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BOSTOM PUBLIC LIBRARY
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXIV • No. 1906 • January 5, 1976
SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER 9 1
THREE ASPECTS OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA Address by Assistant Secretary Rogers 1^
U.S. VETOES UNBALANCED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
CONCERNING ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS IN LEBANON Statements by Ambassador Moynihan and Text of Draft Resolution 21
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIR
Vol. LXXIV, No. 1906 January 5, 1976
For s«le by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
62 issues plus semiannual indexes, domestic $42.60, foreign $63.16 Single copy 85 cents Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETI, a weekly publication issued by tt Office of Media Services, Bureau ' Public Affairs, provides tfte public ail interested agencies of tfie governmet witfi information on developments I tfie field of U.S. foreign relations a,l on tfie work of tfie Department a I tlie Foreign Service. Tfie BULLETIN includes select I press releases on foreign policy, issu I by ttie Wfiite House and tfie Depai' ment, and statements, address, and news conferences of tlie Presidet and tfte Secretary of State and otl ' officers of tlie Department, as well i special articles on various pfiases f international affairs and tlie functioi of the Department. Information 1 1 included concerning treaties and inti • > national agreements to which tt' United States is or may become i parly and on treaties of general intt • national interest.
Publications of tfie Department ' State, United Nations documents, al legislative material in the field ' international relations are also listt.
Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of December 9
Prt'ss release n96 dated December 9
Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle- men, before I go to your questions I thought it would be helpful to review some of the SALT issues that have been raised. I will not get into a debate with aspirants to po- litical office, either statewide or national. Therefore I will not deal with specific testi- mony that may have been given except to note that no opportunity was presented to any member of the Administration to pre- sent the truth. What I would like to do is to deal with categories of assertions that have been made and then to explain the real state if affairs with respect to them.
The assertions have been made that there lave been massive Soviet violations, that :he Administration colluded with the Soviet Union in masking these violations, that the A.dministration has not pursued the issue of violations diplomatically, and that senior officials, especially the President, have not jeen kept informed about the facts with re- spect to these violations.
I would like to discuss with you the pro- •edures that the government is following vith respect to SALT compliance and illus- rate them with one or two examples.
First of all it is important to keep in mind hat with respect to SALT or with respect .0 the strategic forces on both sides, we are iealing with military establishments of neat technical complexity that are con- itantly engaged in military activities. These nilitary establishments, moreover, on both udes are in the process of constant change io that there is great fluidity in what one )bserves. We are not dealing with a static situation; we are dealing with a fluid situa- ion. Therefore, too, the information that is >btained has to go through various stages of malysis.
The first information about any event is usually extraordinarily illusive and ambigu- ous, and one part of the process of the gov- ernment is to refine the information until we reach a point at which senior officials can make a reasonable decision. I believe it is a good working hypothesis to assume that government is not run by conspiracy but by serious people trying to come to serious con- clusions about difficult topics, especially when the charge of a violation of a formal agreement is not a minor matter to be intro- duced into the diplomatic discourse.
Now, first of all, what is meant by a vio- lation? There are several meanings that can be attached to the notion of violation that are being used interchangeably in the cur- rent debate.
A violation can be a deliberate violation of a SALT limitation, aimed at increasing the Soviet strategic capability in ways which the agreement was intended to preclude.
Second, a violation can be an action in- consistent with the sense or the spirit of the agreement and tending to undermine its viability even though it is not prohibited by the agreement. There can be borderline situ- ations where a technical violation cannot be established but where the activity strains the interpretation of particular provisions.
Third, there can be unintended violations occurring, for example, through negligence of higher officials responsible for insuring compliance by their subordinate organiza- tions.
Fourth, there can be actions not banned by an agreement but which complicate veri- fication of the agreement.
Fifth, there can be ambiguous activities resulting from differing interpretations of the provisions of the agreements.
Sixth, there can be activities that are
anuary 5, 1976
assessed as ambiguous due to inadequate in- formation or misinterpretation of informa- tion which suggests a violation where in fact none exists.
I want to repeat that many compliance issues will arise initially as ambiguous ac- tivities which could apply to any of these categories. Our policy is to seek clarification of ambiguous situations as soon as there is a tangible basis for doing so and to resolve ambiguities as quickly as possible in order to preclude development of a more serious situation.
Now to go to the procedures for handling allegations of violations. Any one of these categories would be initially reported in in- telligence channels, either from the Central Intelligence Agency or from the Department of Defense. The Department of State and the White House have no independent means of acquiring any of this information.
There is no instance in which a reported violation was not immediately — an alleged violation — was not immediately reported to the President. And we have searched all the files of all the incidents.
I will in a minute discuss the handling of intelligence, and I would like to talk now about the procedures that are followed.
In order to deal with the problem of com- pliance, there are four institutions. There is a special intelligence committee, which was established by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the summer of 1973. This committee makes a quarterly report on the problem of SALT compliance. This com- mittee— I'm looking now for how many meetings it has held — well, it has met quar- terly since July '73, so you can figure it out for yourselves, and all of its reports have gone directly to the President as well as to every senior member of the Administration that is dealing with the problem of strategic arms.
In addition, there are three other bodies. There is the Verification Panel of the NSC [National Security Council]. There is the Verification Panel's Working Group. And there is, of course, the NSC itself.
The Verification Panel Working Group of the NSC has met on SALT matters 11 times
since the middle of 1973. The Verification Panel has met four times on SALT matters — has met four times on compliance issues exclusively since 1973. But in addition, it has met 40 times on SALT matters since 1973. Each of these meetings, each of these 40 meetings, is preceded by a CIA briefing that includes all compliance issues. So that, in addition to the four formal meetings, there were 40 meetings of the Verification Panel where whatever compliance issues existed at the time were brought to the attention of the Verification Panel.
The President has been briefed on com- pliance matters 10 times since the middle of 1973, six times in the Administration of President Ford. There has been one NS( meeting solely devoted to compliance issues, and parts of others.
The procedure is that the working group will attempt to determine what is going on and will devise either options or recom- mendations for consideration by the Veri- fication Panel. The Verification Panel then reviews it and makes a recommendation or defines options.
In all the meetings that I have described of the Verification Panel there was never a split decision. The allegation that individuals or departments have held up consideration of compliance issues, have obscured consid- eration of compliance issues, have refused to deal with compliance issues, is a total false- hood. All the decisions of the Verification Panel with respect to compliance have been unanimous. That is to say, they were agreed to by the Department of Defense, by the Chiefs of Staff, by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, by the Central In- telligence Agency, and by the State Depart- ment.
There is no doubt that there may have been differences of opinion in the working group as these papers were being considered. I am not familiar with these disagreements, because unless they are passed on to the Verification Panel there would be no par- [ ticular reason for me to deal with them.
Let me now turn to the handling of in- telligence. First of all, I think it is impor- tant to understand how the flow of informa-
Department of State Bulletin
tion to the President is handled, because it is a rather grave matter if it can be alleged that information is being kept from the President of the United States. The flow of information to the President is handled in the following way.
The President receives daily, unabbrevi- ated and without a covering summary, the President's daily brief and the daily intelli- gence bulletin of the Central Intelligence Agency. These are placed on his desk to- gether with separate notes from various departments every morning and waiting for him when he comes to his office.
In the period of the Presidency of Presi- dent Ford he has had, until recently, the practice of reading those two intelligence summaries in the presence not of a member of the National Security Council staff, but in the presence of a representative of the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency. Therefore any in- telligence item that would deal with compli- ance would come to his immediate attention. And in compiling a list of the various com- pliance issues, it is apparent that the Presi- dent's daily bulletin would reflect the in- formation of the Central Intelligence Agency, as you would expect, within no more than two weeks of its first appearance on a tech- nical level.
Secondly, any memorandum from a Cab- inet member or from the head of an agency is transmitted to the President, usually in those cases with a summary by the NSC staff on top of it. But never is the summary alone sent to the President. Therefore, any Cabinet member, any member of the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, all have the opportunity, and know they have the opportunity, to address the President directly. Never has the Assistant to the President held up any memorandum from any of these individuals or any other memorandum addressed to the President by the head of an agency.
However, there is no memorandum in the files by any of these individuals, by any Chief of Staff of any of the services, by any head of any department, raising any of the issues that have been alleged in recent
testimony. There is nobody who has claimed that the issue of compliance was not being adequately pursued. There is nobody who has objected to the handling of the informa- tion. There has been no reclama of any of the decisions of the Verification Panel, ex- cept in one case where one department that had first recommended one course of action — that course of action being not to protest a seeming issue of noncompliance because it wanted to protect its sources of intelligence — later changed its mind and recommended that the issue be raised in the Standing Con- sultative Commission.
When that Department changed its mind, the President agreed with that new position, and the decision of the Verification Panel was changed.
The reason there have been so few NSC meetings on the subject is because the deci- sions of the Verification Panel have always been unanimous and because no member of the Panel has ever appealed to the Presi- dent with a contrary view.
With respect to the handling of intelli- gence, all intelligence concerning alleged noncompliance was immediately distributed to all the members of the Verification Panel and by them to those of their senior mem- bers that were concerned with SALT.
For the period that a preliminary investi- gation was going on, the intelligence was not distributed in the technical publications that were addressed to those whose primary responsibility was not concerned with SALT at a level below the Cabinet level. The long- est time this ever took place was a period of two months, and usually the so-called hold has been for a period of about a week or two to permit the refinement of intelligence.
There has been no case in which the in- telligence was not distributed in the quar- terly intelligence publication that was con- cerned with the question of SALT monitor- ing. And in no case was intelligence kept from members of the Verification Panel.
Even during the period that this refine- ment was going on, the United States did not feel itself precluded from taking diplomatic action. For example, in one instance, which I will get into in a minute in greater detail,
January 5, 1976
in one instance there were reports of un- identified construction in Soviet missile fields. We received this report on June 20 [1973] at a time when Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] was in the United States. It seemed improbable that the Soviet Union would violate the agreement by blatantly building additional missile silos, and there- fore a further study of the subject was ordered.
Nevertheless, on June 26 the United States sent a note to the Soviet Union in the Presidential channel raising the issue of that construction, even before we had begun our detailed examination of the issue. In that case the distribution of that information was kept out of those journals that went to indi- viduals not concerned with SALT matters until August 8, when it was generally dis- tributed. In that interval two American notes had been sent to the Soviet Union in the Presidential channel raising that issue.
Now, as I have pointed out, the issue of compliance is an extremely complicated one, and in rummaging through the files of vari- ous departments it is not difficult to find memoranda written by subordinates who have no idea of what is going on in the overall picture, who will write down their own perceptions of what they think is hap- pening— usually in the modern form of memoranda of conversation to themselves that nobody ever sees, on which no one can ever comment, and which appear three years later in a context that no one can ever dis- cover.
But let us take the case of these missile silos. There appeared in the summer of 1973 in a number of Soviet missile fields, the be- ginning of some construction that clearly looked like additional silos. If these had been converted into missile silos, there was no question that they would have represented a clear violation of the agreement.
The construction of a silo generally takes two years to complete. And it is important for you to keep in mind in any event that almost any of these noncompliance events extend over a time span that, to be signifi-
cant, is months and usually years, so that those of us who are engaged in policymak- ing, and not rhetoric, must have an oppor- tunity to study the problem before we draw any final conclusions, and we do have this opportunity.
Now, when we approached the Soviet Union within six days of receiving that in- formation in the White House, we were told that these would be command and control silos and that as the construction proceeded it would become increasingly evident that they would be command and control silos.
This, incidentally, was also the judgment of our intelligence community. Our intelli- gence community believed that almost cer- tainly these were command and control silos. The question being raised was whether, at some later time, they could be converted into missile silos.
It is also fair to point out that the Soviet Union in reply raised certain questions about certain ambiguities in American practices which we were not excessively anxious to have publicized and which accounted for the fact that these exchanges were conducted in a rather less dramatic manner than some people might have thought appropriate.
There were six exchanges in this channel of increasing specificity, in which we began to advance criteria which could be met in order to assure us that these silos were in fact intended for command and control. This extended over a period of a year. At that point in 1974, we moved the discussion from the Presidential channel to the Standing Consultative Commission and made formal representations building on the previous ex- changes.
We have since received assurances, and I believe it is the unanimous opinion of all agencies, that we are dealing with command and control silos. We have been given cri- teria which seem to us for the time being adequate; and there is no agency that today disputes that this issue is for the time being quiescent, though we will be vigilant in making certain that any unusual construc- tion activity at these silos would raise pro- found questions.
For a variety of reasons, including the
Department of State Bulletin
fact that the information about alleged non- compliance inevitably involves sensitive in- telligence, I cannot go through all of the allegations that have been made; though I vould perhaps mention one other, which is ;he most serious one and which comes clos- st to the borderline of a possible violation, ivhich has to do with the testing of certain mtiaircraft radars in what might be con- idered an ABM [antiballistic missile] mode. The issue is complicated by the fact that, it American insistence, the ABM treaty in- ;ludes a provision that antiaircraft radar ;ould be used — could be tested — in a manner n space for range-instrumentation purposes. : might point out that this was our idea, ind if we had not included that, that issue )f the SA-5 radar could have been more •apidly resolved.
We received information that some test- ng was going on with respect to the SA-5 •adar in 1973. At that time it was routinely listributed, and nobody paid any attention 0 it because it was not put into connection vith a possible ABM testing program. Be- ween Aprili and June 1974 some more tests ook place which at least raised the problem hat the radar might be tracking incoming nissiles. That clearly is not permitted by he treaty, though it raises an ambiguity vith respect to whether this is done for ange-instrumentation purposes.
In any event, several meetings of the
vorking group and the Verification Panel
ook place. The first decision in December
.974 was, on the recommendation of the
defense Department and the Central In-
-elligence Agency, that this issue not be
•aised because we did not wish to reveal the
'liource of our intelligence.
" In January 1975 the Defense Department
(l "eversed itself and recommended that the
■ ssue be raised. As a result, the issue was
S "aised in February 1975. Since then, within
>' i 17-day period after we had raised the issue,
? ;his activity has stopped — has not since
I' oeen resumed. It was at the borderline of
• v^iolation, but it has now stopped.
There are other issues, some having to do
with unilateral American statements which
' the Soviet Union specifically disavowed. I
think it is at least open to question whether the United States can hold the Soviet Union responsible for its own statements when the Soviet Union has asserted that it does not accept that interpretation. Therefore the issue of SALT compliance has been handled in a serious manner. It stands to reason that no responsible U.S. official could wish to make an agreement with the Soviet Union and permit the Soviet Union to violate it with impunity. It stands to reason that the United States would not accept noncompli- ance with an agreement that had any con- ceivable impact on the strategic equation.
I would, in fact, suggest that this debate of the allegation in which some violations are invented, and in which the lack of vigi- lance of the Administration is asserted, may tempt the very noncompliance which it claims to seek to avoid, because it may create the impression that the U.S. Government would make a serious agreement on a matter affecting the survival of the United States and that its senior oificials would then col- lude in a violation of this agreement.
Let no foreign government believe that this is conceivable. And I think the time has come that we deal with each other more seriously.
I want to make just one other point be- fore I go to your questions. That point con- cerns the endless allegations that a secret agreement was made with the Soviet Union respecting 70 missiles to be placed on sub- marines that by now are 30 years old, or 25 years old, that have not been off the coast of the United States since 1967.
On the face of it this charge should be too absurd to require any commentary. I dealt with it at great length in a press con- ference on June 24, 1974, and June 26, 1974. It concerned a highly technical issue: which missiles were eligible for retirement as part of those that had to be dismantled in order to shift from land-based to submarine mis- siles and whether and what kind of new missiles could be placed on submarines with- out being counted.
I refer you all to this press conference if you want to go into the technical complexi- ties of this issue, except to say there was no
' January 5, 1976
secret agreement, that whatever there was in that interpretative statement was stated publicly by me at the press conference that I gave in Moscow the night the SALT agree- ment was signed on May 26, 1972. It was repeated in a discussion of the Verification Panel on June 5, 1972. It was contained, practically verbatim, in a note distributed to all the agencies on June 19, 1972, and it was testified to by Gerard Smith [then Di- rector of the U.S. Arms Control and Dis- armament Agency and head of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limita- tion Talks] before the Jackson committee in July 1972. There was no secret agreement.
Some overawed technocrats found what they thought was a loophole by which, if the Soviets wanted to design a missile that they didn't have anywhere for just that one cate- gory of diesel submarines that was 25 years old, they might conceivably place it on that submarine. We, of course, would never have accepted this.
When we raised this loophole with the Soviet Union, even though they thought it was — shall we put it kindly — a rather strained interpretation, they nevertheless closed the loophole, and despite some rather excited testimony last week, let me say flatly that no price was paid for closing a loophole that did not exist and that we would never have accepted and that ran counter to the whole record of the discussion.
I think I can stop at this point and take your questions on this or any other topic.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent is politics interfering today with your attempts to tvork out a neiv SALT agreement? And do you see a deadline beyond ivhich it would be, be- cause of the political campaigns, impossible to make any real progress on a treaty?
Secretary Kissinger: As Secretary of State it is my obligation to recommend to the President what I believe to be in the national interest. My recommendations are not affected by the political situation; and I have, so far, seen no evidence that his deci- sions are affected by the political situation.
I cannot say that the debate that is going on greatly enhances the atmosphere of con-
fidence in the country, but our recommenda- tions are not affected by the political situ- ation. We are not operating against a dead line.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can I just change tht subject for a moment? Have you proposec to the Israeli Government, as reported today, that it should drop its boycott of the Securiti Council debate? And also, do you see am indications the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] may be shifting its attitude with regard to its recognition, or nonrecog nition, of Israel's right to existence?
Secretary Kissinger: I will answer thi question, but may I then recommend tha we take all SALT questions and then go ti all other questions? I will answer this one though.
The United States has indicated to th' Israeli Government that it would be bette served if it participated in the Securit; Council debate, though it is of course clea that the Israeli Government may not wisl to be in the room while the PLO delegate i actually speaking.
This position of ours has been clear. Ou attitude with respect to the PLO is ur changed. I haven't reaffirmed it for about 4 hours, so it is about time that I do it again We will not deal with the PLO, negotiat ' with the PLO, or urge Israel to deal wit the PLO, as long as the PLO does not recog nize the existence of Israel and as long a,b the PLO does not accept Security Counc Resolutions 242 and 338.
