiet resort
town of about 6,000 to a crowded city of 30,000,
all within 72 hours.

Rut officials making up the plan say there are
rtili many more questions than their arc- an¬
swers.

“How do you see that they have bathroom fa¬
cilities enough.? How do wc sec that they arc
fed and taken care of and kept warm? What .do
wc do with the cars?” said George McAvov,
New Hampshire Civil Defense director. “That’s
where the planning comes in, and there has to
be a lot ot it.”

The weather could also pose a major ihreat

“But I’m not ridiculing the program,” McA-
voy said, “because I believe wc have to do
something,”

I"

V- t c <

t 1 ff 1 ' h<'

'I he pentagon is developing a ‘‘Doomsday” plan to
evacuate 135 million Americans trom 400 key target
areas in the event of nuclear war.

Under the plan, Americans would use private trans¬
portation to relocate to “safe areas” from 20 to 150 miles
away Jrom their homes, and would seek shelter in public
buildings — schools, hospitals, libraries, etc.

food supplies would be diverted io file ‘ host” areas and

“•"urgency medical services t -

| By PAUL BANNIST ER j
another 30 million lives. But
good relocation planning,

. further 70

otal of 180

would he provided. Evacuees
would live in Hits host a>ons
for up to three weeks aftv a
nuclear attack, The ENQUIR¬
ER learned.

Seymour Wengrovitz, staff
(i>rccf(.r the t'kms and S>.i

terns Development Division of

nilhon lives
nil!ion people ’

i still ;

I P;

pr

vpe

-y m /
agon, I
EN- r”

of the no*
'1 Y.;

Qi.lKEH that j
the plan could
save j00 million

“If

do

nothing, 80 mil-

Scym

Wrng.

lion p

surviv- a nuclear attack, out
of our present population of
around 215 million,” Wengro¬
vitz said. “With good civil de¬
fense measures — with people
using shelters and knowing
what to do - we could save

Duluth,

Minn.; Oklahoma City; Colo¬
rado Springs; Tucson, Ariz.;
and Great Falls, Mont.

The Pentagon got skirled on
Hu evacuation plan in I;i74
alter military experts learned
ol the Soviet Union's plans for
mass relocations of population
centers.

“Now. with Russia having
an evacuation policy, should
a nuclear exchange take place
with the Russians evacuating
their cities and the U.S. not
evacuating any of their popu-

fjn-m'v.iL.

gk uitlli'Jr OiMill'liF If : li(d<uk ilfNid'h Am

HIGH RISK AREAS in the event of nuclear attack, according to experts, are mark¬
ed in black. There are 400 such areas on this map of the United States developed
by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, inside the Pentagon.

lation, the U.S. would be at
an extreme disadvantage in
terms of population losses,”
Wengrovitz said.

One military expert, Maj.
Gen. George J. Keegan, a for-

! mer bomber pilot who rose to
become the Air Force’s intel¬
ligence boss from March 1972
I to January 1977, said that if
j nuclear war erupted today 30
! to 40 Americans would be kill¬

ed for every Russian killed.

Wengrovitz said, if funds are
increased as expected, the
mass evacuation plan could
bg completed for the entire
nation by 1983 instead of 1989.

CoflAttfleleo Sfanea

C It'-l •

Thursday, March 18, 1982 / Part I

State Official Labels

Nuclear Evacuation

Plan Hoax on Public

By CARL INGRAM, Times Staff Writer

SACRAMENTO—A top Brown
Administration health official de¬
clared Wednesday that her depart¬
ment will not participate in fashion¬
ing a federal civil defense plan that
envisions moving 19 million Cali¬
fornia city dwellers to the country
in case of a nuclear war.

Director Beverlce A. Myers of the
Department of Health Services said
it would be “unethical" to partici¬
pate in a plan that "creates the . . .
illusion that the public health com¬
munity can offer any assurance of
health protection to the cities of
California in the event of a male¬
volent detonation of nuclear war¬
heads.

‘‘To plan for a hoax is a disservice
to the people of California," Myers
told a stunned legislative hearing
called to hear testimony on nuclear
war preparedness. The hearing was
sponsored by the Senate and As¬
sembly health committees.

Development of Plan

Myers' declaration followed testi¬
mony by officials of the state Office
of Emergency Services, which is
working with the federal govern¬
ment on development of a "crisis
relocation” plan.

And, the statement left the office
of Gov. Edmund G, Brown Jr. sur¬
prised and tinged with embarrass¬
ment.

“This is the first time that it has
been brought to the governor’s of¬
fice,” said press secretary Richard
Steffan.

He said B.T. Collins, Brown’s
chief of staff, planned to summon
, Myers and officials of the Office of
Emergency Services for a confer¬
ence. He quoted Collins as saying,

"If I have any say in the matter,
there will be plans for nuclear cri¬
sis.”

Myers told reporters that
Brown’s office had not cleared her
statement in advance, although it
was approved by her immediate su¬
perior, newly appointed Health and i
Welfare Secretary Douglas X. Pau¬

sing* of ‘Bickering’

Steffan said Collins believed
Myers’ position "has merit, but he
doesn’t like state departments bick¬
ering or arguing with each other in
public.”

Brown, a candidate for the U.S.
Senate, supports a proposed initia¬
tive that would require him to send
President Reagan a letter urging a
freeze on nuclear arms.

Loren Fields of the Office of
Emergency Services said Myers'
department currently Is not active¬
ly involved in "crisis relocation"
planning, so her declaration had lit-'
tie short-term impact.

If her policy was embraced by
Brown for other state departments,
it would take the state out of the
nuclear preparedness planning
business for at least the remainder
of Brown’s term as governor, he
said.

Later in the day, Myers’ depart¬
ment sponsored what was adver¬
tised as a public health "prevent
nuclear war" rally In the atrium of
the new Gregory Bateson state of¬
fice building.

Steffan said the governor’s office
was assured by Myers that the rally
"was not political. We could have
stopped It., We didn't."

Basically, the federal government
is seeking to develop a plan that
would enable people in potential
"high risk” target areas, such as Los
Angeles and San Francisco, and at
military bases, to leave their homes
and relocate in supposedly safer
rural areas.

Federal Emergency Management
Agency representatives from'San
Francisco estimate that Americans
would have anywhere from three to
eight days of advance notice of a
nuclear attack from the Soviet
Union. They said an estimated 19
million city dwellers could be relo¬
cated in the country in an orderly
fashion in a round-the-clock effort

But members of the legislative
committees were incredulous. Sev¬
eral asserted that no one would sur¬
vive a nuclear exchange.

"I can't believe it,” Sen. John Ga-
ramendi (D-Walnut Grove), a can¬
didate for governor, told the federal
witnesses. "Have you gone insane?
Somehow there is an insanity in the
notion (of relocating city dwel¬
lers)."

“I’d like to get my butt out of
town” in case of a nuclear attack,
responded Ronald H. Sandwina.
chief of the plans and preparedness
division of the federal agency's San
Francisco office.

“You and 19 million people are
going to get out of town?” Ga-
ramendi wondered aloud.

At another point. Sen. Aian Sier-
oty (D-Los Angeles) told the fed¬
eral representatives that "what you
are saying strikes me as an effort to
brainwash the American public into
believing that a nuclear attack, a
nuclear war is somehow’ survivable,
acceptable and that it can be part of
our living experience.

“I believe that is not only ob¬
scene, but I believe it creates a false
sense of security for the American
people and leads us away from cur
principal task . . tr dev?!no ao-
proacbes of prevenony trx£ typo of
thing from happening

Interruptions ana questions by
committee memrors verb so fre-
quent tha* Sandwina and Jack
Greene, a federal consultant oncu vu
defense, w’ere unable to present
their full testimony.

Midway in the hearing, Alex Cun¬
ningham, director of the state Office
of Emergency Services, quoted sec¬
tions of both state and federal laws
requiring civil defense prepared¬
ness and tola the lawmakers that
the federal “crisis relocation” pro¬
posal “has the potential for saving
hundreds of thousands of lives.”

He said it was “better to have a
plan and not need it than to not
have a plan and need it”

However, Dr. Jack Geiger, a
founder of the anti-nuclear Physi¬
cians for Social Responsibility, as¬
sailed the relocation proposal as
based on “wildly optimistic assump- ’
tuons.”

He said it overlooked such issues
E? the ability of services in rural
a mas to accommodate millions and
trillions of fleeing city dwellers. He
sa'd water food, energy, transpor¬
tation. (tied icai aid and communica¬
tions systems likely would be
blasted away

DC/2.7 Pile- a ikll

<*Z?

Dried rut still applicable

(You are about to read the most startling issue of Remnant Review ever
published. In five years, I think it will be regarded as the most important
issue ever published. I did not write it. The man who wrote it agreed to
take the assignment only on the condition that he remain anonymous. This
is necessary in order to protect his career, since he is presently employed
in a most sensitive position in Washington, and he does not need the added
publicity. I am putting my reputation on the line by publishing this report,
and I assure you that I would not risk my reputation if I were not convinced
that the man is reliable. I have known him for many years. He is a scholar.
He holds the Ph.D in political science, and he has published in prestigious
journals. He is regarded as one of the most informed conservatives in the
field of European politics. He now devotes his skills full time to studying
Soviet military strategy. He is no crackpot. If his analysis proves correct,
then most of the so-called experts in Soviet studies will be regarded as the
true crackpots. The shocking fact is that all of the information presented
in this report is based on publicly available documents. My first reaction,
three months ago, was simple: "Why haven’t I seen any of this in print in-
any of the conservative journals, let alone the regular news media?" I can
almost guarantee you that this will be your response, too. But having seen
the light -- or more properly, the flash — I have decided to take action.

I will be moving out of Durham before the end of the year, Durham Is too
vulnerable, not to Soviet missiles, but to the emergency regulations that
the Federal government plans to impose immediately after a nuclear attack.

I outline these in chapters 5 and 6 of my book. How You Can Profit from the
Coming- . Price Controls . Another step I am taking is to publish this without
the protection of copyright. Please feel free to reproduce it in any form.

I will follow up on this report in the next issue of Remnant Review . I will
offer a comprehensive strategy of personal defense against the events that
this report warns about. I assure you that the next issue will be fully
copyrighted I — Gary North)

THE DANGER IS DEFEAT, NOT DESTRUCTION
Anonymous

If the Soviet Union were to inflict a nuclear first strike upon the United
States, well over 90% of the American people would read about the attack in their
newspapers, or hear about it on radio or TV. Only a small percentage of Americans
would see, hear, or feel any effects of the attack, and considerably less than one
percent of us would become casualties. Th*s is not wishful thinking, but rather a

Remnant Review is edited by Gary North, Ph.D.. and is published 22 times per year. Subscription rate: $60/year.
Single issues: S3. Subscription address: 713 W. Cornwall® Rd., Suite 100, Durham. N. C. 27707. Its perspective is
straightforwardly Christian and pro-free market, and as such it is an attempt to apply biblical principles to economic
analyna. Remnant Review does not comment on the stock market.

-92-

sober, detailed appraisal of the effects of the Soviet nuclear weapons which exist
or are being built, if they were used according to the military strategy which the
Soviet Union has been teaching to its forces since the beginning of the nuclear era.
Soviet weapons are made especially to destroy American weapons— to defeat America
while killing very few Americans and leaving our economy intact. Simply put, the
Soviet Union is not out to destroy us, but to defeat us. We can take no comfort
in this, because the Soviets have made tremendous strides toward being able to
achieve this goal, and because, after being defeated by the Soviets, most Americans
might wish that Armageddon had come instead.

All of this, of course, is contrary to the picture of nuclear war which has
been propagated by most American politicians, academics, and publicists for a
generation. According to their view, nuclear war would be a spasmodic exchange.

Both the U.S. and the USSR would shoot everything they had at each others' centers
of population, literally bombing each other back into the Stone Age, or worse.

Neither country could or would take any care, before or during the conflict, about
limiting damage to itself. Each would strive only to annihilate the other even as
it was being annihilated itself. As song writer Tom Lehrer once put it, "We will
all go together when we go." This very popular and reassuring view is shared by
people as different in their political preferences as George McGovern and Barry
Goldwater.

The popular American picture of nuclear war has always been utter nonsense.
Nonetheless, the technological advances of recent years have made it even more
criminally stupid. First, the military capacity of the two sides has never been
equal. During the 1950's, had we gone to war with the Soviets, nearly all our
bombers would have gotten through to Soviet targets, while very few Soviet ones
would have made it to our borders. During the early 1960’s, our missiles, inaccurate
as they were, could have knocked out the Soviets' few missiles, which were then
located on soft pads well known to our satellites. During the remainder of the
196.0's, when both we and the Soviets placed our missiles in hardened silos or
submarines, there was some reason to believe that we and the Soviets were equally
targeting each others' population. But it was not so. We targeted industries,
while the Soviets targeted our air and naval bases. But we had a bigger force.

Had we gone to war in the late 1960's, we would have lost most of our military
power, while the Soviet Union would have lost a fourth of its population and less
than half of its industry. Since the early 1970's, it has been beyond dispute that
the Soviet Union has a superior ICBM force built for one primary mission: destroying
American missiles in their silos. (Roger D. Speed, Strategic Deterrence in the
1980 1 s [Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1979].) By so doing the Soviet Union can
diminish the United States' ability to strike back with its population-killing
weapons. So, to sum up, at different times either side has had finite military
ability to defeat the other and protect itself. Second, and most important, the
American image of nuclear war as Armageddon is false because while American planners,
beginning with Robert McNamara, have disapproved of destroying enemy weapons, and
have not attempted to design plans which might allow the U.S. to survive a nuclear
war, the men in charge of the Soviet military establishment have never wavered from
the view that wars have winners and losers and that the job of the Soviet military
is to protect the Soviet Union by smashing the enemy's weapons .

Thus while American policies have aimed at producing dead Russians while
leaving intact Soviet strategic weapons, the Soviet Union has never targeted our
population. (Fritz Earmarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought,"
I nternational Security [Spring, 1978].) As a result of our misperception, we have
been worrying needlessly about being, burned to a crisp, or about dying of radiation
sickness (a la the movie "On the Beach"). We have worried ourselves so irrationally

-93-

about a far-fetched danger that we have rendered ourselves incapable of doing anythin
about the present danger— the Soviet Union's growing ability to defeat us and to do
to us what it has done to other peoples it has conquered .

The Soviet Force

At the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Soviets had less than ten
SS-6 intercontinental missiles capable of striking the U.S. These lumbering giants
were aimed at U.S. Air Force bases. They were dangerous above all to the people
who had to pump fuel into them. Today, Soviet missiles capable of reaching the U.S.
number at least 2400 modern types. (All figures for strategic deployments are taken
from the book edited by Paul Nitze, The Fateful Ends and Shades of SALT {New York:
Crane Russak & Co., 1979J.) We must say ‘‘at least" because we really have no idea
just how many missiles the Soviet Union has built and stored, ready for use. The
Soviets have always refused to let us examine their facilities for producing missiles
while the United States’ vaunted intelligence satellites simply cannot look through
roofs, or darkness, or clouds. Nor can they overhear anything that is not broadcast
in the clear. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the SALT negotiations ten years
ago, the U.S. agreed to believe officially that the Soviets had only as many missiles
as they had silos in the ground and in launcher tubes on submarines. Thus the SALT
treaties have not limited the production of missiles, but only the deployment of
things which American intelligence systems can count—silos and submarines. At any
rate, regardless of the missiles they might have hidden, 2400 is the number of
missiles and bombers the Soviets have openly deployed.

At least 326 of these missiles are SS-18's. These carry ten independently
targeted warheads, each of which has a yield of about one megaton—cne million tons
of TNT. ’ (This is a highly tentative estimate, because the U.S. really does not
understand how Soviets build nuclear weapons.) These 3000+ Soviet warheads carry
more explosive power than the entire American missile force put together. These
warheads by themselves are also sufficient to cover every American "hard target"
twice over. They would have to, because prudent planners assign two warheads to
critically important targets—such as missile silos and "command and control"
points—which have been armored to resist nuclear explosions. The United States
has less than 1500 such sites overall, each able to resist pressures of 1000 lbs.
per square inch. (Figures for hardness of American and Soviet Silos are reported
in Counterforce Issues , published by the Congressional Budget Office, 1978.) The
SS-18's warheads are accurate enough to place their megaton within about one-tenth
of a mile of the target—close enough to be quite sure of killing it. (Performance
data for Soviet and American missiles are from Jane's Weapon Systems , 1978-79 .)

The SS-18 * s alone can go a long way toward disarming the United States.;

The Soviet Union either has deployed or is now deploying 500 SS-17’s and
SS-19's. These missiles carry four and six warheads respectively. Though not
quite so accurate as the 18's, these twenty-five hundred megaton size warheads
could kill "hard targets." But they could also be used to destroy "soft" military
targets such as air bases, or be kept in reserve to threaten cities. In addition,
there are almost 600 SS-ll's, each carrying one megaton. The Soviet Union has also
deployed some 900 missiles aboard submarines. Almost half of these are longer range
than anything aboard American ones, and about two hundred of these carry multiple
warheads. By the early 1980's, the latter's number will rise to about 500. The
Soviet submarine force should be expected to have over two thousand warheads, each
of which would yield between 500 kilotons and one megaton. Such warheads, however,
are only accurate to within a half mile. Therefore they can be used to attack air
bases or to threaten cities.

-94-

The Soviet heavy bomber force is small--less than 150 operational Bears and
Bisons. Yet it can easily be augmented by 200 Backfire medium to long-range bombers,
or even by cargo aircraft. The reason is simple: Soviet aircraft seeking to drop
bombs on the U.S. need not use speed, low altitude, or deception to counteract
American air defenses , because none exist . They have been dismantled over the past
two decades. Even civilian cargo planes could be used to bomb the U.S. i

The Soviet Union, on the other hanc^, has deployed 6500 air-defense radars,

10,000 interceptor missiles, and 2600 interceptor aircraft. It practices air-defense
constantly. It has also built four huge phased-array radars which can be the core
of a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles. The other components of such a
defense already exist. The Soviet Union has but to mass produce them—which, for
all we know, it may be doing—in order to have a respectable defense. To back up
its active defenses, the Soviet Union has an expanding civil defense, featuring
hard shelters for about one-fourth of the urban population, protection for vital
industries, and sheltered food supplies.

American Forces

The backbone of the American force is the Polaris-Poseidon fleet . These 41
submarines carry 16 missiles each—a total of 656 missiles, which can carry some
5000 - 5400 nuclear warheads. About half of this force—some 2500 warheads—is at
sea at any given time. Most of it could survive any Soviet attack. But the
Polaris-Poseidon warheads are curious weapons . They yield only 40 kilotons each,
and are accurate to aoout four-tenths of a mile. Thus they are optimal for
attacking soft targets, such as residential areas. They are less useful for military
targets, and totally useless against "hard" targets. This is by design . As
Poseidon was being perfected. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara rejected plans to
fit it with three big, accurate warheads, on the grounds that the ability to strike
"hard targets" was against America's strategic policy.

That policy, simply put, is to deter war by threatening to kill Soviet
civilians in a second strike. According to that policy, any weapon which can
destroy missile silos makes war more likely because it gives its owners several
militarily rational options—including a first strike. The objective of nuclear
strategy, according to people such as Robert McNamara and the Carter Administration,
is to make war wholly irrational for all concerned. The Poseidon, with its many,
small, inaccurate warheads, is certainly an irrational weapon .

The 1000 Minuteman II's and Ill's are spread in silos at the following Air
Force bases: Grand Forks, North Dakota; Malmstrom, Montana; Whiteman, Missouri;
Warren, Wyoming; Minot, North Dakota; and Ellsworth, South Dakota. Fifty+four
Titan II's are located at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, and Little Rock AFB, Arkansas.
Even the best of these, the 550 Minuteman Ill's, have but slight chances against
Soviet silos and military communications centers "hardened" to some 2500 pounds
per square inch. These missiles, then, can best be used against industrial targets
and relatively soft military ones. But, since the Soviets have weapons capable of
destroying them on the ground, these missiles may do nothing more in wartime than
"soak up" Soviet warheads.

The American bomber force is old . Its mainstay, the B-52, was designed during
the Truman Administration. President Carter cancelled production of its successor,
the B-l. The B-52's in service now are older than the pilots who fly them. Some
300 B-52's are flyable. Each carries about four bombs. In the future, they may
carry cruise missiles. One-third of the B-52‘s are on ground alert at some 25 bases.

-95-

If the Soviet Union attacked these bases with submarine-launched missiles, and also
barraged the bombers' escape corridors, not many would survive to try their luck
against Soviet air defenses.

American defenses are practically non-existent . The old Distant Early Warning
(DEW) line of arctic radars is obsolete. Anyone with a terrain map of Northern
Canada can figure out the holes in it. Once a Soviet pilot gets through that, he
can be confident of flying to his destination undetected. Even if he were detected,
little could be done. The U.S. has only 300 old F-106 interceptors, and no surface-
to-air missiles deployed to defend the country. The U.S. has developed excellent
technology by which to defend against ballistic missiles, but has renounced its use.
According to American strategic doctrine, safety lies in mutual vulnerability. So
far do American officials adhere to this doctrine, that the U.S. is wholly without
civil defense. There are practically no blast shelters in the U.S., and certainly
no strategic storage of food.

How Strategic Forces May be Used

It is clear that the biggest difference between the Soviet and the American
force--bigger than the..differences in hardware—concerns the purposes for which
the weapons may be used. Soviet military writings refer to deterrence quite
differently from American ones. Whereas American Defense intellectuals see the
weapons as scarecrows by which to ward off attack on American cities, the Soviets
see them as tools by which to achieve their ends. Thus, for them, deterrence
is an offensive concept: that is, to keep the Americans from thwarting Soviet
purposes. For them, deterrence is achieved by the ability to win the war . (J.
Douglas and A. Hoeber, Soviet ~ ~Strateqy for Nuclear War (“Stanford: Hoover Institution,
1979].)

The Soviets expect that the U.S. would be deterred from doing anything serious
to stop the ultimate triumph of the Marxist "Socialist Commonwealth" by the following
prospect. If pressed too far, the Soviet Union could launch its force of SS-18's
and therewith destroy nearly all American land-based missiles and bombers. At the
same time, Soviet ships or aircraft would mine the harbors where half of the
American Polaris-Poseidon submarines lay. This would put the submarines out of
action, and keep them where they could be destroyed at will by ICBMs, quite without
killing Americans. Reduced to some 2500 40 Kiloton warheads, what could the U.S. do?
The USSR would still have about 7000 warheads—all invulnerable . If the U.S. chose
to strike back, it could not thereby reduce the threat to itself. At this point, the
U.S. would have suffered militarily, but in no other way. The 3000 Soviet megatons
which would already have exploded over places such as Davis-Monthan Air Force Base,
Arizona and Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, would have killed less than' a quarter-
million Americans—five years' traffic fatalities. Nearly all of the casualties
would have been military personnel or their dependents. But if, at this point, an
American President ordered a strike at Soviet cities,- he would risk a Soviet
attack on America's population . At this point, negotiated surrender would make
far more sense. Moreover, even if the President of the U.S., or several submarine
crews acting on their own, were to launch Polaris-Poseidon on the Soviet Union,
they could do relatively little damage. The Soviet civil defense system would have
been on alert. The key industries would have shut down, "hardened" their machinery,
and sheltered their workers. The rest of the urban population, the non-essentials,
would have been placed in lesser shelters or sent to outlying areas. Finally, the
incoming ‘American warheads would probably be met by some kind of antiballistic
missile system. (It is doubtful the Soviets would initiate such an attack until
their plans for missile defense were well along.) That fraction of the American
warheads which arrived—probably far less than 100—would knock down a lot of

-96-

buildings. (T. K. Jones and Scott Thompson, "Central War and Civil Defense,"

Orbis [Fall, 1978].) The future would belong to the Soviet Union.

This scenario could occur any time after 1981, when the Soviets will have
completed deployment of their fourth-generation ICBM strike force. But because
persons knowledgeable in military affairs know it could, the Soviet Union may not
need to carry out an actual strike . In recent years American leaders have said
loudly and often that military power no longer matters in world affairs. (Gen.

Dan Graham, Shall America Be Defended ? [New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House,
1979].)- They have been whistling in the dark. More people's fates have been
affected by military victories and defeats since 1960 than during World War II.
During these years India has beaten Pakistan twice, Israel has beaten Arab
coalitions twice. North Viet Nam, with Soviet help, has beaten the U.S., Soviet
clients have triumphed in Cuba, Nicaragua, Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea,
Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Laos, and Cambodia. They narrowly failed in Zaire and
Indonesia. Soviet- clients or sympathizers have also waged inconclusive wars or
have attempted coups d'etat in nearly every country of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. The Soviet Union has repeatedly vowed support for such enterprises, and
has made clear that their success depends on the growth of Soviet power. Certainly
the fear of greater Soviet involvement kept the United States from winning in
Viet Nam. That fear has helped to convince American policymakers not to help
America's beleaguered friends in places like Iran. In 1973, the threat of Soviet
intervention into the Middle East led the U.S. to stop Israel from consummating its
victory against Soviet-supplied Arab armies which had attacked her on her highest
holiday. The same prospect frightened the U.S. into submitting to virtual expropri¬
ation of its oil production equipment in the Middle East, and the quadrupling of
the price of oil.

As the Soviet Union's arsenal becomes more fearsome, it will become more
reasonable for the Soviet Union's friends around the world to be bolder, and it will
be more reasonable for the United States and its friends to do more and to suffer
more to avoid antagonizing the Soviets.

The Retreat of Our Allies

The incentives for friendship with the U.S. can only drop. Consider Europe,
which is tied to us by bonds of kinship, culture, and interest. What would happen
if, in 1982, the Soviet Union (or East Germany) quickly seized just a couple of
square miles of farmland on the German border on some transparent pretext? One
thing is certain not to happen. The U.S. would surely riot launch nuclear strikes
against Soviet cities. That would serve no rational purpose whatever. Would NATO
then attack to take back those few square miles? Given that the Soviet Union can
muster on the central front 21,000 tanks to NATO's 7000, over 4000 aircraft to
NATO's approximately 2000, as well as almost two soldiers for each of NATO's, a
NATO attack would ! make no sense. Of course the Soviets would call for negotiations.
No doubt NATO would attend.

What would Europe have to gain by taking an intransigent attitude toward the
Soviet Union? Such an attitude would get Europe nothing but military trouble, which
the U.S. could not alleviate. The U.S. could not help to defend Europe because the
U.S. could not protect itself. American ground and air forces in Europe could not
stop a Soviet advance. But if American strategic weapons were used against Soviet
forces in Europe, the Soviet Union could well afford to unleash a disarming strike
upon the United States. Knowledge of this—not the small amount of force used to
take the small border area—would quickly detach Europe from the United States. This

-97-

end could be accomplished quickly with even less direct expenditure of r crce. The
Soviets could stage a coup d'etat or other military action against Saudi Arabia.

The PLO would gladly lend itself to such a venture. Would America risk World War II
(which American planners have made sure the U.S. will lose) for the sake of the
Saudi Royal Family? But with Saudi Arabia--the world's largest exporter of oi1--
in anti-imperialists' hands, the Soviet Union would be in a position to approach
Europe with the offer to facilitate their oil supplies at stable prices--if only
Europe would slip out of its relatioftship with the United States. Given the balance
of forces between the U.S. and USSR in the early to mid 198Q's, the Europeans would
have to be heroes to refuse the Soviets' offer.

The decisive defeat of the United States in the world--a defeat which would
leave no doubt in anyone's mind who ruled the world—could be accomplished even
more easily, given the "cover" of decisive nuclear superiority. On Oct. 1, 1979,
the pro-Soviet government of Panama becomes legally sovereign over the whole
Panama Canal Zone. Anytime thereafter it can abrogate the treaties which preserve
a residual role for the U.S. Then it can ask the Soviet Union to send troops to
help protect the Canal from the U.S. Of course the U.S. would enjoy local military
superiority. But, given the Soviets' ability to carry out a disarming nuclear
strike on the U.S., and the latter's inability to disarm the Soviet Union, would
the U.S. actually risk killing Russian soldiers? It would be more reasonable to
absorb the loss of the Canal, and of the last shreds of American influence in the
world.

Such losses could not help but jar the United States into realizing that
strategic inferiority to the Soviet Union can only lead to enslavement. But surely,
by the mid-1980's, this realization would come too late . Surely the U.S. would
begin to build the weapons it should have built during the 1960’s and 1980's. But
how would the U.S. respond to a Soviet declaration that the continuation of such an
American build-up would be regarded as an act of war, for which the U.S. would bear
full responsibility? If the U.S. chose to disregard the warning, the Soviets could
look forward to losing their supremacy in a few years. Why should they not use it
while they had it?

Subjugation of the United States would open new and more violent chapters in
the history of the world. We can but speculate beyond the first one, the outlines
of which are clear. The Soviet Union and its victorious coalition will still be
hungry. Moreover, they are possessed of an ideology which tells them that the
wealth of the formerly free world consists of goods somehow stolen from them. The
rape of the United States would be swift. Russians have never been very farsighted
in the husbanding of golden geese . The history of postwar Eastern Europe indicates
the Soviets would set unrealistic reparations quotas and try to squeeze blood from
stones. They would attempt to rid the economy of "parasitic" occupations—and to
rid the earth of "useless mouths." All would be made even harsher by the inevitable
campaigns against religion, the family, and other ancestral enemies of Communism.
Those given power would be the most reliable. Reliability would be proved by
harshness. Unfortunately, this is not speculation, but dreary experience. The
history of Soviet rule consists of little else.

The Possibilities for Defense

The United States is not doomed to defeat. The Soviets have not built their
nuclear forces by peculiar genius. The U.S. possesses technology to build weapons
of the same kind that are even better. More important, the U.S. possesses the
technology to build weapons of altogether different kinds, weapons which are likely
to safeguard both our freedoms and our lives. Of course to build these things at

-98-

all we would have to change the way our officials have been thinking about war and
weapons. Much would happen, however, if the American people transmitted one simple
message to their officials: "We want to survive any war with our freedoms intact."

With such a mandate, the next President of the United States would begin by
ordering the U.S. Air Force to remove the Minuteman II's and Ill's from their silos ,
to place them inside their factory canisters, and to keep them on the move aboard
trucks , whence they could be launched. (See Aviation Week and Space Technology
[19 June, 1979J.) This would remove the Soviet Union’s ability to target and destroy
these missiles. With that gone, the Soviet Union would lose a large part of the
military incentive for a first strike.

Second, the President would order the abolition of the system by which the U.S.
has acquired weapons since 1963. Before 1963 it took about six years to translate
an idea into a weapons system. Now it takes about fifteen years. This system has
reduced the U.S. armed forces to one of the worst-equipped forces in the world.

If we proceed as we have been, the MX missile, our first counterforce weapon, won't
be fully deployed until 1990. That will be years after the Soviets will have
achieved a counterforce capability against the U.S. 1990 is too late. With the
WWII purchase system in effect, the U.S. could quickly build a mobile heavy missile,
capable of taking out enemy silos. If we went about it on a crash basis, we could
have the missile moving on American roads by 1983. Even more quickly, the U.S.
could change the warheads on the Poseidon--reducing their number, and making them
accurate weapon killers instead of terror bombs. A mere 1200 big, accurate warheads
aboard our submarines would do more to defend us than the 5000+ little, inaccurate
ones we now have. Once these weapons were in hand, our targeting strategy could
stop aiming at producing dead Russians, and could begin to concern itself with
protecting Americans. With the weapons we have in 1979, even a massive change in
American targeting doctrine could not hope to reduce the threat to the U.S. We
simply need new weapons.

More important still, the U.S-. could take advantage of new advances in the
technology of anti-missile missiles and radars. These are especially efficient
for defending mobile missiles deceptively based. The anti-missile missile need
only shoot down the warheads which are actually heading for the right targets. A
National network of interceptor missiles for the defense of our population is
expensive, but possible. Just as possible but less expensive is a defense against
ballistic missiles based on laser stations in space. (See Sen. Malcolm Wallop,

"The Emerging Possibilities for Defense," Strategic Review [Fall, 1979].) This is .
not a Buck Rogers system. The technology for it is well known in the U.S. Lasers
are not objects of speculation, as are particle beams. Megawatt-size lasers are
weapons of today. With every passing year, technology is making it even imore
possible for defensive forces to seize the advantage over offensive ones.

Conclusion

By 1982 at the latest, the U.S. will enter the most dangerous period in its
history. In order to avoid the risk of disastrous defeat, the U.S. must begin to
take action now, and surely cannot afford to put off certain crash programs beyond
the first days of a new Administration. These crash programs should: take our
Minutemen out of their holes and fit them with counterforce warheads, fit Polaris-
Poseidon with counterforce warheads, build a truly mobile MX, unhampered by Rube-
Goldberg basing schemes, the B-l bomber, anti-missile missiles, and space-based
lasers. The country may not be able to complete these programs in time. But it
can try.

All of this will be easier on bomber crews in the future, as air-
launched cruise missiles, which can be dropped 1.500 miles from
their targets at the edge of Soviet airspace and then continue on
their own. are now being fitted on some B-52s. In the meantime,
ever)' SAC bomber is equipped, for the benefit of those who do not
make it out of Russia, with dowm sleeping bags, a saw. rations, a life
raft, and .38-calibre pistols. Even' parachute pack contains a water
carrier and three fishhooks. And even crewman is given, and carries
in his wallet, a little card (SAC Form 673) headed "Radiation
Data." The card lists thirty-one tips for surviving if forced down in
territory' that may be radioactive. "Make [a] shelter large enough to
rest,” it says. “Lie down, keep warm and rest/sleep as much as pos¬
sible. ... Potatoes, turnips, carrots and other plants whose edible
portions were growing underground during the fallout period are
edible. ... Avoid traveling within ten miles of any known ground
zero. ... Be alert for enemy warning signs marking any contami¬
nated areas. ... stay cool, use your head, you will survive.”

Copyright 1978 by Kurt Saxon

THE FUTILITY OF
MASS EVACUATION

By Kurt Saxon

On Sapt. 10, I watched 60 MINUTES and recorded the segment on civilian
evacuation in the event of the threat of a nuclear war. I turned on the recorder
just as I realized the subject and so lost the name of the lady narrator and part
of the first or second sentence. Otherwise, it’s all here except for a few lines
garbled by background noises in the film.

The piece was done in a sort of light-hearted manner, as it should have
been. As I've written all along, mass evacuation is a stupid idea in the event of
a nuclear war. The overall damage would be so great that the majority of the
population would perish even after the war was counted as being over by all
the contending parties.

Stories of Russian preparedness are equally silly, even though it is claimed
they can save up to 80% of their population in underground bunkers equipped
with machinery for restoring their system. Since they spend up to 50% of their
national income for weaponry, regardless of their ratio of surviving population,
they could not survive any longer than the average American evacuee. Their
blighted croplands, their known shortage of consumer commodities and the
resultant Chinese invasion, would seal their doom as a nation, despite initial
preparedness against atomic retaliation by the U.S.

Anyway, here is what I recorded: “...save 20%, 50%, 90%—how many do we
want to survive? Clifford McLain, Deputy Director of the Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency: ‘The only system that seems to be workable under an
expenditure of a few hundred million dollars per year is a crisis location
system.’

‘The red areas on this crisis relocation map represent places the Defense
Department thinks the enemy would aim for. The evacuation corridor in states
like Connecticut figure as prime targets, high risk areas in the event of nuclear
attack. Heavily populated, with some defense industries. Further inland in
western Connecticut, certain other towns, mainly rural or just plain small, are
regarded as safe from blast and fallout. They have been designated ‘host
areas’. Crisis relocation simply means, if attack seemed imminent and there
Is at least three days to spare, the President orders the people from the high
risk cities to move to the host areas of the country.

"The Federal Government is paying for crisis relocation. It’s now allocating
five million dollars a year to pay for 150 planners and small staffs to figure out
how to move 137 million people. Here at Defense Civil Preparedness
headquarters in Hartford, Connecticut, calculators in hand, they’re trying, at
least on paper, to evacuate nearly three million people. There are only two
planners and a secretary on the budget. For they’ve decided that some of
those three million will descend on Sherman, Connecticut, a designated host
town.

“Neither of the planners have had the time or the budget to visit there, its
population just under two thousand; double that when the summer people
arrive. Though little Sherman is supposed to receive 10,000 people, they'll be
evacuated from Bridgeport, a risk area about an hour’s drive from there.
Instructions are to house these people In public facilities. The firehouse might
hold a hundred, the school maybe 200. And a few hundred more in a couple of
churches. But Sherman couldn’t find room for 10,000 people, even if they
pushed all the cows and horses out of their barns and took them over.

“Besides, how would they get there? Major highways could become virtual
parking lots as millions fled the bomb. And what would happen when they
turned off on the two-lane country roads?

"Six miles up the road from Sherman is the town of New Mlllford, another
designated host area that the planners haven’t actually surveyed. Compared to
Sherman, New Mlllford is a big city. It has 18,000 people. And Nuclear Civil
Protection planners have big plans for New Mlllford; 105,000 evacuees, to be
exact.

. “Where will a crowd of that size go In New Mlllford? Bernard Shelton, Civil
Defense Area Coordinator, hasn’t the foggiest idea.” ‘I don’t know where we’d
put them. Certainly, it would stretch one’s imagination tremendously’.

“They’re supposed to put them up in public facilities”.

‘That’s what they say; public facilities, restaurants, hospitals. I don’t know.
What public facilities we have are minimal to take care of that number of
• people. They’d be sleeping on the Green, they’d be sleeping anywhere they
could. Then just imagine 105,000 people coming in to one beautiful little town
like New Millford. I think it’s a fairy tale’.

“What’s the status of the shelters you once had In this town?”

‘Really pathetic’.

“We went to take a look at one of the handfull of shelters that still exist. It’s
in the basement of the telephone company. And, like the man said, 'really
pathetic’”.

“How many people would this building hold?”

‘It was originally set up for about 30-35’.

“Now, it looks as though there are some biscuits or something; could we
take a look?”

‘Yes, we might take a look. There should be candy and margarine. This is to
sustain you and with the crackers for carbohydrates.’

“I see, so these should still be okay”.

‘Right. (A lot was lost because of background noises in the basement. But
the survival food stocks seemed inadequate to feed the number of people for
more than a few skimpy meals).

“I’d hate to be stuck down here right now”.

Shelton went on to describe thelnadequacies of the shelter and its stock
and made other general comments on the town’s inability to handle the influx
of refugees. , _

“And that’s a little short, with 105,000 evacuees scheduled to arrive. Well,
who is in charge of getting ail this stuff together? Hal Curtis is the town’s vol¬
unteer Civil Defense director”.

“When you hear about a possible 105,000 people descending on you, what
do you think?”

i shudder’.

“Meanwhile, while local people In supposedly-safe areas shudder, in
Washington, Dr. Bill Chivman (I think that was the name) the Deputy Assistant
Director of plans under Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, concedes he isn’t
really sure where the bombs might fall”.

There is no prediction that any one of these areas would be or would not be
hit. It’s merely a set of prudent planning assumptions. The assumption is that
they might be hit’.

“What If you evacuated all these people and they’re all crowded together
and they had to wait three-four days before the problem was resolved? What
would they be doing all this time?”

‘Typically, there is a great outpouring of cooperative behavior. People help
one another. Altruism is very much to the fore. And in addition, it would be
necessary to improvise additional fallout protection and there Is a little slogan
we’ve heard that fallout protection is as cheap as dirt. If you cart get a half a
foot or a foot of earth between yourself and the little particles of fallout that
give off the harmful gamma rays, you get excellent protection’. (There was
then a Civil Defense film dramatizing piling earth on the sides and tops of
buildings).

‘So the problem would be one of moving about a cubic yard of earth for
each evacuee for who you wish to develop fallout protection; perhaps 70 or
100 buckets full. It would be a question of piling this earth alongside a school
or some other structure and ramps six or eight inches or so on the roof’.

"You would have less than 10,000 people (Sherman, Connecticut), in fact,
refugees in a town and they’d all be out digging? The town would be
destroyed”.

‘Destroyed?'

“Well, I mean you’d be digging'up the whole town”.

‘Oh, yes, there would be pits. There would be pits around town from which
earth would be removed’.

‘‘Burying public buildings is one recommendation the planners seem to
agree on, provided the weather is agreeable and the evacuees pack their
shovels, and that there’s enough time. But other parts of the planning are
going more slowly”.

(Unnamed speaker): ‘Given our current level of effort, it will probably take us
on the order of 12 to 13 years to complete the planning’.

“Even the paid professionals, regional Civil Defense planners, have their
doubts about crisis relocation”.

(Another unnamed speaker): ‘You know, it’s getting embarrassing? Even
when you identify the shelter, people are still asking, where are we going to
eat, where are we going to go to the bathroom? And what happens if they have
a medical problem? And the questions I get are from the State Police, the
local police, the fire department; I’m not going to be around when I hear that a
war is about to begin. I’m taking my family and running. Where are we going to
put ’em?

‘We are contacting local- officials without the benefit of being able to stay in
your building. I don’t care what kind of building it is. They say, well, I don't
know. Who’s going to pay for it? That’s the second question. And these are
tough questions’.

“Some people feel that the plan is not only unworkable, but it is ridiculous.
What do you say to that?”

Chlvman: ‘I’ve heard these views. But I would say to them, if I were
personally confronted with It is, well, no one has to go. If you wish to remain
in the city, be your own guest’.

Mike Wallace: “But that doesn’t seem to be the problem to people who
remain in the city. It's the people who’ll be caught in those giant traffic jams,
the people who’ll be inundating little towns like Sherman, Connecticut. What
to do about them? What to do? Tune in again”.

American Civil Defense has always been a farce. Politicians have always cut
the budget in favor of various welfare programs. Nor have they wanted to
panic the population into becoming self-sufficient. They have deliberately led
the losers of our society into the large cities where welfare payments are
higher and where unskilled work is more available.

This is a good thing, but no credit to them. They encouraged such measures
because the proletariat, congregated in large cities, assures them of greater
blocks of votes which insures them a place at the public trough.

Most of our nation’s better types avoid the cities and are to be counted as a
large reservoir of survivors, to rebuild civilization; hopefully a better one.

Nuclear war, as horrible as it will be, if it comes, will serve to destroy most
of our misfits and degenerates. For this reason, every rational American
should welcome it. Happily, the report shows that the proposed evacuation
program is bogged down in typical bureaucratic bungling and stupidity.

However, Survlvallsts being just outside the prospective target areas should
protest, in whatever ways they are capable, any such programs. Indeed, there
are many fine people living In cities at this time. But they are leaving in droves,
only to be replaced by the illigitlmate issue of city broodsows and rural losers
flocking to the cities as rural welfare programs decrease.

It has long been my feeling that those who prepare to survive, deserve to
survive. Survivaiists outside target areas should prepare to block roads,
destroy bridges, and otherwise disrupt any attempts by city vermin to relocate
in their areas. Within a year, all the city dwellers fit to survive will have left.
After that, it should be too late. We must make it too late.