That will be our attitude during the Secu ^ rity Council debate, and I would like t stress again that the only resolutions tha' the United States considers relevant for th Security Council debate are Resolutions 24 and 338 and we will not accept any resolu tion that tries to introduce any element tha goes beyond 242 and 338.
Now on SALT?
Q. Yes, notv on SALT — do you have an evidence today that the Soviet Union is pre pared to offer, in your own words, a reason '' able and serious counterproposal to the las American proposal that tvas made to th Russians?
Department of State Bulletil '"i
a
Secretanj Kissinger: The exchanges which re have had with the Soviet Union since rovember indicate that the Soviet Union ealizes that no settlement is possible on the asis of its present proposal and that it is 'illing to negotiate on the basis of the prop- sition that it must modify its position and aat we are then also prepared to look at ur position. And it is on this basis that a rip by me to Moscow has been discussed.
Q. Are there plans for such a trip in the nmediate future?
Secretary Kissinger: I would expect such trip to take place within the next four 'eeks —
Q. Mr. Secretary —
Secretary Kissinger: — four to five weeks.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in your discussion car- ter, you made some reference to the fact that t one point — as I recall, after the evidence ad emerged that the Soviets ivere building
certain kind of silo — at one point the evicts raised some questions about Ameri- m practices that we, as I understood you, >ere not anxious to publicize. Could you tell s any more about what those practices light have been?
Secretary Kissinger: No, the basic point nat I wanted to make is this: It was in our iterest — we were interested, as long as aere was no conclusive evidence, to keep ne debate on the confidential level and to ermit both sides to raise with each other echnical issues in which they could raise uestions and clarify questions.
I would say that the issues that the Soviet Inion raised did not in fact involve viola- lons of the agreement by the United States, ut from the point of view of Soviet pho- agraphy, they might not have been self- vident. And it is therefore one of those 6sues where ambiguous evidence is pro- 'uced in good faith that can be clarified by urther exchanges.
There have been no American violations f the agreement, except in the technical lense that I have described.
Q. Are they satisfied ivith your response 0 that?
anuary 5, 1976
Secretary Kissinger: It is still being dis- cussed, but I think we are making prog- ress.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you touched most lightly on the strongest issue, which is a continuing 07ie in Congress, ivhich is a claim that Soviet performance on the agreement has failed to live up to your own assurances of what you told Congress the Soviet Union was expected to do.
Secretary Kissinger: I said —
Q. You referred to the unilateral agree- ments— one of the issues ivhich is a continu- ing one up there, of course, is the question of conversion of Soviet light missiles to heavy missiles. Could you deal broadly with the question which you only touched on earlier, of the unilateral statements and the Soviet nonagreement and nonperformance on those unilateral statements?
Secretary Kissinger: All right, let me first deal with another issue. One of the argu- ments that is being made is that the SALT agreement was sloppily negotiated — between myself and Dobrynin [Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States], usually — and that we are now suffering from the draftsmanship, from that draftsman- ship.
Well, first of all, I do not believe that the SALT agreement was sloppily negotiated. But in any event, the text of the agreement was negotiated in Helsinki. There is not one paragraph in that document that was drafted by any other group than the negoti- ating teams in Helsinki, which included representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Department, the State Depart- ment— and indeed all interested agencies — and which was backstopped by a technical panel here.
So that the charge that documents were drafted in the absence of technical advisers is absolutely ludicrous.
Now, the exchanges that took place be- tween Dobrynin and me, first of all, were confined to very few matters and usually concerned a question of principle, such as whether offensive weapons should be dealt
with simultaneously with defensive weapons or whether they should be dealt with sepa- rately. That question, strange as it may seem today, took three months of exchanges to settle, and those of you who followed SALT matters will remember that at the end of May 1971, it was settled with an agreement in principle that offensive and defensive negotiations should proceed in parallel. That did not require great technical knowledge.
As soon as that decision was made, it was shifted to the SALT delegation in Helsinki, and all the implementing negotiation of that was conducted in Helsinki.
Then on my visit to Moscow in April 1972, the Soviet Union made a proposal and for the first time — in which for the first time they agreed to include submarine missiles in the offensive count and proposed a proce- dure by which this could be accomplished by the retirement of land-based or other mis- siles.
I might add that one of the most ardent advocates of this particular solution is a prospective candidate for the Senate — from Virginia, in case any of you have any ques- tion of whom I am talking about [laughter] — because he did not wish to build any addi- tional nuclear submarines at that time.
This general proposal was brought back by me from Moscow, was put before the Na- tional Security Council at a meeting in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Arms Control Agency and our chief negotiator were represented. Specific in- structions were given how to work out the technicalities of it, and it then was worked out in detail in Helsinki.
Those were the two areas in which I was most active.
Now let us deal with the specific issue of the conversion of light to heavy missiles.
In the agreement there is a provision which was also put in, in part at our request — but at any rate which we accepted without any difficulty — to the effect that the exist- ing silos could be increased by 15 percent in the process of modernization. This is the only legal requirement of the agreement; that is, if either side increased any of its
silos by more than 15 percent it would b( in violation of the agreement.
There is no charge that this has beer done. In fact, it has not been done. The in- telligence community agrees that the in crease in silo dimensions in the moderniza- tion program of the Soviet Union does no1 exceed 15 percent.
The United States added another uni- lateral statement to the effect that if ir these SS-11 holes a missile were placec which was significantly larger than th( SS-11 that we — I don't know what phras« we used, at any rate, that we —
Q. "Significantly larger"?
Secretary Kissinger: "Significantly larger' was the phrase. I don't know whether w( used the phrase, "We consider this a viola tion— "
Q. Substantially larger?
Secretary Kissinger: No, "significantb larger" is the phrase. But I don't knov whether we said it's a violation or what w( said, what the specific — incidentally, tha statement was drafted by the delegation.
Q. But wasn't it on your instruction, from —
Secretary Kissinger: That unilateral state ment?
Q. That was issued by the delegation, as . recall, the last day of the negotiations, jus to finish up the piece of paper.
Secretary Kissinger: Wait a minute, le' me make clear — I don't want to play a game
I agreed with everything the delegatior did. I think the delegation did a good job Everything that the delegation did was fi- nally approved in the White House.
The text of it, however, was not draftee by me, but approved by me ; and I am there- fore fully behind it. I am simply trying tc get the sequence straight.
Now, for about a year, our intelligenct indicated that the two new Soviet missiles that were being developed, the SS-17 and 19, were about 15 to 20 percent larger than the ones that had existed in 1972.
8
Department of State Bulletin
Q. Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: Fifteen to twenty percent — don't hold me to these precise fig- ures, because I am doing it from memory. But it is in that range, and it is always with an inaccuracy factor.
Starting in the middle of 1974, it became apparent that at least one of them, the SS-19, could be as much as 40 percent larger. So we had the dilemma that we have a missile that is larger, by that percentage, than the SS-11 put into a hole that is not, however, in violation of the agreement, by a better utilization of existing space and more efficient use of fuel ; and that raises a serious question.
We are attempting — the assurances I gave in 1972, which were based on the pro- vision of the agreement, obviously dealt with the missiles we then knew. We obviously did not know in '72 what missiles the Soviet Union would be testing in '74 ; and the ques- tions I was asked were always concerned with whether the Soviet Union would be able to put the SS-9 into the SS-11 hole, the SS-11 hole being the smaller one. And all of my answers, obviously, had to be directed toward the missiles I knew and not toward the missiles that came along two years later.
With respect to the SS-19, we are at- tempting to put limitations on this in the current round of SALT negotiations; and it is in that category, which Secretary Schles- inger [James R. Schlesinger, former Secre- tary of Defense] has also described, of no specific violation but of being sufficiently ambiguous to raise some questions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, a three-part question. What evidence do you have that the Soviet Union realizes no settlement is possible on the basis of its last known existing proposal? Secondly, do you have reason to believe that there is now, or soon will be, a new Soviet proposal? And what are the prospects for a new SALT agreement within the next three or four months?
Secretary Kissinger: If I go to Moscow — or the fact that I say that I will in all prob- ability go to Moscow indicates that I have evidence that the Soviet Union will not in-
sist on its last proposal, because otherwise there would be no point in going.
Q. But is there a new one in the works?
Secretary Kissinger: When that proposal will be surfaced — whether it will be surfaced then, when I am there, or whether it will be surfaced ahead of time — that remains for discussion.
Your second question? What was it?
Q. The second part: Is there a new pro- posal?
Secretary Kissinger: At any rate, since I have stated that we will not accept their last proposal, if there is no new proposal, there will be no settlement. There is no possibility of our accepting the last Soviet proposal.
Now, what do I think the chances are? I believe that if both sides make a serious effort that the diff'erences should be solved. The Soviet Union must make a serious effort, and we are prepared to make a serious ef- fort. I am moderately optimistic.
Q. Well, even to be talking about going to Moscow, you must know something that we don't. You would not go there just for the ivinter weather. Do you have a reason to believe that if you —
Secretary Kissinger: I said I had reason to believe that they will not insist on their last proposal.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the neivs reports in con- nection with Admiral Zumivalt's [Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., former Chief of Naval Opera- tions] testimony carry the phrase here that the admiral suggested that "Mr. Kissinger's lack of candor" — and I am quoting from a news report, sir — "sprang from a personal and political commitment to the success of the detente policy" ivhich made him, quote, "reluctant to report the actual facts." How do you react to that, sir?
Secretary Kissinger: I have stated how we have handled information, and I think my statement makes it absolutely clear that the admiral got carried away by his political ambitions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned, among
January 5, 1976
the possible violations, Soviet interference tcith national means of inspection. Have they interfered ivith our —
Secretary Kissinger: No, I have listed that as a —
Q. A possibility, yes. Have they interfered, or are they noiv attempting to interfere, with our national means of inspection? And while I have the floor, how are you doing on the threshold test ban, and what are the pros- pects in that agreement?
Secretary Kissinger: The question of inter- ference with national means of detection: there has been a Soviet program from the middle — it dates back from the middle of the 1960's — to make photography and other means of detection more complicated.
There have been some actions since the SALT agreement in that category. Several of those have been raised with the Soviet Union. Some of those that have been raised have been ended. None of those, up to now, have fundamentally interfered with our na- tional means of detection.
Q. Are they currently trying to interfere?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, you know there are so many separate things going on, there is always an effort. We have several things befoi-e them at this moment. I have said that, up to now, nothing has decisively interfered with our national means of de- tection.
And the second question is: How are we doing on the test ban?
Q. And what are the prospects of getting a settlement on that quickly? There is a deadline on that, I believe, coming up.
Secretary Kissinger: We are negotiating it. There are only one or two issues left, and therefore it can be settled any time, but it hasn't been settled yet.
Q. Aren't those the same issues, though, that existed last July?
Secretary Kissinger: That's true. And so either they will be settled, or they will not be settled. And I know that is going to be the headline tonight. [Laughter.]
10
Q. Mr. Secretary, I think you know that this issue to which you have addressed your- self here this afternoon is so complex that many of us — and probably most of the mem- bers of the public — are unable to understand the details that you are referring to. I won- der if —
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but they can understand the procedures to which I am referring, and those are perfectly plain.
Q. I am just wondering, Mr. Secretary, if , you tvould address yourself to the various political charges, or the various charges that you claim arise from political motives, and in simple language, categorically deny them, if that be the —
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am not saying all of them arise from political motives. Some do, some don't.
But I don't want to go into the question of motives. I think I have dealt with all the essential charges. The charge that informa- tion has been deliberately withheld is false. The charge that the President was not briefed is false. The charge that either I as Secretary of State or as Assistant to the President have refused to deal with compli- ance issues is false. The charge that there were secret agreements is essentially false.
And I think these are the major items; if there is anyone else who wants to ask or if I have left one out I will be glad to—
Q. // / may just follow up: Why do you say " essentialhj" false?
Secretary Kissinger: Because there was an interpretative statement that for some rea- son was not distributed to the bureaucracy, even though the essence of it was distrib- uted to the bureaucracy, and even though the bureaucracy was instructed to testify as to its contents. Why it was not distrib- uted, I cannot for the life of me remember now. But the bureaucracy was told that such an interpretative statement would be nego- tiated, its content was distributed to it, so technically speaking this was not seen, but the content was known.
Q. Mr. Secretary, tivo questions. On SALT Two — ju^t so that I am clear — you said you
Department of State Bulletin
would probably go to Moscow within four to five weeks. Is it a fair assumption that you are not going on this trip you leave on, to- morroiv ?
Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.
Q. And if so, ivhat has happened? I think you left the impression you would go to Mos- cow before Christmas. Was there some slip- page or some bureaucratic problem here or in the Soviet Union?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think there is no sense going to Moscow until we have our positions prepared in great detail and until we are confident also that on the Soviet side there is sufficient understanding of what is needed. And given the travel schedules of all of the key members here, it seemed on the whole best not to hurry the process and to move at a pace that permitted a very de- tailed examination of all of the issues.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the second part of that question deals with another ambiguity, or what-have-you; it's the charge that the Soviets have perhaps built another ABM test site at Kamchatka. Can you address this?
Secretary Kissinger: This is an issue that is now under discussion with the Soviet Union, and I simply want to explain the issue. It is one of these technical issues.
There is no dispute that the radar in Kamchatka faces the Soviet Union, and not the United States. And therefore we are dealing with a test radar. The ABM treaty requires that ABM testing could take place only at agreed test ranges, and we listed ours. The Soviet Union didn't list theirs.
Q. You listed one for them.
Secretary Kissinger: We unilaterally listed one for them, and the Soviet Union gave an ambiguous reply to that, saying what their test ranges were was generally known; but they would not confirm or deny the one we gave for them. And I think we claimed two for ourselves.
If the Soviet Union had claimed the Kamchatka range for itself at that time, there would be no problem. If the Soviet Union told us today that the Kamchatka
range is an ABM test range, then — suppos- ing we were satisfied about the characteris- tics of the radar — there would be no signifi- cant problem.
So here we are dealing with a technical issue of what an agreed test range is — since there is no disagreement that the radar in Kamchatka faces into the Soviet Union and therefore must be used for some sort of internal tracking.
Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that you wouldn't have made these very important announcements here today and this report on intelligence and evaluation and how it all works if it hadn't been for the investigations on Capitol Hill?
Secretary Kissinger: I didn't say anything about the investigations on Capitol Hill.
Q. Yes, I know you didn't — but I mean this obviously is a reply to them. Right?
Secretary Kissinger: I did not criticize the investigations.
Q. No, I didn't say you did. But I say, isn't it a good thing that we have had all this come out today, and isn't it true that it wouldn't have come out had it not been for the investigations up there?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, then the ques- tion is whether it could have come out with- out some of the wild charges that were made.
But be that as it may, I am not criticizing the efi'ort of the Congress to get clarity about how the intelligence process operates. And to the extent that my briefing today was elicited by the Congress, I have no ob- jection if you give some credit to them.
Q. Do you think this will take care of the subpoena now? You say you think this will be—
Secretary Kissinger: No, no, on the sub- poena— the subpoena has nothing to do with this. The subpoena concerns covert opera- tions and recommendations of Secretaries of State when I was not in office — it has noth- ing to do with any recommendations I made — recommendations of a previous decade, to previous Presidents.
January 5, 1976
11
The President has exercised executive privilege with respect to that. I am under instructions from the President with respect to it. The resolution of this issue is between the White House and the committee. It is not an issue that concerns any actions while I have been Secretary of State, and it has nothing to do with the SALT issue. It has to do with the subject of covert operations, and the reason the President has exercised executive privilege is because he believed that recommendations of Cabinet members to the President should be protected.
But I am not expressing a personal opin- ion on that subject.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can we turn to another subject?
Secretary Kissinger: Can we wind this up fairly soon? I have some luncheon guests upstairs who are getting restless.
Q. All right. Mr. Kissinger, on the subject of Angola, you and the President have made some accusations. A protest has been made to the Soviet Union about alleged interven- tion. There's comments about Cuban inter- vention there. Isn't it about time that you told Its roughly ivhat the United States has done in the way of helping forces in Angola, and since ivhen?
Secretary Kissinger: I have said that the United States has tried to be helpful to some neighboring countries. Whatever we have done has started long after massive Soviet involvement became evident. So this is not a case that really lends itself to great dis- pute on that subject, because the Soviet Union has been active there in this manner since March. But I would rather not go any further until we see what can be done in the present diplomatic effort.
Q. What can be done, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, that's what we are trying —
Q. What are the available opportunities open to the United States —
Secretary Kissinger: That's what we are trying to find out. We have stated repeatedly
that outside powers should stay out of An- gola and, especially, extracontinental powers should stay out of Angola.
Q. What do you mean, Mr. Secretary, when you say whatever we have done started long after the massive — what has the United States done?
Secretary Kissinger: I have said that we try to give some assistance to neighboring countries — not South Africa — but I don't want to go any further.
Q. Mr. Secretary, before we say "thank you" — sotne of my colleagues seem about to bury Mr. Brezhnev. Can you give us your latest estimate of the state of his health?
Secretary Kissinger: I have received no communication from the Soviet Government about the health of Mr. Brezhnev, as has been alleged. My visit to the Soviet Union has absolutely nothing to do with any com- ments regarding his state of health. Our impression is that he is in active charge and that he will continue beyond the Party Con- gress.
U.S. Replies to Soviet Proposal on Middle East Peace Conference
Folloiving is the text of a note delivered to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. at Washing- i ton on December 1.
The Government of the United States has carefully examined the message received from the Government of the Soviet Union ' on November 9, 1975, on the subject of re- convening the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva and wishes to convey the follow- ing reply.
The United States shares the concern for further progress toward a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. The United States is also of the view that all of the issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestinian issue, must be re- solved if a lasting peace in the Middle East is to be achieved. The issue is how most
12
Department of State Bulletin
I
ffectively to move toward that goal.
The United States agrees that a resump- ion of the Geneva Peace Conference after areful preparation would serve the goal of chieving progress in the settlement of the onflict. The goal of a reconvened Confer- nce should be the achievement of a com- rehensive political settlement of the Middle last conflict.
The Soviet Union has proposed that the LS. and the USSR as Co-chairmen take a )int initiative to reconvene the Geneva eace Conference. The United States is con- ilting with the parties to determine their lews and will be prepared to consult with le Soviet Government on how best to pre- are the agenda and procedures for a re- jnvened Conference and to deal with the uestion of participation in the Conference.
With respect to the Soviet position on alestinian participation at the Geneva Con- ?rence, the U.S. has always held the view lat legitimate Palestinian interests must be iken into account in an overall settlement, he United States cannot agree, however, lat the Co-chairmen of the Conference m alter the definition of the participants I the Conference initially agreed to by the •iginal participants.
The Soviet Union will recall that the iden- cal letters presented by the Permanent epresentatives of the U.S. and the USSR ) the Secretary General of the United Na- ons on December 18, 1973 stated: "The arties have also agreed that the question f other participants from the Middle East rea will be discussed during the first stage f the Conference." As no decision was eached at the Conference in December 1973 jncerning possible additional participation, lis remains a subject for discussion among le original participants. It also remains the iew of the United States that the appro- riate UN resolutions to serve as the basis or negotiations leading toward a peace ettlement, and the ones which the parties ave accepted for this purpose, are Security 'ouncil Resolutions 242 and 338. It would herefore not be appropriate to introduce ther resolutions not accepted by all parties or this purpose.
As a practical way of proceeding, the United States proposes a preparatory con- ference of those who have participated so far in negotiations looking toward a settle- ment within the Geneva Conference frame- work. In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, such a preparatory con- ference could include Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Israel and could consider agenda, pro- cedures, and the matter of participation in a subsequent full conference, with a view toward laying the foundation for negotia- tion of an overall settlement. The United States is also prepared to consider holding bilateral consultations with the USSR in advance of such a preparatory conference, and solicits the views of the Soviet Union on this possible approach.
United States and Poland Hold Talks on Northeastern Pacific Fisheries
Joint U.S.-Polish Communique '
Delegations of the Polish People's Republic and the United States met in Washington, D.C., December 3-6 to discuss fisheries mat- ters of mutual concern in the Northeastern Pacific Ocean off the coast of the United States. The Polish delegation was headed by Vice Minister Edwin Wisniewski of the Min- istry of Foreign Trade and Shipping. Head of the American delegation was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne L. Ridgway.
A new Agreement concerning 1976 Polish fishing activities off the United States Pa- cific coast was initialed on December 9 and 10, 1975. The new Agreement will be signed in Washington at an early date.
Both delegations expressed satisfaction with the new Agreement, which represents continuing significant cooperation between the two Governments and substantial prog- ress in the conservation of fisheries stocks off the Pacific Coast of the United States.
'Issued on Dec. 10 (text from press release 600).
anuary 5, 1976
13
f
Three Aspects of U.S. Relations With Latin America
Address by William D. Rogers
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Governor [Reubin] Askew, Congressman [Dante B.] Fascell, Congressman [Claude D.] Pepper, Mayor [Maurice] Ferre, distin- guished guests: I was delighted that you should ask me to come to Miami today to say a word or two by way of despedida to those of you who are setting off this after- noon on your goodwill trip to Colombia and Venezuela.
Your visit is important. You will carry the message to Latin America of the central significance of Florida and particularly of this great city to our relations with the hemisphere. You will see once again the vibrance and subtlety of these two great nations. And your being there, as leaders of this country, most significantly will sym- bolize once again for Latin America the importance we attach to Latin America.
I intend to touch on three aspects of that relationship. The first is Panama; the sec- ond, our economic relations; and finally, the future of the inter-American system.
First, Panama. President Lopez Michelsen of Colombia, whom you will see I gather, recently made a state visit to Washington. It was a considerable success.
At the White House banquet, in his meet- ings with House and Senate leadership, and elsewhere, he said, with the tact and sensi- tivity which is his trademark, that Panama is the one continental problem we face. He meant, by that, that the need to design a new relationship between Panama and the United States is the single issue of inter-
' Made before the Greater Miami Chamber of Com- merce and the International Center of Greater Miami at Miami, Fla., on Dec. 4.
14
;«
American relations on which all the natioq of Latin America are most united.
As you know. Ambassador Ellswort' Bunker is now engaged in an effort to wor out a new canal treaty with Panama, would replace the existing treaty of 190 which no longer corresponds to the realil of today's world; it does not accommoda' the enormous changes which have occurrt* during the past 70 years.
We are negotiating because we are co> vinced that a new and more equitable trea1 is essential to best protect our national i terest in Panama. In essence our fund mental interest is a canal that is ope secure, neutral, and efficiently operated.
In today's world the extensive rights tl United States acquired in 1903 to act as " it were the sovereign" over a strip of Pan. manian territory are not only unnecessai to that fundamental national interest, bi this also flies in the face of the need i maintain an open canal. The 1903 arrang ment is an increasing source of conflict n( only in Panama but in the entire hemispher as you will certainly hear in both Venezue and Colombia. In recent years Panamania consent to our presence in the original fori prescribed in the 1903 treaty has decline significantly. Failure to recognize this rea ity and to adjust our relationship coul threaten the very interests we are seekiii to preserve — the availability of the canal I the world's waterborne commerce.
The February 1974 statement of princ pies signed by Secretary Kissinger ar Panamanian Foreign Minister Tack provide the framework for a new treaty relationshi
Department of State Bullet!
Ill
hi
•hich we believe will restore the important ] gradient of Panamanian consent to our j'esence while giving us the treaty rights we i-ed. In essence the principles provide that:
— Panama would grant the United States te rights, facilities, and lands necessary to cntinue operating and defending the canal ir the treaty period;
— For its part the United States would iturn to Panama jurisdiction over its terri- try and arrange for Panamanian participa- t)n over time in canal operation and de- fnse;
— The new treaty would provide for any epansion of canal capacity that may even- tally be needed and give Panama a more (uitable share of the benefits resulting fjm use of its geographic location.
Substantive negotiations on the major i;ues within the framework of these prin- oles have been underway since June 1974. ^e have already reached general agreement
< some issues, such as jurisdiction, the ijhts we shall require for operation and (fense, and Panamanian participation in lese functions. Some of the most difficult
< estions, such as duration, the lands and nters we shall require for operation and
< fense, and economic benefits to Panama, ie still unresolved.
But we are persuaded that a new treaty nbodying the concept of constructive part- 1 rship contained in these principles should lovide a practical means of reconciling our htional interests and assuring that the ( nal remains open, efficient, and secure.
As the President said on October 7 in 'noxville: ^
For three Administrations — President Johnson, •esident Nixon, and myself — negotiations have been >ing on with the Government of Panama concerning at problem. If you will refresh your memory, you ill recall there were serious riots in Panama, I ink in 1965. Around 30 people were killed, including me Americans. Now, these negotiations are going I have taken the position that we will not accept
'For the transcript of an interview with President 3rd recorded at Knoxville, Tenn., on Oct. 7 for tele- sion broadcast that evening, see Weekly Compila- on of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 13, 1975, 1129.
inuary 5, 1976
— and I would not recommend to the Senate — any proposal that interfered with the national security of the Canal, that would interfere with the opera- tions of the Canal.
I would not, under any circumstances, do anything in the negotiations or submit a proposal to the Senate that undercut our national security.
The negotiations, he added, are going for- ward within these principles. The Admin- istration is dedicated to the success of this effort. We think we can find, in those nego- tiations, a new treaty relationship with Panama which will indeed protect and en- hance the fundamental national interests of both parties.
I think you will see no better evidence during your visit of the relevance of this venture to our relations throughout the hemisphere, and most particularly with Venezuela and Colombia. We had better succeed, for the consequences are not pleas- ant to contemplate.
Latin American Development Needs
Now let me turn to a second area of im- portance to our relations with the hemi- sphere— economics. Here, we have some- thing to show for our recent efforts.
The inter-American issues of the future are largely economic issues. Political and security problems have dominated our rela- tionships within the hemisphere in the past. Today the burning aspiration of Latin Amer- ica is development. It is in terms of whether they bode well or ill for Latin America's economic growth that our own policies are now being tested.
In general, the Latin American countries are not among the "poorest of the poor" in global terms. They are the middle-class countries ; they have already achieved a con- siderable degree of industrial development. These are nations which are fully part of the world economy. Their future economic development depends on broad relationships with the economies of industrialized coun- tries, and they are better able to take ad- vantage of such a relationship than those lowest on the development ladder.
Thus the development needs of Latin America are not less than those of the poorer countries. But they are different.
15
They must have trade opportunities that reflect their needs and possibilities. With- out exporting they cannot import.
They also need capital. Investment is the key to growth ; and in many, probably most, of these countries, because they still have only a modest standard of living, domestic savings are not adequate to maintain satis- factory levels of growth.
Thirdly, they need technology. They must be able to draw on the technological ad- vances made in the industrial countries to increase their productivity and reach higher levels of industrialization.
New U.S. Economic Policies
It is in this context that the initiatives of the recent U.N. General Assembly sev- enth special session take on special impor- tance for the nations of Latin America. As Secretary Kissinger stated, many of the U.S. proposals delivered at the beginning of that session were particularly designed with the needs of Latin America in mind. The proposals, many of which were included in the final agreed resolution of the session, are largely directed at improving the func- tioning of the market to better serve the needs of the LDC's [less developed coun- tries] rather than at creating new mecha- nisms to meet development needs. The suc- cessful implementation of these proposals will be a difficult, long-term task. I would like to review with you the progress being made on some of the major initiatives as they relate to Latin America.
One of the major concerns of the develop- ing countries of the area has been the wide year-to-year fluctuations in export earnings, particularly for primary products. These swings in earnings have badly disrupted de- velopment plans and are doing so now. For many of the Latin American countries, the vulnerability to cyclical changes in exports was not only a matter of primary products ; several have become significant exporters of manufactured goods, the demand for which is sharply afi'ected by economic conditions in the industrialized countries. So as a result of the current world economic crisis, in part caused by the huge increase in the
cost of energy last year, many Latin Amer ican countries are now experiencing seven balance-of-payments problems.
As a partial answer to this problem, Sec- retary Kissinger at the special session pro posed the creation of a development securitj facility within the International Monetarj Fund. The facility would provide protectior against disruption of overall export earnings for both primary and manufactured prod ucts. The Executive Directors of the IMF have this proposal, as well as a proposal foi creation of a trust fund to finance grants foi the poorest countries, under active consider ation. We hope they can reach agreemeni within the next few months.
The development security facility, if es- tablished, would be a step toward ameliorat- ing the problem of unstable export earnings from primai-y commodities. In addition, th( Secretary also proposed that there be a pro ducer-consumer forum for consideration ol key commodities and that we move on a case by-case basis in an effort to strengthen th( market functions for both buyers anc sellers. This represents a major advance ii U.S. policy.
Because of the importance of the U.S market for Latin America, the implementa tion of our generalized system of prefer ences on January 1 will also be of specia significance. It will provide new export op- portunities for the hemisphere.
There are other proposals made at the seventh special session which, when devel- oped, will be valuable to the Latin Americar countries. A special working group of the ^ IMF-IBRD [International Monetary Fund- International Bank for Reconstruction and ' Development] Development Committee is considering means of facilitating access to world capital markets by LDC's. As Latin America moves beyond large-scale conces- sional lending, capital market borrowings will be a major source of development funds. They could obtain special benefit from the proposed expansion of the International Finance Corporation to strengthen its sup- port for private investment in LDC's, and the creation of an International Investment' Trust which would attract capital for invest-
16
Department of State Bulletin
ment in public, private, and mixed enter- prises in LDC's.
These proposals represent some of the important economic initiatives set forth, in major part in the Kissinger address of Sep- tember 1 at the U.N. seventh special session. They meet some of the concern of the na- tions of the hemisphere.
There is no more important issue, as I have said, for our relations with the hemi- sphere. It is vital that we support, and cooperate with, the development aspirations of the hemisphere, as you will see in the course of your trip. So we tend to think we scored something of an important break- through with these new U.S. economic poli- cies this fall.
Wide Range of OAS Activities
The same cannot be said for the third matter I would like to touch on — the Or- ganization of American States and its char- ter.
For the better part of the last three years, representatives of 24 American states have been trying to draft a new charter for the Organization of American States. Their goal: to modernize the organization, which is the centerpiece of the inter-American system.
The OAS, oldest surviving international organization, traces its roots back to 1890, and its history has been one of high ac- complishment. In its best known role, the organization has traditionally provided a place the governments of this hemisphere can meet to consult on common problems, including some thorny ones — human rights, family planning — sometimes as an adjunct to bilateral or other multilateral fora, but . more often as the prime locus for discussion. I The inter-American system began that way — as a series of conferences. In the past, these high-level meetings, now called Assem- blies, have produced agreements in a number of sensitive security, political, and economic areas.
Almost 30 years ago in Rio de Janeiro, one of these meetings yielded a hemispheric mutual security pact, the Rio Treaty. Al- though born in response to the Nazi threat.
the treaty during the 1950's drew renewed vitality from the commonly held apprehen- sions of the cold war. But even today, in a world of reduced military tension, the Rio Treaty has demonstrated its staying power, perhaps attributable more now to recogni- tion of growing power imbalances within Latin America itself than to fear of extra- territorial aggression. The member states reaffirmed their support for an updated Rio Treaty at San Jose this last summer.
A 1948 agreement on the peaceful settle- ment of disputes symbolized the commit- ment within the inter-American system to reduce and control strife among the member states, just as the Rio Treaty was conceived primarily as a defense against extrahemi- spheric aggression. The organization's suc- cessful efforts to stop quickly the fighting in 1969 between El Salvador and Honduras show the continuing need for the OAS as a peacekeeper and its ability to act with dis- patch.
But more and more, especially during the last decade, as I have said, economic prob- lems have become the central issues of the hemisphere. A 1967 revision of the OAS Charter set down some general principles of economic relations, and it provided for some new machinery to relate to the development process. But, as we shall see, formal agree- ments do not guarantee success.
The OAS has also served as an umbrella for the activities of a myriad of technical organizations which bring together special- ists from throughout the hemisphere. These have produced concrete benefits in, for exam- ple, telecommunications, tourism promotion, ports and harbors, and trade facilitation.
I have used these examples because they happen to be the subjects of OAS meetings going on at various places in the hemisphere at this very moment. A complete list of OAS technical activities would reveal an astound- ing range of subjects under consideration at the expert level. This fact is a unique fea- ture of the organization.
Finally, the OAS carries out numerous additional projects. Specialized organizations work in the fields of health ; agriculture ; the problems of women, children, and Indians;
January 5, 1976
17
as well as social and economic development; educational, scientific, and cultural coopera- tion; and human rights.
The organization, in short, is big. And it does a great deal. It spends almost $100 million a year, $65 million of which comes from the United States. It employs 1,500 people stationed throughout the member states.
As you can see from this, a gamut of hemispheric concerns has found their way into the inter-American system. This span of involvement has created a unique heri- tage. Can it be sustained in a world of change ?
In 1973, a mere three years after the last major modification of the charter entered into force, uneasiness over the organization's relevance to a changing world led members to agree to yet another study of the organi- zation. Why so soon? What are the factors promoting this presumed need for frequent self-examination? And what were the re- sults?
The OAS groups a diverse polity. It brings together 25 distinct nations. The differences among us are marked, though we share the same hemisphere and all won our independ- ence from extracontinental overlords. Most of the members are, economically speaking, among the world's middle class, but some are truly poor. In terms of size, consider Brazil and Grenada. The four major lan- guages mirror different cultural heritages. Alaska and Argentina are almost poles apart, in more than just geography. The diversity has been growing.
These variations have introduced a new and significant element to inter-American relations for the future. In an earlier, less complicated time, it was an unquestioned principle that all member states should as- pire to liberal representative democracy. This consensus has given way to acceptance of what in the OAS has been dubbed a plurality of ideologies. At San Jose in July, we agreed to incorporate the principle of ideological pluralism in the Rio Treaty.
Moreover, fast-moving events in the rest of the globe during this decade have also
begun to strain the inter- American system: the emergence of a multipolar world, new economic power centers such as the oil pro- ducers, the spectacular growth of transna- tional enterprises, the boom of the early seventies, and the bust that we are now suffering through. These have affected tra- ditional perceptions of international relation- ships in the hemisphere.
U.S. global policies during the last few years have also been noted by the Latins. Detente has changed the context of inter- American security cooperation. Many saw President Nixon's proposal for a "mature partnership" as a form of neglect anything but benign. Economically, bilateral assist- ance to Latin America from the United States stagnated; Colombia has just decided to phase out direct U.S. aid entirely, for example. Various congressional amendments sought to protect U.S. private ventures abroad by threatening reduction or elimina- tion of assistance. The 10 percent surcharge imposed on all imports in 1971 applied equally to our OAS allies and struck at the "special relationship" concept we had touted. The slow-paced implementation of trade re- form, at least until the Secretary's special session address, was viewed by Latins as belying our promises to give their economic interests special weight.
Issues in Charter Reform
The study to revise the structure and purpose of the OAS was begun in 1973 at Latin initiative, in the context of those world changes.
The Latins were motivated to the study in large part as a reaction to policy in the eco- nomic realm, which, as I have said, is the key to our future relationship.
The United States looms large in the eco- nomic life of Latin America — so large in fact that it is not surprising that the special committee created by the 1973 mandate con- centrated on curbing specific U.S. actions which they regard as interfering with their own ability to cope with foreign economic forces.
One of these efforts became known by the
18
Department of State Bulletin
code phrase "collective economic security." Peru took the lead in urging that collective economic security be written into the OAS Charter. It advanced the theory that when a state takes measures which have negative effects on another's economy, it may commit a form of aggression. A tribunal of other states should sit in judgment. If a majority agrees that an offense has occurred, the tribunal should assess damages.
A draft treaty placed before the study committee made clear this potential equa- tion of economic policy with military aggres- sion. The drafters had in mind such exam- ples as our 10 percent surcharge and Con- gress' requirement that we cut assistance in cases of uncompensated confiscation of U.S. property or fishing vessels. We of course do not believe that these actions can be labeled aggression. We could hardly agree, therefore, to create a court and a judge and jury to try us for actions which we consider to be sovereign acts to defend legitimate U.S. interests.
Another charter-reform sticking point re- lates to the conduct of transnational enter- prises. The issue here is Latin America's venerable Calvo doctrine. This juridical no- tion holds that foreign investors may have no recourse to their own governments in disputes over expropriation. The decisions of host country courts are final. We of course recognize that local law obtains; but we be- lieve that international obligations, includ- ing the responsibility of a state to protect its citizens, must be taken into account.
But, more importantly, we do not believe that these contentious issues of principle and doctrine, as important as they are, can be injected into the OAS Charter in the absence of any agreement between ourselves and the Latin Americans regarding their validity.