In the event of a real threat of nuclear war the Army would be on alert. They
could not be used for any evacuation programs. Only the National Guard
would participate. This also would be a farce. National Guard units are made
up of semi-soldiers of their respective states. Most National Guard units are
stationed in their home towns. .

You can well imagine that most Guardsmen would desert and look to the
'protection of their own kinfolk. Even Guardsmen from the cities will
commandeer vehicles to get their own relatives out and so would be of little
use in any concerted national effort toward the mass evacuation of strangers.

Even considering mass evacuation a possiblity, who would be evacuated?
City Survivalists would have seen to their own evacuation plans. That would
allow the vermin to be relocated from their rat warrens and deserved doom, to
communities where they might survive. This would be a calamity no small
community could live through.

The urban no-hopers would prey on their betters in unrestrained vandalism,
looting and rape. Decent citizens would be inundated by waves of degenerates
who would destroy their betters’ chances of survival. Of course, the animals
would die eventually, but their relocation would only serve to spread them out
In the countrysides, attacking and ruining those upon whom our nation’s
future depends.

All this aside, plans of mass evacuation should be fought strenuously in an
attempt to avert war. In the event of a nuclear strike by Russia, there would be
no more than an hour’s warning, at best. In such a case, mass evacuation
would be impossible and so would not present a problem to rural citizens.

But what if the loonies in our government should discover that the Russians
were evacuating their cities? Or what if, by other signs, a Russian attack
seemed imminent in a few days. To broadcast a nation-wide alarm and begin
mass evacuation would only cause the Russians to push their buttons
immediately. A false alarm, leading to evacuation, could in itself, set off a
nuclear war.

Survival evacuation must be on an individual and group basis. The Russians
are paranoid enough, at best, without letting them think the U.S. is
implementing mass evacuation in preparation for an attack on the USSR.

So If you think your town might be considered a “host area”, attend your
next city council and read-this editorial to them. (You might edit out some of
my stronger statements). Write a letter to your local paper’s editor, including
the most pertinent points of this editorial. Write your congressman, if you can
write and he can read, and say you don’t want your town designated a host
area.

Nuclear war would mean the total collapse of our civilization. The fewer
useless survivors, the better the chance of your own survival. Your towns, your
families, your children and all the salvageable elements of your lifestyle would
be destroyed by designating your territory as a host area. You must not let it
happen. C 1

varies 8 revives aeoaie

ever civil defense ,f

By RICHARD L WOKSNOP

&1 (^ufi trrlv

A whole generation of Amencaiu
has come to maturity with no first'
hand knowledge cf fee nation's :1 vl
& tense program, such as U is. i-'oi
about a dozen years after passage oi
the Civil Defense Act of 1550, p ! an?
for pr jieeimg fee c, v:Lo.n pr.puhiticr
frc- n a hv aback were widelv
discussed at the tep levels oi
f jet: nt. But the sense ci

urgency fad-.d wife the sig.'uig of th.
Nuclear r i\>j Ban Treaty in 1363.

Ilo;/ pjaddani Carter has irad?
civil defense a ilvv. issue again, fa a
presiiemldi dim live s.gned Sept,
54 h. called for a “crisis relocation
pivy.rruf’ for cvacaaxng major
whin c liters m tix act >«f a
rx dear attcck. Carter is expected tc
ps rpejo t-ufl milleni far civil defen.K
r* Lb if 'A year . f ~ui) l udget, whidi
is .!•. v i xug drahed. This roud h*.
TCu ly as tac.a. vire than fee
run „i e a ml , r ,a. rims keel oi
$96.5 million.

Carter's j .rapc-itd mil defeat

program difiers markedly from
President Kenn.-uy s. In fee e,j1y
1960s, there was deep concern skoal
the effects of radioactive fallout
from atmospheric nuclear teste.

Thus, th.* emphasis in the Kennedy
White House was on fallout shelters
i toeked with food, water, and oil. .*r
necessities. Thousands oi such
.inciters were 1 esi„.biished, but few
people today are aware of them.
Two years ago, She Pentagon ad¬
vised local civil defense authorities
dint fee stockpiled food supplies nc
io.' v'r were ii’fele and siould be
re; wvr <i and destroyed.

Carter’s dnl defense p-tens bring
to mind these of President
ili.ss rhr-wf r. A leading argument in
favor of the interstate highway
sy,.'era. ers which ‘ construction
began during the Eisenhower ad¬
ministration, was that it would
f- ii-.txe fee evacuation of cities in
time of var. Moreover, a series of
nat’onwida civil defense exercises
were held in the r..iid-fe50s. Tho 1851
Diercjn' lasting three days,
icu'feuvfd th: avect atiov 0 ;
Wudiington D.C., by Eisenhower
a ad IS/MMi federal tvnptoy'jes.

Evacuation plans wire tested also
at fee local la-vJ fa one such
oxer dr,<*, in Decemt'cr 1354, farm
faiTsiUca in Weki Cciu.iy, Colo.,
cared far raid fed some 800 Denver
residents. In drills elsewhere,
rva'wes were removed to neigh¬

boring towns or taken to other
specific reception areas.

SUM, civil defense never wun
broad acceptance among fee public.
A d?x ripUm cf the public's atbtude
offaed by Federal Civil Defense
Administrator Val Peterson in 1353
probably is just as valid today:

“First,” he said, “it is a very
naii j ~J hojcxn tc. lei r / for [ r >1
to be he-nlrui and slow ah’et
preparing for tomorrow, ee'.-.i hi
tl-c-ir cwn plicate lives. S..coad.
everyone hop. 3 and prays and
wishes feat there will not be a tlurd
world war .... And. third, some
people feel that the destructiveness
cf atomic bomus will be so great that
they Leco* ~<c fatalistic . . . and say,
“There isn’t rr.y use in dung
an viking about it.”

3! CA^noncs is any guide, Carter
also can expect reoxtmee to his
pi egrrjn in Congress. 0urin o the
Lbenbtvor and Kennedy years,
Congrous routinely slashed proposed
isvd dhterre budgets — from
r, llbon to $43 rai-iim in fiscal year
1953, for example, Thus, it is highly
questionable whether Congress will
agree ta a subafemial increase in
&»;cnc?<.i£ :or a rrogra.ii that rarely
was popular in the past.

Uito

MM-iq <

_ H'SS- ■

ji ' -Vl * 1 . ^t^^CP’IFtrv^i.iN ,.,

A- [.,':{' cz \vt; f^:' - :?-!i**® 4 * 1 **

Tra«,o fights blink bfigdfy.i«iv6m^ *

‘ ..'streets. ScmebP^erdt/sTtokce cars roll
quietly through the neighborhood to help>
prevent* looting. The hollow rising and
t' falling of wind through the hose of a gas
mask sets an even pace for what little '
human activity remains. It is March or
*..<*July or November in Maine or Tennes-
.If. tape or Texas and a disaster is expected
“’'"or has happened. Last year was particu¬
larly prone to disasters, man-made and.; -
■ natural; refugees from calamity ; ih the "
U.S. and Canada numbered more than a -
million. - j,.- ,

The figures in 1979 were inflated by"
. spectacular events. Between them, Hur-‘-
ricanes Dayid and Fredric forced the
,. evacuation last summer of over 700,000
• people from the Atlantic and Gulf coasts,
of the U.S. (and killed more than 1,200
people, mostly in the Caribbean). The
desperate events at the nuclear power
' plant at Three’Mile Island near Harris- •
burg, Pa., prompted the evacuation of
. nearly 140,000 people (with three times; „
■*. that many poised to join them). In early •
November 250,000 people were
evacuated from Mississauga, Ontanc
’ near Toronto, after the derailment of a
freight train and the release of SO tons c' 1 -
. deadly chlorine gas. It was the largest ,
*■ evacuation in Canadian history. , y
-. These were the big events, but there .
were others even more serious: so so <
' tacular flooding last.spring in.the Mid¬
west, central Florida, Alabama; Texas, *
Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana
killed 14 people and left millions of dol-m
lars worth of damage. Freak tornadoes
killed 59 people, injured BOO, and'
leveled society in’ an .eighf-mile-by-
one-miie swiih of Wichita Fails, Tex. jrt,. ’
fact, weather, liier, spills of toxic chemr-r

Jerry Ahem is a free-lance writer in Georgia;"'

'.

'"cals, earthquakes, and other acts of God
. and man cause an average of 40.000
evacuation-necessitating disasters (in¬
volving anywherefrom a few famii'es to
several hundred thousand people)
every year, according to the American „
Fed Cross. 1 ‘“ : v :

ilow caayou prepare to evacuate? Are ■
■i.therejwaystojncrease your chances of'
'-■’suiyiv-ai curing a disaster, and to soften
the'blow of its devastation? The only

■ way;io approach the problem, is'to.-
'analyze the types of natural and man-
made disasters to which you and your

. family are, most likely to be exposed, ;
then plan specifically to survive them.'
This involves making rough evacuation
plans, inspecting your insurance protec : ’
tion, listing what you must save, instruct¬
ing your family, and generally making as
many decisions as you can before the
event. . • - ,-j j

■_ In case af-jan evacuation, the primary,
consideration is to protect fife;- but ex-r T

■ cept in the most urgent-emergency it is
senseiess;to evacuate with nothing but
merclbthes.'on your back,••■Qqe of the
most important consideration^: in - indi¬
vidual, evacuation planning is to make a
list of economic and personal valuables.
These valuables should be itemized,
along with fheir locations.- '“V- - ' "I*

..You'must'evacuate within, the hour;
You take out your valuables -list^Ht is
always!-kept in the same pl.aceVTlTa
original, along with receipts,'is stbre’d in
your safety deposit box.* Sf you are taking
your car and have a reasonable amount*,
of room; yod "may be able to,take-some-.

. valuables .along. If you must-leave on.,
foot or by boat, you will i>e able to take ’
less. Decide a priority now. Jewelry, heir- •
looms, expensive small equipment,.

firearms (unloaded) may he worth con¬
sidering. Copies of insurance policies :
deeds, titles, birth certificates, med»cai
records, and so on should definitely be
included. Again, originals of these r ams
-.should be stored in a vault box, but hay-
ping-copies of some documents in your

- immediate possession may prove useful
'and save time later.

. . • Among the most important items to
accompany you in an evacuation, no
• matter how hasty, are medical presenp

- tions and appliances. In a disaster it
may be impossible io reach your doctor
to get a prescription verified lor renewal
insulin and hypodermic needles fer
example, may be briefly unavailable.
Many people involved in disasters diecf

- heart attacks brought on by stress Hav¬

ing your pills or your oxygen respirator—
when space permits—could save your
fife. v •

p Large, bulky valuables cannot usually
be brought along. A stamp c-r coincotfec -
1 tion might weli be left behind out of sneer
bulk or weight, ft is wise to evaluate
Whether or not the entire collection
should be stored at home under normal
-tircy instances. Itemizing, locating and
restoring-valuables properly vvii! rot enf.y
:be of- use if an ’evacuation becomes
7/secessary, but also in the avert of fine or
. theft.. How can you claim, the joss of
^something you car,net prove you ownsd
«!ip ’the first place?

'■ c Tor any son of insurance purposes
•far.d just as an aid in ihe grim task of
'.rebuilding or cleaning up, a phctotsccni
--'of your home and its belongings can be
“invaluable.'.:.

20 SAGA

2.-St

r-'~

1 ,,^-

wJffiifj

r i > . ***' 4,1 ^ "

■’ ** ~‘‘ 1 < \ *?
” : 1 <*' 1

- Different emergencies present Different . •

’circumstances. •• ^ -.

Families will be advised to evacuate in" ■
' the‘case of impending flood or noxious
* chemical leaks. But in the event of a
tornado or even a blizzard, there may
not be the, time or the means to
■ evacuate—indeed’,-evacuation itself ,
may be too hazardous. Information from
the.Cen£er for Disease Control in Atlanta
4 ibn causes' of death in the Wichita Falls

■ tornado indicates that people were safer
*■ ywh'en taking shelter in a protected part of

- '.the home, or.some other secure stoic- •

\ , ture, than trying to escape. Yet mobiie-

z .home dwellers might well want to seek -
flout more secure shelter. Find out what
C.your circumstances dictate. , .

- V. Understanding the nature of disasters
vrnnati nwjf /bU' can be the key to ’

• : ’su.nfival. Check your home to determine .

the'most structurally secure section in
/ the event it must become a shelter, if you :

‘live in anisplated area, have at least one -
Y'member of the family learn basic first aid •>
.'/'and keep simple first-aid materials fresh
/ 'end at hand. The Red Cross and other
i .‘agencies offer first-aid courses and your j
: family doctor can easily advise you what

■ your.first-aid kit should include. The Na- ,
tfona! Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-

. ministration (the Weather Burec u) pub- •
lishes many booklets on weather-related
-: injuries. So does the Center for Disease
• Control, which cites several ways to pro¬
tect yourself during a tornado, for exam¬
ple. Many injuries are caused by flying
*• debris. Covering your body with heavy •

■ blankets, even a mattress, can protect
■ against trauma from broken class, olas-

flying-fchcte. Reioforcmg art

SAGA 21

interior room ahead of time—tike a bath
or a hallway—can provide protection
against even a direct hit by a tornado.
Common sense might dictate such pro¬
visions as shovels and crowbars for dig¬
ging, and noisemaking devices to signal
for help with.

In blizzard-prone areas, leam to rec¬
ognize and treat hypothermia and
frostbite. Keep an emergency food sup¬
ply available, as well as heating and
cooking units that you can operate when
normal power is interrupted. A clean
fireplace chimney and an emergency
wood supply could be vital. Learn how to
survive if stranded in a vehicle: simple
precautions like keeping the exhaust
pipe clear to avoid asphyxiation are eas¬
ily overlooked. Travelers in rural areas in
winter should keep a small survival kit in
the car as insurance in the event of be¬
coming stranded. The kit should include
some high protein, storable foods (like
peanuts), blankets, and a working
flashlight.

A portable radio to provide information
and directions can prove invaluable in
the event of disaster. And, like the
emergency flashlight, batteries should
be checked periodically. Know your
community's emergency plans. Are air¬
raid sirens used to signal a tornado
watch? If no real plans exist in your
community, it might make sense to try to
correct that or to get together with
friends and neighbors to make your own
plans.

* he cost of disasters to most people is
in property damage. According to the
Insurance Information Institute, a nor¬
mal home-owner's policy will protect you
from wind damage resulting from a tor¬
nado, and the comprehensive coverage
of your auto insurance policy will protect
the replacement value of your car in the
same way.

There is no commercial coverage for
flood damage. Certainly, if a pipe bursts
and ruins your ceiling or floods your
basement, most home-owner's policies
will cover the loss—but not against ris¬
ing water. If you live in one of the Iden¬
tified Hundred Year Flood Plains, your
only course of action is to secure cover¬
age through the National Flood Insur¬
ance Program of the Federal Insurance
Administration. The federal government
is currently trying to encourage many
communities to reevaluate the wisdom
of continually rebuilding in areas that
frequently suffer flood devastation.

In a tlood-prone area, investigate the
possibilities of storing valuable items in
waterproof containers, determine which
types of construction are strongest
against rising waters, and most resistant
to standing water. If your home is wiped
out, consider relocating before rebuild¬
ing in the same area only to be flooded

out again. Any toss taken now might be
mote than offset by the diminished pos¬
sibility of loss in the future.

No insurance policy will cover you or
your possessions in tfe event of nuclear
disaster as the result of war, and no
commercial coverage is available pri¬
vately to protect you in the event of nu¬
clear accident. But, you are protected,
and, in a small way, you pay part of the
premium every time you pay federal
taxes or pay a utility bill to a power com¬
pany using nuclear energy. .

* here are 73 nuclear power plants scat¬
tered throughout the United States—67
of these are counted as fully operational

facilities. These nuclear plants and cine-
companies involved in the nuc ca-
industry—makers of nuclear fuel
etc.—are insured through two poc ! -
coverage syndicates, mace up ct ihc-
large national insurers. Until May -le/O
the premium coverage was $140 million
If claims rose beyond this figure, the 67
individual reactor plants could be as¬
sessed up to S5 million per plant for addi¬
tional compensation to victims. After tnc-
first of May, the initial premium coverage
was raised to $160 million, for. all plants
except Three Mile Island. The upward
limit of coverage is $560 million, the bal¬
ance indemnified by the federal gov¬
ernment and paid for by your taxes.

Beyond the level of $560 million,

WHO CAN HELP

American Insurance Association
85 John St.

New York, N.Y. 10038

American Red Cross
National Headquarters
Washington, D C. 20006

Center for Disease Control
1600 Clifton Rd.N.E.

Atlanta, Ga. 30333

Federal Emergency Management
Administration

• Civil Defense Preparedness
Agency

• Federal Insurance Administration *

• Federal Preparedness Agency •
(Government Civil Defense)

• U.S. Fire Administration

Premier Building
1725 I St. N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20472

Insurance Information Insntute
3070 Presidential Dr.

Suite 238

Atlanta, Ga. 30340

Mennonite Disaster Service
21 S. 12th St.

Akron, Pa. 17501

National Oceanic & Atmospheric
Administration (Weather Bureau)
Silver Springs, Md. 20910

Salvation Army
120 W. 14th St.

New York, N.Y. 10011

Small Business Administration s
Disaster Loan Programs
1441 L St. N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20046

22 SAGA

SHOCK TROOPS AGAINST DISASTER

The Federal Emergency Management Administration can use your help.
When disaster strikes, college students, grandmothers, retired military
personnel, free-lance writers—anyone who can take off on short notice — are
needed to do just that, take off. flying to disaster areas to work long hard hours
(paid while on duty) to help the victims. These men and women are Federal
Disaster Reservists and their jobs range from writing and editing press
releases to administering Disaster Assistance Centers to serving as public
works projects officers. Clerks, secretaries—anyone with a skill—can
volunteer to help, whether it means aiding in cleanup or just keeping the public
informed to guard against panic. For more information, write: Federal Disaster
Reserve Program, FEMA. 1725 I Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20472.

compensation to victims would have to
be provided by an act of Congress. If
Congress proved unresponsive to pres¬
sure from affected persons, no matter
how many victims there were, no more
money could be paid out in claims. The
insurance pools indicate they would not
drop coverage in the event of a major
accident, but there is no guarantee.

To plan ahead for financial help be¬
yond insurance limits in the event of a
natural or man-made disaster, knowl¬
edge of the Small Business Administra¬
tion’s Disaster Loan Program before
disaster strikes can be invaluable. Vari¬
ous prerequisites exist for these loans,
but any Natural Disaster, as declared by
the President, will automatically carry
with it the supportive loans of SBA.
Businesses and home-owners alike can
be helped, with everything from
emergency food stamps to unemploy¬
ment compensation to overnight living
expenses or evacuation expenses to
loan dollars for repairs to homes and
personal property. Combined loan value
cannot exceed 555,000 in excess of
covered insurance loss. Application,
and of course repayment, can be
deferred. But an understanding of these
requirements and benefits before a dis¬
aster takes place can save a great deal
of confusion and grief later on. One of
the sorriest aspects of any disaster is the
victims' ignorance of how the federal
government and private agencies can
help them. Knowing beforehand can

save^ your family many unnecessary
heartaches and lost opportunities. Keep¬
ing inflation-guard coverage on your
home or business up to the current value
of your property can allow you to get the
most out of your insurance when disas¬
ter strikes, and will help assure that
federally-indemnified loans can make
up the difference on your loss.

Understanding such federal disaster
loan programs can also save you money

and prevent you from needlessly ove’in¬
suring your property. If you know in ad¬
vance that a wide range of types of com¬
pensation will be available in the even! of
disaster—and determine the extent to
which it can aid you when necessary—
you will be able to make a reasoned
assessment of your options when a
crisis arises.

One of the most basic matters to un¬
derstand prior to a disaster is your likely
financial position afterward. Reading
and understanding federal aid programs
can make a critical difference in the de¬
cisions you make during a crisis and
thus in your ultimate financial condition.

Help in cleaning up, emergency provi¬
sions, and emergency medical treat¬
ment in an emergency will largely come
from the private sector. The American
Red Cross, the Mennonites, the Salva¬
tion Army—even Scouting groups—will
all be there to help. These private agen¬
cies work with the Civil Defense Pre¬
paredness Agency and the Center For
Disease Control to treat the injured, pre¬
vent the spread of disease, and help
provide for your immediate welfare.

Supporting these private agencies
with tax-deductible contributions and
possibly becoming involved in their pro¬
grams is one of the most practical and
humane ways of preparing to help your¬
self. No single federal or private agency
can be looked to as a source for all the
information you should have to prepare
for a possible disaster. The Civil Defense
Preparedness Agency is the most ac¬
cessible, however. An estimated 90 per¬
cent of U.S. counties have civil defense
officers.

On a very real and personal basis, for
seemingly more Americans each year,
learning how to survive natural and
man-made disasters may mean the dif¬
ference between prosperity and ruin, life
and death. ★

TEN COMMANDMENTS

1. Find out the extent of your insurance coverage in the event of disaster.

2. Put important papers in a bank safety-deposit box; keep copies (insurance,
deeds, birth certificates, prescriptions) handy.

3. Make a list of valuables (with receipts) and their locations.

4 Keep a freshly supplied first-aid kit (including prescribed medications)

5. In isolated areas, keep.an emergency supply of water, food, a portable
cooking unit, and batteries for flashlight and radio.

6. Rehearse how to escape from your house and know what to take: know
when to flee and when to stay.

7. If you live in a disaster-prone area (flooding, brush fires, earthquakes,
hurricanes), investigate in advance the scope of federal and private aid
programs that would be available in your circumstances. Learn the history
of the problem, know the recommended types of construction, make a
realistic assessment of your risk.

8. Become familiar with local disaster planning; know where you could go in
the event of evacuation (friends, family, public shelter).

9. Know how to switch off gas. electricity, and water for your property; know
when you should not attempt to switch them back on.

10. Plan ahead how to reunite your family, if separated.

SAGA 23

'*9 C

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Region IX 211 Main Street, Room 220 San Francisco, CA 94105

May 8, 1980

Mr. Clarence C. Baal, Jr.

Disaster Control Recovery Team
Douglas Aircraft Company
3855 Lakewood Boulevard
Long Beach, California 90846

Dear Mr. Baal:

The fact sheet requested in your letter of April 28 has been updated and is
now entitled, "This Is The Federal Emergency Management Agency", Six copies
of that brochure are enclosed for your information and use.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was established in 1979.

Program areas that were previously the responsibility of the Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency (DCPA) and the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA) are now
encompassed in the Plans and Preparedness Division of FEMA, The FEMA Division
of Disaster Response and Recovery has assumed the responsibilities of the
former Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA). Two other agencies
included under FEMA are the United States Fire Administration (USFA) and the
Federal Insurance Administration (FIA).

FEMA has not made any earthquake predictions and will not. However, FEMA
representatives have discussed the findings of a Public Affairs Report, Bulle¬
tin of the Institute of Governmental Studies, Vol 20, August 1979, No. 4,
University of California, Berkeley, by Bruce A. Bolt and Richard H. Johns,

which states in part that ".in this light, 50-50 odds can be viewed as a

modest, perhaps even conservative appraisal of the likelihood that California
will experience an earthquake of magnitude 7 or greater during the next ten
years."

Responding to your specifically numbered questions:

1. The FEMA Nuclear Civil Protection (NCP) program includes both Crisis
Relocation Planning (CRP) and Community Shelter Planning (CSP). NCP
is a current priority program of FEMA and planning is under way in all
50 states. Generally, across the nation planning has been pursued at
a relatively modest level of effort, with plans having been developed
for about 12 percent of the jurisdictions for which plans are needed.

2-3. We do not consider electrical generating plants to be "prime

targets". As you might surmise, the identification of likely targets
is somewhat a guessing game since enemy intentions are not only
unknown, but unknowable in detail. An enemy's selection of target
areas is a very controversial subject and perhaps the largest variable

- 2 -

in strategic defense analysis. Nevertheless, the subject can be
approached by evaluating the importance or worth of a nation’s
resources, and then make prudent assumptions on the weapon laydown
likely to be needed to destroy those resources. Targeting objectives
could thus be established and perhaps categorized in priority order.
This was essentially the approach used by FEMA in the development of
the publication TR-82, "High Risk Areas For Civil Nuclear Defense
Planning Purposes". California risk area data may be obtained from
your State/local emergency services coordinator.

4. We do not have any FEMA (or DCPA) publications on chemical and/or
biological warfare. Studies conducted by the Department of Defense
indicate that the threat posed by chemical and biological agents is
relatively less significant than that posed by the nuclear one.
Chemical agents are not considered a major strategic threat, as they
are effective mainly if used against tactical targets of limited area.
Although the possibility of employment of biological agents against
U.S. population centers cannot be ruled out; neither a chemical nor a
biological threat against the Continental United States warrants, at
this time, the attention and priority given to defense against the
effects of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the civil defense program
will continue to emphasize defense against the effects of nuclear
weapons.

Thank you for your continued interest in civil defense.

Sincerely yours.

Robert C. Stevens
Regional Director

Attachment

Cfzp

a-KiaXaix. {iAaIiatUmA-- t AXie^i^Jh 'S~^2--Z'2-

F 7 4*18’*} * OJcu^jUJI A.S'jL

xto H 7 .< ChcJUrzoc*— ’-KjxiJb ~bz*. tu^ffyctstivir . ^tS'A G-tZ. • ^aSa?^ ^ aaaac4L?a>aO

OUA&iM JtAj^sAfyAS&Mish Am- cHofpjACMu4. hr- ^Coh\ ^JmaaaviAaa^ AoJ^f-Oph , (?j2Aw dh*Ul^ UsIMa£*JO
AmAt' AAqpM IAX* -^UaAjXaC? /U~lj*trvC AMA&JI AUUJLMf^ COtfAApu^ t JhuJk/i, Jfa&vy. (<.-%££ UrfxOi hg
towJ OyJ~. Pm uxaJpl. ujtunn^*^ „ (a) ChJU- •^JUa.p ?Ua. f puamA^ u&amO Qaa^jUm

ACdtuyt? Uaam A/UJLft, _

tkjXtAMA^ -XaPAaC* Cts-to <3 AAAaX&Ca?*^ LuZM*jJ) -^AAMu^CuCt^ A^'Afa/Ui^CtA-- / "AUjylA. dUrCcJLs

■JHaA^X rAfUtx- , <3 <3aOm I j iMaaXM^ca^c^ lAsutJl Jkt^. esj, <&j i_ c*. Ou-zmJ ,

6< j •*££, _A«-. CUAApyVUArM^t. *-**■[ ■i/tr&AAAMr&A-- f C A AATvMaPv\ MOvctoutiA. .AJUjfAJVjiCVL / -fytAJU jj£cr )

tXov FI *8^3 lu&scaJa— &Cr& .avaJLZut^ '-few i&&£Zr A>t^JL- JU'CsgJL . %Zoo

U.AvO^£<A<wCv| AaaJmaAa^uj^ JLoo^ iUm4L> ?Y ? ~i j CUU AZcJX. ■i&ccJZ' -@U,-dLr t CaJZaUx. o_

/Lcodloo— AmX- Jam ,m'C‘cJ\ aJL&JX 1. ( 60 dAyJt^- AsCualA- ^aa£Z LuXjU FL/4p£p •^lciaa. £-a 2 <6,.- X. 5”Y f

PamumJPumj X%~1 i Poo juM- t &0 ( ^ t iti^uSL C-

^\mU- ixiaJ— h 0(000 JU&xdLbsA? r 6«X /S' bZjSL* JLtJ[*L-

3.4? ^0 3^\m\m<£mUc%ai CiZ. ^JU^j

Cn~K~ o^j cI&Ll. , JCVO P y PS Utc^mU- aJuU MaaJaajXXIoaA— /w. ~^J4uthjL. Xf-trtPb tX- &czjuJ S S’
AaaaJSmvv , Q- sUajiM Avu£*jiu^ AJAUAaj t^jpp. , <? Mu-£^ jLioU, ^MutcoaP J^P^&AMjmcX^

C cruttj 5. -£r»7at7>4. ^) -^ir- JUiiAAJL- Ls-nlL £> p>-' Eer- At& aUAmA? ; JAUaXaaJaMi^

yu-Aa^ev^ , trunA? _ ammcJIzcu) aiaamSampI? cIjaumZUj /

UJ OmAa~ c^, AaMa} . A?vvvVvvx<^to«wt^nvt- <-6 ac-0 ^oVTAtJL AAAWU.rt, AAMucZiM-P

CaAJ^mXxa c*j\a£si ytc^^y 4 AJLcXx* Lv~~

&o^\ycd?i3c^ XMj _ P 7 ^‘•' U -^C ffXP * LaJ&mAUk OmJLj _‘JLoxm£° AP^cJLCo — yi&cZCFpvtA*

Ou-viJa -^A^JU^iAvc^ Jjwrvto j J^vaMju- ^aa/S^Amoi-O .- t-Z> tModsi— _ AAAJ^Am JluxvO Crtve—

.AMsdcp- Jai^LUaml? , _ _ . .. .

C^iaAjm ^JAXcaIaaa-^ C&%\aZ&aJ*£<^ i A_ Aa-aa^ZaL. £UptMAAs\ hr- Spu<aA <Ac- Ol>4u-&L^

J^mI/Xuaaa - - -

StiAfi- ^twmvUuvO Jt&cniiiA.. ax, _a£L jUo*£&— JHamcus Q.B -&*4jtAr3hhL> <..

t^-t- teA?JheJh. PJhMuj j £ JUimuliu AtA-atuA_ f_ UrULL .KaM^cii^
3-h tJriAA^ » j 3.000 v^l^o /0OO -{ji/XA &—

^Vlt| -^lAAATLr To— —^JhcAAj

(D^aa. JICcJCcxaa e-fo

'7A.( O0O

J\AAaac£A*' hjCMAXs - . CXaAm 3AOO A^Ccw^l- -^otj ^Ai # / S"E>0 " CpAOt— C*CLaJ) -^oc<aAaaa^

oh'-i A*t> 8 CaXaa- <BaM ~^P<-<^uaaaB? al^ HcuJ M^Cocaac^ -(A, dou*roitlAJ>.

OCua- 0U^<xA OX. 630 Sloo' O^coU- t _<Jkejfy-_ Jic? Xu*u4i. <s_

c^u^\ t^rtU- , ca/ <rnx JE..3 42 ^ 450 ^ 4 - , 60 Oa?^* o.mJl. 4 00 yificuc*^ ( (JLcJa-

OMM. JIoAmq i.lS /U«rw<tj- f a~o 3/30 dCuA— -£hj Jb-A-', C JkiXeZ. C.- SS~ MfW c3A5o3
^ -fcuffAAJu- cp^i? oclaj JisiAA^Jn -&V ,&enhr to .viP h joa&xs ; ohcJPL. crJjvuA.

*"?£? AjaXamajaa. AtiA'amIca, .fyrO SO M PH >

o

tr^\ (^(psuSUnn}

3 C&CfLpi, j & 0 O , ObO Uk*JU&Ui*J Usim- JkrftyCU/U&st? J\cnA&cnn Jj^JU JLl^

C^vuAVm^tA-- ItfHQ y O- Cjfst^Uiyj 4 m*MiJ-s\ %£\y£c&xuv UsCUs.a&is y?.&%*Ar*0 ? yiAwi-l — 1

<Aasl(}CI^ <^fUrvw ^Jus J^JV'4*ou;jU-cn-\J . C\^JtuJy€L, &Mscr £u"6~C-u~t^-*P

i ) dh&6scllu*^ UsuA~ J^UrviA yLriAileruO.

o iJfsv vw\ AZ^i/ti^oO C ^ (PiA^vwij JlxJj /V*-S.,C£> £r15i

i (^OA4A^iieiw_ 6U-U cdUL jus^_ JZx&ifU^Uz^. CC^JL djU&i~ uji4\ ^fftt^cX-* GxJjuu- &*ju J~<rcc*^O^L

; -W- l *<S\s&\ _ yLA&dhJ^&L.,. CX^t^JL A\. ^S^£^-^^s2£-

/Wm--'L&4— / ,

o $(X*sV\/L- _ * £ '7'/ ow £o<^ cca^O ULjl* S C? w&^-4-r ^Lt-t^L c&i&JL~*

^Ua^5^vw|. _>VVU^u0M- ,

Os ^'Vktr^/Z- * I 3 ul£LA~- j O^C'fc^j ^ ^^VArViyzi^ 6 c^-cX-

Ow ^ptAyO E^C*^oXZtSir\ - . . .

o :. ... .. :.. .

«&-v J^aA~ jt'vvfa- f Jkj&yfryL^tyCWy s*-t>— t&yy-e- 7<y U*J— ^-&enrtl*y^ l*Q tJUL Ce-Mte-JL £UJ~e~n- -Ay -Ma.

Mwd^busJc j dny~ £<U.v4A/M20* Jy(JU,\ jfc^-sA-r AjLCuJZcvu ujWctdL J^y^€ r '~’^ ^'-'^ Jlh-C? ^WAvuAu •■►v t >-

, yv\A#£U^, uAuzA— civt- &asw&/L* _ J'Vv ^Iua- C*ciajl- , ^ci- >>«*• uj-uu^kj ( oia^cSL ^JcuCUvi^ t*%t€e**vu
: ttOA)U W-. Uivrth- , UAS&- ttaiyJb^etM .*. Ze>- -&t<A ^ i^cvu*0 , <5^0sXv ^ CiyyJL -frjldJL

i vo-fcvifi Ca^jL&frt&A- ofy ■^u^XewJL ^«^lx^ ^ S>*i^u- -Ao^xiz&- ^ c^rvt^u t

d^b£ix*~- I cff j iAyisJU£&l*i *£r£uuL&~/ */£Z*-. &4jfisis-tt€~l/tM(L* -Am* Q^u.*w*JL&-

•M/tyOc^ot^ Wv\ aAl&tU. kJ^ ^xXJb^JitAAy- -^erfU. c. ,

<Jv\ UsCt^fyL^, j|»Ut*4- ITK VufiOU &4/1*-UytLe *-1 e&UA, ( CltyytZ 'O. ciU_, &0^cJL,

Aoc^u §**AL fX ,

V._y ^kJCLU Oce^yuiy

i , ' t ^H i^Oi- dCSlX- C^^A?yi-cJZcy- yb-CA-' *Wltj>lfj[) /Z*sl& LASl££ JI/-Z- £>6£^JU^£ -^SsirZ^^ - (i&^Si^e-.

OjI&> 1~ f cM;riyU^-a^y/ JUu- j Jkosuju j2i.^ Ua/vc^L 7%0m*i£>. Qa&i-

0^vd-u^4- O- ^A/^SU^Y^iriri/i— <5U^€, H-1 .. ^s^ilu, J-CU~)sly> -$v\j tyiAu*-/U* -“gm-co

tOuO .

01 K^/kS'0^4- (M*-y C^\*^cJL c^^r^6t<X- .

o

0V\/XL. Cy JUuUiIaa/VWl~ ^(M^iSiticnn

O

Jk u JfrULvO du- (^‘SULgl*. ^4 .*yvJL^ v*-t £2 (/duu CHJU^ Jftc Otw. Oawu jyft&vtsuv*.,

CA-u-?iu C— s^^vvo^ u;W^ft ^ujw} , i J* ^jAjJL. Ju^wtifc. v ft<L. yVvt^vu-vj oddjlto*$P*~ C&* CedkjL^ 4A*■n^

Jkjk^A'I £rVXJC- i‘i-A/0 # £Uvft lt -- *jfc 4^/M^-t* un4L ^Ia^u^A) ^c<-^cC-_ ft- Jj^4st**A- v^-j o^^<v^ wftv

i$UA» un/4 J^u^U AHc’to UX-i/t (?vO cX'i^o Jlsif&tjL, < 40 : 0~~ ^jUsw / /, rW'v , tt j ££&* (xrp?i^e4

OcJ\A- 6^ Jlx- vjL^/^v* Jl^6*£~ .

.(3*L.J.«JiiA-.,.s^’* M? '- ■■J£mA&...^.-.J*?!*4&i. .4»ii..£&»*&. f . ja*uu&. ..

.i jh&A/t-. k~ wfcsSa- ._J c^-r^ . &y&UAh**S*&<i --■£*■% -

L-&V&/U >/VVv£aw{ UJ-uli CWW As-thz- , ^ <~v7!l*JLt!L. flA/Uisvv^L. Jn&A- UuL- jVUtA— ‘-ft

— C-fX-'^X-' '-<s\^ ALc. , £tv-Aj t-i^C’-ji- j *1sL&'- -^£'£.z_

vu-^w U_Kj!& 1*Ua/v-\ i^«W^ *41 aJ <Xo>~ ~t*J&*Oj~ctuc\o ,

CD (iv^ ‘-|^kuO iAV^X-via. Jft— fatX~ 3u:J. -i£ jUv-e^cisuA. j_ <02^ Jinju4^ dl<rus*C> trv\ Jkj- 4*&-dL }

O^JL uA-c- ^fau^fC-luvO CfVuX- <jL*$ ^vj ^ t^-dcX* CCcjUl i ZiiAs l*s-c£.jL ft— d-Z-*

<jJjCs.^LuvU.&~ t CU^JL JLo Lu^kJL Jkt+sCr U- jL<- jlAcdcdl ArtJuzltA*

d\'£*uL- jiattw^ * dru^p. ^ /

C? £,_ L^4VVAx£i| 3 ; t-A&fto *5- Asi-As^^Ct^, G&s^J

v^UL. t'L"t//c/gj ft. A-ft^o -|’^tXv *£u*v% j Mrin,<J.JL i Jk&AJL* 4 jAL> Aa^’Ha^ T

Id vaJ j^.X- ^ lAu. trcc^w^vA- < £^Ax_ _ (^ux^^CcJi

^XuvSf- _ &ClsJ jXtAuAA^cJl ftA,vvX^

^' Lxl ^ 3 ij 3as— o4> O^AAt^-^d- ft" 6-w 'A-t^e^wj >vux^/

tfv^_, __ _

ai/-. ft— n^viX.-- j 6i^jytt JAc** ft- tnoj ‘-ft-*—

^ X2. yVZ^-'l^uL- , (,'V UAs1>\ CLc~iJ>%b- IJjrxnsjicL'cite* t

( 3 ) (Ao -4JLcu<> ftlZft/7^ ^__ Oi^, jtslMZA* £L**s*jL'_ 0^yi^s4iT/£^ ft- -^vveri^ c-LrtnA^*^-

■dr^^iJx <5L-w-cft ft- t^utco ^ir6«- . feli— ifto t>drva-i?vtn- tft- CcTM^j *4

. .....-._. i r|viM ! a5y^^„iSra4!kL^_ _ <J^.^&ias4d£i . / <3 —..

.„feufeg*3dA_j_ £xJaia.-4J&jl*/k^!M3*&*d&/iZS.. r aAiL. . JSuAm—JLt* ^AUMtCul c. ^ft&5 ..

ftftt- u-Ur^ . X^-v«-*L ^Z*~£- .-^/£4ai>4. . . ...... _ _ _ . _ , _

<£> /-V Uf'Uift- GlI^mA- Jk^r -^&-do ” ^VviA^Vv^ _ ^'M-' X*V_rf ftt-o l Pl£'LAJ>

■-ji'A^vyvfjbQ _ JfAA J ur>-JL'^ *tr*/un- ^ -'tvtcv*- ^nn, 7 ^ .ctt-x^LL. Jh^uj— aa*. ^i fUn*A—

—. Ia.)aJ£ Asi’W i-^_ i ft> ^ T

@ddLil'i'%nX^iX-^ f~L?%£jh. h*V- L\J\T'SkAA*JL CiJ^l/x^X- JLC*Ajn^yt^ tj&TJU^i? JlPZi^A,

MroZiy^ C&A, Q % A Jjr&bfar ^ J^Lr JLc^ ^JUUaM^s >UjLAMj>_.

^£>* UHt*vO '-^><-£>*■'0 ixt-tj 4i ( >vi£,- JLiXa£a*o£ . . j . u,4ur

-'W- ‘r^vVtrlii^J (X_ ^VVU^tio .

LajJ^UAC-, 1 jl/lseJj-^J t.*A ~ CjQ&A*.-jbx~ G/WAtM^w&P PytjDi*. iX.- /^A^A'- ...i^irCa,-. .A£ox— AUA/^UXi^^ Ul-H

.^1/*tftlL .Jlil^tLK Imt. '4wi- -- _. t&v*- ..

. °^£/V^ UL/cUL Afc&dZ'J tT'-'O {. Cck^A'. 4^

‘-^U/L*— K/L<LX=- Xl<- ^Sisis.ZiJZisU 0 VI -&A- y^C^C, 1^1^-

_**&. &P&&... % 0.0. ^

CwXaJL^k^.

~'Yv\AX££l^j<j* t*-/^ /6 ■^If'^f J <^j U'LaX’ 1^ v-^tJ jLA^-tc.^^Xt^ A^-K. tc^ ^X'+t-‘(,'T.^UAJ

ct/u-tf-u^ , ©aa. ^oc/i-taA- Q-Zv.^-^Laa. ' l ^iruyO /%V^ii. isrfitZCv^

. ■ ..

(5,j L-tlA. /2Xwci^| Uk^O- ££ /l^-'^Lrvt^ yU-v tJUA- ^t^OU- ( - &A **,£- C>K2<^0

0u-t- /U^^J .* S S^iuut 3 6'r*&-x.£UL- ^ Co^ua^o

>—VlLv^ltUO L^-<> —■ i^j^4<<A^) , £*-/ -(£^ lIiIxa^ »^C ^^V^Auth£.

vX/Ut^jt- tUA~ '-VUrvjp^^t- «*£ JLa- -fp-X- ^4a- ^ i3u- -te*'^ix*£rclf--tX^

COv^Xa~ j L,f V (A^UX^-IcjL. CtlxA^ <-^0 JpPA '.

LjL^ £*v )^s^£4^i^vv\j j 3 (0 o ^ '4 ia* ^vvx- K kajXjUL.

la ja v/_^6a/ucv Cl>- —t— ^ \^i&c#Jl 0%*duuu> . -J2 /tcwi tut CA.*w <K«>C

&0 Qq_ clou- ^iXA/U'ttX^ } i.KT\^ji>\ LAAJiA^Z fijL&J£LcviSl^ ^^CnjLiX. f A'-'*~

t^UA- -fct»*t,lirK* USU/I- ,sVs\M~-*Hi vat^ 5 Jlk^ , JLm~ 4- Hv*, £<J-'?z,

C^ JLl~ ^jl^'Jju. - twvU^l. CJaua *£>** *^irux-,.

0 ' L^xA- -X*^A-{.M^6 vv<A- ^t,-^ CoJLi^fy !14^s-«U » J -tXL> A'lAtx^^L c-£|?i4*^J-

JC/\AJ^(ji I^VV . > v '. i ^ : >-A- -X^ux-^TA^A^3-^<i<vV i<UW^ •^fUtnAA ^XyL^tCC^ AJ^ifvd&l* l

~(\<aJL s^pAsir-^XL-, -ti^tiJl JlAA^<^i\. iZ*L^ tu-O Ji/^-'U^ Cv\ i^s_ . 4 ! HC VVtX^uXt|

.c^irW- ...... . .. _.. . ... ...