On the other hand, we do believe that a modernized inter-American system can con- tinue to play a significant and creative role in inter-American relations even in the ab- sence of agreement on the concepts of inter- national law relating to certain economic issues. This is so in terms of peacekeeping
and conflict management. It is so in terms of support for the development efforts of Latin America.
And it is so in the area of human rights, where, we are persuaded, the organization can make a major contribution. The stand- ards of human rights are international standards, laid down in the Inter-American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and it is particularly appropriate, therefore, that the determination whether countries are abiding by those standards be in the first instance through international machinery.
In short, we find that the charter-reform effort to date, which has cost several million dollars, has raised more questions than it has answered about the extent to which we can agree on the nature and type of coop- erative relationship we want within the inter-American system. The final draft which has emerged from the OAS labors of the last three years does little to advance the common vision of an OAS which is an effective instrument of regional cooperation. As the Mexican Representative has said in recent days, the organization faces its "mo- ment of truth."
The United States therefore proposed late last week that we drop the new OAS Charter draft and begin over again. This time, we should embrace the objective of making the OAS capable of responding to the hemi- sphere's aspirations for the future, within the limits of those goals and objectives upon which we and Latin America can agree.
We are now approaching other govern- ments of the hemisphere. Our Ambassador to the OAS, William Mailliard, and Deputy U.S. Representative Robert White are in Latin America now. They will be visiting capitals throughout the hemisphere during your own trip, including both Caracas and Bogota. I will be going to Mexico in a few hours. Our purpose will be to explore with other foreign ministries whether there exists a consensual vision of a truly effec- tive, relevant OAS for the future.
There is no more important common effort on the inter-American agenda.
January 5, 1976
19
U.S.-Yugoslav Board on Scientific and Technological Cooperation Meets
Joint Statement *
The U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Board on Scien- tific and Teciinological Cooperation met at the Department of State, Washington, D.C., December 4-5, for its regular semiannual meeting.
The Board reviewed over 100 ongoing projects in a wide range of fields, such as agriculture, health, basic sciences, technol- ogy, ecology, transportation, and others. The Board also approved additional funding for 16 projects, worth approximately 8.5 mil- lion dinars ($500,000), to be financed from the U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Fund established in accordance with the agreement on scien- tific and technological cooperation which the two countries signed on May 18, 1973.
The Board reiterated its belief that scien- tific and technological cooperation between the U.S. and Yugoslavia has been very suc- cessful; and it expressed the hope that new sources of funding can be found to extend the program beyond 1977-78, when most of the current projects will expire.
The United States was represented by Mr. William A. Root, Acting Director, Office of Soviet and Eastern European Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State, and Dr. Herman Chinn, Scientific Attache, American Embassy, Belgrade.
Yugoslavia was represented by Dr. Edo Pirkmajer, Secretary General, Research Community of Slovenia, and Chairman of
' Issued on Dec. 5 (press release 593).
the Board, and Mr. Milos Rajacic, Scienlific Counselor, Yugoslav Embassy, Washington. The Board tentatively scheduled its next meeting in Yugoslavia in late June 1976.
U.S. and Argentina Establish Bilateral Working Groups
Press release 611 dated December 16
Argentine Ambassador Rafael M. Vazquez and Assistant Secretary William D. Rogers met on December 16 to implement a series of bilateral working groups between Argen- tina and the United States. The meeting re- sulted from a decision made by the Argen- tine Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State when they met in New York last Sep- tember, to place greater emphasis on areas of potential collaboration between the two countries.
Ambassador Vazquez and Assistant Sec- retary Rogers moved to establish informal working groups in the fields of trade, invest- ment and finance, culture and tourism, agri- culture, and science and technology. These working groups will be constituted both in Buenos Aires and Washington, to permit representatives of the private sector, as well as government officials, to participate in the task of improving U.S.-Ai'gentine relations.
The Ambassador and the Assistant Sec- retary pointed to the bilateral memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the health sciences, which is to be signed shortly in Buenos Aires, as the kind of mutually productive relationship which can be fos- tered by the working groups.
20
Department of State Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security Council Resolution Concerning Israeli Air Attacks in Lebanon
Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representa- tive Daniel P. Moynihan on December U, 5, and 8, together with the text of a draft reso- lution which loas vetoed by the United States on December 8.
STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN
First Statement of December 4
USUN prtss release 174 dated December 4
The U.S. delegation has insisted upon a vote on the issue of inviting representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization to appear before the Security Council.' As a matter of principle, we shall vote against their being invited to appear.
We have witnessed a concerted attempt to disregard the rules of procedure and to accord to the Palestine Liberation Organi- zation a role greater even than that which over the years the Council has granted to observer governments and a role greater by far than has in more recent times been granted to the spokesmen of legitimate na- tional libei'ation movements invited here under rule 39.
' The Council had before it a letter from the Perma- nent Representative of Egypt requesting "an urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon" and "the participation of the Palestine Lib- eration Organization in the debate during the discus- sion of this item" (U.N. doc. S/11893), as well as a letter from the Permanent Representative of Leba- non requesting an urgent meeting of the Council (U.N. doc. S/11892).
The United States is not prepared to agree to an ad hoc departure from the rules of procedure tailored to meet the asserted needs of the Palestine Liberation Organiza- tion.
What is more important, my government is not prepared to acquiesce in an action which will undermine the negotiating proc- ess, which is the only process that can lead to peace. For the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization have re- peatedly, and as recently as the day before yesterday, told the General Assembly of their disdain for systematic negotiation.
They have openly declared their hostility, indeed their contempt, for the work of this Council. They categorically rejected Security Council Resolution 242, which for years has served as the only agreed basis for sarious negotiation. And now we find the Palestine Liberation Organization citing actions taken in the General Assembly and the Security Council as the basis for still further erosion of the negotiating process.
For these fundamental reasons, we are totally opposed to inviting the Palestine Liberation Organization. To do so will dis- serve the search for peace in the Middle East.
The noblest and most fundamental aim of the Security Council is to achieve peace and security. In the case of the Middle East, my government is dedicated to active leadership in the pursuit of that goal. My government has long maintained that the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people must be reflected in the arrangements that will bring peace and security to the Middle East.
The effort which has been made to flout
January 5, 1976
21
the procedures of this Council and to disre- gard entirely the sensitivities of the people of the State of Israel can only complicate the search for peace. We urge all who share the hope for a just peace in the Middle East to withhold their support from this egre- gious attempt to use this body to deal with an amorphous terrorist organization as though it were a concrete entity with the attributes of a sovereign government. The United States will vote "No." ^
Second Statement of December 4 ^
USUN prtss release 175 dated December 4
I intervene briefly in the interest of keep- ing the record straight with respect to some of the things which have been said here this afternoon.
The distinguished Representative of Iraq asserted that the decision of the Security Council in September to hear the two Viet- Nams is a precedent for the proposal to in- vite what is called the full participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Mr. President, the Vietnamese case was entirely different. First, what the Council did in that case was to invite the Viet-Nams to make a statement to the Council after the vote, not to participate fully.
Second, that invitation was extended on a nonobjection basis. The President very prop- erly paused and, after a moment, said, "Since there is no objection, it is so decided." There are objections here.
Third, although the then President of the Council made no reference to any rule of the Council's rules of procedures when the Council invited the Viet-Nams, there was no reason for him to have done so. We knew under what rule we acted. The fact is that
" The Council on Dec. 4 adopted by a vote of 9 to 3 (Costa Rica, U.K., U.S.), with 3 abstentions (France, Italy, Japan), the procedural proposal for the par- ticipation of the PLO in the debate. Under article 27 of the U.N. Charter, decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
^ For further statements made by Ambassador Moynihan on Dec. 4, see USUN press release 175.
the legal basis of the invitation was rule 39. As the distinguished Representative of Italy has said today, there can be no other basis under the rules as they so stand.
Finally, in this regard, Mr. President, whether we believe there are one or two Vietnamese states, there certainly is at least one such state. But there does not now exist any state of Palestine, nor does the Palestine Liberation Organization claim that there exists a state of Palestine. The PLO cannot therefore be treated properly as the govern- ment of a state.
Finally, Mr. President, I should like to adumbrate certain concerns about refer- ences which have been made here this after- noon to what was agreed or not agreed in the private consultations which the Council has held prior to this formal meeting.
I regret to say, Mr. President, that the recollections of the U.S. delegation are very much at variance at a number of points with the recollections of other members of this Council. I regret this because it must surely be a sign that we have a faulty memory.
I do not in any way mean to suggest that there has been misrepresentation, much lees that there has been deliberate misrepre- sentation. But there is on our part some distress that our recollections and under- standings should be so at variance with those of other members of the Council.
And it must be the fact, Mr. President, that if the creative practice which the Coun- cil has evolved of meeting in private and without the maintenance of a record is to become the source of subsequent confusion, even disagreement and conceivably even the quest for advantage in consequence of the absence of a record, then clearly the dis- position of some members of this Council to continue that practice will have been dimin- ished, and a creative innovation in our pro- cedures will perhaps commence to decline.
I make that point only, Mr. President, in the most open and nonaccusatory manner, simply to say that it seems to me that it is not useful in this debate to make reference to earlier agreements which are now at this point not a matter of record.
22
Department of State Bulletin
Statement of December 5
USUN pitss release 176 dated December 5
Once again we meet to consider the trag- edy of violence and counterviolence in the Middle East and the dilemma which it poses for all of us. Surely no one can listen to the accounts of actions which involve the maim- ing and killing of innocent civilians without feeling the utmost compassion for those concerned. How satisfying it would be if we felt that through what we say and do here we could break this vicious circle which has brought so much tragedy to so many people over the last quarter century.
Surely, however, as responsible member.s of the international community charged with serious obligations under the U.N. Charter, we must recognize we do not accomplish this by condemning isolated acts. The attacks we are considering today do not occur in isola- tion. There is always cause and effect.
My delegation considers that all loss of innocent human life is reprehensible, and we are prepared to deplore it in strong terms whether it occurs from the acts of organized groups or of governments.
We would remind the Council that orga- nizations which carried out recent acts of violence against citizens of Israel have pub- licly acknowledged their responsibility for those acts, just as the Government of Israel has acknowledged its responsibility for the attacks which are now before us. I make these points not to condone or excuse Israel's recent massive air attacks, which by their nature could not avoid taking irtnocent vic- tims. We neither condone nor excuse them. But we must deal with them in context and not in isolation.
So let me be quite clear, Mr. President: the United States deeply deplores these at- tacks, just as we have consistently deplored those despicable terrorist incidents which have caused the loss of life in Israel.
We are prepared to support an appropri- ate resolution which registers the strongest disapproval of this Council of all acts of vio- lence in the Middle East, particularly those which result in the death of innocent civil-
ians, and which calls on all parties to refrain from any action that might endanger peace negotiations.
Certainly there is nothing all of us would wish to see more than an end to this sense- less slaughter. But on reflection I think most of you would agree that there is only one way to do this, and that is to bring peace to the area.
That, Mr. President, is precisely what my government has been devoting its most in- tensive efforts to try to do over the past two years. We remain committed to that goal. We will persevere in our efforts to achieve it. We believe we have made progress, but we recognize that much remains to be settled.
One of the unhappy features of the situa- tion we are dealing with today is the disrup- tive effect it has on the efforts to move fur- ther toward a peace agreement. The tensions and passions generated by the recurring cycle of violence are hardly conducive to the type of atmosphere that will permit the parties concerned to arrive at that accommo- dation of opposing views which is the pre- requisite of a peace agreement.
Our task is to weigh deliberately how our reactions can best advance that reconcilia- tion of views. It will not be accomplished through the adoption of one-sided resolu- tions which leave one party believing it is the victim of discrimination and bias on the part of the United Nations. It will be facili- tated if this body renders impartial, rea- soned, and reasonable judgments on the issues properly within its competence. It is our duty to react in the most responsible and constructive way that we can con- ceive.
Statement Before the Vote, December 8
USUN puss release 182 dated December 8
At the outset of this present debate in the Security Council concerning the complaints of Lebanon and Egypt about Israeli raids in Lebanon, the United States spoke briefly but, we hope, consistently — consistent with a position we have maintained throughout the
January 5, 1976
23
long and often heartbreaking duration of this conflict which is nearly coeval with the existence of the United Nations itself.
We stated that we considered that all loss of innocent human life was reprehensible, that we were prepared to deplore in strong terms such loss of life, whether it occurs from the acts of governments or from the acts of organized groups. We made no dis- tinction, as indeed no distinction could be made, with respect to the value or the ex- tent of the loss of the life of a Lebanese child any more than the loss of the life of an Israeli or Syrian or Egyptian child.
We asked on that occasion, Mr. President, if it were not possible for the Council to join in this perception which all of us shared. None of us around this table in this Council chamber think otherwise; none of the na- tions or that organization seated at this table would share a different view.
We said on that occasion that:
We are prepared to support an appropriate resolu- tion which registers the strongest disapproval of this Council of all acts of violence in the Middle East, particularly those which result in the death of inno- cent civilians, and which calls on all parties to refrain from any action that might endanger peace negotia- tions.
Now, Mr. President, we said this in our capacity as a member of the Council, but I think it will be granted that ours is a spe- cial concern in this regard owing simply to the fact that we are also the member of the Council which is seeking, in the role of mediator, to bring about peace in the Middle East. We are trying to mediate this seem- ingly unending conflict. And we cannot see mediation as in any way advanced by a one- sided resolution, a resolution which would persuade one party or another party that an imbalance had occurred, that an injustice was being done. It is only the evenhanded- ness of the United Nations, just as it is the evenhandedness of the mediator, that bears any promise of success.
In the past, Mr. President, this Council has seen and understood and acted upon this fundamental requirement of responsible be- havior; to wit, the requirement of even-
handedness and balance. The most recent occasion on which a Security Council resolu- tion of this kind has been before us was in April of 1974, when we adopted Resolution 347 in a context not dissimilar from the present context: violence and countervio- lence, and violence counter to the counter- violence, then violence counter to that. It is not new to human history, certainly not to that of the Middle East.
On that occasion the Security Council acted in a manner which was resolute but fair, concrete but balanced. Resolution 347 was adopted by 13 votes to none in opposi- tion, such that the whole of the Council may be said to have approved this course of ac- tion. And, Mr. President, nothing a year and a half later should suggest to us that there was anything imprudent about what we did. To the contrary, it stands as an example of responsible behavior, seeking effective re- sults. We all know this; there is no govern- ment at this table that does not know this.
It is not required of me to do anything more than to say what we also all know, which is that the resolution before us is not balanced, will not be perceived as fair; it will not advance the cause of peace, and to that extent it cannot be seen as responsible.
We speak not just as a government but as a government seeking to bring peace in the role of mediator. That is our role in the Middle East. It is never an easy one. We find ourselves called upon to make pleas to you for perspective and balance.
We fully understand that there are gov- ernments at this table that do not feel bal- anced at this moment. We can understand why they would not. Yet we as mediators say, even so, it is not the moment that matters, it is the progress we are making toward a just and lasting peace. The ques- tion is: Will the action we take today add to that progress, encourage it, facilitate it, or will it do otherwise?
And so, Mr. President, the United States, the mediator country, would like to suggest two simple amendments to the resolution before us. We have asked the Secretariat to circulate the amendments without delay;
24
Department of State Bulletin
and I am sure it is doing its very best, as it always does, and here indeed they are.
Mr. President, these are not unfamiliar amendments. To the contrary, the language will be familiar to you, sir, and to a number of the members of the Council, to most of the members of the Council, for the very simple reason that most members of this Council have already voted for these amend- ments. These amendments have won the approval of every permanent member of this Council which voted on them. They won the approval of all those members elected to the Council who were here last year, and they won the approval of all the other elected members who were there at the time, all of this with the exception of one permanent and one elected member who chose not to participate in the vote. But among the par- ticipating nations, the vote was unanimous.
Mr. President, the U.S. amendments would add to our present resolution, which has three operative paragraphs, a fourth and a fifth. Th^ fourth paragraph reads as follows :
Condemns all acts of violence, especially those which result in tbe tragic loss of innocent civilian life, and urges all concerned to refrain from any further acts of vidlence;
Paragraph 5 reads:
Calls upon all parties to refrain from any action which might endanger negotiations aimed at achiev- ing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
I repeat, sir, these are operative para- graphs which the Security Council has al- ready voted upon and did so in a similar situation — a not dissimilar situation — a year and a half ago. There is no one present at this table who opposed those paragraphs.
The purpose of the fourth paragraph, very simply, would be to provide balance in those acts which we condemn, reflecting nothing more than our true feelings and our stated position — that we condemn all acts of vio- lence.
I cannot imagine that any government would not be willing to condemn and deplore violence which leads to the loss of innocent lives, and I simply point out that there is not a government at this table which did other-
wise when faced with the possibility — more than the possibility, the necessity — of doing so a year and a half ago.
Finally, the fifth operative paragraph would call on all parties to refrain from any action that would endanger the negotiations aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. I remind you, sir, these negotiations have not failed in the year and a half since this resolution was adopted. To the contrary, extraordinarily difficult, dense, but in the end successful negotiation has brought the condition of peace, the absence of violence, stability, to the Sinai, and similar efforts are soon to be undertaken, we cannot doubt, with respect to the Syrian-Israeli border and their relations.
In those circumstances, Mr. President, in the name of sanity, in the name of peace, the United States proposes these amend- ments and asks for a vote.
Statement After the Vote, December 8
USUN press release 183 dated December 8
As has been clear in what I have said here tonight and what my delegation has done today, this is an outcome which is dis- appointing to the United States. On Decem- ber 4, when this matter first arose, we spoke briefly, plainly, and we asked for balance. All day long, as my distinguished friend the Representative from the Cameroon has said, we spoke in private meetings with members of this Council, asking for some measure of balance in this resolution. We were not suc- cessful.
We introduced measures familiar to the Council, part of the Council's record, which we thought would provide balance. The dis- tinguished Representative of Italy asked for 12 hours that we might recess, adjourn if you will, to talk further about these pro- posals, and we voted with five other mem- bers of the Council for such an adjournment. But it was not the wish of a majority.
Mr. President, the United States strongly deplores the Israeli actions which were brought to our attention by the Govern- ments of Lebanon and Egypt through the
January 5, 1976
25
offices of their distinguished Ambassadors who are with us tonight. But we also be- heve that the problem of the loss of innocent life from incursions from Lebanon and other neighboring states of Israel should also be condemned. This is part of the cycle of vio- lence with which we are dealing and which the United States, as a mediating power, hopes to bring to an end.
We worked strenuously for a balanced resolution, and we have reluctantly had to veto the resolution as it now stands, which as we have made clear from the beginning, we did not consider to be balanced.
TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION *
The Security Council,
Having considered the question inscribed in its agenda at the 1859th meeting,
Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/11892) and of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Egypt (S/11893),
Having heard the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon, Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the representative of the Palestine Lib- eration Organization,
Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,
Deploring Israel's defiance of these resolutions,
Grieved at the tragic loss of human life caused by indiscriminate and massive Israeli air attacks,
Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situa- tion resulting from Israel's violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and of Security Council resolutions.
Convinced that Israeli massive air attacks against Lebanon were premeditative in nature,
1. Strongly condemns the Government of Israel for its premeditated air attacks against Lebanon in violation of its obligations under the United Nations Charter and of Security Council resolutions;
2. Calls upon Israel to desist forthwith from all military attacks against Lebanon;
3. Issues once again a solemn warning to Israel that if such attacks were repeated, the Council would have to consider taking appropriate steps and measures to give effect to its decisions.
'U.N. doc. S/11898; the draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council, the vote being 13 in favor, 1 against (U.S.), with 1 abstention (Costa Rica).
U.S. Votes Against General Assembly Resolution on the Middle East
Following is a statemeyit made in plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on December 4, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly on De- cember 5.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT
USUN press release 171 dated December 4 I
This General Assembly plenary continues to focus our attention on one of the most sensitive and difficult problems we face as a global community: the situation in the Mid- dle East. We have already discussed aspects of this issue on various occasions during the current session, and the Security Council and committees of the Assembly are at this moment working on Middle Eastern issues. I therefore do not need to dwell on the seri- ousness of the Middle East situation nor on its importance to us all; the issue is heavy upon us.
Nor do I really need to tell you what U.S. policy is in the Middle East. Since the sign- ing of the new Egyptian-Israeli agreement of September 4, 1975, U.S. policy in the Middle East has been elaborated several times by Secretary of State Kissinger, most notably in his address before this Assembly on September 22. He has explained our view of that agreement and what the United States is prepared to do next. It may be useful, nevertheless, to reiterate here some of the main points of that position in order to demonstrate once again the determination of the United States to go forward in the pursuit of a peaceful settlement.
Our conclusion after the October war of 1973 was that to have approached all the issues pertaining to all the countries in- volved was nearly futile until a minimum of confidence had been established. The United States believed that we should proceed step by step with the parties that were ready to
26
Department of State Bulletin
negotiate, and on issues that allowed some room for maneuver. We believed that, once into the process, the parties would have a stake in its success and that momentum would be created which could produce bepe- fits and agreements that would be kept. We considered that in the end this step-by-step approach would bring about conditions which could then lead to a final overall settlement. This has been our goal from the beginning and remains our goal today.
Since October 1973, there has been more progress toward peace than at any time since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United Nations has played an important role in making that progress possible and in assuring that gains achieved were not lost. Security Council Resolution 338 launched a negotiating process and the first Geneva Conference. Agreements to separate forces and to create buffer zones in support of the 'cease-fires were negotiated between Egypt and Israel in January 1974 and between Syria and Israel in May 1974. A further agreement, not the direct outcome of war but as a step toward peace, was signed in September 1975 between Egypt and Israel.
We have said and we will say again that these are only steps in a continuing process. We have made notable progress, but the task is in no way finished. We are determined to persevere.
The question before us all is: Where do we go from here and how? The United States is convinced answers to this question can be found.
President Ford has made it clear that the United States will assist the parties in any way it can, as the parties desire, to achieve a negotiated settlement within the frame- work established by Security Council Reso- lutions 242 and 338. We are fully aware that all the basic issues must be met and that there will be no permanent peace unless it deals with the concern of the parties for their territorial integrity, political independ- ence, and right to exist in peace and takes into account the legitimate interests of all concerned, including the Palestinians. We
remain ready to help in further negotiations between Syria and Israel. We are ready to consult and discuss the possibilities of a re- convened Geneva Conference. We are ready and willing to explore any practical method of advancing the cause of peace, including a preparatory conference of the original par- ticipants in the Geneva Conference to dis- cuss agenda procedures, participation, and other matters relevant to a resumption of the Geneva Conference. This is the policy of the United States. We shall execute it vigor- ously.
The resolution before us for our consider- ation does not, in the view of the United States, help us in the process toward peace we support. We shall vote against it. Its one- sided condemnation of one of the parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute and its departure from the accepted negotiating framework established by Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 make further settlement be- tween those parties more difficult. It calls upon the Security Council to implement cer- tain resolutions that deal with problems that can only be solved by negotiation. That is the task before us all: to get to the serious work of negotiation among the i>arties in which real progress can be made. Resolu- tions such as the one before us today can only exacerbate the situation.
Further, it adds to the series of one-sided resolutions which are a disservice to our- selves and to this institution. It would take us one step further in destroying credibility throughout the world that the General As- sembly is truly going about its business. These irresponsible resolutions do not take into account the legitimate concerns of one of the parties and lead us into a domain re- moved from the reality where a settlement can be achieved.
Let us turn away from empty rhetoric and resolutions. Let us commit ourselves to a practical process of negotiations, which continues to hold out the best hope for reaching that objective so essential to the peoples of the Middle East and indeed of the entire world.
January 5, 1976
27
TEXT OF RESOLUTION '
The General Assembly,
Having considered the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of the United Nations as well as those principles of inter- national law which prohibit the occupation or acqui- sition of territory by the use of force, and which consider any military occupation, however temporary, or any forcible annexation of such territory, or part thereof, as an act of aggression.
Gravely concerned at the continuation of the Is- raeli occupation of Arab territories and Israel's per- sistent denial of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people,
Recalling relevant resolutions of the General As- sembly and the Security Council, particularly those concerning the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and its right to participate in any efforts for peace,
Convinced that the early reconvening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, is essential for the realiza- tion of a just and lasting settlement in the region.
Convinced that the present situation prevailing in the Middle East continues to constitute a serious threat to international peace and security, and that urgent measures should be taken in order to ensure Israel's full compliance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the questions of Palestine and the Middle East,
Recognizing that peace is indivisible and that a just and lasting settlement of the question of the Middle East must be based on a comprehensive solu- tion under the auspices of the United Nations, which takes into consideration all aspects of the Middle East conflict, including, in particular, the enjoyment by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights, as well as the total withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967,
1. Reaffirms that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and therefore all territories thus occupied must be returned;
2. Condemns Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and re- peated United Nations resolutions;
3. Requests all States to desist from supplying Israel with any military or economic aid as long as it continues to occupy Arab territories and deny the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people;
4. Requests the Security Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities under the Charter, to take all
'U.N. doc. A/RES/3414 (XXX) adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 5 by a rollcall vote of 84 to 17 (U.S.), with 27 abstentions.
necessary measures for the speedy implementation, according to an appropriate time-table, of all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region through a comprehensive settlement, worked out with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, and within the framework of the United Nations, which ensures complete Israeli with- drawal from all the occupied Arab territories as well as full recognition of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the attainment of those rights;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to inform all concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, and to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and report thereon to the Security Council and to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.
U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel-Syria Sector Extended
Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council on November 30 by U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.
STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN
Statement Before the Vote
USUN press release 165 dated November 30
Mr. President [Yakov Malik, of the U.S.S.R.] : I should like to express my grati- tude to you for the opportunity I now have to be the first of the many members — first, I am sure, of what will prove to be all of the other members of this Council — to express appreciation to my brother from Guyana, and his colleagues from Mauritania, from Tanzania, and Cameroon, for the valiant efforts which they have made to bring about | this result. These required a great deal of them and were an expression of their com- mitment to the work of this Council, which we all share and, in their performance this past three days, certainly admire.
Mr. President, with respect to the reso- lution before us, the United States wishes
28
Department of State Bulletin
to make clear that we are not agreeing to this resolution, which includes a provision calling for a Security Council debate on the situation in the Middle East, out of any de- sire for such a debate in this setting — much less out of any intention, howsoever remote, of seeing a transfer of the negotiations be- tween the two parties to the UNDOF [U.N. Disengagement Observer Force] arrange- ments to the Security Council.
We have agreed, we are agreeing, solely out of deference to the right of the Security Council to take up any matter it desires to take up. We consider that this resolution is taken without prejudice whatsoever to the Geneva formula or to the negotiations by the parties through intermediaries.
With respect to the matter of relevant U.N. resolutions, the United States considers that only Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are in fact relevant to the situation in the Middle East.
Statement After the Vote
USUN press release 166 dated November 30
I am sure you would agree, sir, that the only words which would truly serve to ex- press the admiration and the gratitude and the respect which we all have for the Sec- retary General at this moment would be brief words. His labors have been herculean, and I assume, if today is no different from other days, they are not yet concluded. My government, sir, would join wholly in the tributes paid to you.
My delegation wishes also to make clear that the United States, Mr. President, does not support the statement of the Council President- — of yourself, sir — indicating that the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza- tion] will be invited to participate in the January session.' This statement in any
' The following statement was read by the Presi- dent of the Council after the vote:
"It is the understanding of the majority of the Security Council that when it reconvenes on 12 Janu- ary 1976 in accordance with paragraph (a) of Secu- rity Council resolution 381 (1975) the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization will be in- vited to participate in the debate."
event did not report a decision, but was merely a summation of the views of some members of the Council. We do not consider that the extraneous matters which have been introduced into the Council's action to- day can have the effect of changing either the negotiating framework, the basis for these negotiations, or the participants in them.
Mr. President, I should like also to note that subparagraph (a) of the operative paragraph, properly read, declares the inten- tion of the Security Council to debate the question of whether or not the Middle East problem does in fact include the Palestinian question. Such, Mr. President, is the role of the comma in English composition.
Nonetheless, and finally, to the parties concerned and to this Council, the United States pledges its continued efforts to fur- ther the process toward peace in the Middle East. We do that with the indispensable support of UNDOF, of its commander, its officers, and its men, and of course, once again, you, Mr. Secretary General, and those not less valiant colleagues whom you have brought as your associates on the 38th floor.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION "^
The Security Council,
Having considered the report of the Secretary- General (S/11883 and Add.l) on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF),
Having noted the discussions of the Secretary- General with all parties concerned on the situation in the Middle East,
Expressing concern over the continued state of tension in the area.
Decides :
(a) To reconvene on 12 January 1976, to continue the debate on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question, taking into account all relevant United Nations resolutions;
(b) To renew the mandate of UNDOF for another period of six months;
(c) To request the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on further developments.
"U.N. doc. S/RES/381 (1975); adopted by the Council on Dec. 1 by a vote of 13 (U.S.) to 0, with the People's Republic of China and Iraq not partici- pating in the vote.
January 5, 1976
29
United States Urges Increase in Contributions to UNRWA
Following i« a statement made in the Spe- cial Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Barbara M. White on November 18, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the commit- tee on November 20 and by the Assembly on December 8.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WHITE
USUN prtss releast 152 (corr. 1) dated November 18
Sir John Rennie, the distinguished Com- missioner General of the United Nations Re- hef and Works Agency (UNRWA), has told us that the Agency is facing a crisis un- equaled in its 25 years of existence. My delegation believes that this somber warning is one which must be heeded by every na- tion represented in this room today. We are faced not solely or even predominantly with the possibility that an organization of tested merit is in deep trouble. No, Mr. Chairman, the prospect we face is much more impor- tant, much more pressing, and potentially much more tragic ; for we are discussing the lives of the million and a half refugees who depend so directly on UNRWA. In very practical terms, we must face the fact that unless very strenuous efforts are made, the lives of the refugees could be dramatically changed for the worse, particularly by the elimination of the major part of UNRWA's educational services.
It is UNRWA's schools which will suffer especially if expenditures must be reduced to the level of contributions which UNRWA estimates for this year and the years ahead. There can be no other way in 1976, for example, to reduce a budget of $140 million to accommodate a deficit of $55 million. We cannot allow this to happen.
UNRWA's schools mean more than a quarter of a million schoolchildren and over 4,300 vocational students — of whom 92 per-
cent will be employed upon graduation. UNRWA's schools also mean over 8,000 teachers, all of them refugees themselves. UNRWA's schools mean, finally, the employ- ment now and upon graduation of thousands of refugees each year, providing better and useful lives not only for themselves but for the thousands more who are or will be de- pendent upon them.
And there is yet a further consequence: the education provided by UNRWA is a dy- namic in what for 25 years has been an otherwise static situation. While the search for a political solution for the future of the refugees continues, UNRWA has already addressed that future by giving the refugees and their children some of the resources to meet it.
Mr. Chairman, education is among the most vital services that UNRWA provides. With the strong support of the refugees themselves, UNRWA has decided to give the maximum support to its schools, even at the cost of greater austerity in its other serv- ices. It is for this reason that for many years UNRWA expenditures on education have equaled 37 percent of the total budget, an amount roughly equal to that spent on relief.
The Commissioner General was quite cor- rect, in noting UNRWA's anniversary this year, that 25 years of refugee status can be no occasion for celebration. However, to UNRWA's great credit, it is also true that although that status tragically continues, the Agency has made it possible for thousands of the refugees to acquire the modern skills to support constructive lives. The members of the United Nations must not allow this possibility to be destroyed.
In 1975 half of those members, including many countries well able to give, contributed nothing to UNRWA. Many other members have made only nominal contributions. The Commissioner General has asked, with every justification, that UNRWA's chronic finan- cial weakness be ended. This requires — let us acknowledge it here and now — that
30
Department of State Bulletin
UNRWA's income must rise annually to meet the increases in costs from factors such as inflation and currency devaluation over which the Agency has no control.
Let me note here that the United States has responded to the appeals by the Secre- tary General and the Commissioner General in 1975 with two special contributions in addition to our regular pledge.' The total amounted to nearly 40 percent of all govern- ment contributions to UNRWA. However, all members of the United Nations must now respond if regular increases of this size are to be met. Undercontributors and noncon- tributors must take their part of the respon- sibility which their votes in the General As- sembly for UNRWA resolutions over the years have created.
It is our challenge, our commitment, and our responsibility to sustain the hope UNRWA has brought to those it serves. Let us, all of us, discharge that duty together.
The U.S. delegation introduces draft reso- lution A/SPC/L.335 in full recognition of the situation described by Commissioner General Sir John Rennie. In doing so, we call upon all member states of the United Na- tions to make the most generous efforts pos- sible to meet the anticipated needs of UNRWA.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION ^
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 3331 (XXIX) of 17 Decem- ber 1974 and all previous resolutions referred to therein, including resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,
Taking note of the annual report of the Commis- sioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
' On Nov. 26 in a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly for the Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, announced the U.S. pledge of $26.7 million to UNRWA for calendar year 1976. For his statement in the ad hoc committee, see USUN press release 160 dated Nov. 26.
East, covering the period from 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1975,
1. Notes with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in para- graph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed by the Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, there- fore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;
2. Expresses its thanks to the Commissioner-Gen- eral and to the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued dedicated and effective efforts under difficult circumstances to provide essen- tial services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;
3. Notes with regret that the United Nations Con- ciliation Commission for Palestine has been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the imple- mentation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation of that paragraph and to report as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1976;
4. Directs attention to the continuing seriousness of the financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report ;
5. Notes with profound concern that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commis- sioner-General to collect additional contributions, this increased level of income to the United Nations Re- lief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East is still insufficient to cover essential budget requirements in the present year, and that, as presently foreseen levels of giving, deficits will recur each year;
6. Calls upon all Governments as a matter of ur- gency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budg- etary deficits projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and therefore urges non-contributing Govern- ments to contribute regularly and contributing Gov- ernments to consider increasing their regular con- tributions.
= A/RES/3419 B (XXX) (text from U.N. doc. A/ SPC/L.335, draft resolution); adopted by the com- mittee on Nov. 20 by a vote of 79 to 0, with 2 absten- tions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 8 by a vote of 121 to 0, with 1 abstention.
January 5, 1976
31
THE CONGRESS
Department Discusses Grain Exports and Reserves Negotiations
Following is a statement by Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Ajfairs, made before the Sub- committee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations on December 3.^
Mr. Chairman [Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr.] : I appreciate the committee's invitation to appear today to comment on the Administration's policy on grain export sales and management. In these comments, I will seek to respond, within my compe- tence, to the issues raised in your letter of October 30 to Assistant Secretary [for Con- gressional Relations Robert J.] McCloskey. Those were:
— The basis for determining availabiUty of grains for concessional exports under the Food for Peace program.
— The importance of grain exports as a source of foi'eign exchange.
— The policy process as applied to food matters and grain exports.
— The status of grain reserves negotia- tions.
I would like to begin with a few general comments about U.S. export policy as it ap- plies to grain. The same principles of multi- lateralism and nondiscrimination apply to grain as to the export of other U.S. prod- ucts. Full production and improved competi- tiveness over the past several years have allowed American farmers to expand grain exports in response to growing world de- mand, and our policy is to maintain the
' The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
gains that we have recently enjoyed on world markets.
The large majority of foreign buyers of American grain have generally free access to our market. The one exception to this policy is the agreement with the Soviet Union. In this case, because of the Soviet record of highly irregular and potentially disruptive grain purchases, it was necessary to obtain a long-term commitment from them on annual demand and to establish an arrangement to monitor purchases during years of peak demand. The Soviet commit- ment to purchase at least 6 million tons is unconditional. On the other hand, the agree- ment enables the United States to lower the amount it will supply below 6 million tons, should expected supply in this country fall below the 225-million-ton level.
With respect to the food aid program, Public Law 480 (the Agricultural Trade De- velopment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended), provides that the Secretary of Agriculture shall determine the type and quantity of commodities available for con- cessional sales. This determination only sets the limits for what may be programed as food aid. It is the budgetary decision of the President that determines the size of our food aid program. Since it is the prerogative of the Secretary of Agriculture to make food aid commodity determinations, I be- lieve it would be more appropriate for fur- ther comment on this aspect of the com- mittee's interest to be made by the spokes- man for that Department.