© (IJ7ic>

i X*-* -4rVW-^
CVvWt i
<^jiAc^\rvi

'aJL'^.'A vu
. CUX-

i...nj£t -tc_ 4£t -oUl^tJL, -kr l/Li-sUr^^ ('Ml </-’Uif . U-U-o<K.„^(» i

. °)J jLtJL. d /i.tA_ itij- OtJZUUelUA* ... ... t^vu . ^

cdXc£iZ^Xj . JU- - v--

.'VVut, ‘4>‘.‘v*

c6Ut^.>,wC , tv-si £ At. -tec

*e- ^v v ^v-vi^_yc-i«- w.. ju O'sm-'-- t-

- *C- . - ^ -ji—ti-

..At.^<-u-.;. 6-u.U^ii .

^A.u .^i-V sCe

■I.i£i.-£jt! .! '~yA^i^y (~C O’V-i- L^U jLt,^Ui>^Cc.

-

0) Uj JLi ^ QArl«£«66i^ b 4

l ^

u'--*a-4£»-.»_ 4*

'<LE^|Ul ' ^U/'fc ut- (j~\JrU*'~ ^«Avuct^v i^t-vtC, Z'yCc,^ } 4Lu£- fu*£L,jZL* '

-^^uX Jfuv*^ -.'Wiin^j Xt-t^tu- uiu^,v-w jlvC'-JL Ck. _£#WW-c*_. tfy _{jkfrvi<s£c? uAa, .JyisUj-s CV» j£-0 -

L ^'-~ 4^-“ <

vrX- Jkl_J-

0"tZ<i ^■' L ' JhiCu -.^■i-' tUt-nMi, -'C ,i ^'.'l-‘ L ' ‘^-..J JjtO'jC ^ L ' &-&*.-

,fc -JM-i _ t<n-St, t ^ -cMl ' i.-.^J. U^L A i</.-u~£ i^cLt:j.

0 A*. ^ -4.W > •^I’ri'-r^- ^wv*^ J^^,Z»r -t u^u.4£<^.^£t-a~ &-* v'i.xLOtl,

tJu_ A*xi-* £4/U . “W" £-4- wiw* <t<X- 4y**f***f A&u£**s „

>J -^Xr^/cs'-i-' ^i^hvtiit.i^' J ^7<4eC<<v^ <-cx^£.£ vtu ££ s'fct'ft't't*^* &jU ' fc-iXZtUL Uu .

L-O Oi.ifCl*'** Ma,-*- -Zu^ Ufoj^ZLcf &

-irwt r^Vv ^H’vtX. f .

(fV) jfJU'.-^ <iv(.’<_ ,^.W.-L ^-i’i-'w.i '14-0 yMi-U^ LJJ&-, l<'i4^t(4i«i»t. J t v-uX^ C- pjOn-LuMi-r^ ^^UXs^.-V/

-Xv£l 0- tfiA- U-ovvt- li-Jij -C-'Jj,^ iiu- -iM-.il.UjL,. :Jv-\ /h*~j , -,l£. jiJ.-iL.klUj.JU-.i- Alhc-euiX.

Xwcvvtyy AitCiUf I^j, <JT.vdiMjJ.-Oi.JC. Zj- Mi. Jovuoji.-- oJjUlJ u£ t <■"’.’

<:-■- JJ. i-Cvu- ua.'. | ^ y I-} . t/inXfc, (.AjL. *-'‘.’^ Lt w Xf ,-^.‘-i^i.s.'?»^„ jo.c

bjirjvMU.J. Zc- -w 4(,>vw, (MfriJCL,.

Ur- ovi-.^y t^.-n-!,j U-u.~iJvj.,«j t jUc-cJi-.. J-yo- ‘ffjJt-U.i.u- , -kvzJ~ ed-u-i. ' m - lA d-.J O

. ''.i.,Ly C.-C'- ^ LjV’TjJLJ. Jr-L-Jd.. & j.y. --.Vi-cy id LTjlU . ~L' iX ££t"i-ULC .dc.-j 1 Jb.-0 .'“HtV^ i. /t. .i-L-

yJUJl-u. J- ,'cJj. JOi^Cr djdc-cC-- 1V-. «■£ .'X^i, X-iU .-.“Jy^ 3 cjjlJL &uM jWi tX-c L‘Ja^^.h.

-Jjy-L i.i cvT. .

Q,

su^-dji-L, du

e-fZ-ti-L, >tfru yjvjCSjJvc.U.'yysvy-i., yjivo.ic-uc.i-U. cti-c-c

• WviyvC - U-Ul.-l. .

V^&Sa&HjUUJUL. _ tCciAu,

■uj .o-v ‘■i-.v, Jf-T.--.i-. i'X\C'. t, . vivo dpAsJZfetci'iiZci.? -ffi'J J-f— _«.

■.'d^h 4 <^--£'f 4-^. t4va-.i^fU,^ \1.J .U.yoifr.yt -.\.ljJc J.-l,

-ikl, td-vo-i, i J i-VLL, j C^V '—i— id-oLUJC, £C. i-JO^rt-C. -Xi-C-Z. Z-.J.

<-l\j, -.faJLccf. \Jyc-ocjQjL. yyljviioi. otsio <-r JLolc*— ..t.clc<-

i'O (JjUvU JJ.J juj. >-KV-| £>&vjyj-

dcVn^i-Uj ^-K.vvv ^4_ U..-ij.-U.- / U--CO- t- r <.-\ jlVl. Cfj&tf <

CA.JL JCV<_. c'-'w .iA-„- J.V./0C- <~fi Jvou-i-. -ZfL. boJoji Ji-C-ox^jO. ^2'tii-uui'l^ , C'J -^l cJyrjvc.

sJLfviotjfaJc ’-Ji'J. v«X4—■ , JU-vlU .4-^ l.oz-u^ Jc,. (.y.yy i.c ix.L.c(j On *- fyc-icy ,. -cc-L.^y y

Cvs <.j\jLti.-.Zi-jr 21xv^o Jjvu <lj~ y*-o\.<d.octC- ££ .yycijc. ^ OCwif, Jccoofe Cfc-m -ivc. jyv-ic f'J-..-<i Jodij. — {,

juj V.- Me, jIaUv-j , 0>e%uti Ml.- .eM-yi--,yZ.M -itM- -Uccfc-i^ jyjyyy 'a-tu.-ix..^

Zluxvc L%ifV\ l-J Cl- OAft-xUeL *i

L cjj,.i-^ _ Mt&uJtaixA

Wl'Z~U -C-L,C. . .—.....—

.yucu&,.&£t^%AJ^.,Mo%daJd/vc^u^,.LML..M.~e^ .

C.-'-’L-J-C, , ^k-yj. Jo-co.^ UVC:JIllS J.VL C t^vt. LL4oC-Ci,UL-ii-J Uj-UZ MlL
Me. U.4 uMjUcJu/l -OV» ooz,^ Cl- .'M.J JkcyoU~_ ®dU?^ r

•A^'u ctLisM-MO^,

^ ii: VW4X_-- /3^-vC -£**£&&&'£&■

MTirUA, (sGMA- j ~4*AiucliyU> . JAv\±fiirvw\ <Q>~wt tu&tudl

<Xasi4; H4^m*4 «L-i ■ SjuruAs- •2jT c ?o .usxSJL J^uL, .'wm%jLu *<U~ ir---*J— -uX 3 JU>u£<. t

cHaaJa, ciSL. tf'i-’O J 0 Q o | \4/<-z*-~ <~tw«JG *tU*Ay .yv^'-C** CclXju sU%a*Lo* .(UC/c4jUcu~X~

(JnJU, ijvttfe-. &~'--<.<l. <■-*-!.c- _jyyuV--*XW-/' is .'V Xuuu j yujj- =<-!>.. 4 7 *■' 1 *--’{; 4- uuXc~-u .£- ■4-*'

jJL&vO ' l -^-^'.-- V-'!. 'i'L- It --C-cA/'^ -i- '^Xl^ '..V-'O. — J '^'A 5 u ' * -*j4uML -14v<^Lfci. '-“-u

UVuUu-'^i-iX L-* iu &.'ULsu~ , C-.-.-luJL- , hjL’-'\

U0 ^ ^ _ -/vWt- t>~-* _ .-0- JlAor^t^. , •'S.t'l-i''—*"j. t-C-*©" -i-Sg-tCO t

/i<t^ .'-*44-'.-'''“*$**>-e- ■& lt -^ ‘Ax'vfi. i

/ iA*V v 4<t t r H» .

lij/i. y-'. ; ^.i. Uum<\_

XuUu-u AuuU , 4 ~‘ J ‘XUvi^Jp j M; '>'*’’*<‘'4-

(^tA_ C* JLi* 6

C' HX- .^Vt^-iA., V. .

. X'l-- (.L. o. lAU^uy^ f db^ /1 *W

X2d<yVV Virt/iUC^V^'-' I'Vt S-v*. iA*U.'w> — .

'■^vu. Z^Ma^U I^A. . W-tf-^i ^tv

<^A» A'V'U-i.tJrk ..

OjLsirK- Gmstux.

3 t-C*.,

■r*--

< ,A*isXlc-j ~i., Urc~U*JJsu-Ci~'. i— ; tA, .■oi/tJL. ■>£ c_i&L Aaj-(^-c£>.>-- r

0^ Lct/iwi, ~£u~ ^\<\A*j-ZLkjb t i. dUx-. ^JbCM-.A.r^^ u,

-'vt^ -^aa^X. *5. IC t ; ..-^rvt-'lr". idUiyi— ii'dUx.^ duL^sj &iT L *d£$j' .d&&%rCg -Xc^t^Xi

. '^w-bultZiHj itstr- • Ccr^x^l _. c^uZC

Jj-^jAxAr iC^i^S— J £yC K£*f\As%xL* bpt%A~ CxJSXV^^j

■Mam-L ., . .

£>

CO ufitrici. i^UjL
£T~U$y**su*- *>v\ •

SWTUiZ'Sl-

' k ° -M^tnS%4st

ilkvcn-tX-

hc| -^Las^jLl~ jU-v / U,^J/\

^CUuJt4 Xu

>-v-(ua cListi,, '-•- ixv_-j^,‘ -At,.-(,i:, u-

u.-e*4f<JL .-..-i. ^tts„, 00j_ C- JaLU^-\C,iu

J^'£sV\l***jOv ,4ftrv i^y(.-T-' -j-L^

v'y^’-'C'^v, .0-AU C\* Q&aJ

^ .

. CiA'Qjrdjbdl ..,- L-tv-tr y{,(ytX-. d^O ^•^C u ^O

42 > ^'"3^ /j X-i~\; JUsiUc.iAJJ.‘i,- CCuuL., i 0 ^..^ aj^aXX

(j Jw».--.Mwiu^ ..^MaAnJU

LO-WoiC 'kXSi-Vj XauvvJ^-L-^ Q'- Xu'S'^u £‘1o iXtvl- 4' l< -'-^'^’I ) r '~ ~ ' : '' XJ Xt~&^ZA.iC Xu 'U.~tX r iA,

A't-t-U -'^t-'L_ ti»A» JleusriAiU- AvvA^i. t-Viy- O^u^Xu ■^JUUAWfUX- ,

©

U'«-'O w lC Cl^LCisUlA*’ wi,'- £z> ‘‘t'UUy'V

CudbcMxlittf cU-^

CAC ^t't'U/s'lA^C? -4^. x*l£ti>is£ l t&^'£' &L - “2^" -1^ j Q-^bccZdi^-

'^■X,Lr$fi>$ lt , ir is-i. -b-'t^'u.. dU-fd— dj-tuJL -XuA^uJpsuC t-Wrn * *'^UlC XuV.--LXu-\-\ ^1,^ Cc-TaS i/Uui^i,i^ Ut^u* 4 v uAX-L- *■£
JC\JL Wj-tViA P‘4 Uu4uaas <M~. ..ptsiLA- AAt-^-^XiXtL. ,.

C/Ji~$JL •SMsutAsG* Lt/T^A, vU^&u*. ; *&*scJU**d*£*s<*^ ^c<utC-

—|^^!*jg,^ ,. i.-t^zr4- <» Sw^.ilc| C^LX* Cl“/ P IaS\£$L ^VHrt'V' £isti£*Lr Z-> J*4 Za**C$JL*~

*JLa~ L<^Adh^rwA~- Jhx&j^ , dbouL* Uj^ikA Aj*- JL®<~cdl* Xp~ Osl /iMl } ot^c^u diMjj A&tAu&l* C v%l£

<T Ia cJL&ffUAjvJL , $&tsn4* tfov GA*-t4&t^ Jhcrtl^ <S}sU*tL, ^yO-&Jic~ ■

(£$} ^WrtA. Cm^J- sAAWlX- d) Ji&tU, i.£isC~ A**tC& ^ ^WwiX- QA^t^x^tci^ ^JUaa^ /^±XS\S>J<^L Q~l^J?

C~ R> t CWtJL iUsi-$4*£^£&vj Ai^> tiLo S £s£&&£e**z£j> &fa ^ 5 ^^L<^c^vvcX.

lAAA-'vdJL. ^JidUL A4-\ AAdtSKrCCfL* .

(SD cJul^ C-cntA JUts si£&dk^ ^JJL i c tS*S~ j uA?\c<£~ iXAjwsdu c4-*— -

*&* **KfisAAAvo j mad - <Osia— .^ x / *& jl - a^\AS^A/u\ - s

iATtfUdJi Jlla+Ar-* &- ufa jiKA^iA^ Jh*rirtAjL- ^vnr-JL A&rLfr^t* iJurd^ .^s- j &smt~ JuU

(jd^ltU/sVC'^ ofa QA— JhL&scA- _AA\X^Ii'V^M^MX^VT^ C^vx/^a^^ ^C&AJ* * C*J!si0-

(Xi-^-'Z^~' A*JLciCZ\j-4>/i^ AAsi? &A,L&A-~ * l£\Aj CL^Aft4iX^ tsX**v ^WoX- ji*

^t'P^tocd t- <dtr^id^> Vlto^JL duu* , JU^vL. dki*

d}iAJLed — (knwi' ( U>^w^X. 6tK- ct&* j JbdtA*dl~ (rUt^J LArdrfU, OvuQ d-x^^uJO^ JUiAaju<u^\

ax^udL Jhtsp^- (ruO ^&A&Ax^cn^. -

^2^ ) ^'1^-^aAL- * S tk> tfl^| ^u^ajul, ck^ju, Ctu^ 1 7 * ^WvvE^ AL^^ovi- i -Astd— ^Lc-u/^

JbtA**' jUbc&UrMA^ jiA4n*r • t*}J,i&L* <Zfa c^Jj^j a'vuo. (rvx <s_ Jk^dcdc^ t Cd*utL c^u,t^dr^ (^wu^ ct&uJ^J
^vm 5L-» s £'~^X-,- d-iruA^is- \$s Lt -^-vt^. *^A4*&n» CZ^ Ctfa^ 1 ~?~7 r

(&&} Zjn^ ^vyvOAtv| AjLdtL&lrt (X^U%&2irlA~ d^V-C^ } (TV dcrpd- (xjLt^O c£&iA/ /l£&$w?Pl& j tAj-*

^udL -t*- dvtnJL- , Uj^ciJL JU&s<Ai*ein -i~C~ m^Al^ $n) MAu^ dkeU~ ^tu&>,

(^ 5 ^ MsiruU— '-fart , &Q SjLt d€uA &jl* ctcotfLiS 7 ^ tkxcAZL QcuijU.

CAaJU (KjC/U^JUJL } UL Uni£ aHovO iJvU ^uji Jkw&i* , 'Scnmo Altdurwi. LajxM ovdlof Cucct/d^ (AmJu

ctwv\ CrdL CifvC^/udUt, O^ets m£a~*

& ^ (UXwij ix, ^vcwdL Uri^A d, H&unU -JU mx, dh&a~ ~3vaJL uAjl£ MHO- dkx~ *£r&

■^u^U, o^t msj ~&UJL * Seym, tr<n dL^, /UmdL L G&vl&iL JUt, dlou&l~ $utnns\

L&vJh, k'AMh/L, i Lj Jm, Zkiij basvuj GjJL 3 ? OsMtj A ? «=^ juv*j cn^~ ^ Ms^AtiJkiJL

UrdUl iLu-j urd, /u^-^a- <

(^|) iJke^iA' C^-u^UcJL A&c$ivw^ -fprO 6 <a 2 tW| y ^s/ Co-eliL jJ^aZL,,

© 0*^ % XU Jnddk^^JU, u~^o

JUruCL^, u) cnuJL duwiJ u«_ aJZF^puZi-
fe- A^|p OvfyuL, OSXt^&Ms ?

I^ATC*CXA-cXi-tr>v tyhotx&- 0 F

(j3 - ^Wv^i _A/U/2i- Jm^xjl, AjOf^clu^ C&P, ui'>, CiiVUnt^tX &-UOUXJxJ^a*\j , C? ^

fe" id^-r A. e£j:uiv\ ut- 0VU, , JO cJfiA- x*^- (Una.Arv^&Jl* nx^pn^XtyJx- C- iXc4-* cik«A-

$*x> . G aaAAxuxx- u/i-A mux- L-tx^uA^ G~ ■^-eux- . (?uruA

_^vtn>ily 'jwtu^tcutrtudi QaJx- i- ,

CD U^ieX~ ^LCi&dkU^ ' &*fyciiLs sitAJU*^ fi*P. UJ &vjJL JMtdC AjuZX* oulci^^ UkA~ .'Urz^Zk* t c\j

($aj* 6^ ^AMnM^ t

(3) 4 '<A*~ cibtw£%V> CO CiQ^) «yU tt^L- txi^ifisVO „lA/UiAAsU^\^tJ--- yvl*

6\/^Ltw cA>- Ci.i^u^' ClaJ~ ,

f^Ly CZc-h-^O ' Dv\jjuX> . thsiX^ #£ Jo^ 3-tU^u , jjnrd^\ .4rdbji<JU~ ,

c^rEr^ ,

liX---' ■ OO^vJU ^ Cc^-cA'i^^Z- } j^JL JiA^VLsi^JjlL* 5 JkAxK<di^%^<X- Ci^UA^r%3^i-^ ^

© S-fcC. §«A/l/t/Cr6i2 tS^-X tfcjL. VStTn-vO"

©) JU^Jl-loiX- 4^v jgsXeLuJx- taculm Ujt-egxva j iiUtl^ 1 (xani\ t£/u-txv\ G-aJL, LU^mjL^Tb-^irt-o —

tO l/U-U— Ii/%4-. UXxilL txrUAJu vo4vcW J-lXcAji- ct-ru/u j A-LOisSt, cn-U~u^ , OX- <-c^ rt/ '' AmW' UlsvvcrtfX-

^"K. *X-jkk-L-. ^VfrV^- )j4yu£-'A_. r

0 L\J hjsa^ city- ‘-t^tAA^ -|vuX .. OCHA- *© .

t 2 ~VVA*k » U*U<* £> v(M^. I/G-vSl. tf ^Ul^CfW f / 3^ '-^1/1/ JisC^Js'-* £s€U3> j

Uj-tulk 5 / 6 / cbu^c, -JsuZlasxAmJ * Ji^cO- , 40- S -3, — ^>U^.

IC^— -|^X-^v 4^ s/vV^^i-tTVi J tf'j&iso Aa/U^-v^ JlAf\A*cJ8L> C&l*fT*SX- OxS\jLL SuCa/O^L* i^/h* A(rl^%X-. 4,'X^/V! /

cf^ 3*2)0 U"WVa 4 tArrru^t C^u- ' 00 O^Ul. 'jJvn ,

.-'^3&Os-'v^ ^\aJL*j^JL t'X? /'xaJLc~€~'l%^L^ (?-cxx^J'

Q3a 'J^ ^ i -A-^v £U *fac$JLf £isu^ C^tJL.

^^jl^VvUL T

jLdL*» 0&- jX$k*t££*> u- ^ ufa&lJ-' ~ltf *

$\Jo4^ wjx^iv ^ 3 >oZt4p U'luJ^ Aujc k-4. ^ls^t.o£. '‘^v

JL-Ux- j ^Mrn^fJL, l<stt»uL. J-u.-z.-c, XsuaXs (rur^ <a**jXu?l. . §4^tn*&tL.

J--i~- yuvcvwisU- _ uL<_ A^t-tXc— et**-**_ Oai-ujUL* *Xs\4rZtdLc^il — .

4 |) H-«-7q *itrS< irAtcX / £t£i^ ^nr€A^3-^e/ C^ii^Ctdui^ , (aJ,_^£X. J!k&4rf>-

yUld^o- &- U&svvo J^asJjIco Jb+fonA' oJZ**h t SEicf^X a^LuMtuJ)

^V^4<-^-C*» .ffZ't? j£c*€-V^ ^—«■ -^Uri|v j £-&c» &uA^* tc*~ &_

^irW-VVi JlvrtisCAAJ^ * Aixh><^ .‘A^4^ r ^£^ <>W t

( £*3~ y ... ’fcJklUr ^O" ^Ct-* t4vO (/uxaiA * ^Vvvt*|/^*-A_ . &^fAA-* T*q* Afi

£C >VK*Z&J? /l&uzfi Lla€vU JIhasw^UaJ } CrVxA- }

^uJjp CWcJL -Ag^ci-v Cf/» G^ttc^ 4,vu^tc £*^ cLc, ^ Au-. \AM*dh~ C*^tlisfsC*y .- '^iTCU^ C^owvl^

Uf^O Cclia. Uj- s^Juek&* <*v\ <Pt**-dL (ajL<§ 4 <s— ^ Caxa^J jU^ ; ^u^eo\j

J\jL&iS*J> 0^ QaCisJ (X*^d~ (stAAsisJl^ jljL- *

(jj^ ' tiuC. SuAA^tur^ii- } C^tn4v / ■ cdtXc*^ , Ctl- CU+4*. Jk*^Co ^^ofeXcrvv

JUo^ §MliA? JjlmJjsO vMA&XUtJl JlcuJ. S fciiA. ^>w«4. 1 J *A-£c* - (MjuJli^j Jl .

' Cw . jLt. 6^ CmtJL -AMjUUivUJi^ ,

^VJ^A/O OUa-iSL. M~U*~ <T— dMt-'JZj! tcrvi/v-i ( usiXL J^^ru^uXe^M, AM*e^ JL r ^ . QtrUsJUc. JyC^u

K-SUteS lAfit«jlWW . .U^AaIv ^ cEMk5a25u- / ~(Lfkt^Ujt>.J^«44<A.>£ , ... .

(r?) iJiA-£Xe-^&? i .....LOuaPi . iA'Lv~. qfrxrl- ’^ikooO i .^Oa.iaa&| x-la2W 'UrisAjt* iAnsjLtr^JL

"Uboi*^ lA*- ■JfrtAJUrtnjt-. . . - ...

(§) .‘ “ J 2 1/ccJL. -) fv-.i-x^A AJt*Cc%c$#<> &**- U^uiUSL^ c$jis-JL oMm^ *hJ

tfeAfjd

pus a pqnd — s/*a»/ //e ye ssaupajedajd
. jem-ieapnu so }uauodoJd uai/odsjno
ue s/ pee •*«,# wiio/ye/v aj/uiesoA
jeau s*JJ»{S »V» "//»*// uoyXe/o mo
/ yjosfp/eo

«•/»« «BI* »«®l* —Auimsuodsay /epos
jof suappAqg aqf'fo jaquiaw e ‘you jo y/
**»ipq ‘put M3fuo asiieyao /ea/So/o/pe#
paimiaa-VINSJ e */ uoyXe/o jo
-j»yya-| leMAjns
|euosi«d s . ueddex Aauen »l tapfpe
ysj/CA/Ajns soo/jba se //am se ‘(9P106
VO liosjeo *•»** /ejyu «3 *s 6089
“aj«s Jd»0 -30/ ^fvA/AjnsI XS6X «1oo8
/eAiAjns pile I90S08 00 Jappog lOtl
*08 O'd -ajus ydafl ssajrf u/pe/eji
Aepsuiooa Jayyy ayn yo joi/yne ai/y
1 / ag fjadxa /ba/ajiis iem-jeapnu pa tuny
js/8o/ois O'l/d e s/ uope/o aanjg mq

uioj -s.-ninos sjru.ijcui-.npi 'Sajis puisnput ‘pinsj uiw
jo snpq Aipv.t-.m -sucdem ii6<uens c; f) j[P jo uoinrujsip
sno?uPi|mus up se pa^iidM s- jeo6 f'u:ir>Bjri iq_p iwua
jpfjisnpu - pup viPiipiu jt'JUijod p sp sajpic; p.sjtupj iqi qciiump
oj p,>.. 5 iSip- .injod SumSiiei e iqinsap sjuauiniop in\oq

aji m ipuiiuvi iq .ipui sui.ijqojd ip.ii uns vj.ipijp jsod
iu.' ulq: M:;od fii.mPjei jn.ioc; ju.iuni ji.ifjn Ai.iipjniie
ipwiuuue quit; ii-ioq .up jo siaqiunu iq uanum) sjuiuiniop
■ ■ 1-iq: ;• . Pu:.ij‘.jiij .ifijueq si jeqj .iniod fiuijaBipj ipipnu
' ;.*ims iq; }o mi i e ipi.ioid sapwip ioj upjd jc.vi aq:us
jsiq .-"-idju*. p fiumsjnd uiiq spq uoiuff j.'Liuy aqj jpqj. non
id-n' 'dii.uuqnoi oj uoqippp ui 'sunuimop ,x.iqj_ {
■U'i.i'M.1 p injury u.ijcj-jsuf j,iloop) .npp Jininv

40/ vijruq ;moq jiq.mpj pup >sp;fino t ] 115; UjBisn10 <sqj
■njerjumip up; up 'ju.ifip q ( q iq ui|oj% sjuiuinmp

uy ;u V" do. ;o -oSed ( )iH> ‘i i° uourisjN^epip luiiiy
■ \y ■ . "jpc]yc...ue-'

iiip'J.Pil jsi.j nil Suunp ,'v;c uipuiij .isqissod pjmo 'iidoid
u > Ov. j -P v.riu -e 01 Pu.iurouip •^DiLiin- jo M.iofriu ''qi
‘ v.oq lAuifieu:. 01 :;r.iijj.p >:-iu'.s ion! qms jnoqji ^ .miiipnu
pup pnj iiiPii ‘poo/ jo sniddns tpuiiuiuj ui.ia uipjqo oj
up »!t'i:uns iioij >p su.Ysottijun iPiunuppun; qins sijoojiti.io

munication centers and electrical
generating plants. The Russians give elec¬
trical plants special emphasis in their
planning because of the effect sudden
and permanent deprivation of electricity
would have on civilian morale, in short,
their targeting policy is designed to
remove the United States from the ranks
of world powers with drastic finality so
that we will never obstruct Soviet expan¬
sionism again. This is the reality that the
U.S. civil-defense effort must confront
before wasting time and money on un¬
productive. unrealistic programs:

The major current thrust of FEMA and
many state civil-defense agencies is the
preparation of "crisis relocation plans.”
CRPs are supposed to outline the pro¬
cedures by which the entire population of
a high-risk urban area could be evacuated
to low-risk (usually rural) “host" areas
during periods of severe international
tension.

Justification for writing such plans is
that the United States needs to have an
effective relocation plan to counter¬
balance the massive evacuation system
devised by the Soviet Union. The CRPs
therefore become bargaining chips, writ¬
ten so that our president can wave the
studies at the Soviets and threaten: “if
you evacuate your cities, well evacuate
ours, too.”

This must be the real purpose of the
CRP effort, because few civil-defense
professionals think the plans would ac¬
tually work. Many of them will tell you
quite candidly that they are writing CRPs
only because their federal funding is con¬
tingent upon it. In fact, civil-defense pro¬
fessionals (arid survivalists) half-heartedly
joke that the only effect of these crisis
relocation plans would be to relocate the

CRPs presume that there will be a
lengthy period during which the danger
of nuclear war will become more and
more apparent to everyone, and that last-
minute efforts to prepare for the evacua¬
tion can be made at this time. Although
■most plans postulate a lead time of three
to seven days, in some cases this “warn¬
ing period" has been estimated to range
from one to six months in length. Some¬
time near the end of this period, the
president would order the evacuation of
cities.

At this juncture the plans call for the
mobilization of entire urban populations
(17 million in California alone) to outlying
host communities. After the refugees
have been assigned quarters in local resi¬
dents’ homes, the plans call for daily
truck deliveries of food and medical sup¬
plies from the abandoned cities. Essential
services within the cities would be kept
functioning to support the relocated res¬
idents. Police, firemen, telephone work¬
ers. bakers and grocery personnel would
be expected to remain in the city, in spite
of the imminent danger, to coordinate
food shipments and protect property

from fires and looters.

At this point the plans usually draw to
an uncertain conclusion. Few. if any.
plans contain provisions for returning the
displaced people to their homes after the
crisis, and there are no provisions what¬
soever for dealing with them if the city ac¬
tually is destroyed! 1 asked one county
civil-defense director how he would han¬
dle his local residents and refugees if the
attack took place. Fie replied. "Ail 1 could
do would be to go home, take my per¬
sonal disaster supplies down to my shelter
and shut the door after me." This man is
responsible for 70,000 lives!

No wonder this country’s people are
turning to survivaiism for their civil-
defense needs.

The assumptions behind the crisis relo¬
cation plans are enormous and highly
questionable. The 1980s make it brutally
apparent that our greatest danger comes
not from an escalating crisis but from a
Soviet surprise attack aimed at disarming
us. Recognition of this danger provides
impetus for the furor over the MX missile,
B-l bomber, cruise missile. Trident sub¬
marine and even the neutron bomb. As¬
suming, then, that a surprise attack is a
significant danger at this time, a plan that
postulates six months of warning, or one
month, or even a day, is naive to the
point of idiocy.

The second major assumption is that
the urban population would consent to
decamp. If there were a “warning
period,” a percentage of the population
(perhaps as much as 30 percent) would
undoubtedly leave the cities spontane¬
ously. (The Cuban missile crisis produced
such a spontaneous evacuation of Florida
dries.) In California, however, that would
leave 12 million people who for some
reason did not evacuate. All the police,
firemen and National Guardsmen in the
state would be unable to force 12 million
people to abandon their homes. It might
require months to forcibly evict even one
million reluctant refugees. While many
people will leave town on their own.
without a plan, most of the others may re¬
fuse to leave. If this is true, how effective
is the pian?

The third great undocumented as¬
sumption is that people in low-risk areas
will gracefully accept tens of thousands of
refugees into their homes — especially
with a nuclear attack ,in the offing. The
evacuation plans entirely ignore the pos¬
sibility that the refugees from Inner-city
areas may not meet the ethnic standards
of host communities. The bloodshed
potential of this situation should be readi¬
ly apparent to anyone with a grasp of
modern American racial tensions. Often
a newspaper article outlining the crisis
relocation plan for a host area will be
enough to induce vigilante groups to
design plans to “blow up the bridges.”
Whether these groups represent a majori¬
ty opinion matters little. Just one dissi¬
dent per bridge could frustrate the entire
plan.

The fourth assumption suggests that
life will return rapidly to normal once the
evacuation is over. Although most peo¬
ple would eventually find their way back
to their homes through one means or an¬
other. this migration might take one or
two weeks due to its disorganized nature.
Considering the scope of the operation,
the evacuation, relocation period and
subsequent return of the population m
the cities almost certainly would . ;

three to four weeks. The impact of a . .
week dislocation of the work force on me
nation’s economy is a side effect that eivsi-
defense planners tend to ignore, or at
best excuse, on the rationalization that it’s
better to lose the economy than the peo¬
ple.

This erroneous attitude shows an in¬
complete grasp of the situation. If there is
no war, the CRPs will severely wound the
economy without saving anyone’s life.
This consideration alone may prohibit the
president from invoking the pians. or
from invoking them before it is too late.
But even if the plans are put into motion
in time, and even if they perform flawless¬
ly, the CRPs will still not save a single life
if a war actually occurs.

Crisis relocation plans attempt only to
shelter and feed the refugees until the war
begins. After that, the refugees are left on
. their own to survive as best they can. No
food has been set aside to feed them after
the attack; no medicine stocked for the
sick and injured. Locally, essentia! sup¬
plies will not provide even for the perma¬
nent residents in the host communities,
let alone the uninvited guests. It seems
that CRP planners have orchestrated
elaborate evacuations to preserve people
from death by fire, radiation and blast,
only to have them die a few weeks later of
starvation and disease. Worse than thaf,'
planners have simultaneously doomed
the host residents to the same fate, even
though they would otherwise have a
chance by establishing self-sufficient rural
enclaves for the post-attack period.

In summary, current efforts by national
and local civil-defense authorities to
prepare viable crisis relocation plans are
at best meaningless and ineffective: and
at worst imperil the survival of low-risk-
area residents. Whether or not civii-de-
fense planners continue this waste of
money and manpower into the 1980s is a
crucial question facing us. An even more
crucial question will be what kind of civil-
defense program should replace the pres-

The first step toward establishing a
viable -^nd realistic civil-defense program
is to recognize the realities of the post¬
attack situation and to apply the woefully
limited budget earmarked for civilian
defense to the critical areas where such
expenditures will actually influence th’e
nation’s recovery. Any civil-defense pro¬
gram that ignores this principle will be a
waste of time, money and lives.

My proposal for a new national civil-

defense program begins with a very dis¬
tasteful principle: that of triage. “Triage,’’
a term borrowed from battlefield medi¬
cine. denotes the sorting of casualties into
groups prior to treatment.

The first group consists of casualties
who will survive without immediate help.
These people are left for later treatment.
The second group includes the casualties
to whom prompt medical attention will
mean the difference between life and
death. These people are moved into the
operating or treatment rooms at once.
The third group of casualties are so
severely injured that nothing short of a
miracle could possibly save them. Since
treatment of these casualties would drain
aid from those who can still be saved,
they are treated only after the other
casualties have received adequate atten¬
tion.

Viewing potential attack areas of the
United States as casualty groups of “the
nuclear battle" (as the Soviets call it), the
principle of triage can be constructively
applied in a civil-defense context. Some
areas can probably survive a nuclear at¬
tack without any federal assistance (Hilo.
Hi., for example), so civil-defense plan¬
ners can legitimately overlook these com¬
munities while they concentrate on more
demanding locations. Many other com¬
munities. especially rural ones, could be
made substantially resistant to nuclear at¬
tack with small investments of time and
money (for example. Kalispeil. Mont., or
Madera. Calif.). The relatively small ex¬
penditures required there should be
undertaken immediately. Those areas
near strategic-weapons systems, in¬
cluding Great Falls. Mont.. Omaha. Neb.
and Little Rock, Ark., will have such
severe survival problems that no amount
of federal assistance is likely to have
much impact. These locations — like the
third group in the battlefield triage —
should be set aside for later attention so
that they do not detract from efforts to
strengthen the borderline communities
whose survival chances can be increased.

This is especially critical because of the
key nature of the borderline areas. For
the most part they are rural, agricultural
communities that can be made self-suffici¬
ent in wartime if there has been effective
emergency planning to stockpile ade¬
quate fuel and medical supplies prior to
the attack. Since these communities are
unlikely to receive nuclear effects other
than fallout (for which they could be easi¬
ly prepared), they can survive the war
with their physical, political, social and
economic structure intact. With just
limited assistance and encouragement,
they could be prepared for wartime in¬
dependence.

Making rural communities capable of
self sufficiency is an absolute prerequisite
for recovery of the nation as a whole. The
vita! relationship between urban and rural
communities has been entirely ignored by
the civii-defense establishment. Food is

the essentia! factor. During the recovery
period food wv! be the 'hie? limiting factor
in the rebuilding of the nation. Hungry
people, especially parents, w.ll tend to
devote their energies to feeding their
families instead of to reconstructing com¬
munities. If food is scarce, foraging will be
the primary activity of the survivors, and
little if any reconstruction will take place.

Food does not appear naturally and
abundantly in the modern world. Our na¬
tion depends on a small group of agricul¬
tural specialists for its entire food supply.
In a post-war situation these farmers and
ranchers will hold the fate of the nation's
survivors in their hands. They mav well
be able to feed themselves, regardless of
the circumstances, but we must see to it
that they can produce enough grain, po¬
tatoes. meat and poultry to support the
other parts of the nation. If nos, all the
civil-defense planning in the world will
not save us.

No. current effort is being expended to
protect America’s farmers or to ensure
that farming communities will be able to
meet the challenges of the war and
emerge as intact, functioning entities.
This must be the first goal of any realistic
national civil-defense plan. However,
FEMA’s current schedule calls for atten¬
tion to these rural areas sometime in the
late 1980s. Unfortunately, according to
many authorities, that may well be after
the war.

An alarming illustration of defense
strategists’ blindness to the importance of
food-producing communities cars be seen
in the irrational placement of the
Minuteman and Titan missiie silos. These
silos are located in Arizona. Montana.
North Dakota, South Dakota Wyoming,
Nebraska, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri
and Arkansas — the western edge of the
fertile Mississippi Valley and the plains
bread-basket region. An attack on these
silos by nuclear warheads will generate
enough fallout, during the first few
minutes of the attack, to insure that the
nation's largest and most productive
agricultural section will experience severe
radioactivity problems in the weeks after
the attack. Not only was no thought given
to protecting - farmers, silo placement
almost seems a deliberate attempt to
place them in the greatest possible
danger.

in summary, a realistic civil-defense
and national-recovery program cannot be
developed until the civil-defense strateg¬
ists have taken an unflinching look at the
Soviet nuclear-targeting policies to deter¬
mine the probable nature of their assault
on the United States.

Then any proposed survival plans must
be ruthlessly examined against the details
of the envisioned attack. Those programs
exhibiting a lack of contaci with reality
should be instantly canceled.

Any reorientation of the national civil-
defense program should concentrate first
on long-term survival and recovery.

because short-term measures are wasted
if they fail to address the fundamental
issue of how to provide survivors with
adequate food, water and medical ser¬
vices for a period of months or years after
attack. The keystone of this program
should be the strengthening of rural .'

agricultural communities.

Only after these steps have been im¬
plemented will it be appropriate to begin
the expensive and difficult programs that
wii! be necessary if we are to save the lives
of people iiving near strategic nuclear-
targets and in urban high-risk areas. At¬
tempting to save these people should be pouticac.
our lowest priority, not the highest one. PeeEHi&s&aos
Like the severely wounded battlefield
casualties, the high-risk areas drain vital¬
ly needed aid away from communities
where it is more likely to influence the na¬
tion’s recovery. Our current naiional civil-
defense effort concentrates on the high-
risk areas to the exclusion of all others.

I believe that a constructive and effec¬
tive national civil-defense program can be
mounted for a relatively modest amount
of money it these guidelines are followed
Although priorities of community selec¬
tion for aid might be arguable in the
political arena, realities of post-attack sur¬
vival are not. The nation as a whole must
adopt the survivalist credo of “food first.”

When we know that we wii: have some¬
thing to eat we can branch out to such
luxuries as city evacuation or biast-shelter
programs. To pursue any other course in
our civil-defense planning is to embrace
disaster for ourselves, our way of life and
our civilization. @>

> c

V^” ~?^ JU^- {!avi

U5SiL

0 ^LiIaa* a# 6- SiTtn-cXC /T >^VVLi^i^>j f 2-0 ~ ^ c )

9^tiUsU, /Uufr, Oa~d JUs^usUUn, UrtssA ^ -A

<U-L SSsJZ- n/ us-^Mss Cctrts,. jfavUsJ, Zt«»-fv

O —

CAnssJrtssuUoctry , Jl-ct&i, (>hAj 1W(? *?«> JUsO-tssuUL, C Cl Ass.

JUJDsS, SplrvU- -isJtsSSSpAcpvy ^v~ <7V\ oJsnA,

,%JAjOsU\ JtsssS- C&ss &TsA-c^ Jis-oi-iL. Sur Ucxs^ , 0 *MsUs*A. (Twtiu- (J 5
-^OtTV^OVViA-j -£\^i<c£x^ lo-&aXo -£{7 -^nsUUss^srv n tLcxoUtstssJS, y-A, tssvUuA, -Assm, AA-JlUss,

,t*s>ssJLs\s Jsjssj ^yUJC~. S U Ots*ts sUa, d-trust- , -Jw JUsst- Ajk^ assss^ -Ac-t»c,

t-W^U- CcTAJS— ii^Ul t-i^-t_- Usu>Ss*, .

UisssAn, sit. yssiXJL stsS, SssCa- i ^’tO t, Ussfynsw issts Citss Ltstss. ASUssUt^st,) LcjXSS .
2iiA- xmt /i/yaGssjuu-^^ts^ AAGsunxsss^ -Uoul, Zati f?6 trx, &~J . Uun. sa, As— JCssU, GsssS, S'o

^ir /UaULs, • ^Artr* ^vteus+f OsssJauxuaS- J/jsAsss-t, yvw«A*J usc*aa us.<sC UxtsssssAsL*— . S cysxXZ

Jb-sJsjsst, JuL stA- ( ccssU— slurtsCs A*>siU. AsO~ . S-trW^i. ScJ yssxnsJ, tUUsUy -6tta «ac tc*<_

Ccvw cSjA-t*-©-^ 2.00 a£j '■Asss, SaMjl-, Ossst dkjtsjtf att dUc. . «£*■*-/ JivJ- l?CC CdSjU. iiS'-'-J ~

JUecsJ QsCtsUZf UxttUi- utsssA ■ (sUsSs. CXUs Jot— suMotsiU~ > —£l~ . :«"- ■ - '-J

C A-CrfJZ*-’/ ■Xs^i- &Jsjs- jsss^c-ifaui-j lAt, ArUZ@ push, issiiHUs*, Aao-tJi • t/tA tduJXIZ ! c }J- a ) 0

(jJxsAsyistss^ y ^Lovu^v»Y C&isilAsnftJ? , LA)i<*, SlsUfttuXU oy 1 *£+(, .

C/S \AlntssJs AXctA^/Uts AstXsU, Ass^JfUust, , oJ^ (Uu*^ jfmw Lea^Xz s *XJL A*ts-et- _^t-

£«. -fyjjUU,sJ~ -AAjJXus , LOaU. DC a{^Us, C- XsjacssujCt— sssDc— Q/g. . —6vmC ^i4s. Ustlf. JlXc-£, £ ^~
xJytnUUsJ • &\jLss*JUsJ ^cUss^U, UaU) , ^/&— tltr<ss«A- —Awts Cp- apiUusp*s— Qcnsi, -Ho-isc. Xuxj,

t JhsUUi*~\ •*•*-> ^ • >^Ov (ssM-g, Ga^iSss, ( GeUsfi . AGss/C issmsXU- Uusfa ^Sts^issfxss— $un~.

viMsi, fJLaUs, cnsM) a*—JL UxstfUl ^, AptsXjL. •

UiolPU, 4s»~^s U>- -M/M^suUc, ^*Zs j tSJVUjJL <s&4aaU, Gr- CsUo— ^Js^jLc. Q'- Z^ts^ . ,

Z«-^wj ?- <H ctcup— C Jb-tsML) L\J4 sj &OvO iifyyas Oy, 7 GZ Js~ , sur *o*<JLosi— ,

C. Cn*ww^mO CtssXs— OyS-^usotsSM/C—) (sCssA, Cjguu, -^oovxUo^ ~G- Us, jUiUissc/C, ' IaJ gisjlU £ui^

EossuJi assJL ^ca-Uuss -#, ^ Q/hM**. st■ plc^U-ssk. SO -^sssi-uXZoS) < (W.