Export of agricultural commodities has long been one of the mainstays of U.S. foreign trade. The export of grains, always a significant item in our balance of pay- ments, has been an increasingly important foreign exchange earner in recent years. Grain export earnings grew from $2.6 bil- lion to $10 billion between 1970 and 1974, almost a fourfold increase — against a 130 percent gain in the value of our total ex- ports, from $43 to $98 billion. Without the $10.3 billion earned from grain sales abroad last year, the $3.4 billion deficit we expe- rienced on current account would have been
32
Department of State Bulletin
much greater. Our ability to sustain the im- port of raw materials and fuels required by industry and other foreign goods sought by the American consumer would have been diminished. In addition to an increase in unit value, the volume of grain exports has doubled in this decade, and the United States, this year, will supply about 50 per- cent of world wheat exports and 55 percent of feed grains. The significant increase ^xpected in grain exports this year from k-ecord crops in wheat and corn will further strengthen our balance of payments and allow us to meet a growing world demand for food.
These facts underscore the important position of agriculture, and grains in par- ticular, in our foreign economic policy. I oelieve that some of the discussion we have fieard in recent weeks about who makes for- eign agricultural policy simply reflects a greater public awareness of the interna- ;ional importance of U.S. agriculture. The formulation of policy and the decisionmak- ng process within the Administration have lot changed. Our delegation that negotiated :he agreement with the Soviet Union on irain supply was headed by Under Secre- tary of State Robinson and included senior Department of Agriculture officials. Our Darticipation in international eff"orts under- ;aken over the past year to solve world food aroblems has been fully coordinated, involv- ng the participation of all interested agen- cies. The Department of Agriculture retains ts traditional role in both the domestic and foreign aspects of agricultural policy.
In response to your expressed interest, Mr. Chairman, and because it is a major U.S. initiative in dealing with world food needs, [ would like to summarize the status of work jn establishing a grain reserves system.
Building on the principles outlined by Sec- retary Kissinger in his September speech to the seventh special session of the U.N. Gen- eral Assembly, the United States presented k detailed proposal for a system of nation- ally held food grain reserves to a working group of the International Wheat Council |(IWC) that has the negotiation of elements
January 5, 1976
of a new wheat agreement under considera- tion. Our proposal is designed to establish a system to increase assurance that ade- quate food supplies will be available to all countries despite global production fluctua- tions. Twice in this decade unpredictable shortfalls in world grain production have sharply reduced available supplies, causing widely fluctuating prices and altered con- sumption and trading patterns. In those situations, with food-importing countries competing for scarce supplies, the most seri- ously affected have been the more economi- cally vulnerable developing countries. Our proposal for a 30-million-ton world security resei-ve stock of wheat and rice, held by importers and exporters alike, would create a reserve adequate to offset at least 90 per- cent of production shortfalls in food grains.
As I have stated, our reserves proposal is currently before the IWC working group, and those discussions have not yet reached a conclusive stage. We hope that the Wheat Council, meeting this week in London, will agree to accelerate the pace of those dis- cussions so that we can move to actual nego- tiations early next year.
There is an important procedural obstacle, however, posed by the European Commu- nity. The EC has taken the view that pro- posals having to do with grain stocks should be negotiated in the context of trade issues in the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) and has not been willing to continue discus- sions in London. We prefer the Wheat Coun- cil forum for negotiation of a grain reserves system because of its functional experience and expertise in grain matters and because of its membership, which includes the U.S.S.R. We also believe that a reserves system aimed at improving world food secu- rity is urgently required and therefore should be determined apart from other con- tentious issues involving international grain trade. To meet the EC's concerns, we have stated our willingness to take the results of a food security reserves negotiation into full account in the MTN. But so far this offer has not unblocked the reserves nego- tiations. We wonder whether the EC is
33
really committed to acting to improve world food security. Our bilateral contacts with the EC have continued up to this time in an effort to convince it that progress on a reserves system is an essential part of the common commitment to attacking the food problem the EC and we made at the World Food Conference one year ago.
Polar Bear Conservation Agreement Transmitted to the Senate
Message From President Ford '
To the Senate of the United States:
I am pleased to transmit for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification the Agree- ment on the Conservation of Polar Bears, done at Oslo, November 15, 1973.
I am also transmitting, for the informa- tion of the Senate, the report of the Depart- ment of State with respect to the agreement.
This agreement, negotiated by the five circumpolar nations, the United States, Can- ada, Denmark, Norway and the Soviet Union, provides a plan of protection for polar bears consisting of a prohibition of hunting, killing or capturing the mammals subject to specified exceptions. It also pro- vides for the countries involved to cooperate and consult with each other on research in- volving management and conservation of polar bears.
This agreement implements one of the mandates of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 which, in Section 108, calls for development of bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection of marine mammals, including polar bears. No legisla- tion is necessary to implement the agree- ment, since the protections of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 exceed the requirements of the agreement.
'Transmitted on Nov. 28 (text from White House press release dated Nov. 29); also printed as S. Ex. I, 94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the text of the agreement and the report of the Department of State.
34
In addition to being the first international agreement to focus on the conservation of polar bears, this agreement is the first to be negotiated by the circumpolar nations ex- clusively. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this agreement.
Gerald R. Ford.
The White House, November 28, 1975.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done af
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into forcf
April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Papua New Guinea, Decern ber 15, 1975. Protocol relating to an amendment to the conventioi
on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done
at Rome September 15, 1962. Entered into forci
September 11, 1975.
Proclaimed by the President: December 16, 1975. Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizun
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970
Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.
Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea December 15, 1975 (with a reservation). Convention for the suppression of unlawful act
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Janu
ary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea ' December 15, 1975 (with a reservation).
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done a Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force Marc 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 196i TIAS 6820.
Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea December 4, 1975.
Customs
Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Coun cil, with annex. Done at Brussels December IE
Department of State Bulleti
I
1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; for the United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 7063. Accession deposited: Sierra Leone, November 6,
1975.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.
Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea, Ij December 4, 1975.
Health
Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitu- tion of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.' Acceptances deposited: Iceland, December 5, 1975; Qatar, December 8, 1975.
Maritime Matters
invention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044. Accession deposited: Guinea, December 3, 1975.
tAeteorology
Convention of the World Meteorological Organiza- tion. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. En- tered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. Accession deposited: Papua New Guinea, Decem- ber 15, 1975.
^Jarcotic Drugs
'rotocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118. Ratification deposited: Guatemala, December 9, 1975.
Scean Dumping
Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Wash- ington December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 1975. Proclaimed by the President: December 15, 1975.
Privileges and Immunities
Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Done at New York February 13, 1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for the United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900. Notification of succession : Papua New Guinea, December 4, 1975.
Safety at Sec
Convention on the international regulations for pre- venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.'
Instrument of acceptance signed by the President : December 12, 1975.
Amendment to chapter VI of the international con- vention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.' Instrument of acceptance signed by the President: December 15, 1975. Amendments to chapters II, III, IV and V of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London Novem- ber 20, 1973.'
Instrument of acceptance signed by the President : December 15, 1975.
Space
Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.
Accession deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- many, December 18, 1975 (applicable to Berlin (West)).
Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.' Signature: Poland, December 4, 1975.
Trade
Protocol of provisional application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force Janu- ary 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.
De facto application: Surinam, November 25, 1975.
BILATERAL
Australia
Treaty on extradition. Signed at Washington May 14, 1974.'
Instrument of ratification signed by the President : December 16, 1975.
Canada
Treaty on extradition, as amended by exchange of notes of June 28 and July 9, 1974. Signed at Wash- ington December 3, 1971.
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: December 12, 1975.
Iceland
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital. Signed at Reykjavik May 7, 1975. Entered into force December 26, 1975. Proclaimed by the President: December 12, 1975.
Poland
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to
Not in force.
{January 5, 1976
35
taxes on income, with related notes. Signed at Washington October 8, 1974."
Instrumeixt of ratification signed by the President : December 15, 1975. Agreement regarding fisheries in the northeastern Pacific Ocean ofl" the coast of the United States, with annexes and agreed minutes. Signed at Wash- ington December 16, 1975. Enters into force Janu- ary 1, 1976.
Romania
Convention with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington December 4, 1973.' Instrument of ratification signed by the President : December 15, 1975.
U.S.S.R.
Convention on matters of taxation, with related letters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973.' Senate advice and consent to ratification: Decem- ber 15, 1975. Convention on matters of taxation, with related letters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973.' Instrument of ratification signed by the President : December 17, 1975.
PUBLICATIONS
GPO Sales Publications
Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20U02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin- tendent of Docutnents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.
Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with El Salvador, TIAS 8104. 5 pp. 2bt (Cat. No. 89.10:8104).
Narcotic Drugs — Cooperative Arrangements to Curb Illegal Traffic. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8108. 19 pp. 40c'. (Cat. No. S9.10:8108).
' Not in force.
|
No. |
Date |
|
t607 |
12/15 |
|
t608 |
12/15 |
|
*609 |
12/15 |
*610 611
12/15 12/16
t612 12/16
t613 *614 *615
12/16 12/16 12/17
Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 15-21
Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
Snbject
Kissinger: remarks, Fiirth, F.R.G.
NATO ministerial meeting com- munique, Brussels, Dec. 12.
Learson sworn in as Ambassador at Large and Special Repre- sentative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference (biographic data).
Kissinger: arrival, Paris.
U.S. and Argentina establish bi- lateral working groups.
Kissinger: Conference on Inter- national Economic Cooperation, Paris.
U.S. and Poland sign new fish- eries agreement.
Kissinger: interview by ABC, CBS, NBC, Paris.
Shipping Coordinating Commit- tee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on radiocommu- nications, Jan. 15.
Study Groups 10 and 11 of the U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Con- sultative Committee (CCIR), Jan. 15.
Study Group 5 of the U.S. Na- tional Committee for the CCIR, Jan. 16.
Kissinger, MacEachen: remarks, Paris.
Kissinger, MacEachen: joint statement, Paris.
Davis sworn in as Ambassador to Switzerland (biographic data).
U.S. statement in response to announcement of U.K. import measures.
U.S., Canada, U.K., Japan, and the U.S.S.R. continue discus- sions on the Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pa- cific Fur Seals of 1957.
SCC, SOLAS, working group on subdivision and stability, Jan. 28.
Schaufele sworn in as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (biographic data).
*616 12/17
*617 12/17
|
*618 |
12/17 |
|
t619 |
12/17 |
|
*620 |
12/18 |
|
t621 |
12/18 |
t622 12/18
*«23 *624
12/18 12/19
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
36
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX January 5, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1906
Angola. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- ence of December 9 1
Argentina. U.S. and Argentina Establish Bi- lateral Working Groups 20
Congress
Department Discusses Grain Exports and Re- ser\'es Negotiations (Enders) 32
Polar Bear Conservation Agreement Trans- mitted to the Senate (message from Presi- dent Ford) 34
Disarmament. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- ference of December 9 1
Economic Affairs
Department Discusses Grain Exports and Re- serves Negotiations (Enders) 32
Three Aspects of U.S. Relations With Latin America (Rogers) 14
United States and Poland Hold Talks on North- eastern Pacific Fisheries (joint communique) 13
Environment. Polar Bear Conservation Agree- ment Transmitted to the Senate (message from President Ford) 34
Food. Department Discusses Grain Exports and Reserves Negotiations (Enders) 32
Intelligence. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- ference of December 9 1
Israel
U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel- Syria Sector Extended (Moynihan, text of resolution) 28
U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security Council Reso- lution Concerning Israeli Air Attacks in Lebanon (Moynihan, text of draft resolution) 21
Latin America. Three Aspects of U.S. Relations With Latin America (Rogers) 14
Lebanon. U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security Council Resolution Concerning Israeli Air Attacks in Lebanon (Moynihan, text of draft resolution) 21
Middle East
U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel- Syria Sector Extended (Moynihan, text of resolution) 28
U.S. Replies to Soviet Proposal on Middle East Peace Conference (text of U.S. note) ... 12
United States Urges Increase in Contributions to UNRWA (White, text of resolution) . . 30
U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security Council Reso- lution Concerning Israeli Air Attacks in Lebanon (Moynihan, text of draft resolution) 21
U.S. Votes Against General Assembly Resolu- tion on the Middle East (Bennett, text of resolution) 26
Military Affairs. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of December 9 1
Organization of American States. Three As- pects of U.S. Relations With Latin America (Rogers) 14
Panama. Three Aspects of U.S. Relations With Latin America (Rogers) 14
Poland. United States and Poland Hold Talks on Northeastern Pacific Fisheries (joint com- munique) 13
Presidential Documents. Polar Bear Conserva- tion Agreement Transmitted to the Senate . 34
Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 36
Refugees. United States Urges Increase in Contributions to UNRWA (White, text of resolution) 30
Science and Technology. U.S.- Yugoslav Board on Scientific and Technological Cooperation Meets (joint statement) 20
Syria. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel-Syria Sector Extended (Moynihan, text of resolution) 28
Treaty Information
Current Actions 34
Polar Bear Conservation Agreement Trans- mitted to the Senate (message from Presi- dent Ford) 34
U.S.S.R.
Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of December 9 1
U.S. Replies to Soviet Proposal on Middle East
Peace Conference (text of U.S. note) ... 12
United Nations
U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel- Syria Sector Extended (Moynihan, text of resolution) 28
United States Urges Increase in Contributions to UNRWA (White, text of resolution) . . 30
U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security Council Reso- lution Conceming Israeli Air Attacks in Lebanon (Moynihan, text of draft resolution) 21
U.S. Votes Against General Assembly Resolu- tion on the Middle East (Bennett, text of resolution) 26
Yugoslavia. U.S.-Yugoslav Board on Scientific and Technological Cooperation Meets (joint statement) 20
Name Index
Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 26
Enders, Thomas O 32
Ford, President 34
Kissinger, Secretary 1
Moynihan, Daniel P 21, 28
Rogers, William D 14
White, Barbara M 30
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXIV
No. 1907 • January 12, 1976
ENERGY, RAW MATERIALS, AND DEVELOPMENT: THE SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND
Statement by Secretary Kissinger and Text of Final Communique of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation 37
SECRETARY KISSINGER ATTENDS NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING 51
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETI^
Vol. LXXIV, No. 1907 January 12, 1976
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Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BVLLETU a weekly publication issued by tf Office of Media Services, Bureau < Public Affairs, provides tfie public at interested agencies of the governmei with information on developments • the field of U.S. foreign relations ai on the work of the Department ai the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes select press releases on foreign policy, issw by the White House and the Depat ment, and statements, addresst and news conferences of the Preside and the Secretary of State and oik officers of the Department, as well special articles on various phases international affairs and the functio of the Department. Information included concerning treaties and inte national agreements to which ti United States is or may become party and on treaties of general intt national interest. Publications of the Department State, United Nations documents, oi legislative material in the field international relations are also littt
lEnergy, Raw Materials, and Development: The Search for Common Ground
The Conference on International Eco- lomic Cooperation met at Paris December '6-19. Secretary Kissinger headed the U.S. ielegation December 16-17. Following is Secretary Kissinger's statement for the open- ng session of the conference on December '6, together ivith the text of the final coni- nunique of the conference.
TATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER
ress release 612 dated December 16: as prepared for delivery
The challenge of our time is to build a table and just international structure. This ask has two principal dimensions. There is he imperative of peace — the more traditional iroblems of building security, resolving con- licts, easing tensions. These issues dominate he agenda of relations between East and Vest. No less urgent is the imperative of ustice — the compelling requirements of lobal economic progress and social advance, ^hese are now the major issues in the rela- ionship between North and South. They, 00, carry the potential for either conflict or rder. Neither the goal of peace nor that of ocial justice can be achieved in isolation. Ve must succeed in both quests or we will ucceed in neither.
Social justice and economic progress are ur concerns at this conference. We meet lere to launch the dialogue that has been so iften urged and so long awaited. The con- ening of this meeting should itself be a eason for hope. For we believe it represents [i commitment to the path of conciliation. It jlemonstrates a recognition that consumer ind producer, industrial and agricultural, leveloped and developing, rich and poor, nust together address the challenges of the global economy.
anuary 12, 1976
The United States will work with dedica- tion and energy for a positive outcome. We will do so in our own self-interest and in the interest of a more just and prosperous com- munity of nations. We will do our utmost to help mobilize the world's resources and the talents of men and women everywhere in the service of economic progress and common well-being.
In the past two years we have all learned that no nation or group of nations can solve its economic problems in isolation. In a world which is becoming increasingly interdepend- ent, we have witnessed that inflation and recession affect us all. We have seen that no country can achieve redress by exporting its economic difficulties or by exacting an exorbi- tant economic price from others.
But our deepest challenge is political. Eco- nomic distress magnifies the problems of gov- ernment in all our countries, clouding the prospects of social peace and democratic in- stitutions. We have seen that national eco- nomic problems thus become international; they spawn clashes of interest and protec- tionist pressures that strain the fabric of collaboration even among traditional friends. We have all come to understand that, if un- resolved, the competing claims of developed and developing, consumer and producer, will thwart any effort to build a stable and pro- gressive international structure.
Our future depends now not on blind eco- nomic forces, but on choices that statesmen make. The world's nations can struggle in national or ideological contention — or they can acknowledge their interdependence and act out of a sense of community. The United States has chosen the path of cooperation.
The United States, as the world's strongest economy, has demonstrated its resilience;
37
we are on the road to recovery. We might best survive any new round of economic war- fare. But it is my country's conviction that tests of strength benefit no nation. The ap- proach that we took at the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly in September reflects our vision of a more posi- tive future.
The special session reached consensus on an impressive range of economic problems. This commitment to cooperation can become a benchmark in human affairs — if its spirit is carried forward. We owe our people solu- tions, not slogans. So let us set to work. Let us implement the consensus of the special session and take up its unfinished tasks. Let us make this conference a decisive step to- ward their achievement.
The Road to This Conference
We are here because two years ago the international structure was gravely tested by a crisis in energy. No problem on the international agenda is more crucial to the world economy. As this conference demon- strates, it has led us to a much broader con- sideration of the range of related issues.
The unprecedented expansion of the global economy in the decades since World War II relied upon the plentiful supply of energy at reasonable prices. It produced economic growth, fostered industrialization, and en- couraged development in every quarter of the globe.
Thus the energy crisis — caused by a com- bination of the 1973 embargo and the fivefold increase in the price of oil — has dealt a seri- ous blow to global stability and prosperity.
Inflation, recession, and payments balances significantly worsened in all the industrial- ized world and in those developing nations which had realized substantial progress toward industrialization. The poorest of the developing countries, struggling to make modest steps toward progress, were dealt the cruelest blow of all. Their hopes for growth were, and continue to be, thwarted. Their development planning has been dis- rupted. Even their agricultural production has been undermined by the increased cost
of petrochemical fertilizers. For the vasi majority of the developing world, economi( justice was poorly served.