Xxj^JuXs- ^AvViiX Istr dir XssjfCU- Uuss^ J lAssSs On, Usstssussf^ -falsrOj Ass-JL.

^T'- ..,

'Svv iA. esisusji, -$±*-§U*- is.u£ Cns^ %V- ^ao^ltsinnss^t— diMsu fls. *H<W / JsuS, us+t~

^Knnstr^O *suytd, Uuss^ C*~ d*3j . tsiov OusMti^s, tlsuAsji, GcUo^<risns«sss. -XOsy *{j*0 Us, UisgA.

%*nss^*- , Us~ ustruJ, jtJUus- Cb- Ms- _fa, a^_ JuUXuss,

Slnsss, suutf, CTlss. cn, Dssv- 4-^P*- ^svUuss^ ■^tns a, C&Osj isristx. Xuv^y

GsssL utyssjuvusU- QJKss JnssJuL o-. pJkuMLs. c C ^tsL -Zfy uUs. UUe^L. Oss^, } ^. L ,« s7.n£

Us, A-,-.,J‘*.z Ust'sMj, «W,^ Uaot, . CfW*4< *fsj>iuU, ns

ArssUtltsU^ cduu^L, S -ps-tu- "}4aiss^ Annulus , $<UsA. S ^uc-vw £)^fi, ^ Ccnsssssacs, .

J^tstuu, Js— C cnsnuAZ- <ptt-w<- Ccu^oi~ QJCuss. . So,

StTlsyfx, £/$ s^svfaUis* .

°ifc> ^ 7Vwt " 3 S' ^^tsxss, ougo- . QnnssaX- MssusssjOux, A^UuaCSyn

duAs^, , 4 j, JLo~As Sss, -jjfUss^Cs. Oss^, f ^W^t- ^ UcJs- USlZt

LVtsijU-lssJ- QssssszxU, cUsJ{ss, t sX7,~ l0*<

- ‘ -6 ^

M u'fyCnsLu* & lJ Jsi.XS

(3(ZP

I ~fy

ViELoCATtou AuD Re SETTLEMENT Chh't 75s SePEHAT£T>

^2£vi&m_ £jru^e£t*j £•_ JvuaMLuxa, JL^AlOa^l. / W. Axdet^Utnn A/injUt&-{ <a_

lUrUstJZ- o _4A4-<n-<- t4-u_ Sinj-id. i^JI-caa, , di~ aa~ 57- /It^Uc^Zc. ,

CLaX, t'V-i ^C AX^cMLa,^ &Ct^p ; '-'^■j ^|^Uv ^"V .A,„L l-'-A *j C.'- i^-t.T- M~c-ia,<jL~

(X^dA+rO I lAX*- i- ^Vt<4— L^BV> ^3v>- i^u2u^v^ -£«j ^ lit "Cu^3 /• ‘C-*Vl4<& -AAaX- d*, ^LtoMML, JLtA-CV*flLz

A- cfejEiX^WsX/^ A^aoaaJL c-A^. JLc -^OaAiJjJ— -JLe-u^J-- ^v<71a^ 'Aov-cC. , (? i-t-u

AMtc-uMLtfvy j/ AmJUMmaIvM' aA, G- -MAN'LL, A&aaattaA-* AAaoXLa, lIu>aaJ «_ Js&-cMZuc~^ <sufi , Ijj-iZh

t£V\ . .{Lc. *■

Cc^Av- A£A-tlu^j JLc. £$yv> AaJLv-cAALcw cu> OtA is-fanAA-leL-.- , ■dv-L- JwiA -Cvct^ cOUnstX-Oi-

\JbjL. JyiAjMEeJl cAttM&dPN- i-La- UJTiiSiA\, , Cvu/AL „«J- M<, tMcd— <Jxi-t| tftn/c!x^Ai> (3— AaaaaJJ-TLaJ
JL/f^&XAyvvijjC-* AZaa^AaaaMxMAj-- G. t-X c^wvt- /ItJL'Val^rv j -cc crViA^ A. <Not*aaM\j ''U'Ct'i^C. C- i A>-

XM^tvw| dbfa(X\A Mj- ‘A'*— £^U^WvH^ &«C / t &UzAr~ LL^Tou ^ J^U4^ c&c LxnJti

CJJL cUaxl-O iJjXahX^ fc- cioc ? x) JLJtJL lJuM\) / cMtaJ— ,-tX~ cAoAAaaM Xcoo^-j

O-CcL, t jh^xJ— LAJT2-uj j OaassSL. iX_ y!4^v>J£€4- R<<~ fccn^€_ ^

(AtCO ft'tC- GC- S^A, JmaW. -tcv (Ac VUc«-*&|' j CcciuA^TLM-tlXi^lAyi^ (At- \^^{aUaJaJ^ £*j£
V\JAaMMamMaXt' j JAci— GficM/tcCVtcAc -At. )Ua4j$c<A^ JLa^ yuSu^-L*^ JlM^t&o ^iAL- &v\rto<~JL -iaaj a4m£L
X\JAA7ia^Jaa i 'J dLtr\^y~ Jbi^Aj^rC> £>~~ dltAJ<X^

X^XiAAAvxrv~t 6~y yujL4K£%Lay-) CCaa-JL lHa^ •$r0 AJSuAJiit4MlcJL~ sw\a*aA~- tAjJCs A/\a*£i*(JjL* te- ^

tj\s Cv^XUMAJiA^iv^ UrLJL AAhrCsC^ltriSi , Ole -^'V AZOv^<A~-

yUU’JhAjtilC-' ^ JUwJt&sUsiM* , JL/vU~ ‘* / »- -^VL<rut^ (J^uU u^J~oL> AJAt/llctvUuJ—

IwvL- i-irtJJL db-t-v-c* ais\ jxjJ-cooJ^v^,

l ~iXt> Ccdhfa\A*Aii-* AAaaiXLc^ &*nvU*ctkA~ ~$OV-JL- /U^a/aUa^aX^. %- /LctfyirvC- (Aj- AstM'C*£[cJL,
j jUArlLtA^Jdv'^ J j^AsrUUsdds^ £lvi<6 dd-i~^d^ j -\Xc-Zi t. ; M , C&^O AXc^td^ CtAt^o-
dkxj, s}p£i- jfonrd-' AAAJ-tLu&j tc~ aJQxM Jo- ■fyu-LtcrvJ— AJLiiluA^ uZu ULt- dlunL- OriA^si -. Sn-tA
71 ^ 4 ( 4 ^ X >-wt/vv~6<-<-^ 0^ OumAsl- o^xJL unrdyAM- -frrv tx. J$*£vl*iL lr^ X cru JJUxnJ-- uio4a. ,
iA-O aXu-Ji>| JajXa^ CXtiuA- --L-1--JU,- Cv&cirteAyJ- C-i \-A.-AX.-ii^ Zlc' isi otMaaj A^-fddux- f X'vJ_ Jvx,

dbtUu -JiAaA- QvtAAaxLlaj Jwi&A~^4ii\rL'0 j C\&amv£apX(~ <Zt^-cL~ CtxSLfdJLei/vef J)ua^aa7>^ (Uax^xLLx>a\ tjfc^U— WJlfH&dL.

Ga\aM~- -^ 1 n«fi- crdLt-O UaAXaaX^ !LisJ^JbM. UiUA- Ma^aCJL Tv* ^ JUsuaajA^ - /u ^^Y

td JoisJ^pX- Uaa, -b^*sMdlav\ e<J$U, dkx^j Jwiy- jjx*n^ vLa~. jLtU&f7*X- -dJkj£$Lvi.,

CL. JblXA^CA CUl^rVvtJ- t-£, 4 iH4.".i£i| Jhx.<L- A^t^L. JUvf UiAs 6frtrv4AAA,AAiXuX~ A^rxJ

jXMaUVi-LLaaa^ dbu- ^AAtld^viAA. e-fy S\JLCO\s-(a~( (Z^/aa, CoU&tbj , JmzajA. Jd<£*\s ezjx£t- Lit- &J*t-

SL ■JjtsdcM' JUtluz&AX, ffvx J^Qizl^cd-- j oaaaL du.— JurwX-' JluixJtivvL- ; Mind.,

^umaoaaL^ dtcJL ixnMk **• jtoMLxA, lfa*AAj 6 <>-iamJ*u 4- &M(!Mn\> . ‘Ac AXaa^jIua—

APOtrt |to^c-- iMcX~ <Av- Ma^maXaM aMhAa^ urdA Ahwc j Jhjut, Ml,

^^VuM&hwA— ,M^ >VUM,'U-t*^<j lAc “^irxC A*- IXrtvLU, Jcc l5kc- • ^-Ui- ‘X <(VJ-

iW/ a. OuJuxI -friMCa a-vO Cuu>~ <4c .

^ duu- yivvG^<«cJ- vet- . <su~jt JwC- i«A- 2J- -^4- ^Ui-vUiJ f Muru)

icvtu^ ..VL. J- j JctftA? ' COaa, -l-L lt*0 (■ ..<J- 64w „^Lc ^VHTru£ ^ QaaaJL •Xct^r'

*Avi/ft/vvu| X/O* , $4 i&U- yu6c«&'<^0 CXj^aX- fJu-, ^ tJLo

J^jlAm>tX>> j -tA Xu- Jc'C^uM^s Zi>- ,-tvun^-- »Xu- iXuu tA^evw

d^^uWt XaO ^^&uj ^'v^rj CvuX X^tnrjib Q- Xu- X^nc cX*^rsX- «X^^uj $<£&—

OCiA-a yi*/i/X#-£4Aj> . (^n^i^-iX- ^-viXic^id*— '-$■iX^>» vJL. —IX. £-v-i'-'*-> c^ny sXutf-U— XX^X*^ ^j^eJL.

%>* hMswA* AJJ^ JUsj/yvLtosX-?.

^ Oxli/AS <A\**£utc<riM$ J <X- -^rUstsitjL* o£ Jlpvdlou a\i y^/^OA^ilUM^

‘^jxLL S^atwL*-* geJUisUtL- C- a- ~facv crwu cteti^ *. *-W- *- $wu*JL ^

l^VlL £u cX^UvJ mA^ yVVjX- Stfdhs&C* i /lydy^ el Jbtr'i* 3 <?V Q -^ 6 <^V» <2^^ - ^-AiCtfe-

I 't&v\ o^ JfarJ JbfastX/^ i *^wtM^t**^ ^ lJIm* » %J" i '"u *7*5""* JLct^u f ?L 2 . A/a^xvi^'A^. ^

/ 6~U X!b* -^vM/KrM. t/inX£, J^uvt^ jLcXl*^ Xa- CajCc^C^L. <$prtlL -*

fi/i^v 60 fc/<n'i*! -jju^scrJL } ousdL X dcn^C. tJvckA /UUtfy&t^ £Xwv XLo -*w

J-U- OVvXt^ SU'-t^tCcJb (ocZL*rv\ -c4- Zw- cy1/KtfiA& ^uLfJ^JbL- A. 4tcw» '^Wz^/ Co ul^L Jkci. Atyw-caA~- v

aXo^L* tfw f , J&CiaX* MnwJLs JWu\Arurzn/*~ AJk^x^jJi Jtc. &&$,&//*-
iXa^ £rw6oj J[aa^4ajl^ awJMj O- ctc^ { dLc*fck~ iO <mm.$&>- JLu/l~ JLc^ ^mtA~ ^jw dsi<*A~ Cp^4>

tJyA- <*&vinfL ix/i— C&tjb^s&dL JU^ ^U-ttA ^ru/ (sL£z<kij> ) <■&*-*

A&UAaAJL AjImaas j r

%XAaXa &AJ~ 0 ^ OoM* A- 2 y»- CcrVt^-J^X c$lM-«_ -^ec^aj ^uaJL ^

j — iAJ\XM X>0 Xx^t.

A^iXu«( A<AVvy^A/t^u^ Atsi^J^LtLA* ^ Xu- c1U?ccUjlJ? . ^Iva “4^ JUzMou Q^/UU) ^n/JL iX^

^ <^uJL JlyL Q~ AA^Cct- J^4j<^J JU^ yMXjLzX<^.

(JhovL. CXajU frXj^risiJ^ AVui^t^c^v -^ 6 ^/Xa Cc^i^^~i^ iX^. ^ iX-t**-#. ^X<- jAaXX^ CCtAAsVX&Xr*

AjJ(2*Aas\ AMTX44yi-<iA- Xw ^ , 60 ^ t 4a- yU^v^^6-60 Ot/x£X

N-ixvO Xa- w^x^- / c r vuC cXu^ xbn- 1 ^ # l£%ia~ /wt^XX* fX XxX

Xc. ^CiyMclL^ _JL*i A/CfWyt^ /U#-ltyii/&*^,

^cbj- Iaatv- <<^ /A-Lccnst*^ JLJLicAciA* '<£t*-C ‘^vx^jC- iXta_ /UjIa~s\ O *0 JI/€UmJL <J>\

a$nj- Xc^i- CvO tvi£j2 A4Xaa/lvvC**£\ ~Cc- J^j- &aJZia- i yi^w>^ 0^n^ui^v\ , &U i/O.

fctii/L. 60 uL~ <0£?U/*^j Z®- -jfW <£_ J-CVt^ S-to^L. 1 1 Cl**tL AtnVbO aaa-o^ AajLV-c** -O-

At-o^c<^|OX . <9 SLtjj^ -vu^j a/UAs&O Al/^a^j JkcCu frlAfyjiXeJL ^^tcAiXvvt. ,

CRP

Low 6- LfcOm

Low priority put on.
city’s faLout shelters

By Lynn Sprenger

Staff Writer

Good advice for those who
duck into a fallout shelter during
a nuclear attack: don’t arrive
empty-handed.

The designated shelters in
Lcr.g Beach lack the sort of
provisions that would make a
stay in them tolerable while the
dust settles — things like clean
water, edible food and usable
medical supplies.

Whatever boxes, cans and
crates remain stored away-con¬
tain stock that is almost all out¬
dated.

Not that there seems to be
any imminent danger of a nu¬
clear attack, but there’s another
problem with the shelters, too:
finding them in the first place.
The agency in charge of them —
the Long Beach Fire Depart¬
ment's Bureau of Emergency
Preparedness — doesn't have an
updated list of t'- ■ locations,
let alone what is in tr.c-m, accord¬
ing to Deputy Chief Ben Soud-
ers, director of the bureau.

Some have been destroyed or
closed, as with a number of
buildings affected by downtown
redevelopment. Others are no
loner marked by the familiar
yellow and black "Fallout Shel¬
ter” signs.

The fire department con¬
ducted its lest survey of the shel¬
ters more than a year and a half
ago, .vudeis sain. It doesn’t-
seem likely that the city will pay
for another survey or reprovi-
sic trine. as U typical of cities
across the country. Civil defense
is simply not the priority it was
in the early ’80s when the Cuban
missile crisis lent more urgency
to efforts to identify and stock
fallout shelters.

“The (federal) government
has chosen to devalue toe worm
of the shelter prom am,’’ Souders
said. “If you road tee govern¬
ment circulars* thev sav« ‘Yeah,
you should ha" 3 : --iters,’

but they expect local govern¬
ments to pick up t:. tan for re¬
stocking them, it’s a very
expensive proposition.’’

Part of the federal govern¬
ment's loss of interest in fallout
shelters is due to the advent of
more sopfciscated nuclear weap¬
ons. Most fallout shelters would
not withstand the heat and blast
generated by the new nuclear
arms.

“ ‘Fallout shelter’ means
exactly that — they protect you
from fallout, not blast,” Souders
said.

EVEN IF FALLOUT were
the main danger in a nuclear at¬
tack, the shelters would be a less
than ideal refuge.. “All over the
country they were stocked in '62
and ’63, some later, and supplies
have disintegrated,” Souders
said.

“Ail-Purpose Survival Crack¬
ers” are rancid. Wiser f vene¬
rated or went bad. Sterile band¬
ages probably aren’t sterile,
paper sheets are easily ripped,
dated items are spoiled.

A roll of .adhesive tape
marked “August 27, 1952” was
emrmg the supplies cleared out
from a Long Beach junior high
*- ho.il ill June. “It took a two-and
a n.di ton truik to move the stuff
and most oi it’s going to be
dumped,” Souders said.

“ I’he only things that are still
good are some metal items, like
e :.— ,>rs, paper clips and safety
pm-, and that’s typical of most of
Lie -upplies in Long IF ich.”

Tne tire department picks up
medical supplies from shelters to
? <- what, may still be used by the
dr.’s r.maiik-'.lhs. but not any-

"We don’t have the people or
the time to collect all the supplies
;n the city,” h.judt.s slated, “if we
got a call from someone who says

h : g, . a bunch of niuTcrs down
i...re hi d thiy're bad, we just tell
him to throw them away.”

The Emergency Preparedness
staff is limited to a medical coor¬
dinator, a clerk-typist, and Soud¬
ers, who also works half the time
as deputy chief of administration
for the fire department.

- THE BUREAU receives only-
one or two calls a week from peo¬
ple asking where the nearest fall¬
out shelter is. Twice a year, a flock
of calls come from children fulfill¬
ing school assignment. There is
no educational program to indoc¬
trinate ciiisens on civil defense.

“By and large, people (who
cal!) are more inier,.rted in sur¬
vival in an earthquake,” Souders
sab!. His i.U.ri v.o, as in the Euut-
g-m.cy 0;\ riling Center. whi,.h is
a headquarters for relief activities
for natar.J and man-caui-ed disas¬
ters. “Most. people push the nu¬
clear attack qe..-Aion in the back
t : i: ..’i i > . . - i figure they’ll die

aw, iv if it ii.iipvt.”

For those who don’t, Souders
advised two things in event of a
nuclear attack. People should
make sure their chosen fallout
shelters are open; commercial
buildings will likely be locked up
if a war starts during nonbusiness
hours. They should also have a
box of emergency supplies ready
to go, including a medical kit, can¬
ned food, water, flariihsht and
battery-operated radio.

An informal survey of people
in the downtown area, which is
full Of fallout shelters, showed
about half the- people didn’t know
where they would go if a nuclear
attack were about to take place,
hadn’t thought about it, or just
figured they would die in such a
case anyway.

Only two people mentioned
going to a fallout shelter, although
there are a number of the yellow
and black signs in front of down¬
town stores. The remainder
thought they would find a cellar or
some other place.

“I’d hide,” said Nevy Taboa of
Long Beach. “Where? Any hole I
could find.”

“See’s Candy,” said Sandy
Schildmeyer of Westminster,^ a
slender young woman. “If I’m
going to go, I might as well be
eating.”

"To the bank — to get my
money out,” said one man, rush¬
ing into a bank.

“I probably wouldn’t go any¬
where. I’d just burn with ’em all.
Where can you run?” asked Ed¬
ward Mountain of Long Beach,

N.Y.

Department of Defense study shows
a blast shelter system could cost
more than $60 billion. Alternative
is crisis relocation planning.

WITH THE current fallout
shelter situation in the country, a
1977 Department of Defense
Study concluded only 30 to 40
percent of the total population
would survive a heavy nuclear at¬
tack, according to an April 1979
information bulletin by the De¬
fense Ci'.il Preporednti.s Agency.

This is because approximately
two-thirds of the population “live
in po.-.ui.Ic ri.-k a wes -- places
that could suffer the bhei and
heat effects of nuclear weapons,”
the hull.'*in noted. Most fallout
shellcis Osier little or no protec¬
tion from these effects.

A blast shelter system could
cost more than $60 billion, the De¬
partment of Defense study esti¬
mated. The alternat’ve is crisis
relocation planning. This is a
much less expensive but more
uncertain means of civil defense,
particularly regarding the time
element involved.

The plans assume there will be
a week or more for evacuations,
although critics note that Soviet
missiles would reach American
targets in less than 30 minutes.
Others insist any such attack
would probably follow an obvious
buildup of nuclear arms.

For a good but not perfect
relocation — where four-fifths of
th«,:-e in ri.-k art as have and find
fallout protection in most areas —
the study estimated a 30 percent
survived r.Ue.

Crisis relocation planning for
California began last November,
said Loren Fields, chief of the Nu¬

clear Civil Protection Division of
the state Office of Emergency
Services in Sacramento.

The current level of funding
for it by the federal government is
low — $34 $,!hX) this fiscal year for
California, Fields •- mi. k’s antici¬
pated that it will take about eight
years to comph te the plans for all
areas in the slate, given the
present funding level.

SO FAR ONLY Merced
County and the Riverside-San
Bernardino area have been in¬
cluded in *l:e planning because
they contain military installations
assumed to be principle targets in
a war, Fit Ids .said.

Planning for an evacuation of
Los Angeles and Orange counties
will take the must time to com¬
plete, he said, due to a myriad of
complications associated with
trying m mow the mliiiuw living
in these areas.

“We haven’t yet divided the
Los Angeles Basin into who would
go where.” Fields said, “but parts
of the harbor area — including
Long Beach and Huntington
Beach — would be primarily going
to eastern San Diego and Imperial
counties probably.”

If crisis relocation planning
hasn’t been completed and there
is a muclear attack, only one out
of five fallout shelters in Los An¬
geles County will provide even
minimal blast protection, Fields
said.

And, as in Long Beach, sup¬
plies that still exist in California
shelters have exceeded their origi¬
nal shelf life, “so you can assume
that virtually all of it has little
value,” he said.

It nuy not matter, though. “A
nuclear attack?” one pedestrian
said, rushing by. “I hadn’t even
thought about it. It’s not going u>
happen.”

RISK AREA RELOCATION

CRISIS

INFORMATION

FOR

SURVIVAL

PRESIDENT ADVISES RELOCATION

DUE TO THE WORSENING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, THE PRESIDENT HAS
ADVISED THAT RESIDENTS OF HIGH RISK AREAS RELOCATE TO AREAS OF
LESSER RISK.

I KLAKETO FALLS, OREGON

HIGH RISK AREAS

HIGH RISK AREAS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH MILITARY INSTALLATIONS,
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES AND LARGE URBANIZED AREAS. THESE AREAS
COULD BE SUBJECT TO THE DIRECT EFFECTS, i.e., BLAST AND HEAT,
FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK. THE AREAS MOST
LIKELY TO BE TARGETED ARE SHOWN ON THE MAP BELOW.

ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION BEING RELEASED BY LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS WILL PROVIDE MORE DETAILED INFORMATION FOR YOUR AREA.

STATE ACTIONS

IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST, THE GOVERNOR HAS ORDERED THE STATE'S
CRISIS RELOCATION PLANS TO BE IMPLEMENTED. THESE PLANS PROVIDE FOR THE
MOVEMENT OF RISK AREA RESIDENTS TO PREDESIGNATED HOST AREAS, FOR THE CON¬
GREGATE CARE OF THE DISPLACED PERSONS, AND FOR THE REDISTRIBUTION OF
CRITICAL SUPPLIES AND PROVISIONS. LOCAL AND STATE AUTHORITIES ARE MOVING
QUICKLY TO REDIRECT THEIR EFFORTS TOWARD ACTIVATION AND EXECUTION OF PLANS
PREPARED IN ADVANCE FOR JUST THIS EVENTUALITY.

IF YOU ARE A PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEE OR A KEY WORKER IN AN
ESSENTIAL INDUSTRY, CHECK WITH YOUR EMPLOYER FOR ANY SPECIAL
ASSIGNMENT NECESSARY TO SUPPORT CRISIS RELOCATION.

THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CRISIS RELOCATION

HOW LONG THE RELOCATION PERIOD WILL LAST IS UNKNOWN AS ARE
THE SPECIFICS OF A POSSIBLE NUCLEAR ATTACK. THE NEED TO
CONTINUE RELOCATION OPERATIONS MAY EXTEND FROM ONE TO SEVERAL
WEEKS. THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY THAT SHOULD WAR OCCUR,

YOUR HOME COULD BE DESTROYED. BUT ISN'T IT BETTER THAT YOU
ARE NOT THERE SHOULD IT HAPPEN.

THERE IS NO CERTAINTY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTACK OR
WHEN IT MAY COME. RISK AREA RESIDENTS SHOULD TAKE THE
TIME NECESSARY TO PULL TOGETHER THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS AND TO
ASSEMBLE THOSE THINGS NECESSARY FOR THEIR COMFORT IN THE
HOST AREAS.

ACCOMMODATIONS IN THE HOST AREA WILL BE MEAGER. ALL TYPES
OF BUILDINGS MUST BE USED TO HOUSE PEOPLE. TAXING A FEW
MOMENTS NOW TO TAKE YOUR OWN COMFORT ITEMS WILL PAY OFF LATER.

IF YOU HAVE YOUR OWN TRANSPORTATION, TAKE WHAT CANNED OR PACKAGED FOOD YOU HAVE
ON HAND WITH YOU. IT WILL BE USEFUL UNTIL THE FOOD DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS CAN
BE REDIRECTED. DO NOT WASTE TIME GOING TO THE STORE FOR MORE. TAKE ONLY WHAT
YOU HAVE AVAILABLE AND DON'T OVERLOAD YOUR VEHICLE DANGEROUSLY.

MORE THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CRISIS RELOCATION

IF YOU DO NOT HAVE YOUR OWN TRANSPORTATION, BUSES WILE BE
PROVIDED. THESE BUSES WILL LOAD AT SELECTED SCHOOLS IN
YOUR AREA. LISTEN TO YOUR LOCAL RADIO AND TV STATIONS FOR
DETAILS.

.DO NOT WASTE TIME TRYING TO DRAW OUT MONEY FROM YOUR BANK OR OTHER FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS. THEY ARE NOW SUBJECT TO FEDERAL CONTROLS AND MANY WILL BE
CLOSED OR LIMITING TRANSACTIONS.' BASIC ESSENTIALS SUCH AS FOOD WILL BE PRO¬
VIDED IN’THE HOST AREAS WITHOUT COST TO YOU.

IF YOU OWN A VACATION CABIN OR HAVE RELATIVES OR FRIENDS WHO LIVE OUTSIDF A
RISK AREA, YOU MAY BE ABLE TO GO THERE. HOWEVER, TRAFFIC CONGESTION MAY ?F
SUCH THAT THIS COULD BE IMPRACTICAL. IN ANY EVENT, COOPERATE WITH TRAFFIC
CONTROL OFFICIALS.

PUBLIC SAFETY PERSONNEL, COMMUTING FROM NEARBY HOST AREAS,

WILL PROTECT YOUR PROPERTY IN YOUR ABSENCE. UNLESS WAR COMES,
YOUR POSSESSIONS SHOULD BE WAITING FOR YOU WHEN WE ARE ADVISED
THAT IT IS SAFE TO RETURN.

PLEASE COOPERATE WITH YOUR LOCAL OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY
THOSE CONCERNED WITH TRAFFIC CONTROL. THEY ARE THERE TO
HELP MAKE THE BEST USE OF OUR EXISTING ROADS AND HIGHWAYS.
TRAFFIC CONGESTION CAN BE EXPFCTED. BE PATIENT AND COOPER¬
ATIVE.

KHFN YOU REACH A HOST AREA, YOU WILL BE DIRECTED OFF THE HIGHWAY TO A RECEPTION
AND REGISTRATION CENTER. THERE YOU WILL BE ASSIGNED TO A CONGREGATE CARE AND
FEEDING FACILITY.

WHEN v"!* ARE REGISTERED IN THE HOST AREA, YOU KILL BE ASKED TO IDENTIFY ANY
SPECIAL SKILLS YOU HAVE WHICH WILL BE USEFUL. THERE IS MUCH TO BE DONE AND
EVERYONE MUST HELP.

ALTHOUGH THE HOST AREAS SHOULD BE OUTSIDE THE RANGE OF DIRECT

WEAPONS EFFECTS, THERE IS STILL THE POSSIBILITY OF RADIO¬
ACTIVE FALLOUT. HOST AREAS ARE TYPICALLY SHORT ON FALLOUT
SHELTER SPACE. THEREFORE, ALL ABLE-BODIED PERSONS NOT OTHER¬
WISE ASSIGNED TO ESSENTIAL DUTIES MUST ASSIST IN THE' DEVELOP¬
MENT OF EXPEDIENT FALLOUT SHELTER.

DO NOT ATTEMPT TO RETURN HOME UNTIL ADVISED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY THAT IT IS
SAFE TO DO SO.

WE CAN ALL EXPECT THAT THIS PRUDENT RELOCATION OF PEOPLE
FROM HIGH RISK AREAS WILL BE ONE OF TRIAL AND TRIBULATION.

EVERYONE MUST COOPERATE AND SHARE. BE KIND TO EACH OTHER.

WE ALL HAVE MUCH IN COMMON DURING THIS TIME OF CRISIS. IF
EACH DOES HIS SHARE AND ALL PULL TOGETHER, WE WILL BE A
STRONGER PEOPLE COME WHAT WILL.

THINGS TO DO NOW

HERE ARE SOME KEY THINGS FOR YOU TO DO NOW, TO BETTER PREPARE YOU AND YOUR

FAMILY:

1. CHECK TO SEE IF YOU LIVE IN A RISK AREA. IF SO, PREPARE TO LEAVE. IF
YOU LIVE OUTSIDE THE RISK AREAS, PREPARE TO ASSIST THOSE RELOCATING TO
YOUR COMMUNITY.

2. STAY TUNED TO YOUR LOCAL TV OR RADIO STATION FOR INFORMATION AND INSTRUC¬
TIONS .

3. OBTAIN A COPY OF THE LOCAL EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOUR AREA. READ
THESE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY, DISCUSS THEM WITH YOUR FAMILY, AND ACT ON
THEM IMMEDIATELY.

4 . IF YOU NEED PRESCRIPTION MEDICINE OR ARE ON A SPECIAL DIET, CHECK TO SEE
IF YOU HAVE AN AMPLE SUPPLY.

5. IF YOU HAVE NEED TO USE YOUR CAR, BE SURE YOU HAVE A FULL TANK OF GAS.

6. ASSEMBLE TOOLS—ESPECIALLY SHOVELS, PICKS, HAMMERS. THESE MAY BE NEEDED
TO BUILD EXPEDIENT FALLOUT SHELTER.

7. COLLECT ALL OF YOUR VALUABLE PAPERS AND WRAP THEM UP (PREFERABLY IN
PLASTIC) AND PUT THEM IN A METAL CONTAINER (TOOL BOX, FISHING TACKLE BOX,
ETC.) AND KEEP THEM WITH YOU.

8. STAY CALM. PANIC KILLS. FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN YOU BY LOCAL

AUTHORITIES.

RELOCATION

EVACUATION

RADIO ANNOUNCEMENT
EMERGENCY INFORMATION
TO SURVIVE NUCLEAR ATTACK

Here is important information that can help save your life in the event of nuclear
attack.

If you live in a high risk area and are warned to relocate to another locale
temporarily, there are certain things to remember to do:

FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS' AND ADVICE OF YOUR LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

If you are instructed to move to a certain specific area or location, go there;
don't go anywhere else.

Certain travel routes may be specified or recommended. Use those routes rather
than trying to find shortcuts of your own. (It will help you to have previously
become familiar with the routes likely to be used.)

You may be told to shut off your water, gas, or electric service before leaving
home. Know how to turn them off at their source. Disconnect all appliances, draw
the drapes, close all windows, and lock all doors.

Make sure you have enough fuel in your car.

As you travel, keep listening to local radio stations for additional information
and instructions.

DC/ZT S'-A - 7 9

2.

I

NATiAz-JAL t AtdOlllElZ H-il 77

The Pentagon is developing a “Doomsday” plan to
evacuate 135 million Americans from 400 key target
areas in the event of nuclear war.

Under the plan, Americans would use private trans¬
portation to relocate to “safe -areas” from 20 to 150 miles
away from their homes, and would seek shelter in public
buildings — schools, hospitals, libraries, etc.

Food supplies would be diverted to the “host” areas and

emergency medical services <-

would be provided. Evacuees | By PAUL BANNISTER

would live in the host areas
for up to three weeks after a
nuclear attack, The ENQUIR¬
ER learned.

Seymour Wengrovitz, staff
director of the yiar.s and Sys¬
tems Development Division of
the Defense
Civil Prepared¬
ness Agency in
the Pentagon,
told The EN¬
QUIRER that | 7
the plan could
save 100 million
lives.

another 30 million lives. But
with good relocation planning,
you can save still a further 70
million lives, or a total of 180
million people.”

So far, evacuation plans
have been developed for eight
prototype areas of the nation:
Utica/Rome, N.Y.; Dover,
■ Del.; Macon, Ga.; Duluth,

Minn.;_ Oklahoma City; Colo-
J J? ra(io Springs; Tucson, Ariz.;

“If we do
nothing, 80 mil- J erm0B . ir .

lion people will We " 9rov,u

survive a nuclear attack, out
of our present population of
around 215 million,” Wengro¬
vitz said. “With good civil de¬
fease measures — with people
using shelters and knowing
what to do — we could save

and Great Falls, Mont.
r The Pentagon got
L the evacuation plan in 1974
after military experts learned
of the Soviet Union’s plans for
1 mass relocations of population
centers.

“Now, with Russia having
an evacuation policy, should
a nuclear exchange take place
with the Russians evacuating
their cities and the U.S. not
evacuating any of their popu-

HIGH RISK AREAS in the event of nuclear attack, according to experts, are mark¬
ed in black. There are 400 such areas on this map of the United States developed
by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, inside the Pentagon.

lation, the U.S. would be at
an extreme disadvantage in
terms of population losses,”
I Wengrovitz said.

[ One military expert, Maj.
| Gen. George J. Keegan, a for¬

mer bomber pilot who rose to
become the Air Force’s intel¬
ligence boss from March 1972
to January 1977, said that if
nuclear war erupted today 30
| to 40 Americans would be kill¬

ed for every Russian killed.

Wengrovitz said, if funds are
increased as expected, the
mass evacuation plan could
b$ completed for the entire
nation by 1983 instead of 1989.

DC/ZT H-&! ftue * /J55*

dizp

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

Congress of tfje ®niteb States
^otuie at SUynttEtattocs

Kasfitajjton, 3B.€, 20515

WAYNE GRISHAM

33rd District, California

January 12, 1981

WASHINGTON OFFICE:

ON. D.C. 205IS
: (202) 22S-3S7S

HOME OFFICE:

19801 East Whitt,« Boulevard

DISTRICT MOBILE OFFICE:
Travels The District
ToStftve You

Mr. Clarence C. Baal, Jr.

9051 Via Amorita Avenue
Downey, California 90241

Dear Mr. Baal:

This is in further response to your letter of November
19, 1980, concerning civil defense planning in the United
States. As you know, I had written to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) in connection with your concerns.

It is a pleasure to enclose the response I have received
from the agency. Please note that efforts are currently un¬
derway in the areas of CRP (Crisis Relocation Plans) develop¬
ment, as well as interim planning.

You will also note that during the 1960's, the Office
of Emergency Preparedness provided full federal funding for
recovery planning. However, funding for civil defense pro¬
grams has been limited since then, and post-attack recovery
has not been the subject of much attention.

Of course, the responsibility for authorizing and approp¬
riating funds for civil defense purposes rests with the Congress.
I have, therefore, written to the Chairman of the Committee
on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, the Honor¬
able Melvin Price. I have apprised him of your views, and
requested his comments relative to the work we may expect of
the committee in this area during the 97th Congress. I will,
of course, be happy to share his views and comments with you
as soon as I have received his response.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Member of Congress

WG:JAA
Enclosures

DAILY SIGNAL/
SOUTHEAST NEWS

Frl., Dec. 19,1980

Civil Defense
preparations
felt‘deplorable’

Byjark Andenon

WASHINGTON - Ronald Reagan’s vice
president-elect, George Bush, asserted
during 'the primary campaign that a nuclear
war was in fact winnable. But the govern¬
ment agency most directly responsible for
safeguarding the American populace from a
nuclear holocaust emphatically,disagrees.

The underfunded, overlooked federal
Emergency Management Agency is dprged
with protection of the American people in the
event that Soviet nuclear bombs start
raining down on the continental United
States. But a confidential FEMA report —
prepared under contact by the National
Governors’ Association — makes dear that
oifr preparations for dvil defense cam he
summed up in one word: deplorable.

Indeed, Defense Department assessments
died in the FEMA report estimate that, in
our present state of dvil defense disarray,
“sense 160 million people would be killed by
an attack." The Pentagon didn’t even try to
guess what additional injuries would be
sustained by those who survived an enemy
nuclear strike.

Meanwhile, of course, our intelligence
agencies report that the Soviet Union has
intensified its efforts in recent years to
improve its dvil defense program. And as
FEMA has learned in-its unsuccessful efforts
to get support for its programs, critics insist
that an adequate dvil defense setup can lead
the military to think the unthinkable —■ that
nudearwar is a reasonable option.

“There is a general overestimation by to
American public about national civil defense
planning and funding.” The FEMA report
states, adding: “National policy has been
equivocal, and guidance from the federal
levd has been negligible.”

In particular, the document disdoses an
appalling lack of cooperation between
Washington and the 56 state governments,
which are ultimately responsible for the
safety of the public in a nuclear attack.

“Governors and dtizens trust that to
federal government is planning for to
major programs dealing with an attack,”

Here are some M to basic problems
perceived by the civil defense agency:

— Population relocation. The primary
method envisioned so far by our planners to
save lives in case of enemy attack is the
movement of huge numbers of people from
target areas — what FEMA calls “Crisis
Relocation Planning.” The trouble is that
many of to state officials who would have to
cany out this logistical nightmare have
conduded simply that it won’t work.

—• Communications. “Governors in
general do not know how they will be notified
if an attack is imminent,” to report states.
“Will tore be individual telephone calls
from to president? From the Department of
Defense? From FEMA?” Many governors
don’t even have the security clearance that
would entitle them to the latest intelligence
estimates. They might — like ordinary
cititens — have to depend on themedia for
{heir information.

— “Continuity of leadership.” Preparation
of self-sufficient emergency centers for local
and national leaders is viewed as a necessity
by to dvil defense planners. There are
thousands of these “emergency operating
centers" now in existence, dating back to the
days following the Cuban missile crisis in
1962. These centers should be’ blast-resistant
and equipped with reliable communications
systems. But the FEMA report found that
most of these centers are in pitiful condition,
and would be useless in to event of nuclear
attack.

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Washington D.C. 20472

m 6 198 !

Honorable Wayne Grisham
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Grisham:

This is in response to your letter of December 5, 1980 on behalf of

Mr. Clarence Baal, pertaining to civil defense planning in the United States.

We agree with Mr. Baal's contention that ''paper” plans (i.e., various types
of disaster and nuclear operations plans) are not very effective unless they
are supported by operational systems having effective equipment, personnel
and resources to implement the plans (e.g., Emergency Operating Center with
emergency generator, adequate communications to receive warning and transmit
information and guidance, equipment to respond to emergencies, etc.) and
then testing and exercising the plans on a continuing basis. We in civil
defense intend not only to develop the plans, but to insure that an operational
system of personnel and resources is readily available to implement the plans
so that the full lifesaving potential of the plans can be achieved.

The development of Crisis Relocation Plans (CRP's) is a time-consuming effort.
Virtually all planning is accomplished by State planners under contract to the
Federal Government. Not only do these plans call for moving people from high
risk areas to host areas, they also take into account the reception and care of
evacuees in host areas. For example, they identify the facilities that are to
be used for congregate care housing, how evacuees are to be fed, and how fall¬
out protection is to be provided. Incorporating these details into the CRP is
why such planning is so time consuming. As of September 30, 1980, plans have
been completed for 16 percent of the localities needing them (i.e., 534
locations have complete CRP's).

We also agree with Mr. Baal that there is a need for "some interim plans.”

In addition to developing the full-scale CRP's noted above, we have directed
that State and local government Emergency Management Assistance (formerly
Personnel & Administrative personnelj receiving matching funds from the Federal
Government to implement a civil defense program) get involved in a program
to develop "mini-CRP's.” These mini-plans contain several of the most impor¬
tant portions of a full-scale CRP but are not as time consuming to prepare.

When completed, they provide a rudimentary relocation capability which has some
lifesaving potential. We expect that by the end of Fiscal Year 1982, all
areas requiring CRP's will be covered either by a full-scale or a mini-plan.

In the mid-1960's, the Office of Emergency Preparedness (a predecessor Agency
to FEMA) provided full Federal funding for recovery plans (i.e., development of
Emergency Resource Management Plans). California has such a plan although

2

it may not have been updated recently. Since then, due to the limited funding
that has been available for implementing a civil defense program, our
Agency and its predecessors have not been able to devote much effort to
postattack recovery. We have concentrated our efforts primarily on those
programs which have significant lifesaving potential and which can be
implemented in the preattack phase. Should additional funding be made avail¬
able for emergency preparedness„ updating Emergency Resource Management Plans
would be an important area Of activity. I am enclosing a copy of a research
report on recovery from nuclear attack which may be of interest to Mr. Baal.

I trust that the above information is responsive to Mr. Baal's concerns.

Sincerely yours.

Associate Direcj
Plans and Prep.

Enclosure

£-*£>ejr:jL

,<t4?c»MF7 cor.fM/wy

Dio-.o'ij. ccjTeji ^ccv^. i tl,.i
hail Code 7-25
July 20, 1981

Mr. Loren Fields, Chief
Nuclear Civil Protection Division
California Office of Emergency Services
PO Box 9577

Sacramento, California, 95823

Dear Mr. Fields:

A few months ago you were kind enough to send me copies of the 1968 Emer¬
gency Resources Management plan, and Parts 3 and 4 of the California
Emergency Plan. (Think I already had Part 3) I have managed to wade
Through all three, and have some questions.

As I understand, the 1968 plan is still in effect, except where specifi¬
cally changed by the present plan.

What do parts 1 and 2 of the California Emergency Plan cover?

Part 4 of the Emergency Plan covers food allowances for the public in a
crisis situation, but daily calories aren’t specified. I’m assuming the
2000 to 2500 per day of the 1968 plan still apply as the same lists are
used. With this as a basis, I've run a calorie count using both average
or better, and high count foods that meet the criteria. On the high count,
the best I could get was 2374, v/ith 1783 on the average or better.

From what I understand, of CEP, evacuees will be assigned to upgrading tasks,
much of it manual labor. Can manual labor be performed on this calorie
count?

The diet for the period while in the fallout shelters is described as .
"austere.” Mo calorie count is given, but hopefully it will be more real¬
istic than the 714 calories for public shelters in the 60's. I might also
add that in the same period, the Ubha was recommending 20C0 calories for
home shelters.

Part 4, Section 2, Attachment 1, lists hosting ratios as low as 2-1, quite
a drop from the 7-1 for uniform hosting. Law no figures showing other areas
with high ratios, or even listings as high as 7-1* Is this because fewer
people will be moved? I notice the risk population has dropped from 85$ to
80%. Has the increase in our population been considered?

/

MCOOAWn.t DOUGLAS

I have noted'the changes in routing which help to eliminate the problem of
the bottlenecks north of the Los Angeles Basin, but still have a question
about the statement that essential workers will be hosted within 50 miles,
and those without transportation of their own, within 75 miles. Where are
the host areas in Los Angeles and Orange counties?

Part 4, Section 4, Annex 6 mentions packaged disaster hospitals. Do we
still have these units? I have understood they were done away with some
years ago.

What is'the expected completion date of GRP? ’When the plans have been com¬
pleted, how long will it take to train the people who will be expected to
carry out the plan if it is needed?

I understand a partial plan will be in effect before the completion of CRP.

When will this, mini-plan be ready?

May I make a constructive suggestion? I'm confused about some of the duplicate
pages I have for the emergency Plan. I know they are revisions, but am not
sure which is the latest. Would it be possible to date the pages?

Yours truly,

Clarence C. Baal Jr.
Instructor

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWN JR Governor

OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES

»OST OFFICE BOX 9577
ACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95823
(916) 427-4205

February 3, 1982

Mr. C. C. Baal, Jr., Instructor

Disaster Control Recovery Team

Mail Code 7-25

Douglas Aircraft Company

3855 Lakewood Boulevard

Long Beach, CA 90846

Dear Mr. Baal:

The following is in response to your letter of January 17
regarding crisis relocation and is presented in the same
general order of sequence as your questions.

1. Since the information needed to develop crisis relocation
(CR) plans is extensive, I really don't know how to express
status as a percentage. One basic input is the host area
survey data provided by Corps of Engineers. To date 21
counties have been surveyed with 12 more scheduled for
this fiscal year. All host area surveys are to be com¬
pleted by 1984 but some pick-up work is scheduled through
1987. Also see #2 below.

2. The initial plans have been accomplished for Riverside,

San Bernardino, Merced, Sacramento, and Yuba Counties.
Copies of these plans have been provided to those counties.
Fifteen additional counties are scheduled for completion
this year. This includes Imperial and San Diego Counties
in Southern California.

3. Self-developed mini-CR plans have been prepared by 19
counties not yet covered by the OES/FEMA planning contract.
These plans vary considerably in their scope, content and
detail. They all provide some basis for emergency augmen¬
tation or future expansion under the OES/FEMA contract
effort. The cities and counties in Los Angeles, Orange
and Ventura have yet to accomplish such planning, pending
deliberations currently in progress.

4. The crackers provided in the original fallout shelter
supplies were prepared using lard for shortening. This

Mr. C. C. Baal, Jr.

2

February 3

1982

eventually produced a rancid taste, particularly in supplies
stored in hot and/or damp facilities. Many persons found
the smell and taste objectionable although the crackers
were still nutritious. Many were given to foreign aid
agencies who found them fully acceptable in countries such
as India. Some were also used as cattle and hog feed here
in this country. Basically these items have exceeded their
expected shelf life and have or are being disposed of as
the holding jurisdiction sees fit. There is currently no
federal plan to replace these stocks. Persons using iden¬
tified public shelters would need to provide their own
food items from sources available to them.

5. Enclosed are two documents related to Nuclear Reactor
Planning which may be of value to you.

Best Regards,

LOREN FIELDS, Chief
NCP Division

enclosures

1 ail Co<lc f
January 25, l c d2

Irr Angel c s County Supo -vuor ; > . "eth hair

Hull of Administration

lor ' ilii *' , < <

'i'aiiu. t.,' c-vacua f iej , ‘‘ + }< l a in ju c s so of uud .r 2

eu.luh d, it won 1 ] t,].> diyf to evaiid to all to t* o deceit to

such ton's «o Reu’V.uri and i’ur’iu'* i/.xr' there if Jit-io In th \joj

of ra) 3 > •art for i nn a i .*r, j ui’, 1 . r of people. i.pth io... turn if

1,1 L,n. t ?o hornin' 1 ; time, v< ur relation was to prevent tne attack in
the first place.

We include Civil Defense in our classes. Could you give us the
source of your information?

Yours truly,

MCOO/VIVELS. £S£s$JaS£./ZS

STATE

CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWN JR., Governor

OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES

POST OFFICE BOX 9577
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95823
(916) 427-4205

July 28, 1981

Mr. Clarence C. Baal, Jr.

Disaster Control Recovery Team
Mail Code 7-25
Douglas Aircraft Company
3855 Lakewood Boulevard
Long Beach, CA 90846

Dear Mr. Baal:

In your letter of July 20, several questions are raised
which I will attempt to address..

1. Part One of the State Emergency Plan is the basic
plan. It provides authority, lists various potential
emergencies which must be planned for, identifies the
basic state emergency organization and related emergency
tasks, and describes the interfaces between state and
local governments for emergency operations. It was last
updated and published in 1978.

Part Two, also published in 1978, addresses various peace¬
time emergencies and the general concept of operations to
be applied, both in response to and recovery from the
emergency situation. Considerable attention is given to
post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation and the state
and federal programs available to support such activities.

Part Three is the compendium of disaster-related legis¬
lation and references, and

Part Four is the war plan, now being revised and updated.
It is important to note that this document is still con¬
sidered a working draft and it will not be considered
complete until all of the statewide crisis relocation
planning has been accomplished.

2. The various food tables in the war plan were prepared
originally by USDA some years back and lacking newer data
were carried forward into the present document. The plan¬
ning assumptions were based on survival requirements and
are certainly austere. Shelter rations are even more so,
since shelter life is very sedentary.

Mr. Clarence C. Baal, Jr.

2

July 28, 1981

3. We are attempting to use the latest population figures
but are limited, in some instances, by what data is avail¬
able, particularly for computer data processing. These
numbers will be updated as the 1980 census data becomes
available.

4. While a uniform hosting ratio would seem to spread the
congregate care load more equitably, it forces excessively
long initial travel distances and places heavy strains on
the resupply system.

5. The 50- and 75-mile limits are planning objectives,

to be used where they can be met, and intended to minimize
commuting distances and turnaround times. Our hosting
problems are so high in California that host areas begin
immediately outside the desginated risk areas; we have no
buffer zones. Therefore, only the most northern portions
of Los Angeles County and southeastern Orange County are
outside the risk area and available for hosting. Unfor¬
tunately, like the shelter program, the national approach
to crisis relocation does not give us the same benefits
as are possible elsewhere throughout the country.

6. The package disaster hospitals were surveyed several
years back to those interested jurisdictions providing
storage space. Some remain essentially intact while others
have been cannibalized for worthwhile components. They do
not represent a significant medical resource and reference
to them will probably be deleted in a future revision of
the draft plan.

7. When we first proposed doing crisis relocation planning
almost three years back, we estimated six to eight years

to accomplish the first full circle of planning for a state
as complex as California. That estimate still applies.

Last year, in addition to our contract planning process,
FEMA initiated a fill-the-gap approach referred to as mini-
CRPs. Under this approach, e>ach jurisdiction would develop
a rudimentary plan appropriate to the local situation. The
objective is to have a very basic war plan in place which
could be rapidly enhanced in the event of actual need.

Some progress has been made in this direction and it con¬
tinues to receive emphasis. Hopefully this process will
result in a meaningful although limited level of awareness
and preparedness by FY 1983.

I hope this letter is responsive to the issues raised.

Thank you for your interest and concern.

In theory Crisis Relocation Planning (CRP) and improvised fallout
shelter form a beautiful concept. The plan is cheap, and with luck it
can be fairly effective — as long as enemies of the U.S. will give us four
days to implement it. The plan fiis into tight budgets. It fits into a
bureaucracy dedicated to social programs. When it tries to fit into
projections of real disaster the "fit" seems to become questionable.

Here concerned citizen Marc Ridenour takes a critical look.

SAUVE-GUI-PEUT!

— Marc V. Ridenour

You read articles, statistics,
graphs and profiles that show how
far ahead of the United States the
Soviet Union has gone in terms of
various military stockpiles. And
from time to time you see a footnote
on the civil defense situation — how
we have practically nothing com¬
pared to the USSR.

But it really doesn't hit home until
you go for an exploratory walk, as it
were, and see just how bad it is in
your own home town.

Then it sinks in.

That’s what I did in Marshalltown,
Iowa (population: 26,000). I had with
me the current shelter plan — an
attractive yellow and black supple¬
ment from the October 16, 1970
Marshalltown Times-Republican.
Title: “Family Emergency Plan.”

It contained a complete map of
the city, with more than 40 num¬
bered dots on the map to show
where designated public shelters
were located. Each shelter was sup¬
posed to be completely stocked and
equipped with food, water, medi¬
cines, sanitation equipment, radio¬
logical monitoring gear.

I made calls at seven of the listed
shelters. At two of them I found the
remnants of shelter supplies — in
disarray but they were there, at least
in part, for what they might or might
not be worth. I was not tempted to
sample them. At one location — an
apartment building — I simply found
no one who knew anything about
the shelter, no way to check it, no
key on the premises. At three of the
mapped shelters (one being our
own county courtnouse) there were
no supplies at all, no shelter, no
nothing. And at one address there
was only a vacant lot — a city park¬

ing area. The building was long
gone.

That was enough. I cut short my
visit right there. If we can’t take care
of our own Marshalltown people, I
asked myself, how can we expect to
assume an additional load as a
designated host area under the
Crisis Relocation Planning concept?

Editor’s note: In-place shelter advo¬
cates so far have had the lion’s share
of Journal of Civil Defense copy — in
spite of the fact that CRP is appar¬
ently the preferred U.S. Government
civil defense policy. The Journal
invites input from CRP advocates.

I had no answer. But! knew some¬
one who did: Marcella Carlson, the
dedicated and overworked Marshall
County Civil Defense Director. I
knocked on her door. And I asked
her the same question.

“Concerning Crisis Relocation,"
she replied, “I feel it would possibly
work in the case of an incident in¬
volving the Palo Nuclear Power
Plant [65 miles east of Marshall¬
town] with up to 18,000 people ear¬
marked to come from that area. It's
been shown that 20% or less of the
people who evacuate go where
they’re supposed to go. They move
in with friends or relatives, go to
motels, etc., and so we probably
wouldn't get the entire 18,000. But
we are planning for that amount. !
feel it might work in this case.

“However, as far as a nuclear war
happening, no. I don’t see how a
county of this size could take in an
additional 18,000 people and plan to
shelter them from radioactive fallout
when we don't even have enough
shelter spaces for our own. Add to

that weather complications, es¬
pecially in the dead of winter with
the earth frozen hard as rock. And
Marshalltown, Iowa is only one
place of many in this predicament.

“I justdon'tthink it’s a bit feasible.”
•

What came to my mind was the
famous phrase used by French sol¬
diers in rout at the Battle of Water¬
loo: “Sauve-qui-peut” — every man
for himself.

That’s a hell of a way to run our
homeland defense. But it’s obvious
that it’s all we have until something
better comes along. □

Marshall County
nowa) CD Director ■.
Marcella Carlson :

River Cun CluD ■
Shelter

l -

L&L

':7A V-

?/f"\ \

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Employed by the Colorado Division
of Disaster Emergency Services, Larry
Ledwick also conducts private con¬
sultations and training for small sur¬
vival groups. He is a member of the
Colorado Radiological Defense Of¬
ficers Association and has taught state
and local government courses for
them. He is currently an active com¬
petitive shooter with the Colorado Na¬
tional Guard and is writing a survival
handbook about protective measures
against the effects of nuclear weapons.

V i

F RED hears the ,50-cai. macmne gun hammering away witn as steaau
pum, pum, pum. . . Sarge is yelling something and pointing but in the
the eerie light and the noise of battle, Fred can't make out what it is.
Suddenly he wakes up and realizes that he is m his own bedroom. It is 3:00
in the morning. But why all the yelling outside? And the flickering light? He
stumbles and runs to the door, pulling his pants on as he goes.
“Thank God you’re up; get out of here! The plant is burning. . .everything is
exploding," his neighbor Mike yells as he runs toward his car. Fred watches,
dazed, as Mike burns a hundred miles of rubber off his tires. Fred is trying to
decide if this is still a dream.
Then his wife Debbie comes to the porch and. looking at the sky glow in the
south, asks, “What’s wrong, honey?” The night is shattered at tnat moment by a
blinding flash, then a huge ball of fire boils into the morning sky. Even at a
distance of 1 l A miles, the heat is like a blast furnace. In a heartbeat. Fred’s brain
switches to reflexes he hasn’t used since 1967. In one smooth motion he grabs
Debbie and dives off the porch away from the fireball. They hit the grass an
instant before the ground shock arrives, then, HA seconds later, the air blast
rolls over their neighborhood like an ocean breaker. Picture windows become ja
hundred glittering daggers, doors are blown off their hinges and. nearer the
blast, a roof tumbles like an autumn leaf in the angry glare of the fireball.

Continued on page 62

42 SURVIVE

EVACUATE

Continued from page 42

Half dragging and half carrying Debbie,
Fred runs toward their car. With his free
hand he digs in his pants pocket praying
the car keys are there.

Disasters happen frequently, and vic¬
tims deal with them as best as they can.
What 1 have just described is not an evac¬
uation. It is the panicked flight of refugees
from a disaster in progress. An evacua¬
tion is a planned, orderly departure from
a hazardous area before the risk area
becomes so dangerous that movement
itself becomes an unacceptable risk. If
you wait that long, it is too late to
evacuate.

Recently, evacuation has been the
focus of much debate, gnashing of teeth
and wringing of hands — most of which
has been directed at the Federal Emer¬
gency Management Agency (FEMA) and
at state and local governments, who are
responsible for the development of com¬
prehensive evacuation plans to deal with
Sny impending disaster. Unfortunately,
many critics questioned these plans
before they had reached even the first
stage of completion.

Nobody claims that by having fire es¬
capes and exit signs in major office build¬
ings you make arson more likely. But in
this case — because the word “nuclear”
was often used — some felt that a city
evacuation plan would somehow encour¬
age destruction by nuclear weapons.
However, through the efforts of thou¬
sands of volunteers, in the face of ever-
dwindling funding, civil-defense agencies
over the last 20 years have managed to
maintain at least a skeleton of an in-place-
shelter program and public warning
system.

Evacuation is one option considered
when dealing with almost any disaster.
Whether it's a flash flood in Estes Park,
Colorado, or exploding tankcars in Liv¬
ingston, Louisiana, the problems are
usually the same. And the time to handle
them is almost always short.

Planning is characterized by a series of
successive approximations, each more
specific than its predecessor. These result
in the most workable compromise solu¬
tion. There is no such thing as a perfect
plan, although some are significantly bet¬
ter than others. Planning is a process, not
a product. Any plan can be shot down by
playing a game of “what if. ” The trick is to
develop a plan general enough to handle
most unforeseen situations, and specific
enough to be efficient in the most likely
cases — without being counter-produc¬
tive in the worst case.

1 hope to help you develop an .evacua¬
tion plan for your family by showing
some of the preparations 1 have made
and pointing out some of the questions
you need to ask yourself.

The most difficult hurdle for most peo¬
ple is devising a system to pack the essen¬
tials for easy loading or carrying. I use a

modular approach; starting with the most
essential resources in the smaller and
more portable travel packs.

I call my most basic travel pack my
“panic bag,” composed of two items; a
web belt with attachments and a small
teardrop pack or rucksack. If necessary, 1
can carry it. My panic bag contains what 1
consider to be the absolute necessities for
immediate to short-term survival;

Web Belt Gear:

Compass

Whistle

Sheath knife with sharpening stone
Metal canteen (1 qt.. filled) with
folding handle cup
Cocoa mix (2), Dry soup mix (2) (fit
in bottom of canteen carrier)

Lip balm

Disposable butane lighter
Plastic bag with adhesive bandages,
2”x3” gauze pads, Vz” adhesive-
tape roll

Hand soap (hotel size)

5"x7” wash cloth made from old
cotton sock

Rucksack:

Information pack
Plastic tube tent
Wool sweater
Durable pants, 1 pair
Two pair socks
Wool muffler
Two pair underwear
Wool mitten liners
Leather overmitts

Urethane-coated nylon ground
cloth/poncho

50-yd. roll 30test nylon casting line
Assorted hooks and fishing gear
Zinc-oxide sunburn ointment
Folding saw

100 ft. 1/8" nylon rope
Disposable butane lighter in sealed
store pack
Four 3/4" candles
Flashlight
Sewing kit
Sunglasses
Boot laces

Six cans of pull-tab one-dish meals
(e.g.. ! pork and beans)

Roll toilet paper

Wool GI glove liners (for use when
mittens are too clumsy)

Three trash bags
Signal mirror

Boonie hat (soft and floppy for
shade)

Insulated helmet liner or stocking
cap

Obviously, the specific contents of
these modular packs will be modified to fit
your own needs. A family with small chil¬
dren. for instance, will require different
things than a bachelor in his 30s. If you
pack your equipment properly, you
should be able to get out of bed at 3;00 in
the morning, as Fred did, pack your car
and leave in about 10 minutes. 1 did it re¬

cently in 7:23, packing all the bags 1 will
describe, including food and cooking
footlockers 1 routinely use when camp¬
ing. (A side benefit is that 1 never have to
make a special effort to prepare for a
hunting or fishing trip; I am always ready
to go.)

Over the years 1 have tried many dif¬
ferent ways to pack my gear: and the
most effective is to put most of my clothes
and equipment in soft duffel or athletic-
type bags. They are handy to carry, can
be color-coded, conform to odd little
nooks and crannies in my jeep and don't
scratch things up or rattle on rough roads.

I strongly recommend that, with the ex¬
ception of equipment that needs solid
protection, you should avoid suitcases
and footlockers because they're unwieldy
and expensive. You can buy five or six
duffel bags for the price of one suitcase.

One critical feature of my panic bag is
the information pack. This is the key to
restarting your life if your home and its
contents are destroyed. It's also an aid in
less-disastrous situations. It should in¬
clude at least the following information:

Insurance-policy numbers and
agents' names and phone num¬
bers

Location of safety deposit boxes and
bank accounts with account num¬
bers (these can be coded for your
protection by transposing a couple
of easily remembered digits, or by
adding, subtracting, multiplying or
dividing the digits by a number
unique to you — for instance, the
sum of your address and your
birth year)

Copies of medical histories, wills,
birth certificates, drivers’ licenses,
job histories/resumes and educa¬
tional certificates

Phone numbers of relatives, friends
and key associates

Pocket-size manual of emergency/
survival information

Place this information in a stout en¬
velope, seal and label for contents, wrap
several times in newspaper and then
wrap twice in aluminum foil. Seal in a
heat-seal bag and place inside another
heavy envelope. This will form a durable
package able to tolerate a lot of abuse,
float and even resist fire to some degree.

Depending on the circumstances —
and time limit — 1 have prepared addi¬
tionally a pair of duffel bags and a large,
soft pack to augment my panic bag.
These contain items which 1 consider
necessary for long-term survival:

Blue Duffel Bag:

Camp cook set (pots and pans)

Camp stove and spare fuel can

Poncho liner (light quilted blanket)

Quilted, insulated inner pants

One pair fishnet underwear (long-
john)

Insulated vest

SURVIVE

MARCH APRIL 83

Two heavy shirts
Two pair pants
Pair sturdy boots

Two pair socks (stuff inside boots)

Green Duffel Bag:

Backpack tent with poles, pegs and
rain fly

Space blanket (reinforced type, not
thin mylar)

Mummy-type sleeping bag and
over-bag
Large bath towel
Shaving kit

Roll toilet paper (women should in¬
clude sanitary napkins or tam¬
pons)

Tan Soft Pack:

Closed-cell foam sleeping pad
Rain gear (jacket and chaps)

First-aid equipment in three color-
coded pouches
100 ft. 1/8" nylon rope
One pair protective covers for top of
boots

Field jacket, camouflage
One set fatigues, camouflage
This equipment would cover you in a
typical evacuation. In case of nuclear at¬
tack, you should include additional
equipment for protection against fallout.

I also stock a full-size suitcase with first-
aid supplies. There are many good
sources listing what to ihclude.

Under nuclear-attack conditions, there
is a special need for attention to sanita¬
tion. Radiation exposure usually kills by
depressing the body's system: the victim
dies from a massive secondary im¬
munological infection and internal
hemorrhage. The following equipment
will allow you to set up minimum sanita¬
tion facilities in an expedient shelter.
Sanitation Kit:

Portable toilet

Three packages (10 each) dispos¬
able toilet bags

Two packages (6 rolls each) toilet
paper

One can chlorine bathroom cleanser
One plastic bottle cleaner/disinfec¬
tant

Two boxes (40 each) tampons
(more compact than sanitary
napkins)

Six toothbrushes
Pair rubber work gloves
Three bars soap

Two 1-lb. boxes heavy-duty cleaner
(for laundry. 1/8 cup)

My food, water and cooking packs are
slightly more complicated than most
would need, but they certainly make life
easier. Remember that, in the Middle
Ages, spices like black pepper and cin¬
namon were worth their weight in gold.
Take special note of the five gallons of
water: it could easily be your most
valuable cargo.

Some additional items to consider for
long-term evacuation are:

Comprehensive survival manual of
your choice (e g., the Army's FM
21-76 or the Air Force AFM 64-5)
Reading materia!

Deck of cards
Pad of paper and pencils
State highway map. local city map
and topo map of the area to which
you plan to evacuate
American Red Cross first-aid hand¬
book or similar reference
Spare keys for house and cars
Envelope with emergency cash in
small bills, blank checks and
change

Small travel clock
Large sewing kit
Large box laundry detergent
Creature comforts (studies have
shown that things like make-up for
women, or shaving equipment for
men. usually enable people to bet-
. ter tolerate discomforts)

At this point, you should have all your
basic needs packed in some type of suit¬
able container. Now it’s time to load.
First, assign a priority to each package:
the most important wii! be loaded first.
Second, actually fit them together in the
car. When you, find a comfortable ar¬
rangement. go on a couple of errands in
the loaded car. You will usually find that
some small readjustments need to be
made. (In one of my first trial runs, one of
my footlockers was banging on the win¬
dow every time I made a left turn.) Also,
when you return from a trip, make a note
of the things you needed but didn't have
with you. and rote the things you never
needed that could be replaced by more
useful equipment.

The last two aspects of evacuation
planning involve choosing your retreat
site (which should, ideally, be reachable
by foot) and what routes to use. Every¬
one in the family should know where you
plan to go and how you plan to get there.
You should have a family conference and
decide what to do if everyone is out when
disaster strikes. Every plan should include
a nearby, out-of-town rally point. If
evacuation is called for when everyone is
away from home, the first family
members to return home should load the
equipment and then wait only a specified
time for the others. Then they should
move themselves and the equipment to
the rally point, and again wait only a
specified time. If the other family
members still don’t appear, those with the
equipment should move toward the
prearranged final destination. There
should also be a secondary destination in
case the roads are blocked or traffic is
controlled. This plan will make evacua¬
tion more efficient and family reunion
much more likely, because each isolated
member will know where to look for the
others — and where the others will be
looking for him.

If at all possible, drive the planned
evacuation routes, conducting a route

reconnaissance and looking for things like
bridges and tunnels which are easily
blocked and alternate routes around
them. Look for places that local residents
might intentionally block to keep out
evacuees, then find alternate routes
around them. Particularly if your final
destination is hard to find under norma!
circumstances, be sure you don't have to
depend on signs and other reference
points that could be destroyed or altered.

When you have completed this evacu¬
ation planning, you have given yourself
an option with which to respond to any
disorder that might affect your home.
You have not only made a contribution
to your own survival, but in a small way
you will ease the burden on your local
emergency preparedness agency: You
are one person or family group that will
not strain already limited resources dur¬
ing an emergency.

Remember that planning is a process.
You may find that evacuation is not the
best choice for your family — and that is
knowledge worth having. □

RECOMMENDED
READING LIST

The following books are among she
standard sources of information about
nuclear war and how to survive it:

Nuclear War Survival Skills by
Cresson H. Kearny (Caroline House
Publishers Inc.. Dept. SV. 920 W. In¬
dustrial Dr.. Aurora. 1L 60506).

Life After Doomsday by Bruce
Clayton (Paladin Press. Dept. SV.
P.O. Box 1307. Boulder. CO
80306).

Better Read than Dead by Thomas
F. Nieman (Paladin Press).

The Effects of Nuclear War. com¬
piled by the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment (Superinten¬
dent of Documents. U.S. Goverment
Printing Office. Washington. D.C.
20402).

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.
edited by Samuel Glasstone and
Philip J. Dolan (U.S. Dept, of De¬
fense and Dept, of Energy. Superin¬
dent of Documents).

. - Eds.

Shelter and crisis relocation, their respective merits and pitfalls —
Carsten Haaland of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, in the second of
his three-part series, looks dispassionately at the effectiveness of
passive defense measures.

II. HOW EFFECTIVE CAN SHELTERS BE?*

— Carsten M. Haaland
Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Suppose the Soviets build up a
force of twenty to thirty thousand
strategic nuclear weapons. Can
there be any effective civil defense
against such an arsenal used to
attack the U.S. population? People
who have studied civil defense be¬
lieve that it is possible; however, it
would require much, much more
effort, expense, and education. An
anti-missile city defense would add
even more expense, but such an
active defense combined with pas¬
sive civil defense may be essential
for deterrence and for survival, if
deterrence fails, as the Soviets con¬
tinue to build larger offensive sys¬
tems.

Let us consider the effect of a
continuing Soviet buildup of
nuclear weapons on one of the
major proposed civil defense plans
for the United States, the Crisis
Relocation Program (CRP). An im¬
portant study 1 in 1978 showed that
an effective CRP could be devel¬
oped for only about $2-3 billion.
CRP can be effective only if there is
time for the majority of people in
high-risk areas (Fig. 1) to be relo¬
cated before a nuclear attack oc¬
curs. The study showed that a mas¬
sive nuclear attack on the U.S. by
the Soviets in the 80s would result in
possibly 25-40% survivors if the U.S.
civil defense program remained at
its current level, that is, virtually no
civil defense. But if CRP were imple¬
mented, the number of survivors
after the same attack could rise to
80-95%. This program of relocation
looked so good that President Car¬
ter ordered it to be implemented in

‘Derived from research jointly sponsored
by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy
under contract W-7405-eng-26 with the
Union Carbide Corporation.

12 Journal ot Civil Defense: December 1932

Presidential Directive 41, issued first
in Secret form on September 29,
1978 and declassified on June 23,
1980. A siight variant of this reloca¬
tion program, with the costs spread
over a slightly longer time, has come
to be known as Program D-Prime.
D-Prime has many supporters be¬
cause of its estimated low cost and
high effectiveness.

Under this program, most of the
people undergoing relocation are to
be lodged in existing buildings in
small cities and towns, a plan not yet
being accepted by many towns in¬
volved. The buildings will provide,
or can be quickly modified to pro¬
vide, some fallout protection, but
they will provide little or no blast
protection.

If the Soviets build a force of tens
of thousands of strategic nuclear
warheads, many more of the smaller
cities and towns could also become
targets and be rated as high-risk

areas. The number of people to be
relocated would then increase, the
time required for their relocation
would increase, the number of host
areas would decrease along with the
number of buildings available for
shelter in the remaining host areas.
It would then become necessary to
build many more expedient shelters
to protect the relocated population.
Construction of these shelters
would further increase the time re¬
quired to get the U.S. population
into a protected posture.

If the relocation plan finally be¬
comes acceptable and ready to be
implemented only after several
years’ development, it may then have
a much reduced effectiveness: the
time required for relocation of some
90-120 million Americans may by
that time be much longer than the
time required for the Soviets to get
their people into a protected pos-

ture. A US. effort to develop
D-Prime will certainly change Soviet
plans and may spur the Soviets to
hasten construction of their blast
shelters, which they have been
building for years. The belief that
there will be time to implement
D-Prime is predicated on the
assumption that the Soviets will
evacuate their people into rural
areas according to their decade-old

sons: (1) they might feel they could
accomplish their goals without risk¬
ing the disastrous consequences
of a massive U.S. counterstrike
(devastating, even though it may be
insufficient to halt the Soviet’s pur¬
suit of their offensive goal), and (2)
they might believe that, by maintain¬
ing a prolonged crisis, they could
seriously disrupt our economy or
perhaps cause our political system to

psi and would also provide protec¬
tion from most subsequent effects,
such as the heat and noxious gases
from firestorms as well as nuclear
radiation from fallout. The hardness
of 100-psi blast shelters reduces the
area of lethality dramatically (up to
a factor of thirty).

These shelters should be situated
so that most mobile citizens in high
population areas could walk to one

. . . D-PRIME . . . MAY SPUR THE SOVIETS TO HASTEN CONSTRUCTION OF THEIR BLAST SHELTERS . . .

civil defense plans. 2 If the Soviet
relocation went according to these
plans, a week or two might be
required before the Soviets would
feel that their people were protected.
They would probably not consider
launching a nuclear attack and risk¬
ing a devastating counterattack un¬
til they had reached this position.
However, the time needed to protect
the population to a given degree
would be greatly reduced if their
people only had to move a short dis¬
tance to existing blast shelters for
protection. If a nuclear strike were
launched after a crisis period of only
a few hours, only a minor portion of
the U.S. population could be proper¬
ly relocated, and the D-Prime would
not work as intended.

However, there is a possibility that
the Soviets might not launch a first-
strike while a major proportion of
the U.S. population is vulnerable,
even though their people are pro¬
tected. For example, during such a
period, the Soviets may try to talk
the U.S. leadership into acquiescing
to Soviet demands on any number of

change in their favor. Of course, one
may speculate endlessly into differ¬
ent worlds of the future. Strategists
often do, although they too often
neglect the effectiveness of strong
civil defense programs, particularly
as deterrence to war and protection
against nuclear blackmail.

From .these brief considerations,
one may conclude that although
having D-Prime may not be a trump
card, it would certainly be important
to the U.S. in an international poker
game. Furthermore, implementing
D-Prime would immensely strength¬
en our country simply through the
process of educating and training
Americans on survival methods in
nuclear war, and would awaken
many to the realization that ai
nuclear war would not necessarily
mean the end of the possibility of an
acceptable society. An even strong¬
er civil defense program, with blast
shelters, industrial protection, etc.,
would provide even more effective
deterrence and a greatly improved
capability to deal with nuclear
blackmail.

in just a few minutes; however, they
should not be clustered so that a
number of them become vulnerable
to a single, modestly-large weapon.
The distribution of people after they
have occupied the shelters should
be planned so that the number of
people in any circle corresponding
to the extent of the 100-psi over¬
pressure does not exceed, but is
less, if possible, than the preshelter
population in that area. Shelters
should be located in parks and open
areas whenever possible to spread
out the sheltered population and to
reduce the possibility of rubble
covering the shelter. Over moder¬
ately flat terrain, the area affected by
100-psi from a 1-MT groundburst
would be about 1.3sq mi (2.0sq km).
In general, the 100-psi area may be
increased by about 40% by a wea¬
pon that is airburst — in this case,
the 100-psi area for a 1-MT weapon
would be about 1.8sq mi (2.9sq,km).
An attacker might prefer to ground-
burst the weapon despite this de¬
crease in area because, by ground¬
bursting the weapon, he will pro-

. . . D-PRIME . . . WOULD CERTAINLY BE IMPORTANT TO THE U.S. IN AN INTERNATIONAL POKER GAME.

issues, which need not be discussed
here. If, under these tense circum¬
stances, the U.S. leadership ac¬
quiesced to Soviet demands, which
may be made all-the-more tempting
by asking only that the U.S. play a
passive role, then D-Prime would
have failed in a strategic sense.

Should the U.S. leadership not
acquiesce to Soviet demands during
these hours of U.S. vulnerability of
the majority of its population, the
Soviets might yet hold back on a
nuclear strike for a least two rea-

The same 1978 study 1 that pro¬
posed CRP also examined other
civil defense measures. That work
showed that a blast shelter system-
one that would maintain the initial
survivor level at about 85-95% after
the same massive Soviet attack
hypothesized against the other can¬
didate civil defense systems —
could be constructed for less than
$100 billion (1979 dollars). The con¬
struction of blast shelters in high-
risk areas would protect the occu¬
pants against overpressures of 100-

duce an enormous radioactive cra¬
ter and will cover hundreds of
square miles downwind with lethal
fallout. Neither of these effects
would be produced by an airburst.

In areas of high population den¬
sity, the shelters can have a larger
capacity than in less populated
areas. However, they should not be
constructed to hold many more than
a thousand people per shelter. The
problems of handling so many peo¬
ple in a single shelter are multiple
— many more entranceways are re-

Journal ol Civil Detense; December 1982 13

quired to prevent queuing, and ven¬
tilation, sanitation, and manage¬
ment become much more difficult.
Also, the inherent safety from re¬
dundant systems is reduced by
large populations per shelter. It is
assumed here that 1000-person
shelters are the largest to be con¬
structed. In areas where the popula¬
tion density exceeds 2000 per

supply of weapons unless valuable
targets were involved and key peo¬
ple were expected to be in shelter.
The value of property in many of
these areas may be high enough on
the average to justify targeting with
missiles. It will also be much more
difficult in some of these high-
density areas to place the shelters
far enough from military-industrial

per one'-megaton weapon by a fac¬
tor of five when compared with the
payoff of 100-psi shelters. The
attractiveness of targeting people in
the super-dense areas would be re¬
moved by constructing 1000-psi
shelters for them, but the exorbitant
cost of these shelters suggests that
alternate methods of defense
should be examined.

IN MANHATTAN AND DOWNTOWN SAN FRANCISCO ,.. RAPID EVACUATION IS OUT OF THE QUESTION ...

square mile, several shelters may
be vulnerable to a single weapon.
In the following discussion, three
levels of population density will be
considered, namely: (1) 500 to 2000
people per square mile: (2) 2000 to
15,000 people per square mile: and
(3) 15,000 and more people per
square mile.

According to an analysis of the
1970 Census 3 , about 45 million
(22% of the U.S. population) re¬
sided in areas with a population
density of less than 2000 (but more
than 500) people per square mile.
Such areas would be targeted only
to destroy key facilities. Populations
in such areas would be best pro¬
tected by dispersion, if there is
time, to sites away from the key
facilities, although a few sites might
justify having high-overpressure
facilities. The number of weapons
and their delivery systems are a
limiting factor, even if the targeteer
might have many tens of thousands
of weapons. Targets within such
urban areas would be selected on
the basis of the attack plan being
used. There would be no weapon
fatalities in such areas if the shelters
were located at least a mile from the
likely targets, and the attacking
weapon did not miss its assumed
target by more than a quarter-mile.

What about protection of people
who live in areas where the popula¬
tion density is greater than 2000
(but less than 15.000) people per
square mile? Approximately 85 mil¬
lion were in this category at the time
of the 1970 Census 3 . The fatalities
and property loss would be higher
per weapon here than in the
less densely populated areas, but it
still might not be high enough to
justify the use of the always-limited

14 Journal of Civil Defense December 1982

targets to be out of lethal range.
Fatalities per weapon might rise to
10,000 even with people in 100-psi
shelters.

At the time of the 1970 Census,
about 20 million Americans lived
within central urban areas which, if
combined, would add up to only
about 1000 square miles. The popu¬
lation densities for these areas
ranged from 15,000 people per
square mile to a maximum of
135,000 per square mile in the Bronx
of New York City 3 . Protection
of the people in these super-dense
areas with a blast shelter system
alone would be very difficult. The
concentration of valuable industrial
and real property is so great in these
central urban areas that almost
every 100-psi shelter would be
located within lethal distance of a
potential target. Furthermore, the
key-people “payoff” in these super-
dense areas, even though people
are in 100-psi shelters, may become
attractive to the targeteer.

Shelters providing blast protec¬
tion against overpressures exceed¬
ing 100-psi can only be constructed
at an enormous increase in cost.
This increase is necessary to pro¬
vide shock isolation to prevent the
shelter from rattling its occupants,
causing injury and death, when a
nuclear weapon explodes nearby.
To be safe, the shelter interiors must
be mounteo on large springs with
shock absorbers, similar to an over-
sized automobile-suspension
system.

The technology for making shel¬
ters capable of protecting their
occupants at overpressures up to
1000-psi already exists. Such 1000-
psi shelters in the super-dense areas
would reduce the people “payoff”

There are two other methods of
defense for people in super-dense
areas: namely, moderate evacuation
(where possible) to adjacent areas
and active defense, i.e., ballistic
missile defense. In Manhattan and
downtown San Francisco, for exam¬
ple, a rapid evacuation is out of the
question because there is restricted
access to adjacent areas. However,
in most central areas, the people in
super-dense areas could . expand
outwards in a short-range evacua¬
tion into 100-psi shelters in adjacent
areas and thus reduce the people
“payoff” to an unattractive level.

Where the short-range evacuation
from super-dense areas is restricted
by limited access, an active defense
becomes attractive. This defense
could be made strong enough to
force the attacker to use so many
weapons against the defended area
that the payoff per weapon would be
reduced to an unattractive level.
The attacker would then seek other
targets for his weapons. Active
defense will be discussed in the
third and last article in this series.

□

References

1. Roger J. Sullivan. Winder M. Heller, and
E. C. Aldridge. Jr., Candidate U.S. Civil
Defense Programs. SPC-R-342. System
Planning Corporation, Arlington, VA,
March 1978.

2. N. I. Akimov, editor. Civil Defense. Mos¬
cow, 1969. translation by S. J. Rimshaw,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. ORNL-tr-
2306. April 1971. Copies available from
NTIS, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Springfield. VA. 22151.

3. Carsten M. Haaland and Michael T, Heath.
"Mapping of Population Density,"
Demography. Vol. II, No. 2. May 1974, p.
321.

IS NUCLEAR WAR THINKABLE?

"Nuclear war is unthinkable," so state editors, commentators and
talk show hosts. "The fallout would be so heavy no one could sur¬
vive. There can be no winner in a nuclear war. We already have
mutual 1y assured destruction (the MAD doctrine) so why build more
weapons? So what if the Soviets do have a civil defense program,
what kind of world would be left?" The twisted logic of this line
of reasoning implies that if nuclear war is unthinkable, then there
will be no war, and instead of spending money on arms, funds can
be diverted to social programs.

Since the first caveman learned he could bash out the brains of
another caveman with a rock or club, there have been those that
have wailed the race was doomed unless such weapons were outlawed.

The crossbow, the submarine, and poison gas all fell into this cat¬
egory. Poison gas was outlawed in WWII, but the word "outlawed" is
really a misnomer. The Axis did not use poison gas, only because
they thought the Allied capability in this field was considerably
greater than their own. It wasn't, and therein lies a military
principle. You can only prevent an enemy using a military capa¬
bility when you have an identical capability of far greater strength.
This principle can also be applied to the maintenance of peace.

Though it is an amazing accomplishment, many on the national or pub¬
lic scene have managed to expound the theories of unilateral dis¬
armament and detente while their heads are buried deeply in sand.
"Nuclear war is unthinkable?" Wishing only makes it so in fairy
tales, and misguided good intentions may bring you curses from your
grandchildren for forcing them to live under Communism.

Our national policies, especially since the end of WWII, have shown
a complete lack of understanding of Soviet psychology, or the goals
of Communism. Those who follow Marx and Lenin have the fervor of
missionaries, with world Communism the goal of their crusade, yet
even when they have told us what they intend to do, our leaders
have refused to take heed.

To the Soviets, nuclear war is thinkable, and when the balance of
power is heavy enough on their side, they will very likely use
that force. Actually, we have increased Soviet military capability
by feeding them, selling them the technology, and by refusing to
adopt a launch on warning policy. This means that by 1985, or be¬
fore, we will allow the Soviets to destroy over 90% of our missiles
in their silos before we consider retaliation.

The statement that nothing could survive the intense radiation is
plain hysteria. Even under the worst attack conditions, there would
still be areas of little, or no radiation. In fact, the high hazard

areas would be small when compared to the total area of the country.
Proper planning and preparation can assure a good chance of survi¬
val for most of our population, but throwing up ones hands and
wailing no one can survive a nuclear war could turn out to be a
self fulfilling prophecy. If we do nothing, most will perish.

Yes, nuclear war is thinkable. We must consider the possibility,
and we must prepare for it. Many lives would be lost in a nuclear
exchange, but there would be survivors. How long they survive will
depend on mental attitude and advanced planning. As to a winner,
you will have to define just what you mean by the word "winner."

If my grandchildren live in a free society after a nuclear exchange,
while Communism survives only in the minds of a few radicals, then
freedom has won.

- - - - Bud Baal

Probably written sometime in 1981

D dfLT 2-2-8 3

££p

H

Roger J. Sullivan

'ij

£

WHY WE NEED CRP

— Roger J. Sullivan

Roger Sullivan’s position as System Planning Corporation Civil
Defense Program Manager gives his article top credibility.

System Planning Corporation’s civil defense research has been
extensive and widely used as a resource for reliable information
and statistics. Dr. Sullivan writes from a position of unquestioned
prestige and authority. His article reflects his personal views.

President Reagan has repeatedly
called for a steeply upgraded civil
defense program. Congress should
support this.

The Soviet Union and the United
States currently each possess
several thousand strategic offensive
nuclear weapons, deployed on
intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), submarine-launched bal¬
listic missiles (SLBMs), and
bombers. In principle three broad
types of strategic defensive systems
can counter these: antiballistic
missiles (ABMs — to shoot down
incoming ballistic missiles), air
defense (to shoot down incoming
bombers), and civil defense (to
protect the country’s assets, espec¬
ially population, from the effects of
nuclear weapons that penetrate and
explode). Soviet air defense and civil
defense are each many times as
extensive as their U.S. counterparts.
(ABMs are essentially prohibited on

each side by means of the 1972 ABM
Treaty.)

For many years U.S. policy has
been based on “mutual assured
destruction”: the theory that neither
side will attack the other because,
if it did, the attacked nation would
retaliate and destroy the attacker.
Such a principle iis highly dubious
because (1) it is based entirely on
our perceptions of Soviet intentions,
not on their capabilities, and it may
prove wrong in a crisis; and (2) the
Soviets have never subscribed to it.
Furthermore, as accuracy improves
and the use of Multiple Indepen¬
dently-Targeted Re-entry Vehicles
(MIRVs) increases, either side may,
in the midst of some future crisis,
conclude that, by attacking, it can
destroy far more missiles than it
need expend, thus possibly making
an attack seem worth the cost. Thus
the “crisis stability” of the current
situation is not encouraging.

The situation would be much
more stable if it were based on a
principle of “mutual assured sur¬
vival”. Each side would possess rela¬
tively low levels of strategic offen¬
sive systems, limited by means of
arms control negotiations such as
the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks
(START) proposed by President
Reagan; and relatively high levels of
strategic defensive systems to
reduce the effectiveness of an
attack. Stability would be greatly
increased because (1) it would be
based on verifiable Soviet capabili¬
ties, not their intentions or doctrine;
and (2) it would ensure that any
attacker would expend more wea¬
pons than he could destroy, thus
removing the incentive for an attack.
Such a policy requires both offen¬
sive arms control and strategic
defense — two concepts that are
complementary, not contradictory.