In response to the energy crisis, the Unitec States sought first to reach a consensu; among the industrialized nations. We workec together to assure basic security agains future arbitrary disruptions in oil supply an( against potential oil-induced financial difii culties. We pledged ourselves to long-tern cooperation in energy conservation and th' development of alternative energy supplies We agreed not to resort to protectionis measures; and we began unprecedented co operation in our economic policies, as drama tized by the recent economic summit i Rambouillet.
These actions were not taken in a spirit o confrontation. Most are prudent steps of sell protection which have effect only if cor frontation is provoked by others. Other involve an urgent program for the develoj ment of alternative sources to the benefit c all.
But the collaboration of the industrii countries has always been conceived as onl part of a larger program for economic proj ress. From the beginning, we have foresee an effort to develop a constructive dialogt leading to close and mutually beneficial lonj term economic ties with oil-producing natior — so that our investment and technical su] port would contribute to their developmei and their prosperity would contribute to th worldwide expansion of trade and develo] ment. We recognize that the only durab' basis for constructive relations is an ec(' nomic system which fosters the prosperit of all. Each of us has a stake in the progrej of others.
Last April, at the invitation of the Pres dent of France, we agreed to begin this di: cussion. The industrial nations wanted 1 focus on energy. The oil-producing and oth( i developing nations wanted to give equ^ priority to a wider range of developmei issues, including prices and markets f( other raw materials, and to international 1 nancial questions. The industrial nations r garded these issues as too varied and comple to be addressed effectively in a single forur
38
Department of State Bulleti
Tie April preparatory conference failed to r:oncile these positions.
To demonstrate its desire for a construc- te and cooperative solution the United Bites worked closely with other participants ;i developing a mutually satisfactory ar- Mgement: energy, the concerns of the less i /eloped countries about raw materials, i/elopment, and related financial matters vuld be addressed as part of a discussion ):global economic problems, while maintain- i: enough distinction between them for a jiful dialogue.
The United States is committed to a seri- )■; and wide-ranging program of cooperation \h the developing world. My country ilerstands full well, and has shown in its my proposals, that this dialogue must en- mpass issues of concern to all sides — in- ;! ding the needs of the many nations not in 1 endance here. For us, this clearly requires I iscussion of the effects of energy prices )i the world economy. For cooperation de- )• ds on mutual respect, mutual understand- I, and mutual benefit.
"'o this end, at the seventh special session )1 the U.N. General Assembly three months H; the United States made a series of pro- X als in several areas :
-To insure the economic security of de- /oping countries against shortfalls in ex- it t earnings, food shortages, and natural ii isters ;
-To accelerate their economic growth by r)roving their access to capital markets, :€inology, and foreign investment;
-To better the conditions of trade and nestment in key commodities on which nny of their economies are dependent and x;et an example in the vital area of food ;
-To improve the world trading system ti make it better serve development goals, u; realize through the multilateral trade Kotiations a strengthening of developing- ■cntry participation; and
-To address the especially urgent needs lithe poorest countries devastated by cur- rtjt economic conditions.
I^he seventh special session ended on a Q'ie of conciliation and cooperation. The
Wuary 12, 1976
spirit of the session was carried forward to the October preparatory conference in Paris, where the declaration laid the basis for our meeting today.
This will be the attitude of the United States here. Progress has been made in many areas, and this conference must move us for- ward.
The Work of the Commissions
The four commissions that this conference is establishing have much work before them :
— The Commission on Energy should pro- mote an effective world balance between energy demand and supply. It should work for practical cooperation among industrial- ized and developing countries to develop new energy supplies. And it should lay the foun- dations of a mutually beneficial long-term relationship between energy producers and consumers.
— The Commission on Raw Materials should work to establish the conditions for stable longrun supplies of raw materials vital to global progress at prices that are remunerative to producers and fair to con- sumers.
— The Commission on Development should strive to accelerate economic development in all nations, especially the poorest. In par- ticular, it should bring together industrial nations and oil-wealthy nations to provide financial support for the development initia- tives of the U.N. special session.
— The Commission on Finance should ad- dress financial issues as they relate to the work of the other three commissions. It should seek to strengthen the sense of shared financial responsibility for the health and growth of the international economy.
With a cooperative approach, the commis- sions can give direction and impetus to re- lated activity in other forums and organiza- tions, under whose jurisdiction a number of these issues fall. They can serve as clearing- houses for information and motivate other organizations doing similar work. They can identify areas where necessary work is not
39
being done and devise new initiatives where needed.
The United States will support progress on a broad range of topics in the context of the four commissions. But we have a special interest in the following areas:
— First, the price of oil and the security of oil supply as they affect the international economy ;
— Second, the serious balance-of-payments problems of developing countries ;
— Third, the conditions of international in- vestment ;
— Fourth, the issues of key commodities, especially food ;
— Fifth, the problems of trade; and
— Sixth, the urgent needs of the poorest countries.
Let me discuss each of these in turn.
Energy
First, energy. The application of science and technology to tap the vast energy poten- tial imprisoned beneath the earth, radiated by the sun, generated by the movement of wind and water across the earth's surface, or locked in the core of matter is fundamental to the hopes of millions to pull themselves above a bare struggle for existence. For the expansion of the global economy for both developed and developing countries depends heavily on our harnessing and efficiently employing the world's energy resources.
Some nations are particularly well en- dowed with these resources; some have the scientific and technological expertise to ex- plore and utilize that potential. The inter- national flow of energy, investment capital required to produce it, and goods produced from fuels have become in effect a global energy system which sustains all our econo- mies. Only through international coopera- tion can all nations benefit from these processes and can the world economy harness its energy resources most effectively.
The United States is committed to a co- operative approach. We have much to offer. We have produced more energy than any other nation in the history of mankind, our
energy science and technology are the mc ; advanced, and we have tremendous potent I for future energy development in our coi'- try and abroad. The United States also h; much to gain from cooperation. Our ener- needs are the world's largest; our ability i raise living standards for all our citiz€; depends on greater energy production a I the more efficient use of energy resources This dialogue and this conference hf ; these tasks:
— First, it is time to reach a common ev ■ uation of the relationship between changes i energy prices and the stability and perfor ■ ance of the world economy.
The abrupt and arbitrary increase in 1 s price of oil has been a major factor in ra i of inflation and unemployment unpreceden I since the 1930's. It has led to serious balan • of-payments deficits, indirectly throi i global recession and directly through hig! • priced imports.
By extraordinary eft'ort, the indust 1 countries, on the whole, put their payme 5 back in balance over the last year, althoi i at a high cost to the well-being of tl r peoples. Thus the immediate burden of ; massive petrodollar deficit is now bo ; largely by the developing countries wh i have little or no oil resources.
Developing countries, by definition, tent ) have less of a margin to reduce consumpt , to restructure energy use, or to shift 5 alternative sources when the oil price ri; . They are the most vulnerable — and the ir t wounded.
A lower oil price would make possible m e rapid economic recovery around the gk !. It would assist the developing countries 1 easing their enormous balance-of -payme s burden and their debt burden and increas % foreign demand for their exports. A lo' r price, along with stability of supply, wod also benefit producer nations over the I'k term by easing the urgency for consum g countries to develop alternative supy sources.
Conversely, any further increase in pri3 would seriously hamper economic recov('. retard international trade, compound the i-
40
Department of State Bull
nal difficulties of many countries, weaken ability of the advanced nations to assist developing, and strain the fabric of inter- ncional cooperation.
!t is time for a serious discussion of this isue. We are prepared to make a sustained elDrt to achieve understanding.
-Second, we must collaborate to find new
ices of energy and intensify our conser- ■ ion efforts. All consuming countries, de- vtoped and developing, must use energy ■nre efficiently and develop more abundant snplies. Producers need to prepare their scnomies for the day when they will have ajiausted their easily accessible oil reserves.
ndividually, the industrialized countries ii accelerating the development of their m energy sources. The United States is de- I'oping its conventional fuels and also new screes, including nuclear power, to replace ''c^il fuels. We have committed massive re- screes to research and devoted our best :a'nts to this effort; we expect it to result m substantial increase in U.S. energy pro- lition. In Europe, major efforts have been a iched along the same lines, with the N' "th Sea as the most dramatic example )f he potential. The development of alterna- ;i'' energy sources is vital.
II the near future, the industrial countries ■V take the first steps toward welding these liional programs into a coherent cooperative 3rgram. These programs are designed to Jimote conservation and to accelerate the Uelopment of alternative energy supplies -hjugh large-scale joint projects and coop- er tion in research and development. We will leionstrate our commitment to the maxi- nm development of new energy by agree- i^ not to permit imported oil to be sold in )i internal markets below a common mini- um safeguard price.
'his effort will bring a better balance to :h world energy market. But as it gathers aiport, it will bring important benefits to ''eloping as well as industrial countries.
■ programs that the industrial countries undertaking, and those that many de- oping countries have within their poten- 1 to undertake, can lead to additional and rojre secure supplies of energy, which can
be a spur to their prosperity and develop- ment. All nations will have access to a larger pool of energy resources, and there will be less competition for oil. The efforts of de- veloping countries to increase their own pro- duction of energy, if supported, can be the single most important step they take to secure their development for future genera- tions.
At the seventh special session of the Gen- eral Assembly, the United States proposed an International Energy Institute. Through such an organization, the developed coun- tries and OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] can assist poorer developing nations to utilize energy more efficiently, increase their own produc- tion, and improve allocation and distribution of existing resources. It could identify cur- rent or new energy technologies most rele- vant to their special needs. The institute can help oil-producing countries to improve the use of their own energy.
Using the most advanced techniques of analysis, the institute could help assess all countries' energy resources and require- ments. Staffed by experts drawn from gov- ernment, industry, and academic life in both industrialized and developing countries, it could provide training for local and regional technicians or specialists in energy problems. It could become a central point of contact where policymakers and experts could ex- change ideas on plans and programs.
We see the institute as a first bridge be- tween the massive effort the industrialized countries have now launched to develop al- ternative sources of energy and the effort which the developing countries must now undertake.
In addition, the United States has sug- gested a number of other means by which the talents and experience of the developed nations, collectively and individually, can as- sist developing states to find and exploit new energy sources and conserve their national patrimony. We will advance these proposals in the Energy Commission. We anticipate a full exchange of views on their scope and substance.
Oil producers and nations with the tech-
J«i|oary 12, 1976
41
nology to help develop oil resources share an interest in cooperation on conservation and exploration. But this cooperation will be easier to forge in a stable energy market with a more appropriate structure of energy prices.
— Third, the United States seeks a greater participation and contribution of the oil- producing countries in the international economy. With the extraordinary transfer of wealth that has taken place, it is in the common interest that the oil-producing na- tions be constructive members, not challen- gers, of the world economic system, that in- vestment and the latest technology be made available to them on a reimbursable basis for their development programs, and that the flow of goods and services be enhanced between producing and consuming countries.
We believe that these three issues — a better understanding of the effects of oil price increases on the world economy; coop- eration on conservation and new production ; and the orderly integration of OPEC econo- mies into the global economy — are priority tasks for the energy forum.
Balance of Payments
The balance-of-payments problems of de- veloping countries are an immediate and urgent task for this conference to address, closely related to the energy issue. Current projections indicate that the developing world in 1976 will be collectively in deficit by about $35 billion. Bilateral and multilat- eral aid, along with direct investment, will finance roughly $25 billion of this. The ques- tion is whether borrowing from international capital markets can again this year make up the remainder. If not, some countries will be forced to reduce imports, cut back de- velopment programs, and further mortgage their future. The deficits of the developing countries thus could endanger not only their own well-being but also the stability of the international trade and financial system.
A multitude of ideas and proposals are al- ready before us. Let us address steps that can be taken now.
— First, the members of the IMF [Inte national Monetary Fund] should prompt agree on the details of the Trust Fund whi( the United States has proposed to furni; concessional financing for the poorest cou tries. It would provide these countries a ditional resources of $l-$2 billion a ye£ using the profits from IMF gold sales as w as national contributions. We are well on t way to resolving outstanding issues on IIV gold; let us take final action on the Tru Fund in January.
- — Second, the members of the IMF shoi complete negotiations next month on t new development security facility. T United States made this major proposal provide more substantial financing to cot tries facing temporary shortfalls in expc earnings due to the world business cy or commodity fluctuations. We proposed tl on September 1 ; its realization in Janua would be an impressive demonstration international resolve and responsiveness.
— Third, the IMF should approve a oi third increase in member quotas, thus ( panding its potential financing for all me bers.
Final approval can and must be taken each of these proposals at the meeting the IMF Interim Committee in Jamaica early January. Together with substani unused regular drawings still available < developing countries, these measures \ I add significantly to the capacity of deveL" ing countries to sustain their needed impo I and their development programs.
But however substantial these faciliti , they may not be enough. Once the Tn ; Fund and these other proposals have b(i implemented in January, we must determ i how best to respond to the remaining ):■ ance-of -payments problems of the develop) ! countries. The United States is committed ) finding a constructive solution.
Our specific response will depend in pt on whether there is a general across-t- board financing problem or one concentr- ing on a few countries. One promising ■ proach would be to expand the credit tU developing countries can draw from the II'' by liberalizing the rules governing access J
42
Department of State Bulled
regular IMF resources. The IMF Board could, for example, increase the size of each credit drawing, base them on expanded new quotas, or add a new drawing beyond those now available. Decisions on such proposals will aeed to be based on close analysis of their jffect on the financial integrity of the IMF. Secretary [of the Treasury William E.] 5imon will present our analysis and pro- posals for increased use of the IMF at the nterim Committee meeting.
We cannot emphasize enough the need for mmediate action in this area to supplement he long-term proposals which have already )een made. The responsibility does not lie vith the industrialized countries alone. We annot be expected to bear the major bur- lens for remedying balance-of -payments iroblems in which the actions of others play uch a significant role. There is a collective bligation to act; there must be a joint pro- :ram involving the industrialized as well s the oil-producing countries.
ivestment and Technology for Development
The balance-of-payments deficits of the eveloping countries will perhaps moderate s the global economy recovers from reces- ion. But sustained economic growth re- uires the continuous application of capital, echnology, and management skills to de- elopment needs.
Private investment has always been a lajor factor in the growth of the global econ- my. My own country has benefited from oreign investment throughout its history, "oday more than ever, the developing coun- ries need this capital in addition to the mited supply of official development assist- nce.
To make this possible, governments of eveloping countries need better access to /orld capital markets. The United States as urged that technical assistance and ex- lertise be provided to developing countries hat are ready to enter long-term private apital markets for the first time. We have (iroposed a major expansion of the resources 'if the World Bank's International Finance 'orporation (IFC) to strengthen the private
anuary 12, 1976
sector in developing countries and to enhance their international competitiveness for pri- vate capital. We have recommended crea- tion of an international investment trust to mobilize private portfolio capital for invest- ment in local enterprises. And we are con- tributing to the work of the IMF-World Bank Development Committee to assist in removing impediments to developing coun- tries' access to capital markets.
But we also believe that one of the most important vehicles for transferring capital, technology, and management skills to where they are most needed is private enterprise. There simply is not enough governmental capital available. Because of ideological con- siderations, these private enterprises oper- ate in an investment climate increasingly clouded by unpredictable national legislation and uncertain rules of the game.
In this environment everybody suffers. Host countries are deprived of the capital resources, technology, and management which these enterprises uniquely provide, as well as a source of tax revenue. Home countries are deprived of the overseas markets, investment income, and the new ideas and techniques which come with foreign contact. And the enterprises them- selves are squeezed at both ends, making overseas investment less worthwhile for them and reducing their contribution to home and host country alike and to the global product.
The United States has taken an active part in international eff'orts to facilitate inter- national investment on a basis that serves the interests of all parties. We are willing to explore voluntary guidelines for the be- havior of both transnational enterprises and governments. At the United Nations I stated four basic principles that should be included :
— Transnational enterprises must obey local law and refrain from unlawful interven- tion in the domestic affairs of host coun- tries.
— Host governments must treat these en- terprises equitably, without discrimination among them, and in accordance with inter- national law.
— Both governments and businesses must
43
respect the contractual obligations they free- ly undertake.
— Principles for transnational enterprises should apply to domestic enterprises where relevant.
But efforts should not be limited to gen- eral guidelines for investment. Other re- medial measures are possible.
Taxation is one such area. Because they operate in multiple jurisdictions, transna- tional enterprises may sometimes be subject to either double taxation or inappropriate tax incentives. The result in either case is that investment patterns are distorted. We must find ways to enable both host and home countries to coordinate their tax policies and make them more equitable to each other and to productive enterprises.
A second area for improvement is inter- governmental consultation on investment disputes. This is especially important to de- veloping countries whose progress is depend- ent on a climate conducive to an adequate flow of investment. It is time to develop generally accepted international rules for the settlement of investment disputes and the arbitration of differences and other guide- lines for dealing with problems arising be- tween governments and enterprises. The United States recommends that the World Bank's International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes be given a greater role in solving important investment contro- versies.
International assistance for development must also focus on the advancement, selec- tion, and application of modern technology. Many countries in the developing world are already on the path of industrialization. They have proved their capacity to take advantage of the vast storehouse of modern technology. The United States encourages this endeavor. We have long been in the fore- front of the effort to train more managers, technicians, and researchers in the develop- ing countries to carry this forward.
Most technology transfer takes place through international investment and the operations of transnational entei-prises on a licensing, equity, or contract basis. The United States understands the concern of
44
many developing countries not to become the repository of obsolescent technology. Tech- nology must be suited to local needs, the terms and conditions must be mutually ac- ceptable, and it must be effectively managed and utilized. Developing countries must be enabled to make their own informed choices of foreign or domestic technology, to adapt it to their own needs and conditions, and to manage its application skillfully. This tech- nology transfer requires the development of human capabilities — the management and skills that constitute the infrastructure of technological development.
People — their training and their place- ment in a country's management systems- are the key to making technology a produc- ing resource. International cooperation car make no greater contribution to develop- ment than to foster the training of a corps of specialists in each country competent tc select, bargain for, and manage technologies We see this requirement as an importani topic for consideration by the Commission or Development, and we will make concret( proposals to this end.
Commodities
A healthy global economy requires tha both producers and consumers find protec tion against the cycle of raw materials sur plus and shortage which chokes growth am disrupts planning. We must insure mon reliable supplies of vital commodities oi terms fair to all. j
The problem is most urgent in food, man kind's most critical need. The cycles of feas | and famine, widely fluctuating prices of basi foodstuffs, and breakdowns in the system o storage and transportation continue to af flict mankind. These show few signs of abat ing. And in the long run, growth in demani | for food threatens to outrun the expansioi of supply.