The most extensive plausible

nal ol Civil Defense: August 1982

nuclear attack against the U.S. is
one that targets our military facilities
and industry. However, population
per se is not considered a target by
the Soviets: thus an evacuated
population would most probably not
be targeted. A map of probable “risk
areas" reveals that blast and fire
would very likely cover only a few
percent of the area of the 48 contig¬
uous states. Because industry is
generally located in cities, this area
includes about 70 percent of the
populatio/i. Such an attack would
also produce extensive radioactive
fallout over much of the nation. It
would blow generally from west to
east and decay substantially during
the days following the attack.
Although an attack could conceiv¬
ably be launched “out of the blue”,
most analysts believe it far more
likely that it would arise from an
escalating crisis over a period of
several days or weeks.

Protection against an “out of the
blue” attack would require a nation¬
wide system of blast shelters and
would cost over $60 billion. In the
current cost-cutting environment,
such a commitment by the govern¬
ment seems highly unlikely. How¬
ever, protection against the more
likely attack-from-crisis, based on
evacuation, would be far less costly:
about $2 to $4 billion over 5 years or
about $2.00 to $4.00 per American
per year (we currently spend about
50 cents per American per year on
civil defense.)

Four important questions must be
addressed regarding such a pro¬
gram:

1. Would a Crisis Relocation Pro¬
gram (CRP) work if people coop¬
erated?

Linder a CRP, the officials of each
state and county, in coordination
with the Federal government, are
establishing detailed plans and pre¬
parations for moving people out of
primarily-urban high-risk counties
and into rural, low-risk “host”
counties. To protect themselves
from radioactive fallout, people
would have to establish “expedient”
fallout shelter, following instruc¬
tions provided by government. This
could be done most easily by going
into basements of existing buildings
and piling earth around the outside,
and in some cases on the first floor,
to attenuate the radiation. A CRP
should include detailed county-by¬
county preparations for traffic regu¬

lation, building allocation, and
stockpiling of essential supplies,
including water, sanitation kits,
medical supplies, and some food. A
great many issues have been ana¬
lyzed concerning evacuation, in¬
cluding: key workers to maintain
vital functions and prevent looting;
traffic control; evacuation of people
without cars; fuel supplies; housing
and food in the “host” areas; and so
forth. The overall conclusion is that,
if the people cooperate, it can be
accomplished successfully in one to
three days. Analyses show that a
large-scale attack would kill roughly
80 percent of the American people
if there were no preparation, but
about 20 percent if the CRP had
been successfully implemented in
advance.

2 .Would people cooperate?

Since World War II there have
been over 200 evacuations within
the United States as a result of
actual or impending natural disas¬
ters, such as earthquake, hurricane
or flood. These evacuations have
been routinely successful. State
and local civil defense officials are
capable individuals who know how
to direct an evacuation without its
resulting in injuries or inordinate
chaos. Experience shows that the
better the advance preparations, the
more smoothly the evacuation pro¬
ceeds.

In the absence of disaster, many
people are apathetic or even hostile
to the idea of evacuation; but when a
real disaster seems imminent, peo¬
ple put aside their pre-disaster
attitudes and cooperate with offi¬
cials and with each other to a
surprisingly high degree. To
encourage such cooperation it is
particularly important that officials
provide as much information to the
people as possible, before and after
the disaster.

Wheras a natural disaster is an
island of disaster in a sea of normal¬
cy, an impending nuclear attack
would imply potential disaster areas
all across the country, correspond¬
ing to all military facilities arid
sizable cities. Extensive peacetime
preparations, coordinated among
Federal, state and local officials,
would be a prerequisite to an orderly
nationwide evacuation. Neverthe¬
less, to any particular individual,
one type of evacuation would
appear about like the other. Thus it
is reasonable to expect people
generally to cooperate with authori¬
ties during a nuclear crisis evacua¬

tion. Furthermore, experience (e g
Cuba 1962, Three Mile Island) has
shown that, during a perceived
crisis, a substantial fraction of the
people will spontaneously evacuate.
If for no other reason, nationwide
CRP is necessary to channel such
spontaneous evacuation and help
people to relocate to relatively safe
areas, instead of perhaps to other
risk areas.

In a nuclear-crisis evacuation,
people would have to follow instruc¬
tions from authorities to establish
expedient fallout shelters in the
"host” areas. Over the years many
tests have been conducted with
untrained individuals, and have
demonstrated that, given informa¬
tion and incentive, people can and
will copstruct such shelters and live
in them for several days.

Polls have shown that over 75 per¬
cent of the American people want
good civil defense and are willing to
pay the cost of a CRP. Most people
do not become actively interested in
civil defense until a crisis occurs;
however, at that point they besiege
the government for information and
instructions and expect government
to be ready to provide leadership.

3. Would Postwar Survival and
Recovery be Possible?

A number of detailed studies have
concluded that, if people are shel¬
tered until the radioactive fallout
decays, and if proper preparations
are made for continuity of govern¬
ment and management of surviving
resources, then long-term survival
and recovery are indeed possible.
An excellent book on how individ¬
uals can protect themselves is
Nuclear War Survival Skills, by
Cresson H. Kearny. It explains how
to evacuate, construct shelter, ob¬
tain safe water, food, light, and
sanitary facilities, and how to sur¬
vive without doctors. I have per¬
sonally conducted research on sur¬
vival during the first year after a
nuclear attack, considering the
availabiity of such essentials as fuel,
transportation and communication
facilities, food, water, housing,
clothing, sanitation, the threat of
disease and long-term radiation,
and potential ecological disrup¬
tions, following an evacuation and a
nuclear attack. Life would be con¬
siderably more difficult than it is
today, and many cities would be in
ruins. I concluded, nevertheless,
that if governments make sufficient
preparations in peacetime, the
people can survive in the post-attack

environment and begin to rebuild
the nation.

4 Would a U.S. CRP Increase
■the-CftadCe of Nuclear War*?

In 1978 I interviewed about thirty
authorities on crisis management
and nuclear strategy — including
liberals, conservatives, and “middle-
of-the-roaders” — on the question
of whether an effective U.S. CRP
would be likely to precipitate a
serious crisis or make nuclear war
more likely. I concluded the follow¬
ing. If a nuclear crisis occurred, it
would result from many complex
and unpredictable causes. The
presence or absence of U.S. or
Soviet civil defense would have a
relatively minor effect on the central
events of the crisis itself and would
probably not materially contribute
to the chance of escalation to
nuclear war. The U.S. should prob¬
ably not evacuate in the absence of
Soviet evacuation. However, if the
Soviets begin to evacuate, then we
should definitely do so as well, to
protect our people if war follows.
Such a U.S. responsive evacuation
would not be likely to escalate the
crisis further, and could well con¬

tribute to de-escalating it.

Civil defense may be likened to a
seat belt in a car. From time to time I
achieve a particular objective by
driving my car from one place to
another. I drive as carefully as I
can, and try my best to avoid acci¬
dents; however, I also wear a seat
belt to minimize the damage to
myself should an accident occur.
Similarly our country should con¬
duct its national policy so as to
achieve our objectives while trying
our best to avoid nuclear war. Yet we
need the “seat belt" of civil defense
to minimize damage to our people
should nuclear war nevertheless
occur. I believe that civil defense
would not increase the chance of
war any more than seat belts
increase the chance of automobile
accidents.

Since World War II the U.S.
government has performed over 25
broad studies of civil defense and
many hundreds of studies of its
various components. The over¬
whelming conclusion is that it can
work and we need it. In my view,

the purpose of civil defense is not to
make nuclear war more “thinkable"
(thousands of people think about it
every day) or “winnable” (this is
admittedly a dubious concept). It is
simply to provide as much protec¬
tion as possible in case nuclear war
occurs. The weapons are there. No
physical barrier prevents them from
being used. People and nations are
unpredictable. A serious super¬
power crisis can occur anytime.
Several days of advance indication
of attack might well be available,
especially if the Soviets began to
evacuate. Heavy spontaneous
evacuation would occur in the U.S.
The public would cry out for leader¬
ship by government. Proper govern¬
ment preparation would provide the
American people with a greatly
increased chance of survival and
recovery, should deterrence
ultimately fail and nuclear war
occur. We have an obligation to our¬
selves and* our descendants to
protect ourselves as much as
possible against this terrible dis¬
aster. We need civil defense. We
need CRP. □

U.S. blast risk areas. This map was prepared by the Federal Government and illustrates areas judged most likely to be targeted in a large scale
nuclear attack.

Journal oI Civil Detense: August

EDITORIAL . . .

THE MEANING OF “F”

"Preparedness-Protection-Peace — P 3 .” This strategic defense theme for TACDA’s Wichita seminar in October sums
up the convictions of 9 out of 10 Americans. It is historically accurate. Dramatic proof of its accuracy for peace-aligned
nations has been demonstrated throughout the current century.

But being convinced of P 3 does not lead to action to implement it. Needed to bring it on line is the presence of some
other factor or combination of factors.

We see a similar indifference in transportation safety and elsewhere. Seat belts in auto¬
mobiles, for instance, make good sense to 9 out of 10 Americans, and all automobiles are
now duly equipped with them. But 9 out of 10 Americans do not use them. By contrast,
in aircraft everyone buckles his seat belt. Why? It’s a requirement. No one objects — even
though the lifesaving potential is much less in an airplane than in a car.

One of the factors that can lead to a sudden serious consideration of P 3 is the imminence of war. This happened
during the Cuban Crisis. The trouble with this factor is that time for necessary action is absent.

Another factor is the timely realization that war — nuclear war — is an actual possibility or probability and that
family and small-group measures can be taken to implement the preparedness and protection segments of P 3 . The
stumbling block here is that very few people can, without the impetus of sudden danger, grasp the importance of such
measures and are willing to make the required investment. Those who do are apt to be ridiculed by the media and
misunderstood by the public. We call them “survivalists.”

| CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL TAKE DOLLAR S. BUT IT WILL TAKE MUCH MORE THAN DOLLARS. [

Political leadership is also a factor. Participants at a FEMA training seminar at Emmitsburg, Maryland in April
called it the key factor and at FEMA’s invitation reminded FEMA that FEMA’s No. 1 responsibility was not to focus its
attention primarily on community preparedness but to stimulate the national leadership to recognize the fact that
civil defense is an integral, a vital, part of national defense and that it requires unmistakable and sustained major
emphasis and action at the national level. That is, if Americans are no longer to be hostages to foreign aggression.
Whatever the investment, P 3 is a thousand times more important than say, foreign aid — even food stamps. Both
national survival and community survival are at stake. Only with the intelligent and determined exercise of national
leadership can P 3 be implemented to get America off its knees. Commitments to civil defense, no matter how sincere,
are useless unless followed by strong and meaningful action.

In those countries where civil defense now provides an effective nuclear umbrella,
political leadership has been the determining factor. Political leadership —nofthe people
— has been responsible for the programming and realization of P 3 in Sweden and Switzer¬
land. And P 3 there, in spite of overwhelming difficulties, has been responsible for over 165
years without war in the very midst of bellicose, covetous neighbors. All-out leadership
efforts in the Soviet Union and China have achieved a preparedness and a protection for
their peoples that work as hard-boiled deterrents to aggression against them, nuclear
or conventional.

Why has the United States, so sensitive to human rights and human dignity and human life, failed in its primary
constitutional obligation to provide for the safety of its citizens? The idea that survival is tab expensive is obscene.
The idea that survival is impossible is obscene. The idea that Americans do not deserve it is obscene. Yet unfriendly
foreign interests have cultivated these obscenities in our land with our undoing in mind.

Corrective action will take dollars. But it will take much more than dollars. It will take leadership, the kind of
leadership we are capable of, have ready to use, but have not yet demonstrated.

P 3 — preparedness-protection-peace — must now be put into orbit if America is to endure.

This is the meaning of TACDA’s theme for its 1982 Wichita seminar. That theme will underlie the entire seminar
program. It presumes that we are close to P 3 action. We have to be.

There is more than one xoay
to skin a cat—or kill a country

r~t ~l he following exchange be-
1 tween Sen. Claiborne Pell, of
Rhode Island, and Gen. Earle
Wheeler, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, is excerpted from the
record of a Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee hearing of a few
months ago. The subject was a grim
one: the planting of nuclear bombs
in American cities by stealth.

Sen. Pell: Is it not conceivable that
missiles could be planted within our
cities, no matter how good our anti-
ballistic-missile screen was?

Gen. Wheeler: This is possible.

Sen. Pell: If 25 trucks fanned out
over the United States, they could
do the job and negate the most ex¬
cellent ABM device, could they not?

Gen. Wheeler: If someone could
get the devices into the country, as¬
semble them and fan them out, the
answer is yes.

This colloquy has inspired the fol¬
lowing experiment in science fiction:

From a document marked LON¬
DON, MOST SECRET, Eyes
Alone: From Ml 6 for PM, FS and
M only:

The records we have been enabled
to obtain indicate that neither the
Hertz nor the Avis auto-rental com¬
pany had the slightest suspicion that
. the American-International Shrimp
. . Corp. was anything other than an
authentic business concern. At the
request of the corporation, Hertz
therefore unhesitatingly delivered 13
refrigerated lorries to a dock in the
vicinity of Port Isabel, Texas, while
Avis supplied 12 lorries to the

THE DAY
THE US. WAS
DESTROYED

Condensed from
The Saturday Evening Post

Stewart Alsof

shrimp corporation’s representative
at the unloading platform on the Ca-
loosahatchee River, near Fort My¬
ers, Fla.

According to a reconstruction of
the event by our agents, 13 heavy
containers, smelling strongly of
shrimp, were hoisted aboard the
Hertz lorries from three shrimp
boats. The Avis lorries were similar¬
ly loaded. The loading of all 25 lor¬
ries was completed between 2 and 3
a.in.on July n, 1971.

The lorries thereafter fanned out
over the then excellent U.S. highway
system, the Hertz lorries heading for
Chicago and points West, whilst
the Avis lorries sped toward the 12
largest Eastern cities. Only one lorry
failed to reach its destination.

We have obtained a still legible
copy of the Washington Evening
Star of July 12,1971, which on page
2 reports a “mysterious explosion of
a refrigerated truck” no miles south
of Pittsburgh, Pa. The explosion ap¬
parently killed the driver and two
policemen. Presumably the police
had, for some reason, stopped the ve¬
hicle and begun to investigate its
contents, thus triggering a “dead-
man” fuse. In any case, alone of the
major Eastern cities, Pittsburgh sur¬
vived physically intact, although the
majority of its citizens subsequently
succumbed to the heavy fallout from
Cleveland.

The driver-agents (who were
doubtless unaware of the contents of
their lorries) must have been exceed¬
ingly well briefed, for all the remain¬

ing 24 lorries arrived at their
assigned destinations 36 hours after
the start. It has been established
from blast patterns that the Avis lor¬
ry in Washington was parked near
the intersection of 16 th and K streets,
a few blocks from the White House,
while the Hertz lorry in Chicago
was parked a block from the Trib¬
une Tower. Other locations were
chosen with similar care. The tim¬
ing devices must have been extreme¬
ly accurate, for all 24 explosions
occurred within less than a single
minute.

MI 6 has been able to obtain a por¬
tion of the tape recording of the final
conversation between the general
commanding the Strategic Air
Force, in his underground com¬
mand post near Omaha, Neb., and
the commanding general of North
American Air Defense, in a cave in
Colorado:

SAC: No word from the Classified
Locations, General?

NORAD: Not a word, General.
Congress was in session, and the
President was in the White House.
The Vice President had the Second
Satchel, but he must have got it, too.
SAC: Then l guess it's up to us.
NORAD: Yes. . . . Must have been
the Russians, of course. Funny we
got nothing on the radar. Estimates
of fatalities are in the 8 o-miilion
range. Only preliminary, of course.
SAC: I guess we’ve got to go. You
concur?

NORAD: / concur. Over and out.

Within 28 minutes the first mis-

silc of the U.S. salvo exploded on its
programmed target in the U.S.S.R.
The salvo delivered 400 megatons
on Soviet targets, the minimum re¬
quired to destroy the Soviet Union
as a functioning society. The Soviet
counter-salvo, on top of the great
damage already done, achieved the
same purpose in the United States.
Several of the larger American cities
suffered the ignominy of being de¬
stroyed twice over.

In the opinion of MI 6 there is no
question that the American-Interna¬
tional Shrimp Corp. was the cover
name for an elaborate Chinese Com¬
munist operation. Although Fidel
Castro hotly denied it before he died
of fallout from the United States,
there is little doubt that there was
some element of Cuban collusion —
the shrimp boats certainly embarked
from Havana.

In his 78th year at the time, the
late Mao Tse-tung was near death
and unquestionably mad. But, in de¬
stroying at one stroke both the hated
“modern revisionists” and the
“American imperialists,” Mao surely
displayed a certain genius in his
madness.

The Chinese, of course, have nev¬
er acknowledged their role in the

catastrophe, which utterly destroyed
the world’s two greatest powers.
Given the unchallenged global dom¬
ination of the People s Republic of
China today, the Chinese role, on
orders of the PM, may only be men¬
tioned in a Most Secret document,
such as this one. DESTROY ON
READING.

This is not, of course, a prediction
of things to come. And yet, as the
colloquy between Senator Pell and
General Wheeler indicates, there is
no purely technical reason why
something of the sort might not take
place.

We Americans harbor a stubborn
illusion that everybody else must do
it our way: because we depend on
an elaborate and immensely costly
missile system to deliver nuclear
warheads, we assume that every oth¬
er country must do likewise. The
preceding nightmare may serve as a
reminder that there is more than
one way to skin a cat—or kill a
country. Finally, it may also be
worth noting that most U.S. intelli¬
gence experts believe that the senile
genius, Mao Tse-tung, is already, to
a degree which cannot be precisely
determined, insane.

8 Saw Sranrlsco (Djrenidf

★ . Mon., June 28, 1982

Federal Survey

Foes of A-Defeinse

Evacuation Flan

Washington

Local governments for¬
mally opposed to President
Reagan’s civil defense plan
for a nuclear attack are con¬
centrated in California and
New England, a government
survey showed.

Twelve communities in Califor¬
nia oppose the concept of evacuat¬
ing civilians to the countryside to
survive a nuclear war, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency
said, based on a survey taken June
10 and 11 through the agency’s 10
regional offices.

The government Is counting
only 28 communities in the nation
as opposing the plan to evacuate
cities in the event of nuclear attack,
despite a storm of criticism of the
Reagan administration's civil de¬
fease plan.

“I think it’s encouraging,”
agency spokesman David Deane
said yesterday. “The reason I say so
is there’s been an awful lot of talk
that there’s this groundswell of
communities that have rejected it.

"From what we’ve been able to
gather, 28 communities versus the
thousands that are involved in cri¬
sis location planning doesn’t sound
to me like a groundswell.”

Four communities have reject¬
ed specific “crisis relocation pro¬
grams” while 24 have rejected the
"concept” of the government’s pro¬
gram, the survey showed.

The San Francisco Board of
Supervisors voted 7 to 4 in May that
the city “shall not participate in any
civil defense planning that is de¬
signed solely to promote crisis relo¬
cation” for a nuclear attack. The
resolution said that “such prepara¬
tions only increase the threat of
nuclear war by deluding citizens
Into believing falsely that they can
survive a nuclear war."

Marin County supervisors, call¬
ing the federal policy “senseless,”
refused in March to comply with
the request to submit an evacuation
plan for the county’s 220.000 resi¬
dents. “There is only one way to
prepare for nuclear war and that is
to prevent it,” said Supervisor Bar¬
bara Boxer during the discussion.

President Reagan’s $4.2 billion
seven-year program proposes to
move about two-thirds of the popu¬
lation in 319 “high risk” cities and
61 defense installations to the coun¬
tryside. The plan would evacuate 80
percent of the Bay Area’s popula¬
tion and assumes officials would
have one week of warning before a
nuclear attack.

Emergency management agen¬
cy officials emphasized that the sur¬
vey may not be exact because it was
based on information from state
officials and other second-hand
sources. But a preface to the survey
said the information is "correct in
indicating a relatively small num¬
ber of local actions in opposition to
the program.”

Critics say there is no way to
protect the population from nucle¬
ar attack. The program is now
snagged in the budget process.

The agency has hired the Gal¬
lup polling organization to conduct
three nationwide surveys of senti¬
ment toward the proposal. Final
results from the first poll are ex¬
pected this week.

According to the agency sur¬
vey, the four communities that
have rejected specific evacuation
plans are Farmington, Maine; Lin¬
coln County, W.Va.; Alexandria,
Va.; and Boulder, Colo.

Counted as rejecting the "con¬
cept” are Brattleboro, Fair Haven,
Ludlow, Shaftsbury, Sl Albans and
Woodstock, Vt.; -Acton, Lincoln,

Lynnfield, Cambridge and Am¬
herst, Mass., and Houston.

The survey counted 12 commu¬
nities in California as opposing the
concept, but listed 16 jurisdictions
as reacting negatively to the plan:
Sacramento County, Contra Costa
County, Humboldt County, Marin
County, San Luis Obispo County,
Santa Cruz County, Los Angeles,
San Francisco, San Jose, City of
Santa Cruz, Monterey County, Sono¬
ma County, Carmel-by-the-Sea, Sali¬
nas, Palo Alto and Sunnyvale.

The survey also noted "nega¬
tive actions" in Washington State in
King County, Seattle and Mason
County but did not list them in
opposition because of lack of offi¬
cial notification.

United Prttt

WORRIED LOS ANGELES
CRITIQUES ITS CD
.PREPAREDNESS

In a 60-page report the Los
Angeles County Chief Administra¬
tive Officer has responded to Board
of Supervisors concern about the
county’s civil defense readiness.
Gist of the report: the county is far
from ready and badly needs to gear
itself to an effective preparedness
posture.

Much has been done, and done
well, by dedicated experts to pre¬
pare for disasters, especially those
in the moderately severe range.
“However,” the report states, “more
efforts are needed by the public and
private sectors to prepare for
catastrophic earthquake or nuclear
attack. While it will never be possible
to be totally prepared for such a
catastrophic disaster, much can be
done in developing plans for pre¬
paredness and operational coordin¬
ation to reduce the potential
damage, injuries and deaths which
can reasonably be expected to
result from such events.”

Among improvements contem¬
plated are the use of computer tech¬
nology, modern communications,
public education, a new emergency
operations center, damage report¬
ing and medical response at disaster
scenes.

Eleven million people live within a
radius of 60 miles of downtown Los
Angeles and there are 82 incorpora¬
ted cities in Los Angeles County
alone. Add to that the disturbing
fact that the megalopolis is hemmed
in by the Pacific Ocean on the West
and mountains inland.

A serious effort has been made
and is being made to hew to federal
and state civil defense goals, “but
here, as throughout the nation,
the program has been less than ade¬
quate for the needs. . .Few people
who live and work in the greater Los
Angeles area have suggested that
the crisis relocation program, as
currently presented, is a workable
solution for this area.”

The state CD director agrees “and
has indicated that continuing eval¬
uation may bring special solutions
to help resolve the extraordinary
problems.”

Possibilities of supplementing the
crisis relocation with anti-missile
defense and blast shelter are also
covered.

“Whether an adequate civil de¬
fense can be achieved,” emphasizes
the reports, "depends primarily on
the levei of national commitment.
Federal leadership, focus and fund¬
ing are essential. Protection against
nuclear attack requires a strong
national program, an informed
public, essential systems in place
and a crisis ‘surge’ capability .to
increase readiness quickly.”

(See also “Los Angeles Wary of
CRP . . .” in July issue of the
TACDA Alert.)

Journal of Civil Defense: October 1982

injjdjjp pus uoijenjEAj -gj ||j

The Russians aren’t completely stupid ... Their
nuclear policy is almost identical to ours ...

Y ou may wish to readjust some of
your survival plans after you read
this article. The fact that an enemy,
so dangerous as to make Adolph Hitler
appear as a kindergarten teacher by com¬
parison, has been able to fool the Ameri¬
can public, the American press and many
of our elected representatives into believ¬
ing that it wants only peace, will give you
some idea of what we’re up against
If you’re waiting to read about it in the
newspapers or see it over TV— forget it!

As I write this article, my desk is sur¬
rounded by an accumulation of reports,
files and records on the communist stra¬
tegy for taking over the world—over a
half-ton of material. Combining this in¬
formation with events taking place around

the world now, a frightening picture comes
into focus and it isn’t the nuclear threat
In order to see clearly how the public is
being mislead, it will help to picture Russia
as a master magician performing before a
worldwide audience. Visualize a Russian
bear, dressed in appropriate black tie and
taiis performing on a large TV stage for an
audience of 4 billion people.

As even a sroaS child knows, the magician
must “cloud” your mind with a diversion
of words, motions and hidden techniques.
If you will gaze upon the magician you will
observe he holds high in one hand what
appears to be a genuine guided missle,
armed with a nuclear warhead

Tapping it noisily, the bear shouts, “As
you can see, this is a real nuclear weapon

and you will notice that it is pointed directly
at you!” You can bet the audience’s atten¬
tion is diverted.

In“knee-jerk” reflex, some members of
the audience dive under their seats, while
others wring their hands and plead for
mercy. At this point the typical audience
isn’t concerned with what the magician’s
other hand is doing and it's the other hand
that we want to examine closely.

To see what the Soviets are really up to.
lef s look at this magic act through the eyes
of a professional magician. The profes¬
sional knows that the nuclear weapon
threat causes our emotions and eyes to be
diverted from the preparation for produc¬
ing the intended surprise.

How does our expert know this? Be-

cause he has seen the act before and
others like it He knows all the basic tricks
for producing the anticipated result If s
time we learned also.

First the ultimate objective of the trick
is for the communists to take control of the
entire world. This has been their goal since
before you were born—and it hasn’t
changed. Why?

The answer is very simple and basic to
their needs. It is stated very closely in the
communist “constitution” — their mani¬
festo—that communism and capitalism
(or freedom) can not co-exist

Because the U.S. is the world’s“show-
case” for capitalism, and with other coun¬
tries longing to enjoy the same kind of
benefits, the communists will either have
to change us or destroy us. They have no
choice

Surveys taken in the U.S. indicate not
more than 25 percent of our citizens really
understand this Russian goaL Because
the Russians say they want to talk peace,
everybody wants to believe them. It gives
them hope. The news media probably feel
it is their duty to cling to this false hope and
not throw a wet blanket on any peace¬
making prospects.

Before advent of the nuclear bomb,
Russia didn’t have much to work with. To
most people in this country, the Soviet
government and way of life was simply a
joke. The USSR sent many poorly trained
agents to this country to try to convince
Americans that communistic socialism was
better than the American constitution.
When this failed, they tried to get our
attention through demonstrations and
terrorism. Their only evidence of success
was the capture of a few so- called intellec-
tural minds.

After stealing U.S. nuclear bomb secrets
and building their own weapon systems,
the world suddenly had to take Soviet
Russia seriously.

Russia knew that the Americans had
grown so fat and successful that they would
sacrifice almost anything to maintain their
way of life Soon the nuclear threats begaa
By this time the Soviets had built their
worldwide spy and subversion network in¬
to a well-oiled machine that could influence
almost any country at the highest levels.
Their conventional war machine had grown
to be even more powerful—at least on
paper— than ours.

The wringing of hands and the pleading
on bended knees for peace have started.
The Russians are prepared to negotitate
with us now on their now terms— or else! Is
the “or else" really possible? Would the
Soviets actually launch nuclear weapons in
order to take us over?

The simple, unequivicable answer is,
“No!" Here is why: The communists aren’t

These illustrations from a Soviet civil
defense training manual point out that the
USSR is going to great lengths to
prepare Its citizens. Virtually every
citizen undertakes CD training.

(Illustrations from official Russian publication.)

completely stupid. Translating their own.
reports and speechs, we find that their
nuclear policy is almost identical to ours.

First neither country wishes to enjoy
the spoils of a nuclear victory. The prob¬
ability is that there would be none.

Second, both countries will definitely
counter-attack if h:t by a ftrsi strike.

So far, we have a Mexican stand-off.
But Russia had to gain some kind of nu¬
clear advantage m the event the American
people ever pulled their heads from the
sand So the Soviets did what the U. S. has
not been willing to do. They built a civil
defense program, complete with under¬
ground factories and citizen shelters.This
was done at great financial sacrifice-
estimated to be as high as one-half of the
Soviet military budget

Some of the evidence of these prepar¬
ations can be seen in the accompanying
illustrations from the Russian maiVuai used
in training each and every Soviet citizen.

Now, the Russians can say to our presi¬
dent “We aren’t afraid of your nuclear
weapons because we can survive your
attack, but you won’t survive ours.”

Has this changed the situation? No,
nothing has changed They have only gained .
a psychological advantage because the
results of a nuclear war remain unaccept¬
able to them.

Before you run out to find a buyer for
your bomb shelter, let me assure you that
the threat of nuclear war is still very real.

from another direction which 1 can cover
in a future articie.

Meantime, back to the Russian magician
Let’s see what he is doing with that other
hand. Then maybe you will push nuclear
war to the back of your mind

If you were the head of the communist
party and had been fighting a war with
America ever since the 1917 revolution,
and you now find that you are finally on
the verge of winning that war, would you
start a disastrous nuclear war? Of course
not!

Let’s look at our situation now as a
result of that “invisible waf’ which has
been pulled off “right before your eyes.”

In bringing his people up to date re¬
cently, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev
said, “Detente is only a temporary relation¬
ship with the U. S. The Russian people can
expect wars and acute international crises.
Military power will continue to be a decisive
factor in Soviet foreign policy.”

He as not speaking of nuclear war, but
of conventional war. How is Russia wag¬
ing this war? CIA director William Casey,
who is involved in that war on a daily basis,
answers the question in these words, “...
the Soviets go in and exploit the under¬
lying social and economic discontents,
which are plentiful. This gives them a
base. They feed it with trained men and
arms. That drives away investments. The
insurgents sabotage economic targets and
so economic discontent grows.”

As one who has followed Ronald Rea¬
gan’s political career long before he be¬
came governor of California, F m convinced
that he is aware of the danger to our
country. He recently hit the nail on the
head when he said, “The ultimate deter¬
minant in the struggle now going on for
the world will not be bombs and rockets,
but a test of wills and ideas— the ideals to
which we are dedicated.”

That doesn’t sound much like the nu¬
clear Armageddon we read about in the
press every day. Is there still a chance that
Russia might j ust try a nuclear attack? One
who should know is Dimitri Simes, a re¬
cognized scholar from the USSR who has
told Americans that the Soviet doctrine
“... unambiguously states that nuclear
war is unwinnable and should be avoided”

The fact is that the Russian battle plan
against America has never changed in
over 50 years. Marchall Sokolovsky ad¬
vises his people that, “The essentia! nature
of war asa continuation of politics does
not change with the changing technology
and armaments.”

In other words, Russia launched its war
against the free world long before the
advent of nuclear warfare and has never
waivered since then. Their nuclear cap-
abi'/ty has simply given them additional
leverage to accelerate their “conventional
war 1 ’ which includes murder, torture, lying

SURVIVAL GUIDE/ JANUARY 1983 59

spying, terrorism, subversion and, oh, yes,
nuclear threats.

If you take the news of this Russian
nuclear hoax as a comforting thought con¬
sider the fact that they are now winning their
conventional war and are drawing close to
our borders. How can this be possible?

Let me direct your attention to the daily
news. As the countries of the world sweat
with fear each time Russia rattles her nu¬
clear sabers, the Soviets simultaneously
step up their conventional war while ne¬
gotiating for “nuclear peace”

Perhaps you hadn’t noticed. Overa few
short years, the communists have gained
effective control or strategic influence over
Eastern Europe, the Mid-East, Africa,
Centra! America and Cuba

In the east, the Chinese communists
have done the same thing with southeast
Asia Who does that.leave to save the
world? Realistically, it boils down to just
the English-speaking nations. Td cal! that
a pretty effective “conventional war” with
only pea-shooters and propaganda for
weapons.

As the communist troops draw closer,
the Reds are orchestrating worldwide
peace demonstrations Emotions are over¬
riding clear thinking. Our leaders are for¬
getting that in the Russian dictionary, the
word “peace” literally means “a period
when all nations are subservient to Russia”

While the public pressures Washington
to negotiate with the communists, Soviet
troops are free to move without fear from
the U.S. because we can’t take any actions
while in a “state of negotiations” — it would
demonstrate bad faith

The Reds’ war against us faded into in¬
visibility after World War II when the
Russians learned two lessons from us.

First, they saw what an aroused American
public could accomplish, starting from
scratch after the bombing of Pear! Harbor,
Next, they learned the lesson again when
American patriots began to expose com¬
munist agents and sympathizers in the
1940s and 1950s. After that, the party
faded away into the woodwork and the
American liberal was left screaming, “ See,
they were never there because you can’t
see them now.”

To prove they are really nice people,
the communist party was forced to disa¬
vow Stalin and Kruschev. But it is still
business as usual as stated by the Russian
Col Skirdo in his book meant for Russian
eyes, .. war is a continuation of politics
by other, namely violent, means. Marxist-
Leninists will always condem imperialist
(free world) wars, but still support wars for
socialist gains.”.

From now on, keep score on our so-
called unbiased press as it reports the
various revolutions being stirred up by the
60 SURVIVAL GUIDE/JANUARY 3983

Soviet CD training covers workers and families who may not be near government provided
shelter, and who may be trapped by blast effects, (illustrations from official Russian publication.)

communists for “socialist gains.” Is it re- ment through Central America and, with
ported in the story as “overcoming op- thehelpof our own citizens, itissofteningus
pression?” Keep in mind that the com- up from within.

munists consider a majority of our U.S. Forecasting events in oursituation will be

citizens to be “oppressed” If we attempt a valuable aid to your survival preparation:
to aid a country to maintain its freedom or Now, do it yourself. Consider how lightning
independence does the press sum up the travels along the lines of least resistance
action by quoting a source who calls it an Understanding how the communists plan
“ imperialist aggression?” to exploit the poor in order to take control of

Actor Ed Asner, who may be as sincere a country and form an army to march on to
as Charley Brown, actually did us a favor the next country will afford you the oppor-
by helping the communists in El Salvador, tunity to plot their path and progress as they
With counter remarks by Charlton Heston, move toward us— to our very borders,
the press was forced to admit that the com- Mind you, T m not speaking euphemisti-

munists are behind that revolution. The cally. I mean the acuta! southern borders of
press was forced to do this! Maybe we need California Arizona Texas and the Atlantic
moreEd Asnersand JaneFondastogetthe shores. Does this shock you? Is it unbeliev-
Arnerican public fired up. able? Let me reinforce your thinking

Now we can begin to see what our Soviet The communists are irrevocably and

magician is doing with that other hand It is openly committed to taking over the United
about to scoop us up in a pincher move- (Continued on page 62)

Arrows suoehmnosed on world oooulafion arowth mao show how Soviet Russia’s
non-nuclear attack has spread westward into Europe, southward into the Middle East and
Africa, and across the Atlantic to Cuba first, then to Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua.
Obviously, Mexico is next.

States. They have tried to do this inter¬
nally and so far have failed. But they have
weakened our morals and constitutional
values in the process. They have scared us
into agreeing to almost anything— includ¬
ing disarmament Their armies or repre¬
sentatives have or are about to take con¬
trol of most of the free world. They are
currently building up arms and armies in
the line of least resistance—Central America
Cuba is supplying everything needed for
the many revolutions, thanks to the Rus¬
sian supply line

Look at a map. Every Central American
country is steeped in the tradition of re¬
volutions. One more revolution is not really
big news for that area— except that this
time the newly installed dictator will be
Russia The only obstacle is the local mili¬
tary dictatorship which will be outmanned
and outgunned.

In a much tougher situation, Russia
took over Cuba with the help of the Ameri¬
can press and many of your elected leaders
Castro was hailed as “the George Wash¬
ington of Cuba” and as a hero for over¬
powering an “oppressive dictatorship.”

While informed citizens were yelling
their heads off that Castro was actually a
communist and that Russia would soon
have a complete military base at the front
door of Miami, their cries were drowned
out by laughs of ridicule— again from the
press.

Can you believe that the same thing is
now happening to us? As Nicaragua, El
Salvador and Guatemala fall Mexico is
the next country in the path of least resist¬
ance leading to the U. S. 1 can hear some of
you saying “But the Mexican government,
along with the United States, would never
allow the communists to take over that
country.” Fm afraid it's too late to even
pose the problem. Events have already
begun to unfold.

The only positive thing about the situ¬
ation is that there has been a long friend¬
ship between the Mexican and American
citizens themselves— even with the many
social and language barriers. But the
government is something else

Admittedly operating on a system of
graft and corruption, the Mexican govern¬
ment has not been overly friendly with
anybody, with the exception of Cuba

President Lopez-Portillo, near the end
of his term last year, stated that Mexico
must “... further tighten the links of friend¬
ship and cooperation that bind us with the
revolution of Cuba and Nicaragua”

While many Mexican citizens have com¬
plained publically, the government has still
allowed communist guerillas to settle or
operate over the borders of Guatemala,
dangerously close to Mexico’s vast oil sup¬
plies.

Although chosen in a free election, the
president nominated by the “ruling party”
always wins and, under the law, becomes a
virtual dictator who answers to on one. In
effect, every six years the elections change
only the face.

Patriotic Mexican citizens are on the
verge of a revolution. To the credit of the
Mexican army and police, they have made
some raids on communist cells and con¬
fiscated considerable arms and explosives
coming in from Cuba But eventually,
they will be overwhelmed by sheer num¬
bers and arms. If you think this is far¬
fetched, picture this headline: “10,000
Communists Take Over City in Mexico.”
Fiction? The story actually appeared in a
Los Angeles newspaper about four years
ago. Headlines? No. the story was buried
among advertisements on an inside page.

This was no little adobe village, but a
modern suburb of Mexico’s largest indus¬
trial city. The reaction of the government?
The leadership decided it would be easier
to let the communists have the city, lock
stock and barrel The only aspect which
seemed to bother the government was
that the communists refused to pay taxes
on their newly acquired property.

If you were going to call the shot on
Russia’s move into Mexico, remember that
the Reds can’t operate successfully among
a satisfied population. They must have a
discontented population to whip into a
frenzy. If the economy is strong they must
weaken it

In keeping up with the financial news,
which is usually more acurate than the
political news, you may be aware that
Mexico is going through its worst econo¬
mic crisis in memory. The peso has plunged
to around one cent on the dollar (at this
’writing). The U.S. is dumping SI billion
into Mexico’s lap to help save the country.
Many times the usual numbers of illegal
Mexicans are crossing our borders—in
desperation.

Watch Mexico closely!

What happens when the “new Cuba”
.forms up right against our border states? •

1 think that’s the rime when some sleepy
neighborhoods in the United States are
going to take another look at that word
“Survival.” •

9051 Via Amorita Avenue
Downey, California, 90241
November 3, 1981

Mr. Robert K. Brown
Editor/Publisher
Survive Publications Inc.
5735 Arapahoe Avenue
Boulder, Colorado, 80303

Dear Mr. Brown:

A friend has just loaned me the premier issue of SURVIVE, and so far I've
found time to read just two of the articles. The first, Bruce Clayton’s
Nuclear Nonsense, does a good job of correcting some of the misinformation
on the effects of nuclear war. I decided to order a 12 issue subscription,
but then I read Brownell and Zehring's article Civil Defense: America's
Ugly Duckling. Being as Mr. Zehrir. i is involved in the sale of shelters,

I can unuorsland his bias toward tnat fori of reel car nrotection, but in-
place snel tors are not the total answer, and the article contains consider¬
able incorrect data on crisis relocation programs, '.’hat we don't need in
times such as these, is misinformation.

In speaking of civil defense in the Soviet Union, the authors state the
Soviets have "enough shelters and equipment to protect a majority of the
citizens of the USSR." The July-1978, CIA report titled Soviet Civil
Defense, is then cited as being in agreement. I think Brownell and Zehring
should reread that document, as it does not agree, and in fact states just
the opposite.

Page 2 of that report states that blast shelters have been provided for the
leaders, but factory shelters can accomodate only 12 to 24% of the work force,
and in a crisis, nonessential and off-duty workers would be evacuated. At
the writing, a minimum of 10 to 20% of the urban population could be shelter¬
ed. By 1985 the figures would rise to 15 to 30%, but really less because of
the expected increase in population. The last paragraph on page 2 states,
"Only by evacuating the bulk of the urban population could they hope to
achieve a marked reduction in the number of urban casualties." On the sub¬
ject of the Soviet evacuation program, I might also refer you to NUCLEAR WAR:

A SOVIET OPTION by 0. C. Boileau in the fall 76 and winter 77 issue of
Foresight; and WHY THE US WORRIES ABOUT NEGLECTED CIVIL DEFENSE by Michael
Satchel! in the May 21, 1978 issue of Parade.

The Soviets are relying on evacuation plans to save the bulk of their popula¬
tion, and as early as 1972 were conducting limited evacuation drills. Our
military planners now feel there is slight chance of a suprise Soviet strike

-2-

on the US because it would leave their urban population exposed to our mis¬
siles. If the Soviets intend a first strike, it is most likely they will
evacuate their cities first, an operation that could take upwards of a week.
Our intelligence should be able to detect that movement, giving us the,min-
imum three days needed to evacuate our cities.

Our first evacuation plan under the current program, was drawn up for San
Antonio, Texas in 1973, but it wasn't until 1979 that all of our states had
started on planning for evacuation. The east coast and California presented
special problems because of high population concentrations and special stud¬
ies were required. I am the instructor for two different disaster and sur¬
vival groups, and have read the rather lengthy feasibility study for Cali¬
fornia, completed in 1977, and the more recent draft of the California
Crisis Relocation Plan that is still under development.

I'm not familiar with the evacuation plans of areas outside California, but
assume al1 would be basically the same. If so, I have my doubts about the
statements said to have been made at a civil defense conference in Massachu¬
setts, namely that local police would be resoonsible for carrying out evac¬
uation plans. First, there aren't enough policemen, and secondly, phase 2
of Crisis Relocation PIanning involves the training of personnel to actually
carry out the plan. Pol ice would only be a part of this group.

As to the policeman who said he wouldn't stay because there was no pi an to
take care of his family. I again assume that all plans are essentially the
same. The California plan provides for evacuation of essential workers and
t heir families to the nearest host area. These workers will then commute
to their jobs by bus, or a fomi of carpooling. The best of the shelters in
the urban area will be used for workers on duty. Fuel for evacuation does
not seem to present too much of a problem in the California study.

I have to agree with most of the criticism of our civil defense program set
forth in the article. Our program is in lousy shape with too much naive
thinking, some of it straight out of Alice in Wonderland, and especially in
dealing with recovery after atomic attack. I should also point out that
crisis relocation relies on shelters too, but not the in-place kind sold by
Mr. Zehring. Evacuees will be expected to work on the construction of tem¬
porary shelters by using dirt and existing commercial structures in the
host area.

Crisis relocation planning has its flaws too, not the least of which is the
fact that only 1 6 % of the needed plans had been completed by 9-30-80, but it
is hoped that by October 1983, all areas in the US requiring CRP will have a
full plan, or a mini-pian. The latter being a partial but operational plan.