As the world's largest producer and e» porter of food, the United States recognize its special responsibility. At home, we hav' been committed to policies of maximum foo( production and have removed all productioi restraints ; internationally, we have propose< a system of grain reserves to help moderat
Department of State Bulletiit
fluctuations in world prices and supplies.
We believe that our grain reserves pro- posal can be a model for cooperation on other commodity problems. It takes into account the interests of producers and consumers. It makes special provision for the concerns of developing countries. Its reliance on buffer stocks minimizes the distortion of trade and improves the efficiency of the market. We nowf await the cooperation and commitment 3f others to help implement this proposal.
Most importantly, we are increasing our assistance to developing countries — not nerely for short-term relief but to help them 300st their own agricultural production. Our jilateral aid programs in this area have )een expanded greatly. We also strongly iupport the proposal first made by oil-export- ng countries for an International Fund for Agricultural Development. We have an- lounced our willingness to make a contribu- ion of $200 million, or one-fifth of the world- vide goal of $1 billion.
Other commodities are of critical impor- ance to many countries, either as producers >r consumers. Many developing countries lepend crucially on earnings from commod- ty exports to lift their people above subsist- ■nce levels, to support basic social programs, ind to finance the beginnings of industriali- ation. The solution to commodity issues will ffect not only the developing countries but .Iso the industrial countries — who are in act the largest producers, consumers, and xporters of commodities. The economies of 11 countries are affected by the instabilities f the market — the vulnerability of agricul- ural commodities to the vagaries of weather nd shifts in world demand, the sensitivity if agricultural and mineral markets to fluc- uations in the business cycle in industrial ountries, and the higher prices of critical nergy imports. At the seventh special session a consensus vas achieved that commodity issues should )e approached cooperatively. The U.S. posi- ion is that a realistic and constructive ap- iroach will require that we:
— Establish producer-consumer forums or discussions of key commodities; — Reduce obstacles to producers' access to
markets and to consumers' access to sup- plies ;
— -Rely more on buffer stocks, where fea- sible and necessary, in preference to restric- tions on trade and production ;
— Improve the productivity and market- ability of agricultural raw materials; and
— Expand worldwide production capacity in other key commodities.
We now stand ready to cooperate in estab- lishing producer-consumer forums to discuss copper, bauxite, and other commodities. We plan to address the question of supply and mai'ket access in the multilateral trade ne- gotiations in the next several months. We have proposed that the IFC and the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)] make available increased financing for mineral development and look forward to progress in the near fu- ture. We plan to support the U.N. Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration. Finally, we have proposed establishment of an organization to finance and coordinate research on nonfood tropical products to im- prove their productivity and competitiveness.
We look forward to additional discussion of these measures in the Raw Materials Com- mission of this conference.
Trade
An expanding and more open international trading system is a principal factor in the growth and development of both developed and developing nations. We are committed to the strengthening of this system so it can better serve the needs of the international community and include importantly the de- veloping nations.
Trade enables nations to earn their own way. It is most consistent with national dig- nity and with the efficiency of the economic system.
Over the last five years, in a major step of international cooperation, all the major in- dustrial nations have committed themselves to establish a generalized system of tariff preferences, giving developing countries bet- ter access to the markets of all industrial nations.
January 12, 1976
45
The United States will implement its gen- eralized system of preferences in two weeks' time. Under this system we will eliminate duties on 2,724 tariff items, representing some 19 percent of dutiable non-oil imports from eligible countries in 1974. This will open up significant potential new markets for the products of developing countries in the United States.
Tropical products are a promising area of export expansion for many developing coun- tries. The international trading system should encourage this expansion. In the mul- tilateral trade negotiations in Geneva, work is beginning on a package of tariff conces- sions on tropical products for early imple- mentation. We attach much importance to this effort.
Tariff escalation — the process by which tariffs are progressively increased on goods as they move higher on the ladder of process- ing— is an obstacle to the exports and in- dustrialization of many developing countries. At the U.N. special session, we proposed that reduction, or in some cases elimination, of tariff escalation be an important goal for the multilateral trade negotiations. The ef- fort to identify and negotiate specific changes will begin next year.
This effort, however, is related in our view to the issue of access to supply of raw mate- rials. Consumers cannot be expected to im- prove access to their markets for finished products if they face restrictions on supplies of related raw materials. Thus the Geneva negotiations must also improve access to supply as well as access to markets.
Reducing or eliminating nontariff barriers to trade is another major task facing the international trading community. We will make a particular effort to negotiate special and differential treatment for developing countries in this area.
An improved and strengthened world trad- ing system would not be complete, however, if it did not insure greater sharing by de- veloping countries of both benefits and re- sponsibilities. Developing countries should gradually take on the normal obligations of
reciprocity and trade rules as they progress.
The multilateral trade negotiations are the most effective forum for pursuing all these objectives.
The United States put forward proposals in many of these areas at the recent meet- ing of the Trade Negotiations Committee in Geneva as goals for 1976. The developing countries will also benefit from progress in all other areas of the negotiations, which we now hope will be completed in 1977.
The United States is committed to a role of leadership in the multilateral trade nego- tiations. We will seek rapid progress for the benefit of both developing and developed countries. I believe that this conference and its relevant commissions should endorse the work of the multilateral trade negotiations. It should provide continued support for the negotiations by monitoring and contributing ideas to the work in Geneva.
Global Poverty
Our deliberations here must address the plight of the one-quarter of mankind whose lives are overwhelmed by poverty and hun- ger and numbed by insecurity and despair This group has suffered immeasurably froir high prices of food and fuel. Their export revenues have been seriously undermined by global recession.
In these regions less than one person ir five is literate; one baby in ten dies in child- hood, and in some areas closer to one out oi two; life expectancy is less than 50 years; and birth rates continue to be intolerably high. Public expenditures for education and health care are low — and their per capita income has been declining for the last four years.
And so today, alongside the Third World with its increasing power and assertiveness^ there has come into being a fourth world; where human beings still struggle for bare existence.
In one international conference after another, we have all pointed to the fourth world with sincere intentions of giving im-
46
Department of State Bulletin'
mediate help, providing long-term assistance, and devising special arrangements. We have agreed that this is a major test of a just international structure. It is time for all of us here to act on our words. Three areas need immediate action:
— First, many of the poorest cannot fi- nance balance-of-payments deficits because they cannot gain access to capital markets )r because of high interest rates on what ittle finance they can obtain. The Trust ?'und which the United States proposed in ;he IMF to provide up to $2 billion for ;mergency relief is of special benefit to them. !iet us reach a consensus to create this Trust ^und at next month's IMF meeting in Famaica.
— The second area for immediate action s food aid. No obligation is more basic than lur insuring that the poorest are fed. This iscal year the United States expects to pro- •ide more than 6 million tons of food aid — r more than 60 percent of the 10-million-ton rlobal target set by the World Food Confer- nce and a 20 percent increase over last ear's contribution. Others must donate heir fair share.
— Third, the poorest countries need pref- rential and expanded access to oflicial con- essionary financial aid. The United States /ill do its part. More than 70 percent of our ilateral development assistance now goes 0 low-income countries. The concessional nancing of the international financial insti- utions should also be expanded. At the eventh special session, my government ledged to support the fifth IDA [Inter- ational Development Association] replen- 5hment and the regional development banks. Ve are making every effort to secure con- ressional appropriations for funds already ommitted. We hope that the traditional and ew donors will help the poorest through nancial contributions to both bilateral and multilateral programs.
Let us urgently rededicate ourselves to ction on behalf of the poorest among us. iuch action is the responsibility of the entire
world community — not just the industrial countries but also the more affluent in the developing world. While no one commission will be dealing with the totality of problems of the fourth world, each commission has a responsibility to be conscious of the need for special consideration for the poorest.
Conclusion
Ladies and gentlemen: The nations and economies of the world are many; our dif- ferences are great. But our reasons for pull- ing together are far greater. Therefore our dialogue here must be candid, but with a positive spirit and cooperative attitude. The prosperity, the progress, and indeed the security of the world may depend upon whether we succeed in finding realistic answers to the kinds of problems before us at this conference. For lasting peace around the globe will depend not only on containing conflict but mounting progress. It requires not merely the preservation of stability but the fulfillment of human aspirations.
The issues we face are often technical, but their implications could not be more pro- found. They go to the heart of our future. Only rarely in history does mankind con- sciously swing out from familiar, well- marked paths to move in new directions. Only rarely does humanity comprehend as clearly as we do today that change is immi- nent and that the direction to be taken is subject to human decision. The nations of the world face such an opportunity now.
We have the possibility of forging inter- national relationships that will govern world affairs for the next several decades. We can bring together developed and developing, producer and consumer, in common endeav- ors— or we can go our separate ways, with every one of us paying the price for a lack of vision in lower standards of living and increased international tensions. Mutual interest should bring us together; only blind- ness can keep us apart.
The American people have always believed in a world of conciliation rather than a world
lanuary 12, 1976
47
ruled by intimidation, pressure, or force. My country, in spite of its own strengths and advantages, has chosen the path of cooper- ation. We will remain committed to that path. But we cannot travel it alone; others will have to join us. All of us here must base our policies on the reality that we have a practical and moral stake in each other's well-being.
I am confident of our cooperation and of our success. The result will be a fair and prosperous world economy of benefit to all nations, and with it new hope, opportunity, and justice for all peoples.
TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE '
1. The Conference on International Economic Co- operation met in Paris at ministerial level, from December 16 to December 19. Representatives of the following 27 members of the Conference took part; Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cameroon. Canada, EEC [European Economic Community], Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia. The ministerial repre- sentatives who attended the conference welcomed the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. The work of the Conference was opened by H. E. the President of the French Republic, Mr. Valery Giscard d'Estaing.
3. The Hon. Allan J. MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, and Dr. Manuel Perez-Guerrero, Minister of State for International Economic Affairs of Venezuela, co-chairmen of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, presided at the ministerial meeting.
4. The ministerial representatives at the Confer- ence expressed their views with regard to the inter- national economic situation. They made suggestions as to how the problems which they had identified might be resolved. Attention was drawn to the plight of the most seriously affected countries. They recognized that the Conference on International Economic Cooperation provides a unique opportunity to address these problems and to further interna- tional economic cooperation for the benefit of all countries and peoples.
5. The Conference decided to initiate an intensified
international dialogue. To this end, it establishes four Commissions (on energy, raw materials, de velopment and financial affairs) which will mee periodically through the coming year. It was agree that each of the four Commissions would consist o fifteen members, ten of them representing develop ing countries, five of them representing industrial ized countries.
6. The Commissions shall start their work on Fel ruary 11, 1976. Preparation for the work of the fou commissions shall be reviewed at a meeting of th co-chairmen of the Conference and of the four Con missions after consultation with the other partic pants in the Conference. This meeting will tak place on January 26, 1976 within the framework ( the general guidelines contained in paragraphs 10-1 of the final declaration of the Second Preparator Meeting which are approved by the Conference.'
7. The Conference agreed that the following pai ticipants should serve on the Commissions:
— Energy: Algeria, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, EE( India, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Saudi Arabi; Switzerland, United States, Venezuela, Zaire.
— Raw materials: Argentina, Australia, Cameroo EEC, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Spai United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambi
— Development: Algeria, Argentina, Cameroo Canada, EEC, India, Jamaica, Japan, Nigeria, Pak stan, Peru, Sweden, United States, Yugoslavia, Zair
— Finance: Brazil, EEC, Egypt, India, Indonesi Iran, Iraq, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, Saudi Arabi Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Zambia.
The co-chairmen of the Commissions will be:
— Energy: Saudi Arabia and United States. — Raw materials: Japan and Peru. .
— Development: Algeria and EEC. |
— Finance: EEC and Iran.
Joint meetings of the co-chairmen of the Conferen and of the Commissions may be held if the nei arises.
8. It was agreed that members of the Conferen^ who wish to follow the work of a Commission which they do not belong should be entitled to a point a representative in the capacity of audit without the right to speak.
9. The Conference decided that a number of inte governmental functional organizations which a directly concerned with the problems to be consider! would be able to make a useful contribution to the consideration. It therefore invited these organizatioi (United Nations Secretariat, OPEC, lEA, UNCTAl OECD, FAO, GATT, UNDP, UNIDO, IMF, IBR:
'Issued at Paris on Dec. 19 (unofficial text).
- For text of the final declaration of the secoi preparatory meeting issued at Paris on Oct. 16, 197 see Bulletin of Nov. 10, 1975, p. 668.
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Department of State Bulleti
SELA) ' to be represented on a permanent basis in :he relevant commissions. Their observers will have ;he right to speak but not the right to vote and lence will not participate in the formation of a con- sensus. Each commission may, in addition, invite ippropriate intergovernmental functional organiza- ions to participate as observers ad hoc in the exami- lation of specific questions.
10. The Conference decided to establish an inter- national secretariat with an exclusively administra- ive and technical function on the basis of proposals i)ut forward by the two co-chairmen. It named Mr. Jernard Guitton [of France] as head of the secre- ariat and approved plans for its organization and perational procedures. The financial costs arising irom the establishment of the secretariat and from uture meetings of the Conference will be borne by lembers of the Conference on the basis of a formula greed by the Conference.
11. It was agreed that the four Commissions hould meet in Paris. Subsequent meetings of the ommissions will be convened by their co-chairmen.
12. One or several meetings of the Conference at le level of government officials may be held at ■ast six months after this ministerial meeting. The [inisterial Conference agreed to meet again at min- iterial level in about twelve months time.
13. The Conference adopted the rules of procedure ^commended by the Preparatory Meeting which re based on the principle of consensus, according to hich decisions and recommendations are adopted hen the chair has established that no member dele- ation has made any objection. English, Arabic, panish and French are the official and working nguages of the Conference. The rules of procedure pply to all the bodies of the Conference.
14. The Conference took note of the resolution of le General Assembly entitled "Conference on Inter- itional Economic Cooperation" (Resolution 3515 ICXX)) and agreed to make reports available to le 31st session of the U.N. General Assembly.
15. The members of the Conference paid special ibute to President Giscard d'Estaing for the action ! had taken to bring about the dialogue which is )w engaged and expressed their warm appreciation ' the Government of France for its hospitality and ir the efforts and obligations it had undertaken in •der to make the Ministerial Conference a success.
''Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; iternational Energy Agency; United Nations Con- iirence on Trade and Development; Organization for iconomic Cooperation and Development; Food and griculture Organization; General Agreement on ariffs and Trade; United Nations Development Pro- ram; United Nations Industrial Development Or- mization; International Monetary Fund; Interna- onal Bank for Reconstruction and Development; atin America Economic System.
anuary 12, 1976
The Common Challenge in the Search for an Enduring Peace
Folloiving are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger at Fuerth, Federal Republic of Germany, on December 15 upon accepting Fuerth's Gold Medal for Distinguished Na- tive Citizens.
Press release 607 dated December 15
Mr. Foreign Minister, Mr. Minister-Presi- dent, Mr. Lord Mayor, distinguished guests, friends: This is not the first time in the last 35 years that I have paid a sentimental visit to Fuerth. I enjoyed a brief but warm stay in 1959. I have often exchanged letters with your distinguished Lord Mayor and his prede- cessor and have been encouraged and strengthened by their good wishes in many periods of my public life. When the honor I am now receiving was first offered to me, I accepted with pleasure.
I am proud to be here as the Secretary of State of perhaps the only country in the world where it is possible for an adopted son to have the opportunity for responsibility and service that I have enjoyed. I am happy to share this occasion with my family, my parents, who have never lost their attach- ment to this city in which they spent the greater part of their lives. I believe that my visit here exemplifies the extraordinary re- birth of friendship between the American people and the German people.
This is why the central role in this event of my colleague and friend Hans-Dietrich Genscher means so much to me. The partner- ship that he and I carry out every day in international affairs is given a deeper quality by the personal affection and comradeship that exists between us.
Our generation has witnessed — and has no excuse ever to forget — the dark force of brutality and raw power at large in the mod- ern world. As I stand here today, suffering is still dominant in many parts of the globe. Of all the species on this planet, man alone has inflicted on himself the great part of his own anguish.
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Yet our generation, more than any other, also has the possibility and indeed the im- perative of something better. We live in a world of some 150 sovereign nations, in an era of both instant communication and ideo- logical competition and in the shadow of nuclear cataclysm. No longer can we afford to submit to an assumed inevitability of his- tory's tragedy. The interdependence of states links our societies, our economies, and our destinies; we will either progress together or we will decline together.
Much has happened from which we can take hope and courage. Free societies have come closer to the dream of well-being and justice than any earlier period has witnessed. Our two nations have moved from bitter conflict to peace and from peace to reconcili- ation and common endeavor. We have been leaders in the quest for peace — in Europe and in the world.
Our common challenge is to help build an international structure of relationships which keeps continents stable and nations secure, which ties nations to each other by bonds of mutual interest, which fosters the habits of restraint and moderation in inter- national conduct, which gives free rein to man's striving for freedom and justice. Our goal is a peace which all — the small as well as the large — have a share of shaping; a peace that will endure because all — the strong as well as the weak — have a stake in making it last.
We know that such a peace will not come — nor can it be maintained — without effort and courage. We must be conciliatory without weakness and tolerant without moral con- fusion; we must temper strength with wis- dom and seek justice while respecting the sense of justice of others. Posterity will not forgive either truculence or the failure to
act firmly in defense of interest and princi- ples. Posterity will not forgive either illusions or the failure to grasp opportunities that come fleetingly and may never return.
In our search for a peaceful world we must never forget:
— That freedom must be vigilantly de- fended ;
— That stability depends on restraint among as well as within nations;
— That no nation or group of nations can achieve satisfaction of its needs alone;
— That the best must not become the enemy of the good; and
— Above all, that every great achievement is an ideal before it becomes a reality.
Thus in its deepest sense this simple cere- mony, which shows to what extent we have overcome an unhappy past, symbolizes as well the future for which we must strive— a world of nations which find pride in then reconciliations, not their power; an era ir which convictions are the source of mora strength rather than of intolerance or hatred
One of America's first and greatest leaders Benjamin Franklin, expressed a universa hope of human society:
. . . God grant that not only the love of liberty but a thorough knowledge of the rights of men, ma: pervade all nations of the earth, so that a philoso pher may set his foot