Because of the lack of interest, cost, and tax factors, the average individ¬
ual will not build a shelter. Public shelters that are properly equipped
and stocked, keeping after fallout survival in mind, aren't economically
feasible in the short time left to us. The fact remains that the Soviets
are relying on an evacuation plan. You may not think it wi11 work, but
that's not important. What is important, is that the Soviets think it will
work and we urban dwellers better not be home when they put it to the test.

Yours truly.

Bud Baal

Downey, California

CRISIS RELOCATION PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA

Following World War II, the Soviet Union developed a nuclear war capability,
and our government reacted with an evacuation program to remove people from
target areas in case of attack. If time permitted, an hour or more, evacuees
were to go to prepared reception centers outside the danger zone. If the pre¬
attack warning allowed less than an hour, citizens were to take advantage of
any existing shelters, or improvise protection from fallout. Programs were
developed locally, and street signs were posted to indicate evacuation routes.
Though some studies were made, it was concluded that it was impossible to
evacuate the larger cities.

In the I960's, the civil defense program stressed fallout shelters, both pub¬
lic and private. Due to the stage of development of the Soviet missile guid¬
ance systems, it was felt enemy missiles were only capable of hitting somewhere
near our missile sites, and that the main hazard would be the resulting fallout.
Homeowners were urged to install underground backyard shelters, but such were
expensive, and being as they were considered an improvement, taxes went up
accordingly. Needless to say, the home shelter program was not very successful.

Starting in 1966 , a survey was conducted to identify areas in public and commer¬
cial buildings that could be used for public fallout shelters. These areas were
usually in basements, or on the ground floor of windowless structures. Where
such shelters met the criteria, the federal government provided stocks of food,
water containers, sanitation kits and medical supplies. Shelter signs were
posted at the entrances to these structures, but seldom were enough shelter
spaces found to protect the local population in case of attack.

By 1973 the Soviets had gained the nuclear advantage. They have continued to
expand this superiority, and now have missile guidance systems that are ex¬
tremely accurate. It is estimated that by the mid 1980's the Soviet missile
arsenal will have a large margin of superiority over that of the United States,
but of what use is this superiority if we both already have the capability of-
obliterating each others cities? Our government has relied on the KAD doctrine
(mutually assured destruction) to maintain a strategic balance. Unfortunately,
the Soviets don't ascribe to this doctrine, as made obvious by the continued
expansion of their nuclear capability far beyond parity.

Since the 1950's., the Soviets have been looking for a means of exploiting this
planned for superiority by limiting their losses of population and industry in
a nuclear exchange. As early as 1972, they were testing means of transporting
their urban population out of the cities prior to an expected attack. A 1978
CIA report estimates that the Soviets can evacuate their cities in from 2 or 3
days to a week or more, depending on weather and availability of transport.

Evacuation, plus a program of industry dispersal, is seen as a tremendous stra¬
tegic advantage by the Soviet military planners. Will their plan work? I'm
afraid that's not the point. As long as they think the plan will work, we are
in danger of their exploiting this advantage, real or not. They already have
nuclear superiority, and an operating evacuation program, while ours is still
in the planning stage. Though figures vary, at this time we could lose as
many as 160 million killed, while the Soviets lose only 5 million in a nuclear
exchange.

- 2 -

How do we counteract this advantage? Obviously, the only way is to adopt a
relocation plan of our own as soon as possible. Once we have an operational
plan, the Soviet advantage is nullified as far as protection of population
is concerned, and there is less liklihood of a nuclear exchange. With the
cities on both sides vacated, there is the possibility of further negotiation
rather than war. We must also remember that nations other than the two super
powers also have nuclear weapons, and more will have them in the future.

In 1973, a prototype plan was drawn up for the evacuation of the City of San
Antonio, Texas, resulting in information that led to the writing of the first
planner's guide. This was followed by 8 pilot projects for other-cities, and
in 1976 the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency started working with the various
states on evacuation plans for their cities. By March 1979 all states were
working on relocation plans with funding supplied by the DCPA. The new pro¬
grams will require little advanced preparation by the general public, and will
be adaptable to natural and other peacetime disasters. CRP, crisis relocation
planning, would also be of value with the increasing possibility of terrorists
planting a bomb in one of our large cities, and then threatening to detonate
the device unless certain demands were met within a specified time.

You might well ask, if we're going to get out, is there enough time before the
missiles land? In a suprise attack, no. Travel time for missiles from launch
to target is too short a period for you to reach an area of safety, but likli¬
hood of a suprise attack is now considered low compared to earlier periods.
Instead of a matter of minutes, it is now felt that there would be several
days, or even weeks of mounting tension before the point of nuclear exchange
was reached. Prior to reaching this point, the enemy would begin evacuating
their cities. Hopefully, our intelligence would be good enough to detect this
movement as soon as the relocation started, and our plan could be activated.

Admittedly, there have been problems with planning for California. Most areas
of the country can relocate rapidly with few problems, but this is not the
case with California and the Northeastern states, and special studies were
needed before planning could begin. The special study for California, entitl¬
ed "A Feasibility Study of Crisis Reloaction Planning for California," con¬
taining over 300 pages, was completed in August 1977, and has supplied most of
the information for this article.

In order to decide on who must be moved to safety, the importance of targets
had to be decided. The prime targets of course, would be our missile sites.
The second most important category would be other military facilities and
supply bases, plus industry that directly supports the military. The third
category would be industrial and economic centers that are important to our
national economy, and all cities of over 50*000 population or more that were
not included in the first two categories.

The actual criteria for determining the degree of risk, is the force of a
nuclear blast, and the resulting fallout dose over a 4 day period. A blast
pressure of over 2 pounds per square inch and/or expected fallout of 10,000
roentgens or more, would place an area in the high risk category. Now 2 psi
sure doesn't seem like much pressure, but look at it this way. Take a piece
of glass 12" by 12". That's 144 square inches. If you placed a weight of
288 pounds on it, do you think the glass would shatter?

As it turns out, 2/3 of our nation's population falls into one of the three

- 5 -

categories, with the degree of risk varying with nearness to the target. In
California, about(87%/of the population lives in a high risk area, the highest
percentage in the nation. Of the risk population, over 17 million, live

in the three metropolitan areas of San Francisco, Los Angeles, or San Diego.
The remaining high risk population, over 1 million people, are scattered over
9 counties. This means that in case of pending attack, about 18/2 million peo¬
ple would have to be relocated to the low risk areas where there are now only
2.6 million residents, or a ratio© of about 7 guests for each host. From this
it is obvious that tremendous transportation and support problems can be ex¬
pected, and is the reason a special study was necessary.

The feasibility study is assuming attack by the maximum number of Soviet mis¬
siles against all three categories of targets. An air burst gives high damage
below, while a low altitude detonation (ground burst) results in higher fall¬
out levels. It is quite obvious that a single missile can't be both, but the
plan is figuring the wore(e)effects from both in order to overstate, rather
than understate the problem. It is also being assumed that 100% of the risk
population will be moved during the relocation period (percentage is expected
to be actually less) with the objective of getting everyone out in 3 hays or
less in order to equal the assumed ideal Soviet evacuation time.

It is assumed that the order to evacuate would be initiated by the President
after a period of mounting crisis. Notice to evacuate would be spread by the
news media, with newspapers having information pre-set in type, radio stations
using prerecorded tape while TV stations would use video tape to give instruc¬
tions on routes, destinations, etc. There will also be local officials on the
streets to tell you where to go, and what routes to follow. Remember now, we
are not talking about a matter of minutes to make your escape, but at least 3
days, so there is no need for panic. If your family has more than one car, it
is assumed you will take the "first car," and there is plenty of time to get
it gassed up and packed with food and other necessities. How long you will be
gone is uncertain, but better plan for two weeks, or possibly longer.

Some people may not wait for the official order to evacuate, leaving as soon
as it appears a serious crisis is about to develop. If you have friends or
relatives in a safe area that you can stay with, or perhaps such as a vacation
cabin, it would be wise to go there before the order is given. Once the evac¬
uation is started, it may be difficult, or even impossible to reach your cho¬
sen destination. It is estimated that as much as 30% of the population might
evacuate spontaneously before the official order is given. On the other hand,
there is expected to be a small percentage, termed "stay puts," who will re¬
fuse to leave when evacuation is ordered.

Transportation arrangements will be made for those who don't have autos, and
can't get a ride with friends,, or relatives. About 13% of the households in
target counties, about 2.3 millinon people, do not own an automobile, but I'm
assuming many of these are the elderly, at least part of which will make their
own arrangements for transportation. Also included in this 13% are RV and
pickup owners, whose vehicles no doubt will be used in the evacuation.

Though the automobile is by far the main means of transportation in California,
there are still buses, trains and aircraft that can provide transportation for
evacuees. The scheduled aircraft fleet in the state could move 900,000 people
in 3 hays, and the railroads, using passenger and freight cars, could move as
many as 750,000 in the same period, using only a small part of the cars avail-

able, and with trains shorter than the average freight train. Evacuation by-
ship isn't covered in the study, probably because all ports of landing would
be in high risk areas, The study has considered pleasure craft though, but
those large enough for open sea travel have a maximum evacuation capacity of
only 300,000.

Once you are told to leave, the next question is where do you go. In general,
everybody in the state will shift north, even to the point of nonessential lo¬
cal residents being moved north to make room for those coming from the south.
In order to minimize food, housing and other support problems, the^study sug¬
gests a plan that provides for "uniform hosting," or as close to(7^uests for
each local resident as possible. To reach this end, uniform travel times and
distances are also required. Because of this fact, you may be required to
drive by a host area in order to reach your assigned area farther on.

All of the Los Angeles basin is a high risk area, and almost all residents
will be moved to the Central Valley or the Central Coast. If you are assigned
to the Central Valley, your trip will be 350 to 400 miles. If to the Central
Coast, you will have 230 to 3^0 miles to cover. The Los Angeles area has the
longest evacuation trips, and it is quite obvious vehicles will require refuel¬
ing enroute. The study assumes autos get an average of 15 mpg, a debatable
point, especially with the possibility of fuel waste while standing still in a
line of stopped traffic. Fueling points will be established along the routes,
including provisions for fueling directly from tank trucks where necessary.

lour destination will be a small town where you will be housed in such as
schools, churches and other nonresidential structures that the study refers to
as "congregate care facilities." Using a 1975 study of 10 California counties,
it is estimated that only about 29% of the evacuees could be accomodated in
such housing if allow/4o)squaE^ feet per person. Fallout shelter spacing has
previously been set atonly(10J , per person, and if this figure is used, all
evacuees can be housed. Living quarters would be cramped, but you would be
free to go outdoors, at least until it became necessary to take shelter from
fallout.

There is the possibility of evacuees being taken in by local families. Though
it is official policy not to use private residences, this factor was still
studied, and the report estimates that 50% of local families will take in 3
families each. Though not figured in housing requirements, the study does
recognize that some families may prefer to camp out, weather permitting, and
thus actually reduce congregate care requirements.

Now that you've reached your destination, and been shown where to sleep, how
about food and water. First, when you leave home, you will be expected to
take along the food you have at home, hopefully a 2 week supply. The study
estimates that 60% of the evacuees will bring a one week supply. You should
have at least enough food to last you during the trip and for a few days after
you reach your destination. The study estimates that food carried by evacuees
and that in host area stores will be enough for 6/2 days. By the fourth day of
the evacuation, community feeding programs should be in operation. You would
have sit-down meals in existing facilities, two meals a day, with a 20 minute
eating time. It is assumed that on the average, 13 hours a day will be requi¬
red to serve the 2 meals. You will be on normal rations, with one cold and one
warm meal, both either a one dish meal, or a prepared plate.

Figure 3

AQfUS Aini8ISV3d dHD VINdOdllVD

- 9 -

Food production would have to continue, going from producer to processor to
wholesaler to retail store in the host area. The study recommends that the
order in the food chain remain the same except for the last step, delivery to
the retail outlets. In the case of evacuation metropolitan deliveries from the
wholesaler would cease. The problem here is, 2/3 of the wholesale food distri¬
bution in the state originates in Los Angeles. With the chain remaining the
same, it would mean food would travel from the low risk producing area to the
wholesaler in the high risk area, and then back to the retail outlets in the
low risk host areas. The reason stated for this, is the the processors claim
they are unable to handle individual orders. Their normal production goes to
Wholesalers in large lots. It is also claimed there would be a lack of ware¬
housing in the host areas. Moving the population also means moving the food
they eat, but the study shows there are sufficient trucks and rail cars to move
both food and other vital supplies.

Will there be enough water? Tes, but you may have to forgo your morning shower.
Sural dwellers daily consumption of water is 350 to 400 gallons per capita, com¬
pared to the city dwellers 200 gallons. The study estimates that 20 gallons per
person per day is ample, and could easily be as low as 10. If necessary, agri¬
cultural water can be used, and though agriculture is a key industry, human
needs would come first.

Though the report (p>esn't say so in so many words, apparently conventional toi¬
let facilities would be used. The capacity of sewage plants is discussed, and
it is expected that treatment systems will be overtaxed, but it is felt that in
most areas the water supply will not be contaminated by short term incomplete
sewage treatment. Hopefully at least primary treatment can be provided, and
this coupled with purification chemicals for water systems should prevent dis¬
ease problems in most areas. In some areas contamination of water is expected
even with purification, and the study states the problem must be looked at in
later phases of the planning.

As already mentioned, wholesale grocery warehouses will continue to operate in
the risk areas, requiring warehouse workers to keep the food moving. Other
essential industries and services would have to be maintained, all requiring
manpower. The study estimates that as much as 20 % of the work force, 8 % of
the total population, or about 1)& million California workers could be declared
essential. Now this doesn't mean you might be declared an essential worker
and have to remain behind. You and your family would be evacuated, but to the
nearest safe area. About ?0% of the Los Angeles area key workers and their
families would be housed in Riverside County, with the workers commuting each
day by bus and carpool for 12 hour shifts.

With the bulk of the population evacuated, the best blast and fallout shelters
would be selected for the key workers on duty in the risk area. The key work¬
ers transportation, bus or auto, would remain with them on the job, ready to
move them to shelters, along with the "stay puts." The study is not too spe¬
cific on the criteria for key workers, and no dividing line is drawn between
essential and non essential operations.

Host areas should not have to worry about blast damage if the missiles do come,
but there is still the fallout problem. Fallout levels in 95% of the area in
the 29 counties outside the risk areas is expected to range from 0 to 6,000
roentgens over a 4 day period. High risk areas can expect 10,000 and above.

- 10 -

Realistic minimum fallout protection would reduce the 7 day dose to 150 to 250
roentgens. This would still mean some shelter occupants would require medical
treatment, but treatment requirements could be reduced considerably if the ex¬
posure were held to the lower limit of 150. It is already know that there
aren’t enough fallout shelters in the host areas to house all the locals, let
alone 7 times that number. To correct this deficiency, protection can be pro¬
vided by sandbagging and mounding earth around the structure you are being
housed in. Able-bodied person would be put to work upgrading structures to be
used for shelters, mounding earth against the walls and piling dirt on the roof,
or on the second floor of a multiple storied building.

In some areas of low fallout, structures can be used without additional dirt
shielding. In other areas, there may not be enough shelter spaces, and make¬
shift shelters may have to be constructed. The study terms these "expedient
shelters," holes dug in the ground and covered with earth, or contructed A
frames with dirt shielding. The study also considers the use of home basement
shelters, but the figures on the number of residential basements in the state
were taken from census figures and may not reflect the number of true basements.

What about medical needs, especially concerning those that are in the hospital
when the order to evacuate comes? First of all, on the average, only 50^ of
urban hospital beds are occupied at any one time. Using figures for the Christ¬
mas holidays, hospital admissions drop by half because elective things like
having tonsils out can wait a week or so. It is expected that during a crisis
b people will put off what is termed elective treatment. It is also estimated
— that about 50^ of inpatients cptqld be discharged, another kO% moved to host
area hospitals, leaving only (lCf0\o ill or incapacitated to be moved. These
would have to remain hospitalized with a minimum staff, or be moved a short dis¬
tance to a "central hospital."

For the 40$, about 25,000, being moved to hospitals in the safe areas, there
are only about 4500 abailable beds. This means temporary hospitals would have
to be set up nearby, and it may even be necessary to keep open some hospitals
on the fringe of the risk areas. Qe^A^alL

Previous studies indicate there would be an increase in communicable diseases
among the evacuees, especially if they were living in crowded and unsanitary
conditions. An increase can also be expected in stress related problems, plus
an increase in injury and illness due to city dwellers doing such as pick and
shovel work to construct fallout shelters.

A more serious problem is the fact that the rural hospitals of the host areas
aren't as well equipped as those in the metropolitan areas. A very seriously
ill or injured person in a host area may have to be taken to a larger hospital
in the risk area. This can mean an average trip of 200 miles, or 40 times far¬
ther than the average urban run of 5 miles. The resulting delay can be expec¬
ted to be fatal in many cases.

The plan seems to consider all facets of removing and supporting the population,
but the question still remains, can we get everyone out within the 3 days? The
answer is yes, but a qualified one. We can actually evacuate some areas in less
than 3 days. It is estimated that the San Diego area can be evacuated in half
that time, only a day and a half. As for the other two metropolitan areas of
San Francisco and Los Angeles, all could be moved to nearby safe areas within

fallout protection in school buildings

EXISTING SCHOOL BUILDINGS CAN SERVE AS
CONGREGATE CARE FACILITIES FOR RISK AREA
EVACUEES. BEST FALLOUT PROTECTION CAN
BE FOUND IN INTERIOR CORRIDORS AND ROOMS
ON THE LOWEST FLOOR, ESPECIALLY IF THE
SCHOOL HAS TWO OR MORE STORIES AND THE
EXTERIOR WALLS ARE OF CONCRETE OR MA¬
SONRY CONSTRUCTION. FALLOUT PROTECTION
CAN BE IMPROVED BY FIRST EXPEDIENTLY CON¬
STRUCTING A WOOD SUPPORT WALL AT THE
MID-SPAN POINT AND THEN PROVIDING ADDITIONAL
VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL BARRIERS OF EARTH
AS SHOWN IN SKETCHES. WINDOWS IN EXTERIOR
WALLSTHAT ARE TO BE COVERED WITH
EARTH SHOULD BE PROTECTED WITH LUMBER OR
PLYWOOD SHEETS SO THAT THEY Wl LL NOT
BREAK UNDER THE EARTHFILL.

JvJzJ ^ •****' 1

The 3 day period, but it would mean a hosting ratio of as high as 12 evacuees
for each local in the safe areas near Los Angeles. Such of course would pro¬
duce a considerable increase in support problems.

The study recommends that uniform hosting ratios of 7 to 1 still be maintained,
even though it will mean 4 to 7 days to evacuate the Los Angeles basin because
of highway bottlenecks outside the metropolitan area. In spite of these bottle¬
necks, 70 to 75% of the evacuees will be out in 3 days, and every effort will
be made to get the rest evacuated in no more than an additional 2 days. There
are alternatives that could be used to speed up evacuation, such as making all
lanes of highways "outbound," but such would interupt the flow of supply trucks
and possibly hamper military movements.

It should be kept in mind that the study assumes a 100% evacuation, when in
actuality it is known this figure will be somewhat less, and thus the actual
evacuation time somewhat shorter than the estimates. As much as a 30% spontan¬
eous evacuation is expected prior to the official notice. As to the "stay
puts," it is difficult to assess just how many will refuse to leave. In past
natural disasters, the figure has been about 20%, but under a nuclear threat,
the percentage would no doubt be considerably lower. The study is estimating
that 20% of the population will remain behind, but this figure includes both
key workers and the stay puts.

The feasibility study is just that, a study. It is not the final plan, merely
a guide for further research on the part of state level planners. As of Octo¬
ber 30, 1979, only about 20% of the data needed for the drafting of an opera¬

tional plan had been accumulated. Some progress has been made though on plans
for Riverside, San Bernardino and Merced counties. These three areas have both
risk and host areas within their boundries. Hopefully, the plans will be com-
K pleted by the spring of I98O, and if such appear workable, they will serve as
the prototypes for the rest of the state.

The study based many of it's assumptions on a study of only 10 California coun¬
ties, and the conclusions drawn must be double checked. Being as the document
was completed in August 1977, some of the statistics have become outdated in
the interim. As an example, vehicle fuel studies included totaling the number

of gasoline service stations in the state, but we all know a large number of

stations have closed since the report was written.

One of the problems the planners are considering, is the question of just how
much government will be evacuating with the people. At least a portion of lo¬
cal government, administrative, fire, police, etc., will be leaving with the
people of their jurisdiction to provide assistance in the host areas. The
problem is not covered in the study, but the 1962 plan for the City of Freemont,
California covers the evacuation of their city government, and possibly could
serve as a guide for other cities. Freemonts plan, which appears easily up¬
dateable, provides for succesion in all key city positions, preservation of
records, and even designates the cities of Livermore or Tracy as alternate
seats of city government.

As previously stated, California's planners are being paid from federal funds,
and with the continuation of such funding, the state's evacuation plan should
be completed by 1985. Perhaps even more important, is the funding to develop
what the study terms "supporting systems." More plainly stated, training rad-

iological personnel, protected emergency operating centers, protected broad¬
cast stations, training exercises, and an extensive training program. All
this will be necessary to assure an 80 % survival rate, and will have the addi¬
tional benefit of improving organization for natural disasters.

In closing it should be pointed out that the feasibility study and the eventual
operational plan cover only evacuation and support of the population up to the
point of entering fallout shelters. If a nuclear exchange should take place,
what do you do after it is safe to come out of the fallout shelters? To quote
the feasibility study, "In the event of an attack, the relocation could then
evolve into a form of resettlement of undetermined duration."

Bud Baal
December 1979

04j~

Soa.vafe!2_S 1-18" 83 f'/f.e " 9

MORE OF AN ADVANCE

method for planning either offense or defense ...

A fter financial and food storage
considerations, the subject I hear
mentioned most often among survi-
va!istsis“retreats" But uniikethefirsttwo
topics, a discussion of retreating can spawn
some real arguments. Much of what is said
or written actually is expression of con¬
fusion and frustration.

Recently a survival survey was con¬
ducted in Southern California, among a
random selection of families and indivi¬
duals of all ages— few of whom could be
termed practicing survivalists. They were
asked to rate the importance of a number
of survival considerations based upon their
personal feelings. With few exceptions,
the retreat factor was placed at the bottom
of the list. (Health was first.)

There are a number of readers who
don’t even like the word retreat. A Marine,
for example, may not carry that word in his
vocabulary. A novice to survival prepara¬
tion usually will take the word literally and
dig himself a hole in which to jump at the
first hint of trouble. This is not what re¬
treating is all about

Those who are serious about making
definite plans, should consider retreating

from a viewpoint of being completely self-
sufficient This means making preparations
so that you can live when there is no food
supply, no jobs, no doctor, no police pro-
tectioa no transportation and so on. Think
of this subject more as an advance than a
retreat

The backbone of preparation is having
optional plans to allow for any contin¬
gency, then committing your life to being
flexible. Very little published material ex¬
ists on retreat strategy. Most books and
articles are devoted to the preparation of
permanent retreats, which is fine. But as
most military men know, the irresistabie
force can usually overcome the immovable
object. A strictly defensive position is not
the ideal situation.

For example, a fully equipped steel
reinforced bunker which is 10 feet below
ground level may become when subjected
to a near-direct nuclear blast, 200 feet
short of its required depth. Even a deter¬
mined roving band of "good-ol’-boys"
looking for a little fun could probably
penetrate your walls with a shovel, box of
blasting get and a cutting iance fueled by
oxygen and acetylene gas.

The best place to start your planning is
to give some thought to the dangers you
may face in the near future—-including
those that are enveloping the U.S. right
now. Without knowing your enemy or
opponent, there is no sound method to
plan for either an offense or defense.

As you look at the following list visualize
yourself in each situation and imagine what
you could do to protect yourself. For each
solution you come up with, provide your¬
self with another one as a back-up plan

DANGERS

These are divided into four categories
which may help you think of others not
listed here.

Social: Crime, sabotage, guerrilla actions,
vandalism, riots, terrorism, drugs, moral
deterioration, civil unrest and war—in¬
cluding nuclear, conventional, invasion
and internal take-over.

Economic Shortages of food, shelter,
energy raw materials and other needed
hard goods. Transportation interruptions
strikes, unemployment inflation, depres¬
sion, recessioa high taxes national or Inter¬
nationa! bankruptcy. Industrial agricultural

28 SURVIVAL GUtDE.-FEBRUARY 1983

OPPOSITE PAGE—Earthquake frequency, annual rainfall, prevailing wind direction/velocity, winter
snowfall, population density, and possible disruption of transportation and food supply are graphed,
charted and mapped. All should be considered when selecting a retreat site.

strands to permit entry. .

ABOVE—Mini-subdivision has paved streets and streetlights. It is
ABOVE—Steep bank and dropoff on either side of the gate add to populated mainy by relatives and friends. This could be a survival
security. Major efffort can go into a sturdy gate. city.

and auto pollutions through air, water and
land—including noise pollution.

Natural; Roods, volcanoes, earthquakes,
famines, epidemics, pestilence! climatical
extremes, tidal waves, fires, and personal
health— including stress.

Governmental Emergency laws re¬
stricting freedom, price and wage controls,
dollar devaluation, martial law, food stor¬
age, holding gold or silver, travel, public
gathering, political views, religious views,
economic views and employment restric¬
tions.

There are many ways to prepare and
combat these potential hazards and the
methods you choose will depend largely
upon which dangers you believe may affect
your personal life the most. To give you
something you can get your teeth into Til
break down the many retreat possibilities
into six categories and discuss each one
briefly. They are permanent group, mobile,
boat foreign and home retreats.

Permanent When the subject of re¬
treating arises, the first type considered
automatically is the permanent retreat
This is the little mountain cabin tucked

away among the pines near a clear stream
loaded with trout There is nothing wrong
with this picture, but it may or may not be
strategically wise, depending upon the
developing crisis and the location you
choose

The ultimate success of this type of
retreat depends very heavily upon its lo¬
cation. For example, if it becomes neces¬
sary to use it as a retreat five years from
today, will it still be a good location?

In choosing a location there are hundreds
of factors that should be considered. These
require much research and thought on
your part. Maps, statistics, graphs and
charts all come into play here. Coordinate
all pertinent information along with your
family's persona! plans and come up with
several possibilities for further exploration.

Here are some questions that you may
'wish to answer for yourself.

(1) Does your health require certain cli¬
matic conditions? Dry air? Humid air? Hot
Weather? Cold weather? Temperate
weather? Clean air. free of smog or allergy-
producina oar+ides?

(2) Will your retreat depend on growing
your own food? What type of climate will

the food need? Frost? No frost? How will
rain, sun and wind affect your crops? What
type of soil?

(3) What type of crops should you raise?
Should you consider an orchard? Will you
be able to supply adequate water and
power for them?

(4) Is your proposed site near a war or
terroritst-saboteur target such as a mili¬
tary base, power and water transmission
lines, or prison?

(5) Will your site depend upon its own
power supply? Is there an adequate sup¬
ply of wood, sun, wind, water or coal?

(6) How accessible is your location during
a crisis?

(7) Is the community, along with neigh¬
bors, solid and responsible? Would they
protect your property while you are away?

(8) Could you live there permanently, in
the event you lost your home through
foreclosure or some other disaster?

(9) Will the local laws allow the type of
development you have in mind? Do you
plan improvements which you do not want
inspected by the local building depart¬
ment?

(10) Does the location meet the interest

SURVIVAL CUIDE/FEBRUARY 1983 29

RETREATING

and skill factors of your family?

(11) Have you investigated everything be¬
fore you close escrow?

(12) Water? Sewage? Permits? Planning
and zone approval?

(13) Is the site suitable for a deep, under¬
ground room?

(14) Are the taxes low? Can you pay cash
for the land?

(15) Is it away from major population
centers? Is it away from highways? Can it
be seen from the road?

(16) Can you disguise the entrance so it
would be easily overlooked?

(17) Could you get to your retreat when
the highways are completely clogged?

(18) Is your location attractive to the curi¬
ous or campers and backpackers?

(19) Is there one major employer in the
area which could cause huge job layoffs?

(20) Is your site free from natural disaster
such as land or snow slides? Roods? Forest
fires? Earthquakes? Soil erosion?

(21) Could you make a living in the area in
case you lost your job?

This is not a complete list, but it gives
you an idea of how much thought and
research effort is required You should
design your own check list that fits your
situatioa

Group Retreats: It is becoming very
popular now to develop group retreats.
The advantages are obvious: professional
specialists can meet any community need—
such as for a doctor and dentist There is
strength in numbers. Weakness or break¬
down in one family can be compensated
for by the group.

The disadvantages are not so obvious
and seldom—if ever—mentioned in print
A few of them should be kept in mind

(1) The worse the crisis, the more valuable
a group retreat might become. But at an
inverse ratio, it may also become more
risky, if the worsening condition may cause
government agencies or other opposing
forces to focus on and seek out group
retreats. It is virtually impossible to keep a
group retreat totally secret

(2) This form of retreat is very expensive.
First of all, in most cases, you will be
paying for the developer's profit—which
is only fair. The required improvements
are usually extensive and most often must
be paid for in cash. You will also be paying
for any community buildings, security and
group storage buildings, security systems,
utility systems and perhaps a perimeter of
some kind. In addition, there will likely be
monthly fees to pay for guards and other
services.

(3) Personal committments you must make
when signing up may be more than you or
your family would desire.

(4) You may not receive fee simple title—
only a share— which is hard to market in
case you need to get your money out

(5) The sites are usually very remote and
you could be hard-pressed to reach it
during an emergency. You would have to
take-off in advance of an unexpected
emergency.

(6) Many group retreats make room only
for those with a true survival- type talent or
skill

(7) Use of your retreat may be restricted.
Many frown on members using it simply
fora family vacation or on bringing friends
or even other relatives.

(8) Perhaps the major disadvantage is the
very real and common problem of per¬
sonality conflicts. This is especially ap¬
parent when you are not as committed as
other members. Or, maybe you aren’t used
to a “chain-of-command” type of man¬
agement which does tend to build up
resentments. Moral standards may not
meet yours or you may just plain not like
some members— all with whom you are
thrown into very close contact

(9) You may be required to put your life on
the line for the good of the group. Usually,
doctors are exempt from this committment

(10) The retreat’s basic strategy may be
fixed, leaving no room for flexibility-—
either for you personally or for changing
conditions occuring at the time or over the
next few years.

Group retreating is wide open for new
and better innovations. For many, some

Areas of heavy annual snowfall, for retreat
location, mean high energy requirements,
short growing season.

valid possibilities remain in existing groups
of which you may already be a member—
churches, fraternal organizations, social
clubs, employment groups and even your
own neighbors. All you have to do is some
evangelizing and provide the leadership.

Mobile Retreats: Here is where this
writeri scounselingseemstomakea major
departure from most other survival advice
which revolves mainly around two forms
of retreating (1) the permanent retreat
where your mobility is directed toward
traveling between your home and, say, a
mountain cabin, and (2) major investment
in a moving retreat such as a boat, camper
or trailer.

The general approach here builds on
the terms “flexible” and “options.” Look
again at the “dangers” list It must be
obvious that one single retreat plan can¬
not possibly meet all situations, in addi¬
tion, you should consider another pro¬
blem that has been plaguing everyone for
some time: our society and economy are
in a constant state of movement Nothing
is as permanent these days, as it was when
the fatherly admonition was to “ put down
some roots, son.” As long as you are tied
down to a job, there is absolutely no as¬
surance of what your situation will be
tomorrow. This factor alone makes it very
difficult to plan a permanent retreat The
mobile retreat overcomes many of those
obstacles.

There are an infinite number of pre¬
paration and scenario combinations you
could deal with, but let’s look at some
basic actions you might take which could
provide a life-saving edge against almost
any situation.

(1) Prepare a 15- to 30-pound backpack
loaded with basic survival items. This will
allow you to travel fast on foot for, say, one
or two weeks. Prepare one for each family
member. Keep them loaded and handy
for immediate use at home or with you in
the car. If you commute some distance to
work, keep one in your car at all times.
This is the ultimate flexible or mobile re¬
treat and one everybody can afford.

(2) Learn and practice wilderness survival
for the mountain, desert, sea, seashore,
and for both hot and cold weather. Think
of this as an insurance policy. If you are
stuck without your pack, you can still move
and live off the land.

(3) Buy an “off-road” bicycle or convert
your existing bike. Invest in bike-packs
that can turn your bike into a “mini-cam¬
per.” With this outfit you can enjoy a
camping vacation or you could have your-

(Continued on page 68)

30 SURVIVAL GUIDE/FEBRUARY 1983

self a practical mobile retreat Bumper-to-
bumper traffic on the roads and highways
would be no problem to you

A motorcycle is an alternative, but your
bike would be hard to push through rough
country after running out of gas or oiL

(4) Storage depots can make a critical dif¬
ference to your welfare during a chaotic
period— especially if you are left with only
the clothes on your back. This survival
cache might consist of food, water, medi¬
cal supplies, clothes, shelter, weapons,
tools, fuel and some trading items. Their
locations would depend upon your re¬
treating strategy. For example, one could
be buried in your backyard or near your
permanent retreat site. Or, they could be
buried near your planned trail through a
national forest

This is a fairly inexpensive retreat sys¬
tem and your mini-supply depots should
last indefinitely, if you built boxes of ply¬
wood and sealed them completely with
fiberglass and resin.

(5) Having an extra vehicle available some¬
place other than your own home could be
a great asset for staying mobile. The cabin
retreater often leaves his four-wheeler at a
neighbor's and saves depreciation by
commuting in the family car.

(6) Flexibility can be extended by owning
animals such as horses, mules or burros.
These animals can be cheap to purchase
or raise and it may not be difficult to find a
neighbor to board them when you are
gone.

(7) Boats, by themselves, are really a separate
retreating system, but as a part of your
land-based strategy, you can utilize a small
inflatable, folding or aluminum dingy to
great advantage—if you think you will be
near a river, lake or seashore

The small boat can provide a food
gathering platform or you can use it to
travel while carrying aheavy load. It might
also be used to escape trouble:

(8) The motorhome or pickup truck cam¬
per is already included in the inventories
of many survivalists. The uses and ad¬
vantages of these vehicles are easy to see,
but caution should be added here so that
you don’t rely on them for your complete
survival strategy. Remember, they are still
subject to road blocks or heavy traffic and
fuel requirements.

(9) If you are fortunate enough to have a
mechanical skill, consider setting up a tiny
shop in a van or small trailer.

(10) In your planning, you will need
numerous maps. Be sure to collect both
road and topographic maps for not only
your retreat area, but the entire state¬
s'. en the entire U. S., Canada and Mexico.

Plan alternate routes for travel to and
escape from your retreat area. Make sure
all family members ha ve a basic route map
in the event you become separated.

Boat Retreat Like the permanent land
retreat this is a complex subject on which
Survival Guide has already touched. It’s a
topic you will see more of in the future.

This approach offers advantages no
other retreating system caa

(1) A vessel can be used as a land base to
live on.

(2) Boat dwellers can utilize the land while
operating from the boat—along any coast
Seashores are excellent food gathering
grounds.

(3) A boat can carry a survivalist family’s
complete supplies. This includes an inex¬
haustible supply of water—condensed
from the sea

(4) Probably the sea will hold the cleanest
air in event of a nuclear explosion—or
even powerplant leakage

(5) The sea is an excellent escape from
land-based mobs.

(6) Your boat is an effective alternative for
reaching a foreign haven afierthe govern¬
ment restricts all foreign travel.

(7) With sail there should be a little worry
with regard to shortages of fuel, water,
food or travel problems.

There are many disadvantages to boats,
or course, but advance planning can over¬
come many of them. Boat retreating
should, if possible, also include a land-
based retreat.

Foreign Retreat This is the subject
that gave“surviva!ism” the most publicity
a few years ago, through the many books
and newsletters published mainly for the
upper-middle income and wealthy peo¬
ple. The main objective was to provide tax
shelters and low-cost living for those on
fixed incomes. Foreign countries were also
a source of currency investment

For a long time, retirement articles have
touted Mexico and other countries as ideal
retirement place for Americans on fixed
incomes to retire The foreign retreat re¬
mains a popular idea with a number of
survival writers, but the dangers now far
outweigh the advantages.

If you are looking at areas outside the
U.S., consider only three countries: Wes¬
tern Canada. New Zealand and Australia.
Under no circumstances give up your U. S.
citizenship. Aside from loyalty, there are
too many advantages you wouldn’t want
to lose at this time. For boaters, there are
some interesting retreat areas in the Paci¬
fic ocean, although conditions there are
undergoing rapid change.

For those on fixed incomes who are still

looking at countries such as Mexico, you
are likely to take on some problems. The
low-cost living areas are also low in a lot of
things—except perhaps, crime. This
writer has a friend who could live a fabulous
life in the Philippines, but he wishes to
remain in the U.S. to enjoy the medical
benefits. South of the border, the practice
of personal property confiscation by govern¬
ment representatives is all too common.
Americans are no longer exempt from
criminal or terrorist attacks—they are
more likely to be the object of such violence.
Some foreign countries could be good for
a “touch-and-go” system.

Home Retreat Your home should be
the first site you consider for your retreat
preparations. For one thing, you already
have it. You also may have a large invest¬
ment tied up in your house and find now
that you can’t afford to move— even were
you able to sell it Your house could prove
to be a sound strategy—-depending on
many things. You might be able to afford
to add a concealed basement: many of
your survival stores will be with you, so
why not provide a place to hide them.

The most overlooked asset in a home
retreat is the neighborhood— specifically,
the neighbors surrounding your home.
They may feel as you do about survival,
but just don’t wish to discuss it because
they’re afraid you’ll make fun of them.
Think of the secure feeling you'll have
with solid protection on all sides of you.

Most survival-oriented book catalogs
advertised in Survival Guide cover this
subject Send for the suppliers’ book lists.

In wrapping up. keep in mind that the
average person will have to make money
do triple duty as protection, investment
and recreation.

The “perfect’ retreat is only a dream.
You will have to make many compromises.
However, you can come closer to your
dream if you convert the compromises
into useful options, alternate plans and
back-up systems.

In spending large sums of money, al¬
ways consider that you may have that
investment for some years and you will
wish to be able to sell it when you have a
change of plans or require emergency
money.

Finally, test all your retreat plans against
the dangers and pitfalls cited here until
your ideas all come into focus.

Whatever you do. include your spouse
and children in the discussions and plans.
You need their support to make things go
smoothly.

Good hunting! •

DCiZT H tfcc * 556

SHELTERS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO EVACUATION

****************************************

c ftp

Any debate concerning evacuation versus in-place shelters will have to re¬
main strictly academic at this time. We have few blast shelters in target
areas, and probably still fewer crisis relocation plans that are "ready to
roll." Actually, I think the more important question today is whether we
will be able to organize any type of workable civil defense program in the
near future.

Since early this past spring we've experienced what one writer has termed
the greatest peace offensive ever conducted, a well organized and expensive
propaganda campaign aimed at convincing the general public no one can sur¬
vive the bomb. According to the propaganda, only an immediate in-place
freeze will prevent a nuclear doomsday, and any outlay for civil defense is
a useless waste of funds. The antics of Ground Zero Week, with its prior
and continuing message of the coming Armageddon, has apparently captured
considerable support for the freeze initiatives, but that's only part of
the story.

Due to a very quiet, almost clandestine, program being conducted all across
the country, local governments, cities and counties, are being approached
by anti-defense organizations, and asked to pass anti-civil defense resolu¬
tions. If passed, the prepared resolution removes the jurisdiction from all
further participation in any civil defense program. The program apparently
has had considerable success, and is meeting little, or no opposition.

Here in California, one county has even gone so far as to have the words
"civil defense" removed from their disaster ordinance, and another is plan¬
ning to print and distribute anti-civil defense literature. Also here in
California, in addition to those entities passing the prepared resolutions,
others have refused to go along with the mini-plans, the partial evacuation
plans they were to draw up under FEMA guidlines, and have completed by Octo¬
ber 1 of this year. My county, Los Angeles, has decided to wait for the
full plan, but such isn't scheduled for completion until after 1990. We
could all be speaking Russian by that time.

Why has a large percentage of the American public gone from past apathy to
present open hostility toward a civil defense program designed to afford
them some measure of protection in a nuclear exchange? Who's to blame? The
propaganda blitz of the Left must of course take a large share of the blame,
but many of our politicians are equally at fault. They have been too quick
to jump on the doomsday bandwagon, but then most belong to the "me generation,"
no matter what their age. Look out for number one in the now, and to Hell
with the future. Too bad the constituency might have to perish along with
their elected officials. Last, but not least, FEMA must shoulder at least
a portion of the responsibility for this drastic change in public opinion.

They have done little if anything to counteract this peace offensive, and in
my opinion it appears a change in agency leadership is in order.

It should be obvious to almost anyone that a workable civil defense program
of any kind is virtually impossible without the cooperation of local govern¬
ment, yet at present that cooperation is seriously in doubt. The threat of

- 2 -

nuclear destruction can't be eliminated by merely voting in favor of placing
our nation at the mercy of the Kremlin. Hopefully public opinion can yet be
turned around by counteracting the present propaganda with the truth.

Information is the basis of planning, but if you're making plans for other
people, you'd best let them know what you are doing, and why. Up to now,
the 1ittle information the public has received from the pro-civil defense
sector has lacked some of the more important reasons we need a good program.
Spokesmen either don't seem to be aware of, or chose to ignore the fact
that the Soviets have a civil defense program, a program completed in 1972,
and relying heavily on evacuation to protect the bulk of their population.

I have heard both sides of the evacuation-shelter debate point to the 1978
CIA report as supporting their side of the argument. The truth is, those
that claim the report supports in-place blast shelters over crisis reloca¬
tion, should go back and read the document again. The report states on
page 2 that blast shelters have been provided for the Soviet leadership, but
factory shelters can only accomodate 12 to 242 of the work force, and in a
crisis al1 non essential and off-duty workers would be evacuated.

When the report was written, a minimum of 10 to 20% of the Russian urban
population could be sheltered. By 1985 the percentage was expected to rise
to 15 to 30%, but in reality less because of the expected increase in popu¬
lation. The last paragraph on page 2 of that report states, "Only b^y evac¬
uating the bulk of the urban population could they hope to achieve a marked
reduction in the number of casualties." According to FEMA, this report is
still valid.

Probably the biggest misconception about crisis relocation, and a factor
often stressed in the recent peace propaganda, is the question of where we're
going to get the 3 days to a week to evacuate when we have less than a 30
minute warning time. The posers of that question seem to be deliberatly con¬
fusing a suprise attack with a gradual build up of tension that culminates
in the enemy activating their evacuation plan, which in turn would trigger
ours.

Our military planners now feel there is 1ittle chance of a suprise Soviet
strike, when such would leave their urban population exposed to our counter-
strike. If the Soviets plan a first strike, it is most 1ikely they will evac
uate their cities first, a process the CIA says will take 2 days to a week,
and with our superior transportation systems, we should be out in the boon-
docks before they are. Crisis relocation planning is not intended to protect
our risk population in suprise attack. If such should come, and you're in a
target area near ground zero, you've no doubt had it.

Along with the evacuation in less than half an hour, is the related argument
that everyone will die in the massive traffic jams on the freeways. Most en¬
vision the usual rush hour traffic , only ten time worse, forgetting the free
ways aren't that busy 24 hours a day. It can be done, but of course not in
the less than half an hour used in the argument.

Another misconception about crisis reloaction, is that the small town home-
owner will be required to house refugees from the cities. Evacuees will not
be sent to private residences, but to temporary housing in such as schools
and office buildings. Outside the risk area, fallout rather than blast is

the hazard; which brings up another fallacy, the claim that there aren't
enough fallout shelters in the small towns to house the locals, least of all
a large influx from the metropolitan areas. Evacuation plans take this de¬
ficiency into account, and plan to substitute dirt protected commercial type
structures for shelter protection.

Earlier in this article I mentioned the mini-evacuation program, partial
plans to afford some measure of protection until full plans could be comple¬
ted. When FEMA ran into some resistance from local governments, they drop¬
ped the requirement for such plans. Both local government and FEMA seem to
be completely ignoring the fact that there are critical time restraints, and
any lengthy delay in preparations could prove disasterous. I'm speaking of
course of the window of vulnerability that will open in the mid 1980's. At
that time our military intelligence feels that Soviet military strength will
have reached the point where the Kremlin can dictate the terms for our con¬
tinued existence. I personally feel that window is already at least par¬
tially open.

I've often wondered why it should take us almost 20 years to complete the
basic planning for an evacuation program. We started in 1973. If it takes
us that long to complete paper plans for crisis relocation, how long would
it take us to construct blast shelters for all those Americans residing in
risk areas? Certainly not by 1985, and I doubt such could be completed even
by 1990. Sure a number of European countries have provided shelters for their
people, but they didn't start construction yesterday, and their per capita
expenditures for civil defense are many times greater than ours. This brings
up the matter of the cost of a blast shelter program. I've seen various
price tags ranging from 60 billion to 100 billion, with all estimates con¬
siderably higher than the estimates of the cost of evacuation planning.

I don't mean to imply that in-place shelters are a bad idea, but due to time
and financial constraints, it seems counterproductive at this time to drop
relocation plans in favor of in-place shelters. Actually, risk area blast
shelters are included in, and are necessary to crisis relocation planning,
as not everyone can up and leave town when the evacuation order is given.

A portion of the essential work force in such as power, telephone, fire,
police and food industry workers will have to remain on the job. Such em¬
ployees, and their families, would be evacuated to the nearest safe area,
and the workers would then commute to their jobs. Blast shelters will be
needed for the essential workers on duty, and though some shelters already
exist in the risk areas, it is doubtful there are anywhere near enough spaces
to meet the requirement.

I'll be the first to admit that crisis relocation planning is far from per¬
fect. I have my doubts about the plan being able to turn the food chain a-
round in order to feed the bulk of the population relocated to the rural
areas. I don't like the calorie count of the meals to be supplied to evac¬
uees in the host areas. This especially when all able bodied evacuees will
be required to do pick and shovel work constructing shelters. I'll even
concede that there will no doubt be some collision deaths on the freeway,
but even with all its faults, crisis relocation seems to offer the best pro¬
tection for the near future.

Whether we rely on evacuation, or in-place shelters, after a nuclear attack
we're going to have a lot of stranded people. Remember, during the shelter

- 4 -

period, the food chain and all other systems have stopped. When it's safe
to come out again, how much food, water, and other essentials remain in the
shelter stocks for continued survival? Probably very 1ittle, if any at all .

In addition, I think we can expect a large portion of the nation's electri¬
cal power to be out of service, either because generating plants were tar¬
geted, or because of the EMP effect of nuclear detonations. A lack of elec¬
trical power effects all other systems, and especially water systems, mean¬
ing many cities and towns will be without water.

The latest civil defense 1iterature I've seen on recovery after nuclear at¬
tack calls for a return to the cities, or at least to the undamaged, or only
siightly damaged portions. Such reoccupation would of course have to be de¬
layed until such time as any damaged utilities can be repaired. I don't ex¬
pect all our cities to be completely flattened after a nuclear attack, and
in fact many on the fringes of a target may suffer little damage, but with¬
out utilities, a city is just a worthless mass of steel and concrete.

Could the damaged utilities be repaired? Lets stop a moment and look at just
what such repairs would involve. First you have to get repairmen to the site
of the damage. That means vehicles, and especially fuel to run them. It
also means repair parts must be found and transported, and no doubt portable
electrical generators will be needed, plus fuel to run them. Add to this
food, water and other vital supplies needed to support the workers while they
make repairs that could take many months. Where do these supplies come from?
We have no stockpiles, and in fact, recovery isn't even on the planning agen¬
da until after 1990.

With shelter supplies low, or probably already exhausted, the surviving evac¬
uees in the rural areas no doubt will be forced to forage for food and water.

They can't return to their homes in the cities because their vehicles are out

of gas, or nearly so. How about those workers in the blast shelters in the

cities? Their supplies are probably low, or gone too, and it's pretty hard
to forage in a city.

In August 1977, a study on the feasibility of California engaging in crisis
relocation planning was completed . the conclusions were positive, but the
last sentence of that report reads, "In the event of an attack, the reloca¬
tion could then evolve into a form of resettlement of undetermined duration."
No, in spite of the optimistic picture painted by some of our past civil de¬
fense planners, I don't think we'll be returning to the cities. First I don't
think there will be any utility repairs made in the cities due to the logis¬
tics involved. Secondly, I feel we'll be lucky if we even manage to rescue
those left in the metropolitan blast shelters.

I was born and raised in a rural area in Iowa near Dubuque, a city often
named as the butt of small town jokes. If I emerged from a shelter in Dubu¬
que after a nuclear attack, I could reach the rural area at the city's edge
in less than a two hours walk. In about another five hours walking I'd be
among farm relatives with wells and amply stocked cellars, a definite plus
when it comes to survival. The problem is, we don't live near Dubuque any¬
more .

Twenty five years ago we moved to California, right smack in the middle of
the Los Angeles basin. I can reach the city limits in 1 ess than 20 minutes,
but instead of being out in the country, I'm merely at the edge of another

- 5 -

city, and beyond that another city, and another, and another. It's probably
a two day walk up the dry San Gabriel River bed to the Morris Reservoir, and
probably a couple weeks of walking over two mountain ranges and a stretch of
desert to reach the food growing area of the San Joaquin Valley. If the irri¬
gation systems of the valley have failed due to lack of power, it means more

walking to find a self sustaining area. We have all the "bug out" gear and

supplies, including walking shoes if we have to move on foot, but I'd much
sooner be starting from the middle of the San Joaquin than from the middle of
the LA Basin.

I'd of course prefer living somewhere out of the Basin, up in some small town
in a non-target area, but in spite of the advice of some survival advisors,
we can't all just pick up and move to the safety of the boondocks. I'm not
self employed, and my employer won't let me take the timeclock with me. When

retirement comes in a few more years, we'll head for the relative safety of

a small town, but I doubt my opinion will change on the evacuation-shelter
question.

In conclusion, we don't need evacuation, or shelters, we need both, but we
also need recovery stockpiling and planning at the same time. To me, it is
neither logical, nor ethical, to try and seperate the two. What is the sense
of saving the population from missiles and fallout, only to have them perish
later from lack of food and water, but then to return to the realities of the
present, before we can have any effective civil defense program, we have to
somehow create a reversal in American thinking, from fatalism to a desire to
survive.

Bud Baal
Nov 1982

OTifST [boFoZ-C Till r fto'na

P 81

WILLIAM W. JOHNSTONE

With less than ten hours before launch, the world
went into a blind panic. In America, there weren’t
enough police and soldiers to control the frightened
mobs trying to flee. Wild reports that hundreds of
thousands of enemy troops were on the way split the
airwaves. Troops were moving, but they were Russian
and Chinese troops moving toward each other, not
toward the U.S.

Rioting and looting in American cities began slowly,
then picked up in intensity and savagery as night
darkened the streets. Subways were jammed with
frightened people running blindly, clutching a few
possessions.

Freeways and expressways clogged, slowed, then
became hopelessly snarled as cars and trucks broke down
and were abandoned. For the most part, efforts to try to
clear the interstates failed because civilians refused to
obey military orders.

Civil defense and evacuation plans in America were a
joke. Leaderless, the people were left to their own panic-
stricken imaginations, and they ran wild.

The military had declared martial law, but the news of
that only served to frighten the people more. The
American people reasoned that if the military had
declared martial law, then we must be under attack—
from somebody.

Because of jammed highways, the military had had to
airlift troops in, and at night, troops in battle dress all
look alike. Who could tell?

Automobiles became useless; death became indis¬
criminate. The elderly became the first casualties—most
had no place to go, and others could not get where they
wanted to go. The old could not move swiftly enough, so
they were trampled upon and left to be robbed, assaulted,
and killed. Children became separated from their
parents. They sat on the curbs and howled their fright
and were knocked out of the way by panicked adults.
Some ran into the streets and were crushed by speeding
automobiles. Others were left to wander the streets in
total mindless terror and confusion. Older children
found rocks and sticks with which they broke windows,
then stole candy and food. The girls, those old enough—
in most cases—were dragged into alleys and, at the very
least, raped.

It is a fact that in times of great crisis, human animals
prowl the streets in far greater numbers than normal.
Weaponless, most people had no means with which to
defend themselves. But criminals never register guns;
and never seem to have any problem getting them. Shots

CkiP

were fired, fires were started, the flames and the gunfire
and the screaming heightening an already near-impossible
situation.

And the worst was yet to come.

A wire service reported that America was under attack
from foreign countries. Flash. DJs hit the air with the
news. More panic.

And, just as America has agents in every country
around the globe, gathering intelligence and waiting to
strike in case of open hostilities, most other countries
have agents in America, waiting to do the same. They all
have their orders: in case of attack, knock out
communications and create panic and confusion. And
that they did. They could not reach their home countries,
and most of their embassies were closed, so they followed
the earlier orders. The U.S. had begun jamming
frequencies—as many as they could, and that created
even more problems and confusion.

The Emergency Action Notification System—ENS—
was ordered activated. It is an expensive and bothersome
mess that has never worked, and many (if not most) DJs
did not have the vaguest idea of what to do when the bells
started clanging and the buzzers began buzzing and the
tones began howling and whistling.

More panic.

Then the first missile was fired. It was not clear (and
never would be) just who started the dance with whom,
or why, but India and Pakistan exploded, and that part
of the world began burning.

South America had erupted in warfare, as had the
Mideast, and Africa. The world had, for years, balanced
on the edge of insanity. The slender tightrope had
snapped, and the world went berserk.

86

"No.” Travee’s voice was emotion-charged as he
thought of his wife of thirty-five years, and of his sons
and daughters and his grandchildren. He had sent them
all to his birthplace—where he owned land—up in the far
north of Wisconsin. Perhaps they would be safe there,
but he doubted it. "No, I’m not that anxious to die.
Malelov, you seem to be overcome with philosophical
meanderings. . . . Perhaps you can tell us what brought
the world to this point?”

"But of course,” Malelov said. "General Travee . . .
oh, excuse me, you are President Travee now, aren’t
you?” He laughed. "As I am now premier. As to the cause
of this . . . misfortune we are about to bring to the
world—or did we bring it? Oh . . . anger, frustration,
helplessness, greed. No.one cause. It was our country
meddling in your business; your country meddling in
everybody’s business. And . . . perhaps it was the fact
that both of our governments neglected a middle ground:
something between the extremes. Not communism or

Copyright © 1983 by William W. Johnstone

socialism or democracy—but, well, I don’t know. 1 will
admit, now, that I am having serious doubts about my
own political philosophies. One can only enslave a people
for so long, be it physically, mentally, socially, or
economically; then they revolt.” He chuckled. "Is that
not correct, Mr. President-General?”

*That is correct,” Travee said.

"Your constitution is a most interesting document,”
the Russian said. "I have, read it many times. Interesting,
but vague. And totally unworkable to the satisfaction of
all the people it must encompass. I believe, Travee, that
from out of the ashes both of us will produce with our
missiles, there will arise a great number of small
nations—including many within the United States. That
is what I believe. Nations, small ones, that will serve their
own people—those being willing to live under the
particular laws of that nation. All, in the main, answering
to some degree to one central flag, but not in the whole.
Yes, that is what I believe. Have you ever given that any
thought, Travee?”

"Yes,” Travee admitted. "I have. But it won’t work,
Malelov.”

"How do we know?” the Russian challenged. "Have
either of our countries ever tried it?”

"Could we try it now?” Prime Minister Larousse
suggested hopefully.

"No!” Malelov said, flatly and quickly. "It is too late.
Too late for us. Ah! Enough small talk.”

Travee was in constant communication with his
northernmost tracking stations. No blips had yet
appeared.

"No,” Malelov said, his voice holding sadness. "It is
too late. Crazy Horse knows. We are both soldiers. We
know what we must do. Our generation, in both our
countries, brought all this on: your country, Travee,
with its maze of conflicting laws and rules; mine with its
repression—I will admit it. So, our world is closing
around us. However,”—he sighed—"from out of the
ashes .. . and all that nonsense.”

The men were silent for a time, their breathing heavy
over the miles.

Suddenly, Malelov laughed. A great, booming laugh.
"All right, you"siliy Frenchman. I have a present coming
your way. Not many, but enough.”

The PM cursed the Russian general.

OIP

PULLING THROUGH

Dean Ing

In my hurry, I hadn’t followed my own drill; hadn't kept
two radios tuned to different stations; and so I didn’t hear the
President’s brief, self-serving spiel that called for crisis relo¬
cation and, by implication, admitted that we could expect a
‘‘limited” nuclear response to the tactical weapons we were
unleashing on the wave of Soviet tanks that had lashed across
the border into West Germany. "Crisis relocation” was an old
weasel phrase for “evacuation;” our Office of Technology As¬
sessment and thinktunks like the Hudson institute had solemnly
agreed that Americans would have between twenty-four and
seventy two hours of wanting before any crisis developed into
a nuclear exchange.

Actually, from the moment our Navy engaged Russkis in
the Aegean until the first wave of nuke-tipped MIRVs streaked
up from Soviet hard sites, we’d had about fifteen hours, it
might’ve been halfway adequate if we’d planned for it as So¬
viet-bloc countries had done—or even as one solitary local
government had done in Lane County, Oregon.

Everybody joked about the jog-crazy, mist-maddened tokers
around the University of Oregon in Eugene, so the media had
its fun upon learning that city and county officials there were
serious about evac—I mean, crisis relocation. Some poly sci
professor, in a lecture about legal diversion of funds, pointed
out that most federal funding for crisis relocation was turned
over to emergency-services groups in sheriffs’ departments.
And that those funds—all over the country, not just in Ore¬
gon— were being diverted by perfectly legal means to other
uses. The overall plan for a quarter-million people in the Eugene
area was orderly movement to the touristy strip along the coast.

Then an undergrad checked out the routes ami nervously
reported that the wildest optimist wouldn’t believe that many
people could drive out of firestorm range in two days’ time
through a bottleneck consisting of a solitary two-lane highway
and a pair of unimproved hold-your-breath gravel roads. County
maps showed several more old roads. They hadn’t existed for
thirty years.

Firestorm in Eugene bloody Orygun? A strong possibility,
since the Southern Pacific’s main switching yards in the coastal
Northwest sprawled out along the little city’s outskirts. No
prime target, certainly, but a!! too likely as a secondary or
tertiary strike victim in c county commission meeting, some
citizen asked, Why worry? Well just get on the capacious
Interstate 5 freeway and drive south.

The hell you will, replied a state patrol official". We have
orders to keep that corridor clear tor special traffic running
south from Portland and the state capital. There’ll be riot guns
at the barricades; sorry ’bout that, but Eugeneans were sched¬
uled to the coast and if they didn’t like that, they could stay
home and watch the firestorm from inside it, har har.

When local |x)iiltco- rcah/cu c.uw many tc isty toiks in the
Eugcnc-Springficld area were clamoring tor a solution, one of
them hit on a rationale that couldn’t be faulted. Eugene could
be is tu’get be* oise (he ibilroad had such tremendous load-
carrying capacity, right?

Right. And ISP’s rolling stock, flatcars for milled lumber
tuid boxcars slated for Portland and Seattle, otters sat waiting
on sidings all over the place, right?

Right. And the SP had a branch railway straight to the coast
and admail yard for turnarounds only two hours away.by slow
freight. A hastily assembled train could haul fifty thousand
people and all the survival gear each could lift from Eugene
in a single trip, then return for more.

And that was right, too. With public subscriptions helping
to fund their studies, SP troubleshooters found that they could
make up such a train in about twelve hours. They even tried
it once, billed as an outing for subscribers who’d paid SP to
do the groundwork, and though two drunks were injured falling
off a flatcar, it made a lighthearted tag end to the eleven o'clock
news across the nation. That had been two years ago.

9051 Via Amorita Avenue
Downey, California, 90241
May 16, 1982

Major Robert Kingsbury
Military and Veterans Affairs
Hall of Administration
500 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, California, 90012

Dear Major Kingsbury:

In regard to the uproar caused by your statements of this past week,

I thoroughly agree with you. It will take survival .skills and the
strength of youth to bring about recovery after a nuclear attack on
this country. At present, emotion, not logic, seems to be the gen¬
eral public’s long point. The present anti-defense ’’peace offensive"
is changing the public’s apathy to fatalism.

I first heard your statements on the. 1 . 1:30 am news on Ch 11 this
past Wednesday. lour statements, or rather the justification, were
in an interview at the end of the segment. Was this taken out of
context , part of a longer interview?

That same evening, you *'ere raked over the coals by Ray Taliafaro
(not sure of surname spelling) on his KGO talk show in San Francisco.
The first caller agreed with your logic, so the host was immediatly
antagonistic. When the caller mentioned he was a member of Mensa,
his intelligence was attacked thereafter, and before the end of
the conversation, it was being implied that you would require IQ
tests before exiting the cities. When the caller said he was a
survivalist, and had made provisions for himself and his family,
Taliafaro termed this selfish, and said the man instead should be
out demonstrating for arms controls.

I conduct classes for an industrial disaster program, and for two
small survival groups. All three groups have been given classes
on Soviet CD and the status of our evacuation program-. They have
also been informed that the jurisdictions in the LA Basin have
refused to enact the mini-evacuation program that was to be ready
by October 1 of this year, a decision that did not appear in any
paper, or make any of the TV news programs.

- 2 -

I personally believe no effective civil defense program, is possible
without an informed public. With the cooperation of the news media,
a tremendous amount of misinformation is being disseminated both by
anti-defense organizations, and by politicians. Counteracting this
kind of propaganda would seem a hopeless task.

Being as it appears logic will not prevail, how does the informed
person go about planning for the survival of self and family? I
personally agree with CRP and have told the survivalists in my
classes to adapt it to individual use as I see little chance of a
public program being ready in time.

Yours truly,

Clarence C. Baal Jr.

Thursday, Sept 8, 1983

The Register Cl

When hunting for survival shelters,
they don’t mention ‘atomic bombs’

Aaron Epstein
Knight-Ridder Newspapers

MARTINSBURG, W.Va. — The basement room
where the students meet is a veritable museum of civil
defense.

Assembled there are the artifacts of the scrapped
plans for shelter survival in the nuclear age: stacks of
rusting batteries, yellowing pamphlets telling how to
stockpile food before the H-bomb drops, 17-gallon
drums of drinking water, cartons labeled “Biscuit,
Survival, All-Purpose, Date Packed July 62, Gross Wt.
32 lbs.”

The shelf life of the biscuits expired years ago, but
in this eastern panhandle town of 13,000, Berkeley
County civil defense chief Richard Lowman Jr., keeps
them around anyhow'.

“It’s better’n snowballs, as my father-in-law used to
say when the hay was no good for the cows to eat,” he
said with a philosophic air.

A few government-hired architectural and engi¬
neering students have been working out of this civil
defense room, in the federal building, inconspicuously
gathering data for a federal plan to house hundreds of
thousands of people believed likely to flee the Balti¬
more and Washington areas in case of an anticipated
nuclear attack.

These students, part of a contingent of 17S hired
across the nation this summer by the Federal Emer¬
gency Management Agency, are surveying publicly
accessible buildings of all kinds for possible use in any
emergency — including an international crisis that
could prompt fearful city-dwellers to head for these
green and placid hills.

When Gregory Sulon, a 21-year-old student at Tem¬
ple University in Philadelphia, enters a doctor’s of¬
fice, a drug store, a church or a supermarket, he
doesn’t mention nuclear bombs or evacuation or ra¬
dioactive fallout.

Instead, he displays his identification card and
says: “Hello, I’m with the Federal Emergency Man¬
agement Agency and we’re doing a survey of congre¬
gate care facilities.”

That usually satisfies the owner or manager. Sulon
then inquires about basement, roof, walls, dining fa¬
cilities, commodes and beds, and paces off the dimen¬
sions of the building as required by FEMA form 85,
which replaced Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Form 682, which is obsolete.

“We don’t tell them we’re preparing for a war,”
explained FEMA’s John Albright, who supervises the
students here. “We play it down. We tell them it’s for
any type of disaster, floods and so on. Nuclear war is a
turnoff.”

FEMA spokesmen say that officialdom’s downplay¬
ing of nuclear war merely reflects the agency’s
broader mission to advise states and localities on a
wide range of emergencies.

Dean Neal of West Virginia’s state office of emer¬

gency services says, on the other hand, that FEMA
adopted euphemisms as “a smokescreen to get the
word ‘nuclear’ out of the picture.” For instance, he
says, his title was changed recently from “nuclear
civil protection officer” to "population protection offi¬
cer” although, he said, “I’m doing the same thing.”

So the students have attracted scant attention here,
which is just fine with FEMA. The Reagan adminis¬
tration, convinced that planned evacuation offers the
only hope of reducing casualties in a nuclear war,
wants to avert any more grief over its crisis relocation
plan, which already has drawn mushroom clouds of
scorn and ridicule.

During a House debate on the plan last year, one
congressman said the plan was based on the
“Strangelovian notion that we can fight, survive and
win a nuclear war. Nothing could be further from the
truth.”

Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., called the evacuation
concept “not evil” and “not obscene.” Rather, he
said, “it is silly.”

The U.S. Postal Service hand-delivered a round of
guffaws with its nuclear war contingency scheme to
move its operations to evacuation areas and pass out
change-of-address cards.

Former California Gov. Edmund Brown Jr. noted
that “Los Angeles cannot even evacuate itself on a
Friday afternoon with no (smog) alerts in effect.”
New York City r spumed the plan, too, one councilman
there calling it “voodoo preparedness.”

Here in the West Virginia “host” area (which
FEMA now would like its people to call a “reception”
area) for the Maryland-D.C. “risk” area (which
FEMA prefers to label a “high hazard” area). there is
skepticism among residents and even civil defense
officials themselves.

“Why Martinsburg?” asked Ed Light, who sells
used guns and adult films at his discount store. “We’re
only 90 miles away from Washington. D.C. From what
I can understand about nuclear stuff, it doesn’t seem
to me 90 miles is going to do any good. We’re going to
have a lot of congestion with people coming out of
Baltimore and D.C. We got enough congestion right
now on weekends.

“Of course, it's gonna be every person for hisself.
that’s the way it looks to be, and my guns aren't gonna
be much good unless we’re gonna fight World War I
again.”

To local civil defense director Lowman, an apple
grower already irritated by the federal government’s
farm labor rules, the coming of the students and the
FEMA forms seems to be more bureaucracy and
paperwork.

“The money’s there, it’s funded and it’s gotta be
spent,” he said. “Isn’t that the government way of
doing it? That’s the way we used to fly (in the Navy h
If we had gas eft at the end of the quarter, we'd fly
around and use the gas up. If you didn’t use it, you

SURVIVAL: ‘Congregate care facilities’ sought

STUDENTS: In the survey, ‘We play it down’

didn’t need it so you wouldn’t get it next time.”

State official Neal peppers his reactions to crisis
relocation with such unkindnesses as “pipe dream"
and “pork-barrel program.”

From start to finish, he said, crisis relocation is “a
logistical nightmare.”

Up to now, Maryland wants no part of the FEMA
scheme, even though the state car. get federal plan¬
ning help without cost. Does this mean that FEMA is
planning for West Virginia guests who aren't planning
to arrive?

“It could be,” responded Pete Fredericksen, a for¬
mer Pentagon mapping and biological warfare spe¬
cialist who directs emergency management
programs at FEMA’s regional office in Philadelphia.

“But we could simply schedule people from other
evacuation areas for there so the effort wouldn’t go to
waste. They could come from Washington, suburban
Virginia and around Waynesboro, Gettysburg, Cham-
bersburg in Pennsylvania, which would be very close
by.

"Plans or not, we would expect a lot of spontaneous
evacuation, people who would say, hey, things are
looking bad, now’s a good time to head out to the
summer home in the mountains or whatever. How¬
ever, it would be better if the evacuation is orga¬
nized.”

FEMA is studying "spontanous evacuation” and
how to “upgrade" mountain structures to resist radio¬
active fallout by, say, piling dirt around buildings,
said James Holton, an agency spokesman in Washing¬
ton.

The forms compiled by the West Virginia students
— from Charles Town to Paw Paw — will be sent to
Neal. He said he will "use my own discretion” to
choose the best buildings, using a guideline of 10
square feet per person for fallout shelters and 40
square feet per person for temporary housing for
other types of emergencies.

The National Shelter Survey (renamed the National
Facility Survey) will be linked to other planning “an¬
nexes” covering such matters as assessing risks, dis¬
persing evacuees, and replenishing food and medical
supplies. All of this information and more will be
incorporated into an Integrated Emergency Manage¬
ment System.

Because Congress cut the Reagan administration’s
civil defense request for the fiscal year 1983-84 from
S253 million to $169 million, FEMA officials say that at
the current rate of spending, their emergency plans
won’t be completed until well past 1990.

Lowman, among other local civil defense directors,
has been asked to evaluate the threat to Berkeley
County (High? Medium? Low? Unsure?) of drought,
earthquake, flood, major fire, tornado, tsunami (tidal
wave), water contamination, radiological incident
and nuclear attack, among other catastrophes.

What happens after he completes that task ? “ I don’t
know,” he replied. “They didn’t tell us.”

Behind all this planning lies the assumption that
there will be about a week of international tension
before a nuclear attack, giving residents of the Wash-
ington-Baltimore target area time to evacuate, pref¬
erably to the west because prevailing winds are likely
to blow fallout in an easterly direction.

"We’ve always assumed we’d have low risk of nu¬
clear emergency here because the only thing we’d get
here would be fallout or a hit that was mis-aimed or a

malfunction,” Lowman observed in his apple sales

office,

“But it doesn’t kill that many people. Gosh, they’re
making a big deal over this Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Now that killed a lot of people at one time but there’s a
lot of people still living and they went and rebuilt the
towns.”

The safest place in Martinsburg, he says, is a
quarry near the Martin Marietta Corp. plant, though
“it would be like living like rats, 60 degrees year-
round and kinda damp.”

One of the students, Michael Wuerthele, 22, of Pitts¬
burgh and Penn State University, likes McDonald’s
restaurants because they have “fully buried cooking
facilities.”

The downtown stores are best because of their thick
common walls, Sulon says.

The manager of the state liquor store, when asked
recently about the use of his place as a shelter for
evacuees, said something like, “Well, we’ll have a
good party here for a few days.”

Actually, Lowman confided: “I think everybody’s
gonna wanna stay home. I just wouldn’t want to leave
my things behind. How much of your silverware and
your collections and your antiques can ya take with
ya?”

Indeed, surveys have shown that most people “just
don’t want to face the reality of a nuclear war,” said
FEMA’s Holton. “They don’t like the thought of dent¬
ing their $10,000 car. But if the situation came up,
they’d get the hell out of there and not worry about it.”

For the students, despite some grousing about after-
hours boredom in rural America, it has been a good
summer job. FEMA pays them at the rate of $10,000 to
almost $12,000 a year, plus $23 a day for living ex¬
penses and use of a government car, and they are
reluctant to spoil it by commenting publicly on the
validity of their work.

“I agreed to find all the places to use in case of
emergency," Sulon remarked before assessing Af¬
fordable Wheels, a used-car lot advertising a Honda
special.

“But if the bomb drops I don’t know whether it’ll
help or not. I’m not convinced we can live through it.
We do this for the money and to stay in school.”

In the sales shack, Irvin Catlett, a round man with
green suspenders, told Sulon: “Nope, no water, no
commodes, no nothin’. Just a Johnny House put in by
the WPA in 1936. I wouldn’t li.ve here.”

No good for a fallout shelter, Sulon decided. Or even
congregate care.

WAR: People ‘just don’t want to face reality’

ttp-e

“Kansas City," says Southwestern Bell's Ed McKaskel, “is not sharing with
the rest of the country the fatalistic attitude which seems to say civil defense is
useless. ” McKaskel is one of the Kansas City leaders who, with federal bless¬
ings and help, wants to ditch evacuation for shelter. Here McKaskel tells why
and how. /

KANSAS CITY’S ALTERNATIVE TO RELOCATION

EDWIN P. McKASKEL

The Kansas City metropolitan area con¬
sisting of a million and a quarter people is,
perhaps, more vulnerable to the conse¬
quences of a nuclear exchange than most
other areas. Located closer to more missile
fields and SAC bases than any other major
city, it lies just 30 miles from the Whiteman
AFB complex of approximately 150
Minuteman missiles dispersed over
western Missouri. In addition, it is less
than 200 miles from the McConnell AFB
Titan missile field to the southwest and
SAC headquarters to the north near
Omaha.

To a greater degree than people of any
other large city, Kansas City has begun to
be sensitive to civil defense and to in¬
dependently involve the citizenry in a local
option which, unfortunately is not available
everywhere.

Kansas City rests upon the thick layer of
Bethany Falls limestone which has been
exploited by mining interests for at least 75
years with a resulting complex of dozens of
mines underneath the metropolitan area.
The mines are unique not only in their
dispersion throughout the city, but they are
also blessed with geological qualities
which make them perfect for uses other
than mining. Layers of limestone are

overlayed by a layer of shale which makes
them virtually water tight, an unusual
event in limestone developments. Due to
the roiling hills upon which the city is built,
the mines are exploitable simply by
blasting mine entrances into the hillsides.
This allows horizontal mining with direct
entrances which may be used by trucks
and trains without using ramps, elevators,
shafts or other conventional mine entry
techniques.

The huge food warehousing needs of
Kansas City caused food producers and
brokers to discover the practicality of stor¬
ing all types of foodstuffs below ground in
the millions of square feet of cool, dry
space left by the mining operations.

From food storage the underground
facilities quickly adapted to a multitude of
other uses. The security and virtual
elimination of heating and cooling costs
made the sites of great interest to all types
of government and business. While they
still are largely used for general storage,
they are increasingly used for vital records
centers, office space and even manufactur¬
ing. One Taiwanese company is scheduled
to open a plant to manufacture electronic
equipment and may eventually empioy
more than 350 people in the Great Midwest

Corp. facility. Other plants will follow.
Computer centers, emergency relocation
centers and many other operations are
opening in the mines daily, joining the
more than 1100 companies already there.

The active civil defense effort which is
growing in Kansas City has its roots in the
fact that the city lies in a region which has
been devastated repeatedly by tornados,
drought and flood. The people have lived
through those disasters and know that
calamity can be survived if you plan ahead
and have the will power to stay prepared.
The smooth handling of the recent Hyatt
Regency Hotel disaster was no accident. It
was the result of thousands of hours of

MILLIONS OF SQUARE FEET OF
COOL, DRY SPACE.

practice and planning by hundreds of
public safety and volunteer organizations.

For years, there has been a regional
emergency preparedness group composed
of full time civil defense and Red Cross of¬
ficials, public safety officials, utility

*FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency

6 Journal ol Civil Defense: October 1981

managers, government agencies and con¬
cerned citizens who meet month y to plan
for disaster. The annual spring tornado
season allows ample experience m testing
radio facilities, sirens, school anc industry
safety programs. Citizen volunteer efforts
keep people interested and involved. More
than a hundred community leaders regular¬
ly turn out for the monthly civil defense
meetings. Civil defense experts from other
cities are amazed at the degree of com¬
munity involvement.

The stage was set when the federal
government turned its back on ‘'in-place”
blast and fallout shelter programs and
adopted its “relocation” program to
evacuate American cities into rural, and
supposedly iess vulnerable areas. But the
truth is, after years of study, the evacua¬
tion plan is not in place and federal officials
will tell you confidentially they douDt that it
ever will be.

In the case of Kansas City, FEMA's*
evacuation plan calls for moving most of
the population to an area due south of the
city in Southwest Missouri. Not only are
the roads inadequate, food, shelter and
security non-existant, but to get tnere the
citizens would have to drive through the
Whiteman AFB missile field, literally within
a stone’s throw of some sites.

There is a midwestern expression used
when people feel they have been treated
derisively. They say “we didn’t just ride
into town on the back of a turnip truck.”
Indeed, the flaws in the evacuation pro¬
gram as it applies to Kansas City were so
obvious and so fatal that the local emergen¬
cy preparedness group sought a more
logical alternative, one which would give
the people a reasonable chance to survive
at least a heavy fallout situation.

The Kansas City Emergency
Preparedness Group brought in the most
knowledgeable people in the field: General
George Keegan, General Daniel Graham,
Dr. Leon Goure (foremost expert on Soviet
civil defense), Dr. Eugene Wigner, Dr.
Edward Teller and many others. From
these experts they heard a new story, one
which has not been explained to the
American people. They learned that civil
defense is real and has worked time and
time again in other countries.

THE CITY COULD LOOK TO ITS
VAST UNDERGROUND.

So work began in Kansas City on a
logical alternative. It was obvious to many
that the city couid look to its vast
underground for more than its economic

welfare. An effort was begun to analyze
those facilities by the Kansas City,
Missouri Office of Emergency
Preparedness and by such local scientific
volunteers as Dr. Denis Ward and Pro¬
fessor Robin League of the University of
Missouri, who have done geologic studies
indicating the underground sites have blast
and fallout resistance equal to or better
than any other public shelters in the world.
This analysis was confirmed by Cresson
Kearney and Dr. Carsten Haaiand of the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

There is ample space to house the entire
population with more than twice the square
footage considered minimal by FEMA for
such numbers.

80,000,000 square feet is
an area difficult to visualize.
However, if you dug into the
side of a mountain and the
width of your tunnel were
100 feet (twice the width of
the average house) you
would dig over 150 miles
before you dug out
80,000,000 square feet!

Map of Missouri shewing stipulated distant evacuation route for Kansas City and
close-in underground area proposed for use by the Kansas City Emergency
Preparedness Group.

Journal of Cm l Defense: October 1981

The orientation of mine openings (mostly
north and west) is away from primary blast
probabilities at Whiteman AFB to the east.
Even those openings facing east and south
can be equipped with piles of rock to act as
low cost blast deflectors in front of open¬
ings.

Local rail and truck lines, given a few
days to prepare, could easily back trains
and trucks containing water, fuel and other
supplies into the underground in sufficient
quantities for survival to supplement the
stocks already in each site. All that is need¬
ed is a professional, full time effort to
organize an orderly transfer of people into
the facilities plus a better placement of
emergency supplies, medical facilities,
etc.

Towards this end, a new not-for-profit
corporation, the Kansas City Emergency
Preparedness Group has been formed
under the leadership of Major General
William Dietrich (USAF-retired) with a
cross section of informed citizens and pro¬
fessional civil defense experts.

The organization hopes to persuade
FEMA to exclude Kansas City from its
national relocation program and to divert
funding from the program on an equitable
basis to assist in setting up the plans, full
time staff personnel and equipment needed
to push the Kansas City program to comple¬
tion.

Towards this end the new organization is
continuing to brief civic and business
leaders of the community so that a united
effort may be used to persuade the federal

officials of the wisdom in their ideas. Such
civil defense advocates as Congressman
Ike Skelton (D-MO.), Congressman Don
Mitchell (R-NY.) and others will be urged
to support the program.

In the near future a communty-wide
briefing of key leaders will be held in
Kansas City to acquaint them with the
goals of the Kansas City Emergency
Preparedness Group and to gain volunteers
to raise the funds necessary to put on a
demonstration project in one of the
underground sites to show, in a tangible
way, the potential of the program and to
learn some of the pitfalls. The group hopes

it can demonstrate to FEMA and the
Reagan Administration that at least one ur¬
ban area is concerned about nuclear sur¬
vival and is willing to do something about it
without waiting for Washington to tell us
how.

The group also hopes that when the pro¬
gram is fully implemented and people all
over the country compare the chances of
survival in Kansas City with their local
area, they will decide to get involved in
their own survival. And maybe, just
maybe, Americans will at last begin to
think of civil defense as the vital necessity
which it most assuredly is. C

Homemade Solution to Nuclear Pollution

by Phillip Abies

I T finally happened. The missiles
rose, the bombs fell, and you were
unprepared. Sixty minutes into World
War III and you're scared spitless.

Still, you haven’t done too badly. In
less than an hour you’ve gathered your
family into a room in the middle of the
house and sealed yourselves in with
towels and duct tape. Your jury-rigged
bellows — made from cardboard and a
trashcan liner, with flannel shirts and
toilet paper for filters — should scrub the
fallout from the air and keep you from
suffocating on your own carbon monox¬
ide. If the fallout doesn't last too long,
you may live.

It’s the fallout that has you worried.
The odds are that prevailing winds are
wafting tons of radioactive, micron-sized
concrete and earth toward your home.

How extensive was the attack? How
will you know when it’s safe to leave your
makeshift shelter to search for the
medicines and provisions you should
have stored?

The only radio in the house is built into
your stereo cabinet; the electricity went
off half an hour ago. Your water will last
less than a week, the battery from your
car only a matter of hours. You could
have purchased a reliable CD-surplus
radiation meter for less than $100; you
didn’t, and you may die from your short¬
sightedness. Why weren’t you ready?

Calm down. With the following instruc¬
tions and some common household
items, you can build a dosimeter that will
gauge with surprising accuracy the level
of radioactivity in your area. It just might
save your life.

The materials you will need include:
An iced-tea-size glass, some nylon
thread, transparent tape, scissors or a
pocket knife, a small metric ruler, and the
lid from a 6’/2 ounce tuna or similar-size

Step 1: Carefully line the inside of the
glass with aluminum foil, using your fin¬
gertips or a pencil eraser to work the foil
into the sides and bottom of the glass.

Step 2: Remove the foil from the
glass. Measure down two inches from the
upper edge, then cut a one-square-inch
window in the foil. Cut another window
directly across from the first, then replace
the foil in the glass.

Step. 3: Cut the lid off the can. Mea¬
sure out one inch from the center and
punch two small holes side by side. Do
the same on the other half.

Step 4: Cut two pieces of nylon thread
over 12 inches long each and lay them
parallel, one inch apart, on a table, being
careful not to touch the thread near the
middle. Measure three inches from one
end and tape the threads to the table.
Measure another six inches — without
touching the middle! — and tape the
threads again. Measure three more in¬
ches and cut the threads at that point (see
Figure 1).

Step 5; Cut two circles the size of a
quarter from another piece of aluminum
foil. Slide one edge of a foil circle under
Continued on page 57

To determine the level of radioactivity in your area, you must take your dosimeter Outside. First, protect yourself as best you can. Put
on a plastic rain suit or overcoat, rubber boots, gloves and a hat. Tear up a flannel shirt — the newer the better — or a cloth diaper and
wear it across your nose and mouth Keep your exposure to possible contamination as brief as possible. Let's say your shelter is an inter¬
ior room of your house, without windows. As you leave it, have another occupant seal it behind you. If you're alone, do ft yourself. Carry
the dosimeter outside, charge it, then return inside and watch the gauge through a window with binoculars if possible. If not, wait outside
and watch the gauge, if the discs start moving immediatelv. get back inside immediately — and don't forget to leave your "radiation
suit" outside the shelter The gauge is used to help determine the present level of radioactivity. The reading you obtain from it is a rough
estimate of safe-exposure time Remember, this is a last-ditch device, not a sophisticated scientific tool. Your surest bet is to have a good
dosimeter on hand before you need it._ _

Phillip Abies has a Bachelor or Science degree in psychology and serves as director of a sheltered workshop for handicapped
adults. He hopes his familv will inherit a better world than this, and spends his time with them reading, woodworking and collec¬
ting and practicing survival skills.

MARCH /APRIL 83

SURVIVE 35

one of the threads, halfway between the
two pieces of tape, and bend that edge
back over the thread, using just enough
foil to hold the disk in place (see Figure
2). Again: Do not touch the thread with
your hands. Repeat with the other foil
disc and thread. Remove the tape.

Step 6: Run the loose ends of each
thread up through the two sets of holes in
the can lid and knot so the foil discs hang
evenly from the lid (see Figure 3).

Step 7: Tape a strip of paper horizon¬
tally to the outside of the glass directly
beneath one of the windows. In the exact
center of the horizontal scale, mark a
zero. Measuring exactly 2'/2 millimeters
each time, make six marks on either side
of the zero, numbering from one to six in
each direction. (If you don't have a metric
ruler, turn a nickel edgewise and mark
either side with a penl)

You have now completed the two
parts of your homemade dosimeter. The
final step is to adjust the discs by first plac¬
ing the lid assembly on the glass so you
can see the thread and discs through the
windows in the foil. If the discs are not an
equal distance from the zero mark on the
scale beneath the window, or not hang¬
ing edge-on to it, you will have to lift the
lid and adjust the discs until they are —
being careful not to touch the thread in
the process. Now, record the discs’ dis¬
tance from the zero mark in this uncharg-

The two foil discs serve as a type of
electroscope. The principle is that radio¬
activity causes static electricity to dis¬
charge at an accelerated rate. To make
the dosimeter work, the discs must be
charged with static electricity, which is
done by running a comb through your
hair and holding it close to the discs.

Now lower the lid carefully back onto
the glass so the discs retain their charge,
and note immediately the number they
indicate on the scale. Under normal at¬
mospheric conditions it should take 15
minutes or longer for the discs to dis¬
charge their static electricity and return to
the distance from zero they were in their
uncharged state.

If radiation is present, the discs will
discharge their static electricity and come
together more quickly than that.

Next, record the time it takes the discs
to move one unit closer to zero. Convert
this time into seconds, then multiply by
ten; the result is the number of hours a
healthy adult could tolerate the radiation
level present before a fatal dose had ac¬
cumulated. Thus, if it takes five seconds
for the disc to fall from 4 to 3. the safety
margin would be five times 10, or 50
hours.

That may sound like a long time, but
remember: Radiation poisoning is a cum¬
ulative process. If the discs falls one unit
in less, than five seconds^, you'd better

shelter until the discs repel one another

for a full 15 minutes. Children, the sick
and aged are more susceptible to the ef¬
fects of radiation.

Keep your chin up. With a little luck
and lots of ingenuity, you'll probably live.
Just don’t get caught without next time:
you can only push your luck so far. □